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Scottish fiction has almost inevitably suffered in critical comparisons
with the 'great tradition1' of the English realist novel. Yet it is
possible that both the concept of an organic 'tradition' and the form
of the realist novel may be inappropriate to the reflection of Scottisn
life and culture.
Taking three writers, Robert Louis Stevenson, Robin Jenkins and Muriel Spark,
none of whom are generally perceived as belonging to the mainstream of
Scottish 1iterature,.and whose work cannot be described as following the
conventions of literary realism, I consider the reasons behind their
uncategorised and apparently peripheral literary positioning by examining
the nature of their moral perspective and the effect which this has on
their fiction. I begin this process of relocation by discussing the
forces which have shaped Scottish attitudes to art and morality, concen¬
trating in particular on the influence of Calvinism. In its expression
of an absolutist philosophy the Calvinist cast of mind makes impossible
tne holding of a liberal humanist view of existence. For writers exposed
to this residual, yet still powerful, influence in Scottish life, the
writing of realist fiction, with its implicit assumption of liberal
humanist ideology, also becomes problematic. Unable to accommodate a
view of existence which incorporates an awareness of moral aosclutes, the
realist novel is therefore an unsuitable vehicle for such writers in the
reflection and exploration of their ontological position.
In different ways, Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark - all responding to their
consciousness of, or desire for, an aosolute dimension to existence -
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challenge the conventions of realism. I therefore examine their
approaches to fiction and the moral vision conveyed, by considering a
selection of novels from the worxs of each author. In Stevenson's case,
his concern with an absolute pattern providing an external definition to
human existence emerges most clearly in those fictions set in rich and
unfamiliar locations; his use of exotic imagery and his manipulation of
the adventure genre are therefore considered in some detail. His Scottish
novels, however, may also De seen as providing a fruitful area for
examining his moral outlook; in them, by confronting contexts familiar
from his own formative experiences, he must balance his use of the
fantastic with the representation of a recognisable 'reality1. Robin
Jenkins, apparently more securely located within the realist mode,
nevertheless tests the human desire for moral absolutes against the
constraints of the reality depicted in his novels. His developing
challenge to realism may be traced from early novels which confront the
literary conventions of realism with the intractability of absolutes, to
those later works in which, through more radical experiments with the
novel form, he faces the darker implications of moral polarities. As
very little critical material exists on Jenkins - a prolific writer,
receiving critical acclaim, but nevertheless remaining in relative
obscurity - I include in an appendix my record of a recent interview with
him. The achievements of Muriel Sparx are more widely recognised out
her moral outlook has generally been explained in terms of her Catholicism.
Emphasising the impact of her early years in Scotland, I examine her worxs
as both a testing of the absolutism implicit in her own witty departures
from the conventions of realist fiction and an exploration of the
implications - positive and negative - of an absolutist perspective on
human existence.
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In considering the literary methods and moral outlooks of these three
writers it becomes apparent that together they present a structure of
feeling - also to be found in other Scottish writers - quite distinct
from that of English humanism. In their approach to the novel they
offer an alternative pattern of fiction which is both identifiable as a
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INTRODUCTION
In tnis thesis I take as my subject the works of Robert Louis Stevenson,
RoDin Jenkins and Muriel Spark, three novelists who may, at first glance,
appear very different in style, in reputation, and in background.
Robert Louis Stevenson, next to Scott the most prominent Scottish
literary figure in the nineteenth century, was born in Edinburgh in 1850,
moved in the major literary circles of his time and, mainly due to ill-
health, was an exile from Scotland for most of his life, dying in 1894
in the South Seas. Best known for his children's romances and adventure
stories, it was two of his ostensibly non-Scottish works, 'Dr Jekyll and
Mr Hydeiand Treasure Islandfwhich gained him international recognition.
In contrast, Robin Jenkins is one of Scotland's most prolific yet most
neglected writers. Born in 1912, he is now a retired headmaster, living
in Dunoon. Jenkins too has spent some time working abroad but his best
known works, such as The Cone-Gatherers and Fergus Lamont, are distinct¬
ively Scottish both in location and subject matter. Although born, like
Stevenson, in Edinburgh, Muriel Spark left Britain for Africa in the
Nineteen Thirties while still in her teens, returned to live in London
during the war, moved to New York, and has now settled in permanent exile
in Italy. Acclaimed internationally as a writer of slender, witty novels,
which indicate a sharp and innovative intelligence, her most famous work
is, ironically, her only novel to be set in Scotland, The Prime of Miss
Jean Brodie.
Connections between the three writers, literary or otherwise, are not
immediately apparent. Nevertheless my attention and interest was first
caught by two features they seem to have in common. Firstly, all three
{
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have failed to fit into the pattern of Scottish literature as it is usually
perceived. Neither their various forms of exile from Scotland, nor their
ambivalent relationships to Scottish culture can fully account for the
fact that three such major writers remain on the sidelines of what is
generally seen as the mainstream Scottish literary tradition. Yet tne
second feature wnicn they have in common, that of a shared concern, may serve
to account for their isolation; writing in very different ways, all three
respond in their fictions to the problematic concept of an absolutist morality.
Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark each explore the challenge which is presented
to the conventions of the realist novel by the contradictions created in the
attempt to reconcile, within fiction, the possible existence of external
moral absolutes with the relativity of an earthly and practical morality.
And through such a confrontation with conventions they challenge both the
standard idea of the realist novel in general, and that of the Scottish
novel in particular, thus making their work difficult to place within the
dominant concepts of literary tradition. I would therefore suggest that,
without directly influencing each other or noticably sharing a common
heritage, they can nevertheless be seen as constituting an identifiaole
pattern of fictional response within Scottish writing. It is the nature
of this pattern that I wish to examine, by studying the techniques of each
author, their adaptations of style to their subject matter, and the
manipulations of form necessary to the expression of their moral perspective.
In the process of such an examination I will also seek to identify the
underlying reasons for the particular pattern created Dy these three
novelists.
Yet before proceeding to an exploration of the ways in which Stevenson,
Jenkins and Spark respond to their particular metaphysical concerns in
individual works, two questions must be asked. Firstly, what is it
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in the nature of dominant views of Scottish literature that makes
assimilation of these three writers so problematic? And secondly, why
should an apparent concern with moral absolutes, arising from three
writers with such different backgrounds, be in any way an identifiable
manifestation of a Scottish consciousness? In order to answer both
those questions it is necessary first to consider the concept of 'tradition'
in its relation to a Scottish literary context, and to discern its effect
on the development of the Scottish novel in particular. Equally vital
is an examination of that most obvious form of an absolutist philosophy in
a Scottish context - that represented by the principles of Calvinism.
Through the conjunction of these two elements a context may be created
from which the literary characteristics of the three novelists, and the
theoretical implications of their approach combine to present a possible
alternative to previous perspectives on the Scottish novel.
CHAPTER I
MORAL ABSOLUTES AND THE CHALLENGE TO REALISM
4
(i) SCOTTISH FICTION AND THE CONCEPT OF TRADITION
Tradition in a Scottish Literary Context
The development of the novel as a literary form in Scotland appears to
have been long overshadowed by a concept of 'tradition' which has found
its most cogent formulation south of the Border. Compared with writers
operating out of a long line of 'great' English Novels, Scottish novelists
have suffered from a sense of lack - whether real or imagined - of a
literary inheritance upon which they can establish a similarly satisfactory
and nationally individualistic concept of fiction. In many instances
therefore, they have either been forced to seek patterns and examples
within a familiar, yet culturally alien, legacy - that of the English
tradition -or have tried to create a role for themselves within their own
national literature - an idiosyncratic place within an already disparate
group. The ambivalence thus created in many writers towards their own
culture finds a parallel in the malaise frequently affecting critics who
attempt to discuss the novel. Unwilling to concede that Scotland may
not possess 'a great tradition' along the lines of its English counterpart,
yet unable to find a suitably organic line of development to compete,
Scottish critics are often forced into a defiant negativity. And once
again, the inability to make the most of the material at their disposal
appears to stem from the highly developed concept of an English Tradition.
The concept of an 'English Tradition' - in both poetry and the novel -
is one which has dominated twentieth century criticism since it was first
highlighted by one of the century's foremost poets and critics,
T.S. Eliot. In Tradition and the Individual Talent Eliot set out to
establish a critical appreciation of 'tradition' in a sense which he saw
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as being previously neglected.1 Condemning the fact that most people
interested in a poet focus on 'those aspects of his work in which he
least resembles anyone else1, Eliot suggested that 'tradition is a
matter of much wider significance.' It involves, he stated, a
'historical sense' which both allows the poet to assimilate 'the whole
of literature of Europe from Homer', and for his/her work to be accepted
into, and in its turn alter, the ideal order of literature. 'No poet,
no artist, of any art, has his complete meaning alone,' continued Eliot.
In what Graham Martin describes as 'the most ambitious feat of cultural
2
imperialism this century seems likely to produce', Eliot put forward
his vision of an organic tradition, developing naturally along healthy
lines - although certain more 'unhealthy' strains, which must be rejected,
would occasionally creep in. Among those unhealthy elements which Eliot
rejected were Romanticism and Protestantism - both in themselves features
of Scottish literature from Burns and Scott onward.
Eliot's concept of masterpieces forming a certain ideal order, which in
turn validates the individual works, was soon applied to the novel form
and developed, although with a different political impetus, by F.R.
Leavis, in The Great Tradition. 'With breathtaking boldness Scrutiny
redrew the map of English literature in ways from which criticism has
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never quite recovered,' comments Terry Eagleton. Jane Austen, George
Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad, D.H. Lawrence, and - after recantation
- Dickens, were given the Leavis seal of approval, while other novelists
T. T.S. Eliot, 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', (1919), Selected
Prose of T.S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (London, 1975), 37-44, p.36.
2. Graham Martin, Introduction, Eliot in Perspective, ed. Graham Martin
(London, 1970), p.22.
3. Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (London, 1983), p.32.
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were pushed to the sidelines of this 'major' tradition. Wuthering
Heights, for example, is described as a 'kind of sport', although
Leavis concedes: 'It may, all the same, have had some influence of
an essentially undetectable kind ... Out of her a minor tradition comes,
4
to which belongs, most notably, The House with the Green Shutters.'
And Leavis argues: 'To insist on the pre-eminent few in this way is
not to be indifferent to tradition; on the contrary, it is the way
5
towards understanding what tradition is.' It is in his discussion of
Lawrence, one of the 'great' novelists he most admired, that we can find
Leavis indicating the criteria for his judgements. Lawrence is not
only innovative and experimental in form; he also possesses a 'most
0
serious and urgent kind of interest in life.' In this statement Leavis
reinforces the primacy of realism in approach, and humanism in morality,
that have become the main characteristics for English criticism of the
novel. And, despite his protestations to the contrary, Romanticism and
Protestantism are again relegated to the 'minor' tradition. Moreover,
the organic tradition becomes seen as the reflection of an 'organic'
society, characterised by the qualities of 'Englishness'.
The pronouncements of the two major figures in twentieth century literary
criticism therefore appear to leave little space for the Scottish
novelist who may be writing outwith a realist, humanist tradition as
established by the 'great' English writers of the nineteenth century.
And even those critics who have more recently advanced beyond the stances
4. F.R. Leavis, The Great Tradition (London, 1948), p.27.
5. Leavis, The Great Tradition, p.3.
6. Leavis, The Great Tradition, p.24.
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of an Eliot or Leavis, still cling to the validation of 'social
relevance' in the English novel when making critical judgements.
Studies in Scottish fiction, however, have lacked an assurance in the
validity of any lines of development within their culture which does
not conform to what is seen as the 'norm' of English fiction. Scottish
critics are therefore frequently forced either to seek the 'English'
standard of criteria for assessing value - social relevance, 'seriousness',
a realist approach - or have to create and justify an equally valid concept
of 'tradition' which can be applied to a Scottish context. They then
meet the problem of a body of literature which refuses to be categorised
into a line of 'organic' development. And in both cases they fail to
consider the relevance of their imported criteria for the literature and
the culture under discussion.
Much of the criticism of the Scottish novel tends therefore to be
characterised by a far larger degree of self-justification - and a
correspondingly greater element of uncertainty - than that found in
writing on the English novel. To take an example contemporaneous with
T.S. Eliot, William Power in Literature and Oatmeal, after arguing that
literature means as much, if not more, to Scotland than to England,
launches into a poetic defence of his examination of Gaelic literature:
The 'Celtic' spirit in actual history and fact may be
this or that, or a dozen different things. What we
are concerned with are the broken golden threads which
emerge from the Celtic past, and which may with advantage
be taken up and woven into our scheme of life. 7
Pleasing as the image of a 'golden thread' may be, it hardly constitutes
7. William Power, Literature and Oatmeal: What Literature has meant to
Scotland (London, 1935), p.31.
8
a discriminating criterion for access to a Celtic past. Kurt Wittig
attempts a similar defence of his endeavours in The Scottish Tradition
in Literature:
Let me emphasise, too, that in speaking of a tradition
I am not postulating any inherited racial characteristics.
Some well known architectural motifs ... are often said to
be characteristically Scottish. Does that imply that none
of them can be found elsewhere? Or does it mean that they
all express a Scottish spirit? The implication is, I take
it, that they reflect an underlying, essentially Scottish
conception of beauty, and the same essentially Scottish
conception of it is to some extent reflected in certain
other Scottish arts. 8
Wittig then proceeds to argue that such traits in the arts are 'collect¬
ively a spontaneous expression of the national character, as shaped,
inter alia, by geography, climate, history, social conditions, education,
religious beliefs, and various conventional Scottish attitudes, opinions
9
and prejudices.' Once again the Scottish geist is seen in terms of
some mysterious animism. More recent criticism has moved away from the
perspectives of Wittig and Power. David Craig, for example, in
Scottish Literature and the Scottish People 1680-1830, does focus on
the more specific social relationships between literature and history but
in a sense denies his own potential achievement by quoting Leslie Stephen
on the point that literature is 'too small a part in the whole activity
of a nation, even of its intellectual activity, to serve as a complete
indication of the many forces which are at work.'^ And even a historical
approach is not immune from the demands of justification. F.R. Hart,
for example, adopts an almost apologetic tone when arguing the validity
of his subject in The Scottish Novel:
8. Kurt Wittig, The Scottish Tradition in Literature (Edinourgh, 1958),
pp.4-5.
9. Wittig, p.5.
10. David Craig, Scottish Literature and the Scottish People 1680-1830
(London, 1961), p.14.
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But surely we can postulate that the novel as a form
of historical and cultural representation must be
significantly influenced or conditioned by the history
or culture from which the practioners came or within
which they work.
This book seeks what general understanding of the
novel in Scotland may be found in its historical
development as well as its development in history. 11
Yet, despite his determination to create an organic line of development,
Hart tends to rely on various abstract thematic groupings to categorize
the novels in his study. Therefore, although all the works mentioned
here possess individual values in their discussions on Scottish literature,
none of their authors appear to have found a methodology which they can
apply with complete confidence to their subject, nor do they seem to have
reached any real confidence in the validity of their undertaking.
Burdened by the influence of English literature, with its strong emphasis
on the concept of an 'organic' tradition, the majority of Scottish critics
appear to have lost sight of possible alternatives in the patterning of
fiction and continue to focus all their attention on chronological
influences and shared themes. Yet, ironically, an alternative is available,
although it is one originally postulated by a writer best known for his work
on English society and its cultural configurations. Through the development
of his concept of 'a structure of feeling' Raymond Williams has opened up a
wider perspective on the possible patternings of fictions within a culture,
and between a society and its literature. In a discussion of 'tradition'
in The Long Revolution he points out that although a principle of selection
is involved, in deciding which works are to be included, the process is not
12
simply one of a 'continual selection and reselection of ancestors.'
11. Francis Russell Hart, The Scottish Novel: A Critical Survey (London,
1978), p.viii.
12. Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (London, 1961), p.52.
10
Ratner the cultural tradition 'is not only a selection but also an
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interpretation.' Therefore, although in his own work on English
literature Williams may find the dominant structure of feeling to be
one of a humanist philosophy of social relevance, his theoretical
awareness of the interaction between the observer and the tradition
observed, of the various configurations which may be termed 'tradition',
provides a useful means of opening out the question of 'tradition' when
applied to a Scottish context. The implications of a 'structure of
14
feeling' allows for a far greater flexibility when considering elements
within Scottish fiction than the need to trace parallels between the
Scottish and English situation, yet it also permits consideration of
social and historical factors when looking at the culture.
Certainly the two situations possess radical differences in both history
and social ideology. And one of the major differences is that high¬
lighted by E.P. Thompson in his introduction to The Making of the English
Working Class, when he explains why he will not tackle the Scottish
situation:
But the Scottish story is significantly different.
Calvinism was not the same thing as Methodism, although
it is difficult to say which, in the early nineteenth
century, was worse. We had no peasantry in England
comparable to the Highland migrants. And the popular
culture was very different. It is possible, at least
until the 1820's, to regard the English and Scottish
experience as distinct, since trade union and political
links were impermanent and immature. 15
13. Williams, The Long Revolution, p.53.
14. 'Methodologically, then, a 'structure of feeling' is a cultural
hypothesis, actually derived from attempts to understand such
elements and their connections in a generation or period, and
needing always to be returned, interactively, to such evidence.'
Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (London, 1977), pp.132-133,
15. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London,1963),
p. 13. '
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Thompson emphasises the significant role of English religion in the
development of a working class consciousness just as Raymond Williams
in Culture and Society discovers the salience of a paternalistic and
individualist humanist philosophy which has dominated English cultural
ideology.16 A very different pattern emerges when looking for a
similarily dominant feature in the development of a Scottish consciousness^
a pattern dominated by the aspect of religion noted by Thompson - that
of Calvinism. The uncompromising tenets of Calvinism had a far longer
lasting and more widespread effect on Scottish society than they did
in England where all real hope of official sanction for such absolute
beliefs was lost after the Restoration. Even today Calvinism continues
to be an implicit, often unacknowledged influence on the moral and
philosophical outlook of Scottish culture, and no-one who studies the
effects of Scotland's past on its present can avoid the force of
Calvinist ethics or practice, however much they may be reviled. In
many ways, therefore, whether condemned or, in rare cases, approved,
Calvinism remains something of a national obsession.
In this thesis Calvinism has a dual importance. Firstly it operates as
the representative of a particular moral philosophy within a Scottish
context, a set of ideas which, although they may have lost their original
impetus through continued social application, nevertheless retain a
powerful influence over Scottish culture and thought, just as English
humanist philosophy continues to have a cultural and moral impact even
though the society and attitudes which gave it birth have mostly disappeared.
Secondly Calvinism has a less positive role in this discussion. The
16. Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (London, 1958).
constraining effects which the proximity of a flourishing English
novel has had upon the way in which Scottish fiction has been perceived
can be seen in the defensive tone of its critics. As an extension of
their need for self-justification there has developed the desire to find
something to blame for the implicit 'failure' of Scottish fiction to
compete with its English counterpart. Calvinism, an important element
in the context in which the Scottish novel is perceived, offers itself
as an ideal scapegoat. One of the most severely condemned elements of
Scottish national life is the destructive force of the Calvinist religion.
The force then which represents the type of morality out of which
Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark operate has also been a central point in a
perception which allows them no real place in Scottish literature. Such
a perception, however, ignores the fact that Calvinism as the abstract
source and representative in a national context of a particular moral
philosophy is very different from the social phenomenon which has become
the bogeyman of Scottish literary criticism.
In order to understand the context in which I wish to discuss these three
authors, therefore, it is necessary first to consider those attitudes to
Scottish fiction which have operated as constraints on both the writing
and the discussion of Scottish novels. Not only does sucn a consider¬
ation involve an assessment of the standard views of Calvinism as it
affects Scottish literature, but also requires an examination of the
other predominant feature of Scottish criticism - an emphasis on the
literature known as the Kailyard, which is frequently seen as a major
turning point in the signs of decline in Scottish fiction. The over¬
emphasis and distortion of these two ideas have often limited perspectives
on the novel in Scotland and need to be viewed with some detachment as
providing a background against which the moral concepts and the status of
the three authors can be viewed.
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Calvinism and Criticism
Calvinism has tended to be seen, both in and out of Scotland, through a
veil of Victorian morality, with its basic ideas being lost in the
continued emphasis on the repressive nature of its social practices.
Not only has John Knox become a representative villain, obstructing all
that might have been to the good of Scottish culture or society, but other,
and perhaps more significant, elements of a Calvinist heritage have been
dismissed from Scottish popular history. The Covenanters, for example,
have never captured the imagination of Scots in the twentieth century to
the extent which Mary Queen of Scots, or Charles Stewart, both fighting for
the Catholic cause, have; and the religious conflict of that time has never
received the attention given to the Cavalier and Roundhead confrontation in
England.17 Attitudes to Calvinism are, therefore, ambivalent: while many
17. The Covenanters, however, did retain their power over the imagination
for much of the nineteenth century. In 1913, for example, James King
Hewison writes:
In my youth it was my privilege to dwell among a peasantry
whose ancestors fought and fell for the Covenant. Their vivid
traditions, narrated with awe-inspiring reverence around their
hearths, in sight of the trusty weapons which once guarded them,
are now substantially corroborated from the indestructible records
of whose existence the raconteurs never heard.
James King Hewison, The Covenanters: A History of the Church in
Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution, second edition,
2 vols (Glasgow, 1913), I, p.xi.
Ian Cowan also indicates the once-favourable view held of the
Covenanters:
This estimate, which remains unsullied in popular lore, reached
its height of popularity in the nineteenth century when seceders
from the established church increasingly identified their own
struggle with the Church of Scotland and their state with that of
the Covenanters. But in recent years a marked change has taken
place. Views expressed in modern works of scholarship have alter¬
nated between outright condemnation of the Covenants and their
adherents and condemnation qualified by praise for the Covenanters
and their consistency under persecution if not for their principle.
The changing emphasis from excessive adulation to denigration and
oblivion is an interesting one and appears related to changing
ecclesiastical attitudes. In earlier eras the Covenanters were
liked or disliked as opponents of state control of the Church.
Today they are more likely to be seen as unreasonable men who
prevented rapprochement between episcopacy and presbyterianism
from becoming a reality.
Ian B. Cowan, The Scottish Covenanters 1660-1688 (London, 1976), p.13.
Certainly the image of the popular Scottish hero projected today is far
likelier to be that of a Jacobite than a Covenanter.
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Scots have tried to ignore, or write out of their historical consciousness,
a religious force which at one time permeated every level of Scottish
life, others have tried to distance themselves from it by loading on to
Calvinism the blame for all that they perceive as being wrong in the
nation's culture and spirit.
The most extreme forms of conscious Calvinist paranoia emerged in the
early twentieth century as part of an attack on the 'failure' of Scottish
art and literature - indeed on national life in general - which was
motivated by the writers of the 'Scottish Renaissance1. Edwin Muir was
a prime mover in this onslaught; in Scott and Scotland he writes:
I have often wondered why the Scots, who have shown
themselves in the past to be a theological and
speculative race, should have produced scarcely a single
verse of good religious or metaphysical poetry ... Now
it is clear that there are other reasons for this poverty
of Scots poetry in the seventeenth century and since than
the fact that Scotsmen already felt in one language and
thought in another, and that there was no effective
collaboration between their sensibility and their intellect.
It will be best, therefore, to consider some of the reasons
first. One of them was without doubt the strict Calvinism
of the Scots, which was adverse both to the production of
poetry, and to poetry itself. Another was the complete
prohibition put upon poetic drama by the Reformers just when
it seemed on the point of developing; a prohibition which
killed not only the drama itself, but also a great number of
other forms of poetry which normally flow from it. This
matter of dramatic poetry, indeed, or rather the lack of it,
was probably crucial for Scottish literature; and if that is
so, then the Reformation truly signalized the beginning of
Scotland's decline as a civilised nation. 18
As Muir takes the great age of Elizabethan drama as his standard of
comparison he is presumably expressing an argument that he sees as
equally applicable to prose: his rhetoric is therefore worthy of some
analysis. Throughout this passage he implies that no development at all
18. Edwin Muir, Scott and Scotland (London, 1936), p.23.
took place in Scottish literature - not that it may have developed,
but in a different manner. Scotland is thus seen as possessing, not
an alternative culture, but no cultural traditions at all. Refusing
to allow that the influence of Calvinism and the Reformation may have
shaped Scottish literature's forms and traditions in a different
direction from that of England, he talks only in terms of loss, opposing
'flow' to 'prohibition' and 'killing.' Having established the sense of
a lacuna, he further strengthens it by his remarks on Scott:
The hiatus between cause and effect in Scott's novels,
the imperviousness of his heroes to the consequences of
their actions, cannot be explained, I think, except by
the fact that he was born and brought up in a sort of
vacuum, a country without a centre which could gather up
within itself and give meaning to all the actions of the
people who composed it. 19
Accepting the phenomenon which Muir describes, and which he presumably
also attributes to the eschatalogical nature of Scotland's religion,
we are left without any explanation of what should be there, except for
the negative comparison with countries who are in possession of a
'centre'. And whereas this feature of Scott's writing'could be seen
as an accurate fictional embodiment of a certain ideology, Muir chooses
to view his work only in terms of flaw. He also chooses to ignore the
fact that other world literatures might prove more suitable models for
comparison.
Muir is, of course, not the only offender - although one of the more
perceptive and convincing - in this case. In Literature and Oatmeal
William Power extends the areas in which Calvinism can be castigated:
19. Muir, Scott and Scotland, p.171.
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Literature was to mean less and less for a people who
had lost the sense of national continuity, who were
immersed in perpetual squabbles over an open Bible
every phrase of which was held to have equal and absolute
authority as a rule of faith, life and politics, and who
were under the domination of a largely lay Kirk that
usurped the powers of Parliament and extended its Mosaic
interference to every detail of private conduct, except
the sacred business of exploiting one's tenants or
workers. 20
Once again the rhetoric extends far beyond the historical context of the
remarks - in Power's case, the Reformation. Apparently unaware of the
inconsistency of condemning the Kirk for virtually governing the whole
nation, while expressing the desire for 'national continuity', Power
relies on the emotive appeal of his criticism, in the ironic 'sacred
business of exploiting1, and shows no interest in analysing the cultural
implications of Calvinism itself. Blurring the distinctions between its
effect on daily life, on the individual psyche, and on a sense of
identity, he also confuses Calvinist ideas with its causal effects leading
to union with England. And, like Muir, he is careful to distance himself
from Calvinism, denying any influence it had on his own inheritance,
relying on words such as '.usurped' and 'extended' to make Calvinism appear
as a yoke thrust upon the unwilling people of Scotland, and from which
they must escape to be free of ideology - as if such a state were possible.
The perspective expressed by Power can be found in even more emotive
terms in the writings of Fionn MacColla. The Reformation, as he describes
it in At the Sign of the Clenched Fist, represents a deliberate attempt to
separate the people from their basic desires, a subversion of the 'natural'
course of history:
20. Power, Literature and Oatmeal, p.53.
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Europe had grown up by, with, and in the Church, wnich
had been the generating element of the vast and sustained
social, intellectual and moral effect which produced the
'Thing' that was Europe, a varied and diverse society,
which was, nevertheless 'One Thing', with common intellect¬
ual, moral and social ideals, a common 'mind' upon life,
and a common language of cultural and intellectual activity.
It was this Unity of life and traditions which the Reformers
set out to overthrow, in order to replace it - not by
freedom of choice in religion: such a notion was never
conceived - but by their own governance: in Scotland in
particular the sect of Calvinists claimed nothing less than
that the civil power itself should be directly subject to
their supervision and control. 21
Again through the use of emotive and abstract language - 'common mind upon
life'; 'unity of life and tradition'; 'vast and sustained ... effect' -
MacColla presents the world before the Reformation as possessing an all-
embracing and totally fulfilling concept of existence, upon which
Calvinism was then imposed, ignoring the fact that both Luther and Calvin
received the support of the people surprisingly quickly, and embodied, on
a practical, if not a theological level, much of the resistance to the
22
Catholic church of the time. In opposition to the supposedly 'organic'
and free nature of pre-Calvinist society, MacColla depicts Calvinism as
unnatural, disruptive and reductive, always denying fulfilment, again
overlooking the fact that Calvinism served to relocate 'fulfilment', by
emphasising it as essentially a feature of the next world, as opposed to
this one. Yet assuming Calvinism's intrinsic inferiority, MacColla also
views it as a tyrant, a force of oppression to which escape, not analysis,
21. Fionn MacColla, At the Sign of the Clenched Fist (Edinburgh, 1967),
pp.59-60.
22. As the following description of Martin Luther's influence indicates:
'Luther's revolt thus occurred as a protest against an especially
obnoxious example of the long-standing tendency to reduce salvation
to a business transaction. His initial protest had less to do with
the theory of indulgences than with their practical effects upon
simple men and women.'
A.6. Dickens, The Age of Humanism and Reformation: Europe in the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (London, 1972), p.146.
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is tne only solution.
A similar theme now begins to emerge from these various criticisms of
Calvinism: all the writers talk of an ideal state of unity, of community,
even of civilisation, which has been destroyed by the advent of Calvinist
religion, most noticably in a Scottish context. Art, nationality and
religion are perceived as a single entity, organically interacting in
those countries to which Scotland is compared. In our case, it is
implied, any possibility of achieving such coherence has been taken from
us. Yet these writers ignore the terms in which they themselves are
discussing the problem: in spite of complaints of the fissures that have
been created between art, religion and national identity, they are in fact
talking of them as being inextricably linked - with the qualification that
the result of this interaction does not fulfil their expectations.
Although they may see the influence of Calvinism as purely negative, they
are unconsciously emphasising the extent of its power and the pervasive¬
ness of its influence - not only in Scottish life but also on their own
art. Imposing their own ideals of what Scotland should be - based
either on an age long gone, the period before the Reformation, or on
another culture, usually that of England - they expend their very real
powers of analysis in discussing absences rather than presences within
their culture. George Mackay Brown's writing on the Reformation
epitomises this attitude and provides a final example for the present •
discussion:
23. See, too, the work's conclusion: 'IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT THE
REFORMATION DID WAS TO SNUFF OUT WHAT MUST OTHERWISE HAVE DEVELOPED
INTO THE MOST BRILLIANT NATIONAL CULTURE IN HISTORY.' p.204
19
What was broken, irremediably, in the sixteenth century
was the fullness of life of a community, its single
interwoven identity. In earlier times the temporal and
the eternal, the story and the fable, were not divorced
as they came to be after Knox: they used the same
language and imagery, so tnat the whole of life was
illuminated. 24
Once again Calvinism is the victim of a preconceived ideal; the organic
community and the sense of self it provided have been destroyed by a
national religion, story and fable torn apart. Yet Brown sees Calvinism
purely as a force imposed on Scottish life: if it is seen as arising
as an expression of general reaction then story and fable are not
unnaturally torn apart, but simply placed in a different conjunction, and
one that is less easily categorised.
George Mackay Brown is representative in his attitude of a general view
which holds that Calvinism has always been inimical to art. Yet those
adhering to such a view not only ignore the fact that art has been
produced under Calvinism, although that art may not conform to their
desired ideal, but also fail to inquire as to whether their desired
ideal may, in fact, be inappropriate to the representation of a Calvinist
society. In the case of the novel the desired ideal appears to conform
to that of the English novel 'norm1, which has been predominantly the
realist expression of humanist values in a social context. This form
of art may not, however, be totally relevant to a world influenced by
Calvinist metaphysics. In a Calvinist society the world is seen as a
place in which the individual is left face to face with an omniscient
and judging God in private. In public life, however, the individual
24. George Mackay Brown, 'The Broken Heraldry', Memoirs of a Modern
Scotland, ed. Karl Miller (London, 1970), 136-150, p.145.
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must also prove membership of the Elect through social roles.
Operating in two very different spheres the Calvinist consciousness would
be unable to find accurate representation in a realist novel which deals
with the social and public aspects alone as the manifestation of private
morality. The private dimension, dominated by an all-powerful God and
in which absolutes may operate contrary to the workings of everyday
reality, would have no place in such a form. Calvinism, therefore, may
demand a reordering both of the conventional view of human experience
and the traditional means of expressing it.
It is not, therefore, surprising that the problems of assimilating the
full implications of Calvinist theology experienced by writers such as
MacColla, Muir and Brown has also been felt by critics approaching the
issue with less polemicism. F.R. Hart, for example, divides the
development of Scottish fiction into two strands, gothic fantasy and
social history, which he sees as possessing two correspondingly different-
techniques, fantasy and realism. Thus Stevenson is viewed as adopting
the gothic element, writing in the tradition of romance, and there
finding consolation for his failure to come to terms with an increasingly
industrialised society: 'the hellish realities of industrial urbanism
26
seems to have been beyond the imaginative tolerances of the novelist.'
Robin Jenkins, 'a natural moralist', he classes as a 'novelist of
survival' - one who advocates the survival of 'limited vision'. And
Hart accounts for the element of the grotesque in Jenkins' work as a
27
deviant form of Gothicism. Spark is perceived as one of a group of
25. 'If the Calvinists agreed with Luther that good works availed
nothing to save a man, they accepted the converse belief that such
works provided an evident sign of divine grace.'
Dickens, The Age of Humanism and Reformation, p.169.
26. Hart, The Scottish Novel, p.399.
27. Hart, p.286, p.272, p.284.
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expatriate novelists who 'took exile, homelessness, and flight as
existential metaphors, but also as inevitable betrayals of a cultural
28
inheritance at conflict with itself.' In each case the gothic
elements, the use of fantasy and the grotesque, is seen as a total
denial of realism. Hart thus imbroils himself in yet another Caledonian
antisyzygy, obliterating any possible fusion of the fantastic and the
real. By assuming that they are opposite he evades the issue of
whether there may be circumstances - and from a Calvinist perspective
such an interaction is not at all unlikely - in which the real and the
fantastic may exist in conjunction. Hart is well aware of the power
of Calvinism: 'The severest anti-Calvinist seems unable to escape a
sense of its power, or for that matter to shake off its convictions of
a man's pettiness, idolatry, delusion and distance from old Eden', and
29
he also acknowledges its ability to produce art. He tends, however,
to limit his attention to its powers as expressed only through social
manifestations. He states: 'A noteworthy feature of Scottish fiction
is the moral'primacy of community, the faith (some would say Calvinist
in genesis) tnat the community is the ground of individual worth and a
30
condition of salvation.' Since one of the essentials of Calvinist
teaching is that a public facade is no absolute guarantee of salvation,
his comments simplify the extremely paradoxical nature of Calvinism's
31
social effects and soften its role in the Scottish community.
28. Hart, p.400.
29. Hart, pp.400-401.
30. Hart, p.401. .
31. See Cairns Craig, 'Fearful Selves: Character, Community and the
Scottish Imagination', Cencrastus, 4 (1980/81), 29-32, for further
comment on this issue.
Moreover, his emphasis furthers the distinction of social and private
subject matter and categorisation of fantastic and realist techniques,
without looking at their interaction in any fruitful way.
Some critics have, of course, considered the more theoretical and
spiritual implications of Calvinism. David Craig, for example, comments
on the ways in which Calvinism prevented public or ritualistic art: 'it
is through such processes in the sensibility, rather than in any outward
censorship that 'Calvinism' mainly affected the deeper life of the
^ O
country.Yet in spite of his sensitive awareness of the effect
Calvinism may have upon the consciousness rather than its purely social
manifestations, Craig's writing still contains a note of blame, presumably
stemming from his belief in the necessity of a 'public' art for the
survival of a nation's literary heritage. William Donnelly too, in an
33
unpublisned doctoral thesis on Scottish poetry, has discussed the
spiritual effects of Calvinism. In describing the effects of the
Reformation he states:
the means by which man might reconcile his material and
spiritual being was eradicated. Spirit and world came
to be divided absolutely. Given that in reality a life
at one with the spiritual ideal is impossible, one result
of this was that tradition of contradiction to which such
characters as Holy Willie, Robert Wringhim, and Dr Jekyll
bear witness. 34
Yet although Donnelly explores what he sees as a negative metapnysical
effect, the characters he uses as examples are among the most vivid in
Scottish literature. Moreover, he restricts his detailed analysis of
32. David Craig, Scottish Literature and the Scottish People, p.76.
33. William Joseph Donnelly, 'Religion and the Poetic Imagination: A
Study of the Relationship between Religious Vision and Poetic
Expression in Scotland from the Fifteenth Century to the Present'
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1981).
34. Donnelly, 'Religion and the Poetic Imagination', p.148.
the religious dimension of Scottish literature to poetry, and his
important research has never found a counterpart on the novel.
Novelists and critics alike share the difficulty of assimilating
Calvinism. While this thesis will examine, through detailed
discussion of individual novels, the variety of approaches used within
one pattern of development, it is worth noting at this point three
main avenues which have been open to novelists apart from Stevenson,
Jenkins and Spark. The literature of the Kailyard offered one model,
in its depicting of the everyday implications of Calvinist theology.
J.M. Barrie's Auld Licht Idylls balances the severe Kirk of the 1AuId
35
Licht1 with the more liberal theology which was becoming fashionable
in the 1880's. Satire offered an alternative approach. Burns'
'Holy Willie's Prayer' remains the best example of this kind. And in
the last century an amalgam of both approaches has appeared, attempting
to deal both realistically and critically with the everyday
manifestations of a Calvinist inheritance in society. From A.J. Cronin's
Hatter's Castle (1931) through Fred Urquart's Time Will Knit^ to
38
Consider the Lilies by lain Crichton Smith (1968) the different social
faces of Calvinism have been depicted with both accuracy and resentment.
Thirdly, there exists a group of Scottish novels in which the attempt is
made to bypass Calvinism and return to a pre-Reformation golden age.
35. J.M. Barrie, Auld Licht Idylls (London, 1888).
36. A.J. Cronin, Hatter's Castle (London, 1931).
37. Fred Urquart, Time Will Knit (London, 1938).
38. Iain-Crichton Smith, Consider the Lilies (London, 1968),
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Fionn MacColla and George Mackay Brown in particular offer examples
of this approach in their work, although traces of it can also be
found in the novels of Edwin Muir and, to a lesser degree, Neil Gunn.
All these approaches, however, share one characteristic, in that they
represent attempts to move away from Calvinism rather than acknowledge
its psychological and philosophical impact as well as its social force.
The major English novels of the nineteenth century - with the exception
perhaps of Wuthering Heights - can be seen as encapsulating the ideas of
Protestant teaching, precisely because such ideas are .concerned with
public behaviour as the manifestation of private morality. The
difficulty experienced by novelists who choose only to portray everyday
life as imbued with Calvinist ethics may be attributed to the fact that
Calvinism as a religion is not concerned merely with relative social
expressions of morality: its focus is on preparing for the next world,
not on teaching how to live in this. The teleological approach means
that, despite its social effects, Calvinism also demands a more abstract
application of its ideas which may have only a limited applicability for
everyday existence. Its emphasis on day to day reality is only as a
dimension in which to prepare for, or despair of, an eternal existence.
Indeed, Fionn MacColla's powerful image of Calvinism (along with
Gnosticism, 'Englishism', Communism and German National Socialism,
amongst others) as 'THE BRANDISHING OF A CLENCHED FIST IN THE FACE OF
APPREHENDED BUT REPELLED OR REPUDIATED REALITY', (his capitals) is
39
surprisingly accurate, although originally intended purely as condemnation.
As such Calvinism presents a demand for the movement away from literature's
conventional methods of dealing with apprehended reality and its
39. Fionn MacColla, At the Sign of the Clenched Fist, p.178.
significance, creating the necessity for a shift of focus. It also
calls for a different perspective on the role of literature. If a
writer is at all influenced by the Calvinist belief that since the
Fall all humanity is sinful, literature then loses the function of
seeking actively to improve the individual but is instead pushing the
reader to a point of recognition at which a metaphysical dimension to
reality can be appreciated. Therefore, although there has been a
tendency to perceive the alternatives presented by Calvinism as a
blight upon the norm, it is also possible to see its ideas as presenting
an exciting demand for a hew approach to the novel form, both in function
and technique, within a Scottish context.
Criticism and the Kailyard
The second major obsession of Scottish writers and critics, and one which
has served to reinforce a sense of deficiency, has been with the
literature of the 'Kailyard.' Like Calvinism, the literature of this
particular period and its subsequent development into a genre, has been
castigated and attacked for the so called inadequacies of the Scottish
novel when compared to its English or European counterpart. Although
now viewed as a recognised literary form, 'Kailyard' was the name given
by the critic J.H. Millar to a group of novels written in the 1890's,
published under the auspices of a Free Church Minister, William
40
Robertson Nicholl, editor of the influential British Weekly. This
term, taken from an old Scots song which was used as a frontispiece for
one of the most popular novels of the group, Ian Maclaren's Beside the
41
Bonnie Briar Bush:
40. J.H. Millar, Literary History of Scotland (London, 1903).
41. Ian Maclaren, Beside the Bonnie Briar Bush (London, 1894).
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There grows a bonnie briar bush in our kailyard,
And white are the blossoms on't in our kailyard.
was first applied to novelists in Nicholl's enclave, including J.M.
Barrie, 5.R. Crockett, and John Watson, writing under the name of
Ian MacLaren. However, altnough their novels sold in great numbers,
it is unlikely that they would have been seen as representing a major
stage in the development of the Scottish novel if anything
else had Deen written at the time which came anywhere near the
expectations created by comparisons with the English Victorian novel.
Stevenson may have been producing some of his best work around this
time but it was never seen as belonging to any mainstream tradition,
partly because it was somewhat alien to nineteenth century conventions.
Kailyard literature, however, could be viewed as a poor and backward
relation of the English novel, a simplistic attempt to represent
social reality using familiar, albeit degenerated, conventions.
Through such comparisons Kailyard literature has come to be seen as a
major stage in the development of the Scottish novel. A more worrying
aspect of this perspective, however, is the way in which it has also
become a central point - although an inglorious one - to which Scott and
Gait lead, and from which an 'anti-kailyard reaction' and the twentieth
century Scottish novel has emerged. It is often viewed as an abyss
into which previously great writers fell, and from which all subsequent
novelists have been scrambling out, in a desperate attempt to escape its <
ethos. It therefore appears to have assumed dimensions out of all
proportion to its original form.
Yet this perception is as blinkered as that which loads all opprobrium
for the patterns of Scottish literature upon Calvinism, since it too
excludes all forms of fiction which do not fit into a certain narrow
line of development. Obviously some of the criticism on the Kailyard
has performed a valid function in tracing certain aspects of the
Scottish novel but it also places certain constraints upon its develop¬
ment, by preventing it from accommodating writers such as Stevenson,
Jenkins and Spark, who do not immediately fit into the pattern, and by
claiming so many other writers as examples. A brief glance at the
rhetoric of this kind of criticism reveals the way in which such
constraints operate. Ian Campbell's book, Kailyard, contains the
fullest and most recent discussion of the genre and is therefore a
valuable addition to Scottish literary knowledge, but he concludes:
The Kailyard, inheriting possible modes from the
history of Scottish fiction, expanding them into
an immensely possible version of Scottishness, and
sustaining this creation through several generations
of literary activity, brought a version of Scotland
to millions, but made what many would regard as a
legitimate functioning of the Scottish imagination ^
impossible, or extremely difficult, for generations.
Not only does this statement indicate that the Kailyard is responsible
for all that is 'wrong' in Scottish life and culture, but it also places
it in an undeniably central position in any perspective on the Scottish
novel. Given a role of prime importance, it is viewed as actually
carrying Scottish fiction forward - although into a period of stagnation
- through the use of words such as 'sustained' and 'expanded' wnich
again attempt to imply some concept of organic growth. Mere importantly,
the use of the phrase 'legitimate functioning of the Scottish imagination'
raises the question of how such a concept is constituted in terms of cur
42. Ian Campbell, Kailyard (Edinburgh, 1981), p.128.
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expectations, both of the role of the imagination and its 'proper'
mode of expression.
Inevitably, when considering what is legitimate in the fictional
imagination, 'realism' appears as the technical norm that should be in
the centre of the Scottish novel but is strangely missing. And if
the Kailyard can be perceived as almost fulfilling that criteria but in
a debased populist form, over-simplifying and sentimentalising what it
claims is a presentation of social reality, then far more significant
Scottish novels must either be left out of the 'central' pattern of
development, or distorted to fit it. Thus a damaging selectivity
begins to operate in criticism of Scottish fiction: Jeanie Deans, for
example, is seen as an early representation of Kailyard virtues, while
the violent, even revolutionary implications of the Porteous Mob in
43
the same novel, Heart of Midlothian, are frequently ignored. Annals
44
of the Parish and The Ayrshire Legatees are cited as examples of
Kailyard prefigurations in John Gait's social documentaries, but his
45 45
novel on the Covenanters, Ringan Gilhaize, has been sadly neglected.
Moreover, although both the Annals and the Legatees attempt to expand
the horizons of enclosed communities, mocking parochialism and analysing
its role in such societies, rather than praising or sentimentalising it,
43. Walter Scott, Heart of Midlothian, ed. Andrew Lang, Waverley Novels,
Border Edition, 48 vols (London, 1892-1894), XI-XII (1893). All
further references to Scott's novels are to this edition.
44. John Gait, Annals of the Parish; or The Chronicles of Dalmailing:
during the 'ministry of the Rev. Micah Balwhidder (Edinburgh, 1821)
and The Ayrshire Legatees; or The Pringle Family (Edinburgh; 1820).
45. John Gait, Ringan Gilhaize; or The Covenanters, 2 vols (Edinburgh,1823).
46. Although, see John MacQueen, 'Ringan Gilhaize and Particular Providence',
107-119, and Patricia Wilson, 'Ringan Gilhaize: John Gait's Neglected
Masterpiece', 120-150, both in John Gait 1779~1979, ed. Christopher
A. Whatley (Edinburgh, 1979).
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critics have found the actual subject matter of more use in making
supposed connections with the contents of Kailyard novels than in
trying to differentiate the angle of approach. Stevenson, too,
suffers from this process of selectivity. Writing during the vogue
for the Kailyard, certain of his novels, most notably Weir of Hermiston,
have been chosen as suitable examples of Kailyard elements, while the
significance of his South Sea works, his travel stories, and his
fa.ntasies, has received scant attention, despite the fact that they
47
too deal with questions familiar to the Scottish consciousness. The
fantasy novels of George MacDonald may have been denied assimilation
into the Scottish 'tradition' for similar reasons.
The Kailyard, then, frequently represents for critics of the Scottish
novel, a clear point of (obviously unfavourable) comparison with what a
novelistic 'tradition' should be. And rather than seeing the Kailyard
as representing only the failure of the Scottish novel's development in
one possible, and perhaps unsuitable, direction or, alternatively,
viewing it as a period of transition which has evoked a strong response
because it draws attention to its own inappropriateness in discussing
48
our culture, many writers on the Scottish novel have continued to
focus on the Kailyard and its influence as an unchanging and unchangeable
blight on Scottish literature.
Nevertheless, the significance and the powerful effect of such attitudes
cannot be discounted. Campbell's statement implies that since the
47. Stevenson and Victorian Scotland, ed. Jenni Calder (Edinburgh, 1981)
and Robert Louis Stevenson, ed. Andrew Noble (A)tu>V«k, 1983) botn
contain essays which attempt to redress the balance.
48. This line of thought has been fruitfully developed in relation to
American Literature in Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American
Culture (New York, 1977).
Kailyard could only function as a 'version' of reality, the true role
of the Scottish imagination is to capture reality. As we have seen,
the Kailyard is presented as an unsuccessful version of what the
realist novel 'should' be achieving in a Scottish context. Yet it
could be argued that the Kailyard may represent the attempt to emulate
an external, imposed and perhaps inappropriate model upon the fictional
representations of a Scottish consciousness: and such a view might also
provide a reason for its failure. Christopher Harvie, in Scotland and
Nationalism, answers his own valid question of 'Why did the tradition of
realist literature fail?' with, 'The bogus community of the Kailyard
49
was promoted as an alternative to the horror of the real thing.'
However, a further question could be asked as to whether the 'realist
tradition' of the novel was either the only or the most suitable means
of expressing the 'real' things in Scottish life and consciousness.
Harvie's argument that Scotland's affinity for the Kailyard was a form
of escape, a shying away from reality, may be true, but it can also be
transmuted into the reasoning that the Scottish imagination may have had
deeper reasons than social dissatisfaction for being unfulfilled by the
representation of only the everyday realities of existence. It is
possible that the Kailyard offered a middle road upon which writers and
readers alike could evade facing up to the implications of their own
disquiet with realism as a method.
49. Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society
and Politics 1707-1977 (London, 1977), p.144.
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(ii) ABSOLUTE MORALITY IN A LITERARY CONTEXT
Literary Realism
The novelist in Scotland is, of course, faced with the problems of the
novelist in any society, searching for approaches to fiction that will
permit a full imaginative recreation of that society's consciousness
without oversimplifying its contradictions and complexities. In
English society the classic realist text appeared to offer the dominant
model in the nineteenth century, a model which, in spite of the
innovations of modernism, seems still to offer a fairly satisfactory,
or at least popular, means of achieving social representation and an
adequate expression of most aspects of the national consciousness. In
Scottish literature, however, the realist novel appears never to have
enjoyed a period of flourishing as the most adequate means of
representing the Scottish consciousness. Neither Scott, Hogg, Gait
nor Stevenson can be categorised as such, and in the twentieth century
the most impressive Scottish novels, such as Lewis Grassic Gibbon's
50 51
A Scots Quair, and Lanark by Alasdair Gray, are those which have
avoided direct literary representation of social realism through
narrative experiments. Scottish distancing from the conventions of
realism would appear to support the idea that it is not the most
appropriate form for encapsulating the various aspects of Scottish
experience. Yet in order to discover why it should be so inappropriate,
it is useful to consider the ways in which the conventions of the
English novel, its nearest and most accessible counterpart, should be
suited to representing its society.
50. Lewis Grassic Gibbon, A Scots Quair: A Trilogy (London, 1932-1934).
51. Alasdair Gray, Lanark: A Life in Four Books (Edinburgh, 1981).
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Within the conventional English novel, and here I am thinking of authors
such as Jane Austen, George Eliot, Mrs Gaskell, Thackeray, Trollope, and
Thomas Hardy - and admittedly glossing over the problems posed by Emily
Bronte, Meredith and, to a certain extent, Dickens - each human being has
a flexible position within a clearly defined society, has a role to fill
and, more importantly a potential personal and social fulfilment to
achieve. He or she operates within a morally relative universe in which
it is possible to improve, to learn, and to adapt as a member of society.
Each individual is seen as possessing a certain freedom within the
realities of their everyday existence and that provides the sphere in
which the moral interest operates. And within the confidence created by
such a perspective it is possible to believe in the validity of a
metaphysical understanding which can be successfully applied to reality.
Even in those periods when it might most be expected to disappear such
an outlook has governed most of English literature. In his discussion
of Romanticism, for example, Raymond Williams points out that the
Romantics' apparently revolutionary views on art concealed an innate
confidence in their medium wnich had characterised previous periods of
English literature:
The tendency of Romanticism is towards a vehement
rejection of dogmas of method in Art, but it is also,
very clearly, towards a claim which all good classical
theory would have recognised; the claim that the
artist's business is to 'read the open secret of the
Universe' ... The artist perceives and represents
Essential Reality, and he does so by virtue of his
master faculty, Imagination. 52
It is therefore clear that within English culture certain moral and
social beliefs allowed its writers a confidence in the reality around
them and a justification of the prime significance of their endeavours.
52. Williams, Culture and Society, p.39.
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It is, then, reasonaDle that 'realism' as a literary method and structure
of thought should so affect the development of the novel within their
society.
A rather different religious and philosophical perspective can be traced
running through Scottish history, since Calvinism was a far more dominant
force and had a further reaching effect than in England. As a more
abstract theology it relocates the sphere of humanity's moral operation
away from earthly reality, and emphasises the relationship with God as oeing
of equal importance as social or cultural considerations in the shaping
of consciousness. Humanity must be continually aware of its flawed
existence in a world that is essentially alien, governed by a God who
demands moral absolutes. Salvation is always a matter of uncertainty,
no matter how confident anyone may be of their membership of the Elect.
Confidence even in an acknowledged earthly identity or in temporal
considerations would be misplaced. Allan Massie hints at the nature of
Calvinism's effects on the national consciousness when he writes:
What do we mean by Calvinism when we speak of Scotland?
Not merely the beastliness of Predestination and Holy
Willie's Prayer. The image is the Kirk in the moorlands,
man face to face with God,; reductio ad simplicatem.
It is God felt as a pure wind of Reason and also as
something beyond reason ... It maxes an intellectual
appreciation of the existential position and adds 'and
yet ..." 53
The expression of such a perspective is, therefore,one avenue open to the
Scottish novelist, and one which would appear to interest particularly
the three novelists under discussion, even when they may have abandoned
belief in the actuality of God. Yet it is a perspective which obviously
53. Allan Massie, 'Retrospective', in Jock Tamson's Bairns: Essays on
a Scots Childhood, ed. Trevor Royle (London, 1S77), 56-77, pp.67-68.
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brings its own challenges to the conventions of the novel form.
The impact of Calvinism in literary terms would generally lead away
from the 'real' as traditionally defined. Reality is to be considered
not for its own sake but for the implications of a higher meaning and
purpose which may be revealed to those who can see this dimension in
the real. In order to examine the question of realism in a Scottish
context, it is therefore necessary first to understand the nature of
Calvinism in Scotland in particular, to consider the type of morality
which it embodies, and to assess literary treatments of it outwith the
works of Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark. And by understanding its
psychological and technical effects upon the novel form reasons for the
limitation of realism in the total imaginative recreation of a Scottish
structure of feeling may become apparent.
Calvinist Morality
The pervading ethos of the English novel has been what one might broadly
characterise as Aristotelian. Relative and humanitarian in its precepts,
it sees each individual as possessing the opportunity and ability to do
either good or evil. As such, it has close links with Aristotle's
statements in his Ethics:
Since, wnile the end is an object of wish, the means to
it are objects of deliDeration and choice, the actions
that are related to the means will be performed in
accordance with choice, and voluntarily. But the exercise
of moral virtue is related to means. Therefore virtue
lies in our power, and similarly so does vice; because
where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power
not to act, and where we can refuse we can also comply.
So if it is in our power to do a thing when it is right,
it will also be in our power not to do it when it is
wrong; and if it is in our power not to do it when it is
right, it will also be in our power to do it when it is
wrong. And if it is in our power to do right and wrong,
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and similarly not to do them; and if, as we saw,doing
right or wrong is the essence of being good or bad, it
follows that it is in our power to be decent or worth¬
less. 54
The philosopher Gilbert Ryle has in his writings discussed with some
success the applicability of this -perspective to English morality and
to literature, although again there are exceptions within the English
55
novel tradition. (Wutherinq Heights is again the obvious example of
such an exception.) Ryle, however, puts forward a convincing case for
viewing the morality of the English novel in general - and most notably
in the nineteenth century - as Aristotelian. Calvinist morality offers
a direct contrast to this Aristotelian viewpoint. By its absolutist
perceptions the universe is defined in unqualified terms of the
polarities of good and evil. The individual either belongs to the Elect
or is damned, and the element of choice to be 'decent or worthless' is
ultimately denied humanity, although the potential for doing good or
evil may remain.
A Calvinist outlook also leads to very different rules of social practice
from those of a relative, Aristotelian morality which, in novelistic
terms, may permit a social resolution of moral difficulties. Calvinist
morality in social practice can only create contradictions between its
theory and its practical realisation. Individuals who believe them¬
selves damned are admitting defeat and giving access to the temptations
of the Devil, since their lack of hope could lead to a dangerous disregard
for the quality of deeds and action. In order to be one of the Elect
54. Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics,
translation J.A.K. Thomson, revised Hugh Tredennick, with an intro¬
duction and bibliography by Jonathan Barnes (Harmondsworth, 1975) Book
Three, v., p.122.
55. Gilbert Ryle, 'Jane Austen and the Moralists', Critical Essays,
Collected Papers vol.1 (London, 1971), 276-291.
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therefore, it is necessary to appear as preferred, to act as if
Election were assured, and to lead a worthy life to the extent that
all actions may be 'justified1. Calvinism thus demands a public
face as proof of the desire to share God's grace. The essential
paradox of Calvinism, however, lies in the fact that even if 'saved' the
individual remains fallible in judgement because of Original Sin, and
may not be assured of salvation in spite of adherence to a rigid code
of behaviour. The individual thus cannot judge his or her position
within Calvin's description of an apparently arbitrary process of
selection:
In actual fact, the covenant of life is not preached
equally among all men, and amongst those to whom it
is preached, it does not gain the same acceptance
either constantly or in equal degree. In this diversity
the wonderful depth of God's judgement is made known. 56
The Elect, moreover, cannot be sure even of the validity of their actions
but must believe them to be part of a larger plan. As Frangois Wendel
explains in his influential analysis of Calvinism, Calvin, the Elect
soul: 'is an instrument of the Divine Will, although this is not to
say that his will is annihilated. On the contrary, regeneration
57
liberates his will, but by making him will what God expects of him.'
But the paradox still remains; the fallen mind can have no sure access
to the mind of God, and cannot be sure of a place among the Elect, even
by good works; as Calvin states in the Institutes: 'none excel by their
CG
own effort or diligence.' Indeed, Calvin almost actively discourages
56. Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T.
MacNeill, translation Ford Lewis Battles, The Library of Christian
Classics, 2 vols (London, 1961), Book III, xxi, 1, pp.920-921.
57. Frangois Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of his
Religious Thought, translation Philip Mairet (London, 1965), p.274.
58. Calvin, Institutes,' Book III, xxii, 7, p.941.
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the individual from pursuing the nature of predestination, giving a
warning to those interested in it:
First, then, let them remember that when they inquire
into predestination they are penetrating the sacred
precincts of divine wisdom. If anyone with carefree
assurance breaks into this place, he will not succeed
in satisfying his curiosity and he will enter a
labyrinth from which he can find no exit. For it is
not rignt for man unrestrainedly to search out things
that the Lord has willed to be hid in himself, and to
unfold from eternity itself the sublimest wisdom which
he would have us revere but not understand that through
this also he should fill us with wonder. 59
As Wendel concludes: 'The separation of the elect from the reprobate
is effected by God, but that as far as we are concerned we cannot
clearly distinguish the elect from the reprobate in spite of some 'sure
signs' to that effect given in the Scriptures.'50 A dichotomy is thus
created between the need to act as if saved and simultaneously to
acknowledge an implicit uncertainty as to salvation; the psychological
conflict, it produces is, then, an essential feature of Calvinist thinking.
Writing on Calvinism, Max Weber quickly perceives the social implications
of this theological perspective, as Gordon Marshall, in Presbyteries and
Profits, explains:
Weber stated that, at the level of pastoral theology,
the Calvinist was taught the 'terrible' decree of
predestination, but also that in order to resolve the
crisis of unknown status, the recommended means generated
by this doctrine were: first, to assume one's election
(since to have doubts about this was to doubt God's mercy,
which was surely the work of the Devil); and, secondly,
that in striving for this assurance diligence in one's
worldly calling was commended. 51
59. Calvin, Institutes, Book III, xxi, 1, pp.922-923.
60. Wendel, Calvin, p.265.
61. Gordon Marshall, Presbyteries and Profits: Calvinism and the
Development of Capitalism in Scotland, 156Q-17Q7 (Oxford, 1980), p.88.
38
On the one hand, therefore, the individual must live by certain rules,
which instil in him a supreme confidence in the moral structuring of
society, while on the other he is thrown into an abyss of uncertainty,
trying to achieve absolutes of morality that cannot but De refused
because of humanity's flawed state of sin. The only avenue left open
is that of 'good works' and even this offers little assurance for, as
John Knox pointed out: 'Now seeing that good workes spring furth of
election, how can any man be so foolisn to affirme that they are the
cause of the same?' The rigid - and almost inevitably hypocritical -
everyday morality demanded by Calvinism thus sits in conjunction with a
sense of the ultimate futility of adherence to such codes, and to an
uncertainty about one's position in a world defined by moral absolutes,
governed by an incomprehensible God. Obviously such a perspective will
have powerful implications when expressed on a national level, since
Calvinism advocated the practice of its religious precepts through
the machinery of the state. Writing on tne 'quality of seriousness'
behind the Reformation, Campbell MacLean points to the inevitable result:
Only a people who took themselves seriously could
have emoarked upon so ambitious a programme. For
it was nothing less than an attempt to dedicate
the total life of the nation to a single end. In
theological terms, it was the attempt to realise
tne kingdom of Heaven on earth. 63
The dimensions of such a design and its unavoidable failure gives some
indication of why Calvinism should be a force of such strength in shaping
a national intellectual and moral structure of feeling, and why it should
62. Marshall, Presbyteries and Profits, p.88, quoting from John Knox,
'An Answer to a Great Number of blasphemous cavillations written by
an Anabaptist', in The Works of John Knox, ed. David Laing (Edinburgh,
1846-1864), v., p.357
63. Campbell MacLean, 'Who Is Their God?', Aiistair MacLean introduces
Scotland, ed. Alastair M. Dunnett(London, 1972) 1S4-2U8, p.201.
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linger on as a means of perceiving the world, even in the minds of those
who have long ago rejected the God of Calvin, but who cannot escape the
influence of its ethos.
The power of Calvinism thus becomes clear; but the question still exists
as to why the effect of its moral absolutism was so overwhelming in a
Scottish context. This is a question to which few totally satisfactory
historical or sociological answers have been given. Weber's thesis on
the sociology of religion in relation to the development of the
Protestant work ethic and the growth of capitalism does not adapt easily
64
to the Scottish situation. Discussing the relevance of Weber's
thesis for Scotland, Gordon Marshall makes a strong case, in Presbyteries
and Profits, for Calvinism's influence on the development of the spirit
of modern capitalism but is forced to admit that the economic support
for this abstract spirit was somewhat lacking in Scotland at the time
of the Reformation. In emphasising the dual nature of Weber's argument -
that Calvinism both governs everyday life, and produces
psychological sanctions for the behavipur it advocates - he omits
discussion of the divergence between the effect of psychological insti¬
gations and the actual means of their fulfillment. Scotland's economic
underdevelopment at the Reformation must have made it extremely difficult
for the individual to 'prove' salvation in either commercial or social
terms, as was the case in Germany, France or even Geneva. Therefore,
although Scotland's economy did pick up in the eighteenth century,
providing a more practical basis for expressing religious precepts, it
would appear that Calvinism initially could only operate successfully
64. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
translation Talcott Parsons (London, 1930).
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in conceptual terms.
Lacking the material opportunities to justify preferment, greater
emphasis will inevitably be placed on the psychological impulses of
the religion in the abstract; and this is one aspect of Scottish
Calvinism which has received attention. In Scotland and Nationalism
Christopher Harvie writes:
A backward, semi-feudal, northern society adopted a
religious ideology - Calvinism - associated with
advanced urban commercial communities ...
The Calvinist theology, with its stress on an
autonomous and capricious God ... both liberated and
imprisoned. On the whole it led to a practical
stoicism. Predestination recognised the same sort of
lottery in life as in death. Over this pit, Calvinism
constructed rules to keep civil society together. As
James Hogg showed in Confessions of a Justified Sinner,
it could mask tendencies far darker than those Burns
caricatured in 'Holy Willie's Prayer1, but it provided
the hard and fast rules a frontier society needed. 65
The contrast Harvie makes between the 'pit' and a 'bridge' of social
rules, with the resultant sense of an uneasy balance, is a feature of all
literature which makes a serious attempt to come to terms with Calvinist
theology. Tom Nairn, in an early essay, offers an explanation of the
peculiar consequences this double perspective had in Scotland:
originally the Reformation movement was an absolute
attempt at moral and religious order, isolated from
the very conditions that would have made it an
integral part of history ... Just because it could
not be the veiled ideology of a class, the Scottish
Reformation was bound to be an abstract, millenial
dream - in effect, a desperate effort at escape from
history, rather than a logical chapter in its
unfolding. The Scots wanted, and needed, Salvation
in the most total sense imaginable. The Scottish
Revolution gave it them neat. 66
65. Harvie, Scotland ana Nationalism, pp.125-126.
66. Tom Nairn, 'The Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism', Memoirs of
a Modern Scotland, 34-54, p.36-37.
Since Scotland lacked the economic and social structure by which the
Elect could be seen to 'get on', the philosophical and psychological
implications of a theology dependent on material conditions for practical
fulfilment assume overwhelming significance. Seeds of a metapnysic were
planted in Scotland long before the behaviour codes aligned with it could
take root. On an ontological level, the Scots were led to see themselves
in a void, governed only by the absolutes of morality. Considering that
those behavioural codes, once established, have remained a strong influence -
indeed, can be seen in Scottish life even today - it is not surprising that
the original metaphysical implications of Calvinism, which preceded and
dominated its social patterns, have also remained a pervasive force in
Scottish thought. Obviously neither Calvinist strictures on behaviour
nor its particular mental set are still recognised in specifically religious
terms. Nevertheless, even if God has been rejected, Calvinist theology
may be translated, in secular terms, into a philosophy which balances
numan awareness that our fallibility and uncertainty must be concealed in
public life, with the recognition that such a sense of uncertainty is,
nevertheless, the irreconcilable fate of humankind. Although no longer
inducing a specific wish to attain Heaven, the remnants of Calvinist
thought encourage a philosophy which still turns to moral aosolutes as the
ideal means of defining the universe and of ascertaining humanity's
position within it.
'Moral Realism'
The moral implications of Calvinism can also be viewed in terms of the
psychology of moral development. The influential child psychologist,
Piaget, describes in his work on the moral development of the child, two
major stages through which children pass; firstly they go through a
phase of 'moral realism', and then subsequently 'mature' into a 'morality
of cooperativeness', with each stage being represented in a different
type of moral awareness.67 As Derek Wright points out in The Psychology
67. J. Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child. (London, 1932).
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of Moral Behaviour, Piaget sees the second stage of development as the
more desirable:
The basic elements are the child's awareness of other
people's points of view, his realization that moral
rules grow out of human relationships, and his incipient
moral autonomy ... Conscious of the 'need for reciprocal
affection' among equals brings with it a dawning realis¬
ation that morality is not a matter of obeying authorities
but of evolving guiding principles for achieving mutually
agreed and valued ends. 68
Such a moral outlook can be' seen to have close affinities with
Aristotelian morality as previously described, from the Ethics:
It is the way that we behave in our dealings with other
people that makes us just or unjust ... Hence we must
give our activities a certain quality, because it is
their characteristics that determine the resulting
dispositions. So it is a matter of no little importance
what sort of habits we form from the earliest age. 69
Both statements refer to a relativist perspective on morality, to a
belief in the reciprocal exercise of virtue. And this view of morality,
as something allowing for choice and acquired through habit, is one
which has generally characterised the English novel, with its mature
and reasoned relativism and its belief in the educative potential of
experience. Once again the nineteenth century novel, with its faith in
'the growing good of the world' offers a prime example of this type of
i •+ 70morallty.
68. Derek Wright, The Psychology of Moral Behaviour (L-ondon, 1971),p.157.
69. Aristotle, Ethics, Book Two, i, p.92.
70. See the concluding paragraph of George Eliot, Middlemarcn:A Study
of Provincial Life, 4 vols (Edinburgh, 1871-1872), and also the ideas
on progress set out in Samuel Smiles, Self Help: with Illustrations
of Character and Conduct (London, 1859X1
The earlier stage of the child's development, according to Piaget
that of 'Moral Realism', has a far less rational basis for its precepts,
as Wright again indicates:
Piaget groups together the characteristic features of
the young child under the label moral realism. They
all share the assumption that moral rules are external
and rooted in authority with the consequence that their
application tends to be literal and socially insensitive.
Moral realism is 'the tendency which the child has to
regard duty and the value attaching to it as self-
subsistent and independent of the mind, as imposing
itself regardless of the circumstances in which tne
individual may find himself.' 71
It would appear therefore, that certain similarities exist between this
outlook and a Calvinist-influenced view of the world. With its emphasis
on the external law of God, on the individual as unalterably damned or
saved, with its literal interpretations of the Scriptures, and its
historical development from an abstract code to an unyielding social
practice which sees every action and every soul as either black or white,
good or evil, the analogies between Calvinism and 'moral realism' are
fairly evident. Wright himself points to the connections between 'moral
realism' and certain kinds of religious thought:
It will not have escaped the reader that there are aspects
of Christian morality, at least as popularly understood,
which parallel the moral thinking of the immature child...
However, it does not necessarily follow that Christians
are psychologically immature in their moral thinking... The
important distinction must be drawn betv/een having rational
grounds for holding a moral opinion and being psychologically
compelled to hold it. 72
And, as we have seen in discussion of the Scottish context, the
psychological compulsion of Calvinism is one of its most powerful
71. Wright, The Psychology of Moral Behaviour, p.157.
72. Wright, p.165.
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features, giving sanction to a particular frame of mind. As Wright
indicates: 'in Piaget's view the crucial factor in retarding moral
development is a relationsnip of fear, dependence and respect towards
73
authority.1 Here too the relationship of the individual to a
Calvinist God offers a comparison.
Although Piaget's thesis can be disputed, in that children may rebel
against authority, and can be criticised for a failure to take into
account the effects of actual moral teaching, such arguments serve only
to highlight the dichotomies between the social practice of morals and
abstract conceptualisation of morality. And although much research on
the development of morality in children has been undertaken since Piaget,
few psychologists would dispute . the existence of a category similar
to that/he labels 'moral realism'. Lawrence Kohlberg, for example, the
most prominent figure in theories of moral psychology today, divides the
74
child's development into six stages. His first category cut of the
six, however, is very similar to the first phase of development as
described by Piaget; in Fairness in Children, Michael Siegal sets out
the characteristics of that stage according to Kohlberg in an accessible
tabular format:
What is Right: To avoid breaking rules, backed by
punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding
physical damage to persons and property.
Reasons for doing Right: Avoidance of punishment, and
the superior power of authorities.
Social Perspective: Egocentric point of view. Doesn't
consider the interests of others or recognise that they
differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of
view. Actions are considered physically rather than in
73. Wright, p.163.
74. Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, vol 1; The Philosophy
of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San
Francisco, 1961).
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terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion
of authority's perspective with one's own. 75
Again the divergence betv/een this and a relative, reciprocal morality
is self-evident. One further aspect of this early moral stage, which
Kohlberg only touches upon, citing the stages of development as set out
by another child psychologist, Fowler, provides interesting links between
the psychological implications of a Calvinist moral perspective and the
question of realism. According to Fowler, in the first stage which he
labels 'Intuitive-Projective Faith': 'Typically there is little concern
to separate fantasy from fact. Narrative ability is limited. Causal
relations are vague to the child and notions of effectance in the world
tend toward magical explanations.'^ So it would appear that one product
of such a morality could be either an 'inability' to cope with, or a
desire to avoid the conventions of literary realism which places
considerable emphasis on the 'narratability' of the world, on causal
relationships and on the embodiment of facts. The term 'moral realism'
can therefore be seen as one which is appropriate for describing an
aDsolutist morality, such as that of Calvinism, and will be used in this
way throughout the thesis, although with the awareness that paradoxically
'moral realism' translated into a moral perspective within the novel
would appear to preclude a commitment to literary 'realism' as a
technique.
Literary Realism in relation to Moral Realism
Literary realism as a technique offers the form most appropriate for
conveying a relative, Aristotelian morality. Yet the material of
75. Michael Siegal, Fairness in Children: A Social Cognitive Approach
to the Study of "Moral Development (London, 1962), p.141.
76. Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development vol.1, p.324.
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literary realism cannot wholly transcend the world in which it must De
located and is, therefore, an inadequate means of expressing the
absolutes of moral realism. It cannot remain rooted in reality and
also make that leap of the imagination necessary for encapsulating a
sense of external authority. In any case, one of the strengths of
realism, as found in the English novel, is its focus on contemporary
material from a secular viewpoint, and on the play of forces within the
parameters it creates. A world of external absolutes is, as J.P. Stern
points out, in his study of realism, inimical to the realist approach:
'A world governed by a divinely pre-established harmony would be as
little amenable to a realist approach as a world of absolute freedom.'7'7
By this criterion both moral realism and a philosophy of absolute freedom-
such as existentialism - would preclude the adoption of realist techniques
as a satisfactory way of expressing their metaphysics. Indeed, French
Existentialism and American Puritanism would appear to share tne
problematics of Scottish Calvinism in this respect. Although each would
view the 'external authority' in different terms (and as an absence in
the case of existentialism), in all cases there exists an awareness of an
alternative dimension outwith the boundaries of everyday reality and its
conventions. Moreover, the nature of this dimension is such that it
cannot be directly imitated or represented by realist fiction.
Writers who cannot share a relative moral outlook have, therefore, been
forced to create their own forms of representation for their philosophies
and its effects on the psyche within the novel. Such perspectives nave
even made seme impact on the English novel. In discussing Puritanism in
77. J.P. Stern, On Realism (London, 1973), p.173.
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tne English novel - with particular reference to Defoe - Arnold Kettle
acknowledges a 'tension between two sorts of realism. On the one hand
... the shrewd realism of acceptance ... on the other the more dangerous
and exciting realism of potentiality - tne realism involved in the
78
ability to see the inner forces at work.1 The latter category would seem
to be represented, in an extreme form, in works by Scottish novelists
influenced by Calvinism. Yet throughout Kettle's discussion the concept
of 'potentiality' is used in almost purely social terms, which obviously
operates as a restriction on its applicability. Kettle would presumably
accept Marxls definition of religion as 'a fictional perfection that
compensates for society's imperfections ... men locate in Heaven the
79
fulfilment denied them on earth.' English Puritanism can thus be
seen as a fiction in which the divergence between the real and the ideal
is perceived as functioning in terms of a social directive: Heaven
provides the inspiration for what could be achieved on earth. English
Puritanism, which enjoyed only a brief period of autonomy, has otherwise
always existed in conjunction with a Royal ruler and an established
social system. It has, therefore, almost always received a social check
to its abstract philosophy. And any threats which it could have posed
to the literary representation of social reality have thus always been
mitigated. The concept of 'potentiality' which Kettle describes has not
moved far beyond its expression through social realism. So although
novelistic representations of English Puritanism may offer some interesting
parallels, they provide little solution for the Scottish novelist faced
with the abstract complexities of Calvinism in which the gap between Heaven
and earth is viewed as static, unable to be bridged, focus on the ideal
must inevitably change under such a perception and it becomes impcssiDle
78. Arnold Kettle, 'The Precursors of Defoe: Puritanism and the Rise of
tne Novel', On the Novel, ed. 3.S. Benedikz (London, 1971), 206-
217, p.207.
79. Harold Fallding, The Sociology of Religion: An Explanation of the
Unity and Diversity in Religion (London, 1974), p.35.
to find a total function in the representation of social reality, since
no real hope of change or evolution can be indicated. The contemporary
and secular ceases to be a relevant parameter and the terms of realism
are no longer wholly applicable.
Nevertheless, the problems faced by Scottish writers are not their's
alone. Forms of French Calvinism, for example, create similar
contradictions. Andre Gide offers one instance of a writer brought up
in a strong Protestant tradition, and he explores certain preoccupations
80
very similar to those of writers such as Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark.
In The Counterfeiters he considers the question of an individual's
autonomy in relation to the novel through his central character, Eduoard,
a novelist:
because the novel, of all literary genres, is the
freest, the most lawless,' held forth Eduoard, 'it
is for that very reason, for fear of that very
liberty (the artists who are always sighing after
liberty are often the most bewildered when they
get it), that the novel has always clung to reality
with such timidity? 81
And through Eduoard's discussions the intractability of the problem is
emphasised:
80. Andre Gide was, in fact, mainly responsible for a renewal of
interest in the Confessions because of his introduction to the
Cresset edition of 1947, in which he expresses amazement that the
work is not better known:
How explain that a work so singular and so enlightening,
so especially fitted to rouse passionate interest both
in those who are attracted by religious and moral questions,
and, for quite other reasons, in psychologists and artists
and above all in Surrealists who are so particularly drawn
by the demonaic in every form - how explain that such a
work should have failed to become famous? ^ ^
He also remarks: 'It is a long time since I can remember being so
taken hold of, so voluptuously tormented by any book.' (p.x) And
he concludes: 'I consider it an extraordinary achievement and snail
be happy if what I say of it awakens the belated glory to which, I
believe, it has a right.' (p.xvi)
Andre Gide, Introduction to The Private Memoirs and Confessions of'a
Justified Sinner, translation Dorothy 8ussy (London, 1947).
81. Andr£ Gide, The Counterfeiters, translation Dorothy Bussy (Hamindsworth
1S66), p.66.
'But I thought you wanted to abandon reality.'
'My novelist wants to abandon it; but I shall
continually bring him back to it. In fact, that
will be the subject; the struggle between the facts
presented by reality and the ideal reality.'
The illogical nature of his remarks was flagrant -
painfully obvious to everyone. It was clear that
Eduoard housed in his brain two incompatible
requirements and that he was wearing himself out
in the desire to reconcile them. 82
In this dialogue about a novelist writing a novel about a novelist Gide
sets out very well the nature of the dilemma that is faced by some
Scottish novelists, unable to settle for the boundaries of reality, but
unsure as to what formal alternatives exist. Yet through this example
it is possible to see that alternative models to the English novel do
exist and may be of use in understanding the Scottish situation.
American literature also provides some interesting examples of concerns
akin to those of the Scottish writer, especially in the works of
Hawthorne and Melville. As Austin Warren states in The New England
Conscience: 'Hawthorne ... had a deep faith ... which was skeptical of
humanitarian reform, skeptical of traditional aristocracy, skeptical of
CO
solutions to the enigma of life.' A similar ambivalence can be seen
in the work of Melville, as Ann Douglas indicates in The Feminization of
American Culture: 'While he distrusted fiction ... Melville could, by
complex and brilliant tactics of displacement, use and expand the
84
narrative form itself to express his hostility to it.' She then relates
this conflict to a similar duality in his attitudes towards belief,
82. Gide, The Counterfeiters, p.169.
83. Austin Warren, The New England Conscience (Ann Arbor, 1966), p.137.
84. Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture, p.290.
supporting her argument with Hawthorne's own comments on Melville:
It is strange how he persists - and nas persisted ever
since I knew him, and probably long before - in
wandering to and fro over these deserts, as dismal and
monotonous as the sand hills amid which we were sitting.
He can neither believe, nor be comfortable in his
unbelief; and he is too honest and courageous not to
try to do one or the other. 85
However, in America no single religion possessed the control over the
machinery of the state as Calvinism did in Scotland.
Indeed, the power which Scottish Calvinism possessed served, paradox¬
ically, to curtail its own representation in literature. Forms of
unspoken censorship led to an open and direct assessment of Calvinist
precepts becoming almost impossible. An obliquity thus became
necessary which further complicated the novelist's search for a suitable
means of expression. Yet although it is all too easy to take Edwin
Muir's line and see a result of censorship as the total failure of
Scottish writers to produce significant work, it is of more value to
examine the work that was produced in relation to the possibilities
and challenges with whicn Calvinism confronted its authors. In order
to fully comprehend the nature of such a challenge, it is necessary to
examine, in both a general and a historical context, specific treatment
of Calvinism within Scottish novels, to assess the more abstract
response to its influence on art and, in particular, fiction, and tnen
to consider the pattern of literary approach which emerges as Deing
necessitated by the overall metaphysical impact of Calvinism and its
contingent problematics.
85. Douglas, p.292, quoting from Jay Leyda, The Melville Log: A
Documentary Life of Hermann Melville 1819-1891 (New YorK, 1951) ii,
p.519.
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(iii) CALVINISM AND THE SCOTTISH NOVEL
Calvinism as subject matter
In examining the representation of Calvinism in the Scottish novel tnree
nineteentn century works, James Hogg's The Private Memoirs and
B6 87
Confessions of a Justified Sinner, J.G. Lockhart's Adam Blair, and
Jonn Gait's Ringan Gilhaize, offer useful illustrations of the ways in
whicn writers attempted to deal with the dialectic between the private
implications of Calvinism for the individual and the public face it
demanded as a religion.
Hogg's famous novel of 1824, taking into account the Editorial
introduction and conclusion in addition to the narrative of the Sinner
himself, can be read as a 'justification' of the difficulties of coping
with the metaphysical implications of Calvinist theology. The Sinner
turns to religious fanaticism as a means of dealing with the polarities
of good and evil which face him. Yet, having become a member of the
Elect, he is faced with another set of polarities represented by the
pure evil of his mysterious 'Friend' and the unexplained goodness of men
such as old John Barnet who became his victims. Neither the symbols
of good or evil, however, present him with any reasonaple modus vivendi
that the Sinner could accommodate within his world. His attempts to
find any means, fair or foul, whereby they might be reconciled, leads
ultimately to his own destruction. His memoir ends:
86. James Hogg, The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified
Sinner ( London, 1824).
87. J.G. LocKhart, Some Passages in the Life of Mr Adam Blair, Minister
of .the Gospel at Cross-Meikle (Edinburgh, 1822).
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But, ahi who is yon that I see approaching furiously -
his stern face blackened with horrid despair! My hour
is at hand. - Almighty God, wnat is this that I am
about to do! The hour of repentance is past, and now my
fate is inevitable. - Amen, for ever! I will now seal
up my little book and conceal it; and cursed be he who
trieth to alter or amend! b8
The Editor of the novel, however, can be seen as making a similar and
ostensibly more successful attempt to apply reason in order to evade
full consideration of irreconcilable opposites. After considering all
the evidence he can only conclude:
Were the relation at all consistent with reason, it
corresponds so minutely with traditionary facts, that
-it could scarcely have missed to have Deen received as
authentic; but in this day, and with the present
generation, it will not go down, that a man should be
daily tempted by the devil, in the semblance of a
fellow-creature; and at length lured to self-destruction,
in the hopes that this same fiend and tormentor was to
suffer and fall along with him. It was a bold theme for
an allegory, and would have suited that age well had it
been taken up by one fully qualified for the task, which
this writer was not. 89
By using documentary evidence and his literary 'taste' the Editor
attempts to maintain a 'realistic' world view and avoid assenting to
the vision of the world implied in tne Sinner's narrative. Therefore,
although he does not actually 'alter' the memoir, his reasoned con¬
clusions can be seen as an attempt to 'amend' its implications. As
such his attempt is cursed - or doomed to failure. His inability to
explain the discrepancies in the various accounts of events indicate
the full extent of his failure to set boundaries on the fantastic; the
final metaphysical vision remains unreconciled with, and uncircumscribed
by,'reality'. For'the reader, the overall effect is to make us
88. Hogg, Confessions, pp.367-368.
89. Hogg, Confessions, pp.369-390.
recognise that conventional methods of assimilating facts, both in
our rationalising of existence and in our moral ordering of tne
world, may have limits and may be broken down completely if brought
into contact with a different frame of reference, such as is provided
by the extremes of Calvinism.
J.G. Lockhart's Adam Blair (1822) is a less technically sophisticated
attempt to confront similar issues, and much less successful as a novel
than Hogg's work. Nevertheless, it merits consideration for the
dualities whicn it reveals in the author's response to Calvinist ethics.
Very much a man of the Enlightenment, Lockhart is obviously influenced
by the contemporary fashion of Gothic romance, but the material of his
melodrama brings him uncomfortably close to the metaphysics of his
national inheritance. Although his choice of Adam Blair, a local
minister in a small village, for the central character in this tale of
adultery is in itself significant, the technique he uses wnen
confronted with the moral issues his subject raises is even more striking.
Evil receives its strongest expression in the novel not through actually
wicked deeds - the act of adultery is the single action constituting
Adam's 'fall' - but through a dominant sense of sin in the individuals
concerned. Their consciousness is presented in highly melodramatic
moments, such as Adam's flight to rescue Charlotte, or nis meeting with
her in the graveyard. Notable too is their encounter after adultery
has been committed, by a pool of unknown depths, out on the moorland:
When he stopped, he threw his eyes round him, and saw
nothing but a narrow circuit of heathy and stony
desolation; and in tne centre of tne Darren amphitheatre
a small dark mountain tarn, the still waveless waters of
which reflected notning but the surrounding gloom - and
that so truly, that ne stood almost on the margin ere he
had discovered that there was anything but heath below him.
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This melancholy tarn, formed where three hills
descend into tne bosom of the earth together, is of
such depth that no plummet could ever sound it, and
it shelves from the very brink sheer down into this
unfathomable blackness. 90
Only through such images can Lockhart indicate the moral abyss wnicn
threatens his hero and which destroys humanity's capacity for
rationalising actions and judgements. Yet Lockhart describes this
moment as 'these profounder meditations of misery to which the writer
of a story such as tnis can venture no more than an allusion', thus
indicating his own doubts as to how such a perspective of 'the secret
miseries of a soul prostrate under the sense of spiritual abandonment'
could ever be accurately represented irf fiction. Evil can only be fully
expressed through images of a surrealistic norror - such as Adam Blair
seeing his father's tomb; 'with filthy things crawling up and down upon
the face of the marble.' (p.227) Likewise, the near-drowning of Adam's
daughter is used as an excuse for evoking emotions not usually permitted
to disturb the surface of civil society.
Yet despite the duality of tnis approach, the underlying reverberations
which are prevented from becoming too threatening, Lockhart continually
draws back from the implications of his own writing. Just as Adam
only commits adultery wnen drunk and then escapes recriminations througn
being struck down with a physical fever, so Charlotte conveniently dies
to avoid any fuller assessment of the action's significance: her
presence is no longer there to impede the plot's progress into forgiveness
for Adam. Yet-even with such cautious sidestepping Lockhart appears
unable to control the power of his own images, or to face tne moral
90. Lockhart, Adam Blair, p.225.
horror implied by the situation that is his subject. Throughout the
novel there is a conflict of Old and New Testament moralities. In an
introduction to the novel David Craig writes: 'Lockhart's own
91
generation was notable for a drift away from formal religion1, thus
indicating the importance of the development of a more liDeral theology,
not only for Adam Blair, but for the Scottish novel in general. This
more humanitarian aspect of religion is seen to lie with the community.
Hints are given as to Adam's Covenanting family history but this
lies safely buried in the village churchyard. And what Adam seems
to fear^ as much as any eternal damnation for his sins, is isolation from
the community. Wakening from his adulterous sleep he hears the bells
of his local church and is struck with horror at his future alienation
from this way of life because of his sinning. Ultimately he is forced
to expiate his sins by living apart from the community until they are
willing to accept him back. The fact that he is received by them once
again, and reinstated as minister, would seem to indicate that the
community is . adverse to being governed by pure good and by pure evil,
and that Adam offers a middle of the road alternative. A central image
in the novel is that of the 'rod of love' which both indicates
Lockhart's ambiguity and would seem to hint at the movement towards a
more mitigating religion than that of Calvinism. This religion is seen
as one which can survive successfully with a foundation in the community,
thus avoiding the awesome ideas of a face to face encounter between the
individual and God. Nevertheless, Lockhart's writing indicates that
Adam Blair is only a stage of transition towards a more humanitarian and
relative morality. Althougn liberal theology triumphs in the context
of the plot, since Adam is forgiven, the most obvious imaginative
excitement is still generated by the language used to express Adam's
91. David Craig, Introduction to Adam Blair, Scottish Reprints 1
(Edinburgh, 1963), p.xxii.
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sense of sin within an absolute framework.
The emphasis on liberal theology to be found in Adam Blair came to
predominance in the literature of the Kailyard but the process was a
slow one. In 1S23 John Gait published Ringan Gilhaize; or The
Covenanter a novel which again showed the still powerful influence of
Calvinist thought. Like Hogg's novel, it justified its subject matter
py establishing a historical context - that of the Covenant - which set
it even further back in time than the Justified Sinner. And it too
takes an extremely circuitous route to that past. The novel is
narrated by the 'Covenanter1, Ringan Gilhaize, wnose]father was involved
in the early days of the Reformation and the social disturbances around
the time of John Knox's return to Scotland. Since this is obviously
a significant historical contextualisation for the Covenant, much of
the novel's three volumes is taken up with a first-hand account of the
grandfather's adventures as narrated to Ringan. When Ringan then
describes the events and misfortunes of his own life it is no surprise
that nis outlook on life, strongly influenced by his grandfather,
provides-Gait with an excellent opportunity for dramatising the fanatical
Calvinist imagination. In the novel this influence is usually revealed
through Ringan's sudden moments of poetic vision, such as:
For my spirit was as a flame tnat blazeth in the wind,
and my thoughts as the sparks that shoot and soar for
a moment towards the skies with a glorious splendour,
and drop down to the earth in ashes .../„ onc , , .K (p.296, vol 11}
and,
In the same moment I looked up and there was a vision
in the air as if all the angels of brightness, and tne
martyrs in their vestments of glory, were assembled on




As with Adam Blair the ricn language is used only to convey moments of
extreme metaphysical consciousness, which have little place within
reality as ordinarily conceived.
Ringan Gilhaize, however, also illustrates a more technical aspect of
the problems faced by writers dealing with the philosophical implications
of Calvinism: that of temporality. The retrospective narrative used
in the novel is one way of coping with the Calvinist doctrine of
predestination. Ringan's hints as to what will become of him:
So that, although I rose from the rock where I was
sitting in. the clear conviction that our array would
be scattered like chaff before the wind, I yet had a
blessed persuasion that the event would prove in the
end a link in the chain, or a cog in the wheel, of
the hidden engineering with which Providence works
good out of evil (p.2S1. vol II)
become slightly more acceptable when seen as part of a narrative that
looks back over his life. The convolutions of the narrative ensure
that the lack of suspense is not so immediately noticeable, and also
permit Gait some characterisation of the interesting arguments of
Providential self-vindication which had become a feature of Calvinist
reasoning. Ringan's brother, for example, having broken the news to
him of his daughter's rape, says: 'Ringan ... we have met with a
misfortune. It's the will of Providence and we maun bear it. But
surely in the anger that is caused by Providence, the Creator tells us
to resent.1 (p.76, vol. Ill) Such a perspective, which would no doubt
appear unpalatable in a straight-forwardly chronological narrative, is
slightly more acceptable in a narrative wnich incorporates temporal
disjunctions as part of its format.
Yet although Hogg and Gait experimented witn narrative as a means of
exploring the mental implications of .Calvinism for the individual and
the writer, the public face of Calvinism, as seen in Adam Blair
increasingly became the focus of attention. This interest can, however,
be traced as far back as Scott. In his fiction Scott appears to have
shied away from dealing with the implications of Calvinist theory as
his subject matter, and to have concentrated, rather unfavourably, on its
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social aspects. In Old Mortality, for example, 3urleigh is presented
as an unpleasant fanatic by nature, while the Royalists are depicted to
a much greater extent as being a product of their social value-systems.
In Heart of Midlothian Davie Deans' religion leads to his 'stubborn
resolution' and lack of support for his fallen daughter Effie. And in
Redgauntlet Scott goes so far as to transpose fanaticism to the Jacobite
side, with their leader Redgauntlet sneering at Calvinist hypocrisies:
Darsie Latimer's 'note from some Geneva sermon' is seen merely as an
93
excuse for plodding and cant. Burns' 'Holy Willie's Prayer' is an
attack along similar lines on the social face of Calvinism, and by the
nineteenth century Calvinism was increasingly criticised or defended in
terms of its governing a way of life, rather than as a significant
94
theology.
By the period of the Kailyard, literary attacks on Calvinism were
made primarily on the grounds of its social severity, with its main
exponents, the Kirk elders, seen as predominantly grim and humourless,
92. Walter Scott, Old Mortality, IX-X (1893).
93. Walter Scott, Redgauntlet, XXXV-XXXVI (1894)
94. See A.L. Drummond and J. Bulloch, The Church in Victorian Scotland
1843-1874 (Edinburgh, 1975), especially p.282.
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unless tney too could be softened by liberalising influences. The
95
Lilac Sunbonnet , which tells the story of the last days of the
'Marrow Kirk1, and Auld Licht Idyllswnich focuses on the 1AuId Licht1
kirk, both concentrate on the effects of communal hypocrisy which
sanctifies itself in acts of petty meanness: 'The plate for collections
is inside the church, so that the whole congregation can give a guess at
96
what you give.' Mocked in this way, Calvinism was gradually rendered
impotent as a theological threat. Writers who subsequently turned
against the Kailyard, such as George Douglas Brown and J. MacDougall Hay,
attempted to redress this balance to a certain extent, by exploring the
matter of religious influences in a wider and more metaphysical way.
Their position in this respect was, however, rather awkward: the Kirk
could also be seen as a pillar of the community ethos which they were
trying to attack. Their only avenue of escape, therefore, was to
gesture, through the use of melodrama, in the direction of vast cosmic
forces unrestrained by petty village moralities. In both Gi1lespie and
The House with the Green Shutters anger at social phenomenon is trans¬
lated into the image of a wratnful God, but in the latter case this
figure is not even identifiably Christian. So by this stage it would
appear that the majority of Scottish novelists had abandoned any close
analysis of the psychological and philosophical implications of Calvinism
in any depth, but had turned their attention to the much more recognisable
public side of that religion, wnicn provided a far larger target for their
criticism and satire.
95-. S.R. Crockett, The Lilac Sunbonnet (London, 1894).
96. J.M. Barrie, 'The Auld Licht Kirk', Auld Licnt Idylls, 60-93, p.64.
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Calvinism and Art
There is, nowever, anotner element of Calvinism wnicn has also been
described as creating problems for the Scottish writer - the supposed
Calvinist opposition to art in general and to the 'dangers' of fiction
in particular. Certainly Calvin himself warned against the setting up
of false idols:
Meanwhile, since this brute stupidity gripped the whole
world - to pant after visible figures of God, and thus
to form gods of wood, stone, gold, silver or other dead
and corruptible matter - we must cling to this principle.
God's glory is corrupted by an impious falsehood whenever
any form is attached to him.... But God does not compare
these images with one another, as if one were more suitable,
another less so; but without exception he repudiates all
likenesses, pictures and other signs by wnich the super¬
stitious have thought he will be near them. 97
But this warning does not contain the outright hostility to all forms of
art that has often been attributed to his teaching in a Scottish context.
As G.G. Coulton points out in Art and the Reformation: 'Calvin was far
98
less definitely inimical to art than is generally imagined', and he
quotes from the Institutes as proof:
Yet I am not so scrupulous as to judge that no images
should be endured; but, seeing that the art of
painting and carving images comes from God, I require
that the practice of art should be kept pure and
lawful ... Therefore men should not paint nor carve
any thing but such as can be seen with the eye; so
that God's Majesty, which is too exalted for human
sight, may not be corrupted by fantasies wnich have
no true agreement therewith. 99
97. Calvin, Institutes, 3ook II, xi, 1, p.100.
98. G.G. Coulton, Art and the Reformation (Oxford, 1928), p.407.
99. Coulton, p.407, quoting from Institutes, Book I, xi, 2.
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Nevertheless, despite such defences, tne image of Calvinism as being
opposed to art appears to have captured the public imagination - and
may actually have been incorporated into social practices in Scotland
in a very crude form, ignoring tne fact that Calvin's true criticism
was of tne intermingling of secular and religious in such a way.that the former
affected respect for the latter.
Yet Edwin Muir, as we have seen, held that the rigid repressions of
post-Reformation Scotland stunted the growth of a national literature;
John Home's Douglas is frequently mentioned in histories of Scottish
literature as a defiance of the Kirk's attitudes towards drama;^ ^ and
even in the literature of the Kailyard we can find references to
Calvinist censorship. In Barrie's Auld Licht Idylls one of the short
sxcries tells how Chirsty finally triumphs over her husband Tammas'
dangerous interest in Shakespeare and his dalliance with a Literary
Club; the tale which begins; 'The ministers in the town did not hold
with literature', ends:
Chirsty saw a deterioration setting in and told the
minister of her suspicions. Mr Disnart was newly
placed at the time and very vigorous, and the way he shook
the truth out of Tammas was grand ... Mr Disnart was not
a man to be beaten, and he landed Tammas in the Auld Licht
kirk before tne year was out. Chirsty buried Shakespeare
in the yard. 101
100. Then, just before Christmas 1756, the capital was electri¬
fied by the production of 'The Tragedy of tne Douglas', a
sensationally popular play made doubly sensational by the
fact that it had been written by one minister, John Home of
Athelstaneford, and presented in the very obvious presence
of another, the redoubtable and flamboyand Alexander Carlyle
of Inveresk, who for good measure got himself publicly
involved in a scuffle with a drunk in tne audience. Both men
were notable members of the Moderate party and had powerful
friends in the General Assembly; the attack upon them by the
outraged high flyers had therefore to move circumspectly.
T.C. Smout, A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830, Second
Edition (London, 1970), p.237.
101. J.M. Barrie, 'A Literary Club1, Auld Licht Idylls, 231-250, p.250.
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Once again Calvinist distrust of literature is given only a superficial
and purely social face which can be easily mocked.
Deeper reasons for Calvinism's ambiguous influence on literature do exist
however. In Calvin and Art Mary Ramsay points to one of its proDlematic
aspects by quoting Calvin's plea: 'Let this be a principle: that in the
using of God's gifts we depart not from his intention, when it is
referred to that end, unto which the author himself created and appointed
102
them tor us ...' Of course, as we have seen, humankind can never be
wnolly sure of God's intentions and may not have access to divine truth.
The possible falsity of art therefore leads to the inherent dangers of
literature, which can be viewed as a form of lying. Again this is a
far remove from the concept of 'Essential Reality' and the confidence
in the imagination wnich Raymond Williams describes as part of the
English creative spirit. As Pierre Macherey points out in A Theory of
Literary Production: 'The proposition that the writer or artist is a
creator belongs to a humanist ideology.'103 For the writer influenced
by Calvinism to see him or herself as a creator would be an obvious
usurpation of humanity's inferior position to God. Moreover, it could
be interpreted as falsely implying access to divine, absolute truths.
In humanist ideology, as Macherey states: 'man is released from his
function in an order external to himself, restored to his so-callea powers.
Circumscribed only by the resources of his own nature, he becomes tne
104
maker of his own laws.' Within a Calvinist ideology, however, the
102. Mary P. Ramsay, Calvin and Art (Considered in relation to Scotland)
(Edinburgh, 1936), p.29.
103. Pierre Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production, translation
Geoffrey Wall (London, 1976), p.66.
104. Macherey,A Theory of Literary Production, p.66.
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universe is defined by, ana centred around God, not 'man', so the
humanist perception, with its confidence in humanity, is impossible.
Writers influenced by this structure of feelings cannot wholly trust
nor totally commit themselves to fictions.
The effect of this kind of religious thought on literature is not
confined to Scotland. American literature again shows interesting
parallels in this respect, especially in the works of writers influenced
by Puritanism. In the Prologue to The Scarlet Letter Nathaniel Hawthorne
writes:
'What is he?' murmers one grey shadow of my forefathers
to the other. 'A writer of storybooksl What kind of
business in life - what mode of glorifying God, or
being servicable to mankind in his day and generation -
may that be? Why, the degenerate fellow might as well
have been a fiddler!1 105
Austin Warren, in The New England Conscience, points out that the
abhorrence of fiction mocked here represents an attitude that extended
into his fiction:
He was embarrassed to 'tell a story', to construct a
downright fiction. It is extraordinary how few of the
'tales' in his three books of alleged short stories are
really tales - how many of them are 'sketches', half-
essays and meditations ... how many take refuge as scenes
from New England history ... or as allegories and parables...
106
And the results of this attitude can be seen even in an apparently
conventional fiction such as The House of the Seven Gables, which he
begins with a defence of the work as Romance:
105. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, with an introduction Dy
R.W. Butterfield (London, 1971), p.16.
106. Warren, The New England Conscience, p.134.
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When a writer calls his work a Romance, it need hardly
De observed that ne wishes to claim a certain lassitude,
both as to its fashion and material, which ne would not
have felt nimself entitled to assume, nad ne professed to
be writing a Novel. The latter form of composition is
presumed to aim at a very minute fidelity, not merely to
tne possible, but to the probaole and ordinary course of
man's experience In the present work, the Author has
proposed to himself ... to keep undeviatingly within his
immunities. The point of view in wnicn this tale comes
under the Romantic definition, lies in the attempt to
connect a Dy-gone time with the very Present that is
flitting away from us. 107
The concept of 'disguised' fictions tnat Warren indicates, the circuitous
avoidance of admitting that a fiction is a ' Novel' that Hawthorne
demonstrates, and the converse need to prove tnat a fiction does have some
valid function, can also be traced witnin Scottish literature and has had
significant implications for several of its novelists.
Sir Walter Scott is generally recognised as the originator of the
> 10fa
'nistorical novel', especially since Lukacs' famous essay. Neverthe¬
less his 'histories' are rarely considered important for their historical
accuracy alone, for Scott is also known as a writer of adventures
characterised by a blend of nistorical fact and romance. It is possiole
to argue at some lengtn about such polarities in Scott's work - the manner
in which he assimilates his own obvious attraction to romance and the
adventures of a violent past to a real fear for the repercussions of such
violence within civilised society - but on a more mundane level it is
worth considering the simple fictional devices through which ne reinforces
his ambivalent position. The use of frames for his narratives - such as
Or Dryasdust's conclusion to Redgauntlet - simultaneously concedes the
107. Hawthorne, The House of the Seven Gables, ed. Milton R. Stern
(Harmondswort'h 19»t), pp. 1-2.
108. See Georg. Lukacs, The Historical Novel, translation Hannan and
Stanley Mitchell (London, 1962).
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tale's fictionality while attempt to justify or reinforce its historical
verisimilitude. Scott appears afraid of revealing himself as wnolly an
author of either romance or historical reconstruction. In Old Mortality,
for example, the reader is led into the tale through a funnel created
tnrougn textual accounts of the novel's various sources - Jeaediah
Cleishbottom, the Schoolmaster, the Parish Clerk and Peter Pattieson all
contribute to give the impression of an oft-told tale - yet the story
itself begins with a historical justification of Old Mortality's existence
and the truth of his account: 'I have been able to qualify the narratives
of Old Mortality and his Cameronian friends by the reports of more than
one descendent of ancient and honourable families ... who yet Iook
109
proudly back on the period.' Likewise in The Antiquary Scott pleads
against tne confusion of reality with fiction although the novel is
itself centred round such confusion: 'I have further to request my reader
not to suppose that my late respected friend resembled Jonatnon Oldbuck
110
eitner in his pedigree or the history imputed to the ideal personage.'
And ironically the novel is one of the most heavily allegorical of Scott's
novels, thus emphasising the element of conscious artifice wnich he seeks
111
to deny. Rob Roy presents the hero of folk-legend but surrounds the
tale with a welter of appendices detailing 'accurate' and conflicting
reports of the hero's 'real' life. And even in The Heart of Midlothian
when Scott's attention is diverted from grander historical matters, he
has to give an account of the 'real-life' character whom he 'improved
upon' for the character of Jeanie . Deans.
109. Walter Scott, Old Mortality, p.15.
110. Walter Scott, The Antiquary, V-VI (1893), p.ix.
111. I am grateful for this insight to Professor J. MacQueen, School of
Scottish Studies, University of Edinburgn, given in a seminar on
'Allegory in The Antiquary', 1984.
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Such examples show a definite pattern of contradiction in Scott's
writing. Accepting that texts can 'place' themselves, creating
restraints to their interpretation, then Scott's historical addenda can
De seen as performing exactly this function. Edward Said, discussing
sucii effects in 'The Text, the Word and the Critic', uses Conrad as an
example of a writer who prefaces his tales with dialogue, so as to place
112
the text in the situation of an interplay between speech and reception.
Scott can be seen as creating a similar interplay between the admission
of fictionality and the proof of historical validity, using the framing
narrators both to imply their own role in the fiction making but also to
indicate that they possess an on-going relationship with 'reality'
outwith the text. Discussing Clarissa as an example of just such a text,
Said writes :
Surely the novelistic imagination has always included
this unwillingness to cede control over tne text in
the world, or to release it from the discursive and
human obligations of all human presence; hence the
desire, which is almost a principle of action of so
many novels, to turn tne text back, if not directly
into speech, then at least into circumstantial, as
opposed to meditative duration. 113
In the more extreme case of Scott, therefore, the text can be seen as
containing a conflict between the desire to address the reader so that
recognition of historical accuracy can be shared (and thus disclaiming
any element of fictional fancy), with a need to highlight that very fic¬
tionality as part of the authorial fear of claiming to influence 'reality'
by what has been written, leaving the text firmly placed in the realms
of fancy and thus avoiding any accusations of presumption. The ending
112. Edward Said, 'The Text, the Word, the Critic', Textual Strategies,
ed. J.V. Harari (London, 1980), 161-188.
113. Said, 'The Text, the Word, tne Critic', p.177.
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of Old Mortality provides a clear example of this strange conjunction;
tne author solves the problem of his own duality by vicariously
addressing the reader with questions and complaints aDout the novel
through the cnaracter of Miss Buskbody, his 'fair critic'. Having
achieved tnat identification Scott leaves us, too, trapped within the
text and its questioning of its own conclusions, unable to draw back from
that or to take the fiction with us into our 'reality1.
The constraints within which Scott operates take a slightly different
form in the works of James Hogg, although they are still very much in
evidence. The 'Ettrick Shepherd' was less a recognisable part of the
dominant cultural fashions and could more easily depart from the
conventions of fiction. Nevertneless he too found ways of expressing his
own uneasy relationship with the 'novel' form. Certainly his links with
the folk tradition allowed him a greater choice of forms wnicn explicitly
accept an obvious fictionality, offering alternatives to realism and
freeing him to explore the interaction between fiction and reality. As
we have seen, the Confessions focuses upon just such a dichotomy,
exploiting the readers' uncertainty as to their own positions in the
game of interpretation. A similar process can be seen operating in
114
The Brownie of Bodsbeck, in which Hogg places the Covenanter and
Royalist conflict against a background of hauntings by a local spirit,
the 'Brownie'. The device displaces the serious import of the battles
involved - deaths and mutilations are described with a degree of
detachment which helps create a meta-perspective whereby the ludicrous
nature of earthly conflicts becomes apparent. And even when Hogg offers
114. James Hogg, The Brownie of Bodsbeck and other Tales, 2 vols
(Edinburgn, 1818).
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a supposedly 'realistic' explanation of the Brownie's activities at the
end of the novel, several supernatural occurences are left unexplained.
The . fact that tne supernatural holds sway for so much of the novel
means that the final denouement has little effect in detracting from the
non-realistic dimension that has been so well established.
Hogg's concessions to realism, therefore, remain minimal but are sufficient
to indicate the tensions of a dichotomy. In The Three Perils of Man
he uses a far simpler device to point to the disjunction between
115
established fact and the freedom of fiction. By making Michael
Scott, the magician, a pivotal character in the plot, and by using magic
and the power of physical transformation to reveal the arbitrary nature
of human 'laws', he bypasses the conventional view of the novel as a
vehicle for representing reality. And yet, like Walter Scott, he backs
off from the implications of his own approacn by stressing his
ignorance as to the truth of the plot - he heard it all from 'Simon the
Curate1. He thus effaces his own role as narrator. Of course, in so
doing, he places himself again in the role of selective narrator, thereby
implying that some 'reality' does exist outwith those elements of the
tale that he has chosen to tell. Richardson uses much the same
technique in Pamela, but the difference lies in his possessing sufficient
Editorial confidence to proclaim the morally-improving nature of the
tale he has to tell: a justification which Hogg never offers. Hogg
appears simply to delight in exploring the contrasts between the
artificiality of fiction and the supposed 'truth' of reality by placing
them in unusual conjunctions. And in so doing he achieved one of the
115. James Hogg, The Three Perils of Man; or War, Women and Witchcraft:
A Border Romance 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1b22).
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most successful explorations of antinomianism and its metaphysical
implications in The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified
Sinner.
John Gait, in contrast, adhered more to the conventions of the novel
than Scott or Hogg, lacking the liberation of a folk-tale inneritance.
Yet Gait is, paradoxically, much more explicit than Hogg in admitting
his distrust of the novel form. Annals of the Parish, which ne
116
claimed to be a 'theoretical history1, does provide a wide perspective
on the social history of the period through its presentation of scenes
full of local details. The breadth of Gait's view, however, is
achieved by the conjunction of such information with what he does not
detail. The divergence between the consciousness of the narrator, the
Reverend Balwhidder's perception of events, with the reader's awareness
of their larger implications, serves to insinuate what is happening
'off-stage' in the novel. It is to the author's advantage therefore to
appear to share the naivety of his narrator. Balwhidder constantly
delimits the dimensions of his role: 'But it is not for me to make
reflections, my task and duty is to note the changes of times and
117
habitudes.' The similarity here with Hawthorne's concern for a
function and a 'duty' is quite clear, but the statement also shares
parallels with Scott's appendices in that it attempts to deny any
creative fictionalising on the pari of the author, while also avoiding
the claim, to total truth.
116. For a useful discussion of this idea see Keith M. Costain,
'Theoretical History and tne Novel: the Scottish Fiction of John
Gait', English Literary History 43, 2 (1976), 342-365.
117. John Gait, Annals of the Parish, p.102.
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Considering Gait's argument, Annals of the Parish could almost escape the
title of'novel1. Yet even in those works wnich are more obviously
wortny of the term, Gait continues his anti-fictionalising approach.
The Entail, for example, contains a narrator who addresses the reader
most of the time as if relating a story, but also occasionally inserts
118
himself into the fiction as a cnaracter/observer. And when the
narrator of The Last of the Lairds appears in the fiction it is as an
active participant in the plot. Nevertheless, this narrator, who
appears quite conscious of his role as author of a novel, is attacked by
other characters in the tale as an anglicised intruder: 'Haud your nand.'
119
Nane o' your parleyvooing, ye loon that ye are!' Gait reinforces
such paradoxes when discussing his relationship to the novels. Writing
on The Last of the Lairds he states:
owing to some cause, which I no longer remember, instead
of an autobiography I was induced to make it a narrative
and in this respect it lost that appearance of truth and
nature which is, in my opinion, the great charm of such-
works. 120
An 'appearance of truth and nature', of course, prevents any questioning
of tne form's fictionality ana avoids the imputation of it possessing
any poelmical quality in relation to reality - nence Gait's regret.
Indeed, his writings on his own work can be seen as a continuation of
the process of disclaiming fictions. It also indicates his search for
a new form, not the 'novel' in which he could encapsulate nis view of
the world. Writing about Annals of the Parisn and The Ayrshire Legatees,
118. John Gait, The Entail: or The Lairds of Grippy 3 vols. (Edinburgh,
1822).
119. John Gait, The Last of the Lairds (Edinburgh, 1826), p.32.
120. Jonn Gait, The Literary Life and Miscellanies 3 vols. (Edinburgh,
1834) 1, p.270.
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he describes how they: 'have generally been received as novels and
I think, in consequence, they have both suffered, for neither of them
121
have, unquestionably, a plot.' Gait, too, is clearly troubled by,
and seeking to avoid, definitions of his work based on conventional
expectations of the form and function of the novel.
It would seem from the above examples, therefore, that Scottish
novelists have evolved means of encompassing recognition of the philoso¬
phical and artistic paradoxes of Calvinism in their work, and of
expressing an intrinsic awareness of the dichotomy between the
metaphysics of 'moral realism' and the techniques of 'literary realism.'
And in spite of the so-called failures of Scottish fiction, it would
appear that an encapsulation of Scottish concerns has been possible,
although the forms which this takes may offer challenges not only to
realism but also to conventional expectations of the nature and role of
the novel. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the approaches of
certain Scottish writers can be identified as constituting definite
patterns of fiction, as necessitated by the remnants of religion
within their culture and society.
121. Gait, Literary Life, 1, p.226.
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(iv) CHALLENGES TO REALISM
Since Calvinism first came to Scotland the original religious impetus
has obviously been lost, but until recently many of its social practices
remained. Yet this evolution does not mean that writers who attack
the hypocrisy, the intolerance and the social faces of Calvinism nave
wholly escaped its influence as a way of looking at the world and at
humanity's position within it. Neither Stevenson, Jenkins nor Spark
would give their approval to the manifestations of Calvinism in Scottish
society - in all three cases they would be more likely to attack them -
yet they retain a moral perspective which can be seen as adopting stances
typical of theoretical Calvinism. Attacking Calvinism in society, they
postulate a vision which is even more extreme in its desire for
absolutes of morality which cannot be realised in this world. With such
a vision, of course, they cannot use their novels as a means of showing
the reader how to live. The Calvinist belief that all activity on
earth is simply a stage through which fallen humanity must pass before
reaching Heaven, if Elected, or Hell, if Damned, lingers on. Those
writers who, perhaps unconsciously, have assimilated the legacy of this
attitude, translate it into a recognition that the novelist's role need
not primarily be concerned with guiding the reader into any social
morality, since the social world is potentially transient anyway. Their
strong sense of an ideal world, as opposed to a fallen reality, means
that for them fiction is the only possible means of realising their
unattainable vision. And yet, of course, another aspect of the Calvinist
legacy, a distrust of art, ensures their awareness of contradictions
inherent in tneir medium.
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Tensions between the need to attack the public faces of moral hypocrisy
which may result from Calvinist ethics, the desire to give fictional
expression to the concept of an absolute morality, and the awareness
of fiction as a potentially deceptive medium, creates a fascinating
construct in whicn Scottish novelists, and Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark
in particular, must operate.
Attacking the public face of Calvinism may seem a fairly simple exercise
in social criticism, but in the Scottish context it does have deeper
implications for the novelist. Writing of Calvinist teaching on
hypocrisy, Gordon Marshall states:
Calvinist pastors were themselves aware of this danger
and continually exhorted their flocks, on the one hand,
to seek assurance, to prove themselves in the faith by
their works ... but, on the other, warned them repeatedly
acainst the dangers of arroaant self-confidence and dead
faith. 122
The latter part of this comment gives some indication of the role into
which writers may be forced - that of destroying confidence in a world
ordered by relative moral values. And in achieving this end the writer
may, once again, have to question typical forms of the English novel
which tend to reinforce the reader's position through recognition of
shared values and a secure acceptance of the nature of reality within
society. In contrast the kind of Scottish writer under discussion has
to find forms which break down secure concepts of selfhood, destroying
the familiarity of social structures and forcing the reader to abandon
the usual rules for judging moral wortn. Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark
can be seen experimenting with various devices in order to achieve this
effect; they rely on surprising shifts of moral condemnation,
122. Marshall, Presbyteries and Profits, p.64.
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dislocations of authorial sympathy, and simple temporal discontinuity,
which all serve to place the reader in a position of subjectivity and
even uncertainty.
The subjectivity they achieve must, however, be balanced by their
presentation of some alternative concept of existence, an alternative
perception of values. They must also, therefore, create moments of
awareness for the reader, in which access to a different dimension may be
gained, a dimension removed from the restrictions of reality. Yet by
their very nature such moments of insight can only be temporary, and can
only be justifiable within the fiction. It is their task to find
fictional forms which can accommodate the expression of such complex
purposes. In the search for suitable forms, however, new problems arise.
Empnasising the subjectivity of the reader leads to a focus on the control
of the authorial persona. If the novelist assumes an external objectivity,
providing the only means of definition and understanding them s/he may be
open to accusations of playing the role of the God of Calvinism. Such
a stance would be a total denial of their sense of the innerent
fallibility of humanity. As author, the novelist must also find a means
of acknowledging his or her own fallibility, or of proving that authorial
control is only temporary, is for tne duration of the fiction, and is
not making any claims for a total superiority of perspective. The
writer must therefore evolve a method of indicating that s/he is only
aiming for moments of clarification-, offering a reorganisation of
perspective that can find no"reasonable correlative in reality. If
tne writer is to play God,the novel must be no more than a passing glimpse
of Heaven. Naturally the paradoxes of this situation produce a highly
developed awareness of tne pitfalls in fiction expressing an absolutist
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outlook, and a recognition that the reading process must be explicitly
highlighted as a conscious operation.
Attempting to fulfil all these needs in the various areas of the novel,
the writers under discussion are forced to develop variations of the
form. As a result the stable conventions of the realist novel are
either departed from .or questioned in several significant ways. Detailed
examination of the novels of Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark will obviously
provide the best opportunity for discussing the individual manipulation
of such devices, but at this stage it is worth pointing to some factors
which represent a shared concern. Despite the differences between the
authors, the question of language, the issue of temporality, and the
creation of character are all important elements which contribute to
their most significant shared characteristic - the challenge to realism
itself.
Language is recognised as a writer's central means of definition but one
which is always loaded with moral values, whether of approbation or
condemnation. Language also serves to create the illusion that literary
representation and verbal explanations have power over the basic
mysteries of existence. Language can achieve this almost invisibly
since, encouraged by the traditions of the English realist novel, and
without the benefit of post-structuralist treatises on the matter, most
readers still tend to treat language as if it were transparent. The
writers under consideration have therefore to ensure that their words
fall short, to such an extent that the reader can recognise language's
limitations, ambiguities, contradictions and inadequacies. Not only does
this- force the reader into continual definition and reinterpretation but
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also creates an awareness of the uncertainties endemic to conventional
guidelines for making moral judgements. The awareness of the
limitations of language has, of course, greatly increased in the last
eighty years - a change which has been reflected in fiction t-o a certain
extent. But the difference between a modernist or post-modernist
approach and those of the three Scottish novelists under discussion is
that in the latter case a distrust of language is used to mirror the
moral and philosophical patterns of tneir novels, to enact their sense
of the temporaneity and aroitrariness of this world, and to reflect their
uneasiness with the assumptions of the fictional medium.
The time spans of reality also begin to be questioned. In Ringan Gilhaize
and Confessions of a Justified Sinner the effects of a Calvinist concept
of predestination on the representation of time could be clearly seen.
This force therefore contributes to a loss of focus on the accuracy of
chronological representation as found in the 'realist tradition1. Seen
from an external and 'atemporal' perspective, with even the slightest
consciousness of the doctrine of predestination, the usual novelistic
ordering of cause and effect ceases to have the same importance. Time
can be manipulated either to establish new moral perspectives or simply
to reinforce a sense of uncertainty. Human temporal logic may be seen
as representing only one possible ordering of the world and does not
provide any real answers or secure interpretations in a universe governed
by moral absolutes. Even Sartre, admitting his own desire for extremes
(in a world of absolute freedom), points out that they can so easily pass
unperceived in the apparent logic of existence. And it is this apparent
123 •
logie of existence which tends to be imitated in the realist novel.
123. The realist novel accommodates determinism, the processes of cause
and effect, but not predestination.
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Here, then, is another convention from which those writers concerned
with absolutes must depart.
A similar need for a shift of emphasis can be discovered in the
representation of character. If humanity can know neither itself nor
God, any attempt to represent a 'rounded' character in full must have
limits. The Calvinist perspective thus highlights another 'deception'
in fiction which is usually concealed by the conventions of realism -
the idea that all facets of a person can be described either by another
character or by a narrator. As C.H. Rickword pointed out in 1926:
for 'character' is merely the term by which the reader
alludes to the pseudo-objective image he composes of
his responses to an author's verbal arrangements.
Unfortunately, that image once composed, it can be
criticised from any angle and its moral, political,
social or religious significance considered, all as
though it possessed an actual objectivity, were a figure
of the inferior realm of real life. 124
Through the awareness inherent in Calvinism, however, a character may
be judged in moral, political, social or religious terms but always with
a consciousness that this cannot be a full representation, that an
element of mystery must remain. That knowledge which is concealed by
the assumptions of realism must, again, be made explicit. Novels
written from this viewpoint gain a paradoxical freedom through the
process since the reader is both permitted to interpret the characters
within an apparently realistic framework and to see them functioning in
a symbolic and representative way, without any kind of contradiction.
Once again the three authors obviously achieve this through different
methods but in each case a variety of characterisation tecnniques can
124. C.H. Rickword, 'A Note on Fiction', Edge11 Rickword, Essays and
Opinions 1921-1931, ed. Alan Young (London, 1974), 231-241,
JWvr r «•-
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exist since tne authors make total commitment to none.
All tnese elements within the worKs of Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark
would appear to present challenges to the conventional representation of
reality. Yet in order to examine those aspects of realism which they
challenge it is necessary first to consider the implications of realism
which they wish to avoid. Realism can be seen as a way of offering a
paradigm of reality, a means both of directly representing the world and
of coming to terms with that representation. Stendhal describes the
novel as 'a mirror journeying down tne high road. Sometimes it reflects
to your view the azure blue of heaven, sometimes the mire in the puddles
125
on the road below.' And George Eliot reinforces the conventional
realist position when she states: 'I aspire to give no more than a
faithful account of man and things as they have mirrored themselves in
126
my mind.1 Both remarks indicate tne way in wnich realism is a
matter not only of technique but also of attitude. In George Eliot's
case, for example, it implies a certain assurance in the world and its
depictabi1ity, in its abundance of material, and a confidence that a
consequential and logical pattern will emerge from the examination of
such material.
'Realism' is a term which has held and developed various meanings since
it was first used in the middle ages. Kant, however, defined it as being
opposed to idealism - an opposition wnich has useful implications for a
literary as well as a philosophical discussion. It is a definition
125. Stendhal, Scarlet and Black, translation Margaret Shaw
(Harmondsworth, 1953)-, p.365.
125. George Eliot, Adam Bede, second edition, 3 vols. (Edinourgh, 1859),
11, p.2.
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wnicii J.P. Stern uses in his work on realism, pointing out that realism
implies an assent to the world whereas with idealism: 'the relation
that obtains between a work of literature and the world outside is ...
127
negative, expressive of a problematic attitude towards the world.1
Stern, however, goes on to discuss an aspect of idealism which differs
slightly from the opposition to realism that can be found in Scottish
writing. Arguing that idealism is still concerned witn the world, he
states that it: 're-enters the world as realism knows it and becomes an
element in a portrayal of that world... At this point idealism ceases
to be a philosopher's abstract scheme of 'universal laws' and takes on
128
the form of ... a character's concrete beliefs.' Yet if the
philosophical implications of Calvinism are to be accepted it would appear
that in the novels under discussion - although to a varying degree - this
second stage described by Stern is never reached; the ideal moral position
is seen as having very little effect in reality, nor can it be fully
described through those operating within that reality. Moral idealism
in a Calvinist context is not a force with the potential for changing
the world. And even for those who adhere only to its desire for moral
absolutes, idealism is an essentially pessimistic force since it insists
on acknowledging the limitations of reality.
Nevertheless, in order for the writer to point to a gap between the
ideal and the reality s/he must also admit contact with the latter.
Indeed, in the cases of Stevenson, Jenkins and, to a certain extent",
Spark, their dislike of the material manifestations of Calvinism is so
great that they need to create seme opportunities for attacking its social
127. Stern, On Realism, p.44
128. Stern, p.45.
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realities. Their search, therefore, is for a means of accommodating
their own brands of 'moral realism', their absolutism, in conjunction
witn these conventions of literary realism they may find useful. For
tnis reason none of them completely abandon realist conventions and
turn whole-heartedly to teenniques of tne experimental novel; althougn,
of course, the commitment of writers from such different backgrounds to
one method or another obviously varies. Nor is it possible for them
to reduce their novels to the level of linguistic games alone, since
fiction's integration with reality is the only point at wnicn they can
bring botn moral dimensions together. In this respect Stern's
definitions again prove a useful contrast. He describes idealism as
129
being tested from 'the vantage point of the real.' In the novels
under discussion here it would appear that the situation is reversed;
that reality is being tested from tne vantage point of the ideal - and
is found wanting. The authors under consideration are not questioning
our actual experience of reality per se, but are asking us to look
again at our interpretations of reality and to see tneir limitations in
forming a total explanation of tne moral dimension to existence. They
are not attempting to destroy all semblances of reality in fiction, but
merely to undermine our confidence in its authority. Given that the
awareness of a national religion, without necessarily a belief in it,
can structure our responses to existence, it is possible to see Robert
Louis Stevenson, Robin Jenkins and Muriel Spark as writers wno share the
strong influence of Scotland's Calvinist past. That shared past has
instilled in them an awareness of the dichotomy between a morality of
absolutes and the translation of such values, through the mitigations of
social experience, into a purely relative morality. Their novels, as a
129. Stern, p.45.
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result, are explorations of the implications, for fiction and for
metaphysics, of the awareness of an external morality. Without
necessarily believing in divine order, they nevertneiess investigate the
effects of perceiving reality as a realm in which perfectabi1ity may
never be realised. Attempting in their work to effect a realisation
of a moral dimension which is external to practical considerations, even
if only temporarily, they avoid a total commitment to the conventions of
realism. In so doing they may indicate the complexities of their moral
perspectives, but they are also forced to move outwith traditional images
of tne patterns of Scottish literature. By questioning the conventions
of realist fiction they create their own individual variations on the
form of the novel. The nature and significance of their innovations
can, however, only be fully discerned througn the detailed examination
of a range of their works.
CHAPTER TWO
ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON: THE EXOTIC AND UNFAMILIAR
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What is rignt is that for whicn a man's central self
is ever ready to sacrifice immediate or distant
interests; what is wrong is what tne central self dis¬
cards or rejects as incompatible with the fixed design
of righteousness.
To maKe this admission is to lay aside all hope of
definition. That which is right upon this theory is
intimately dictated to each man by himself, but can
never be rigorously set forth in language, and never,
above all, be imposed upon another. 1
This comment by Robert Louis Stevenson, from his essay 'Lay Morals', not
only provides a clear illustration of his moral pnilosopny and his own
awareness of its innerent contradictions, but also indicates the nature
of the problem whicn ne chose to confront through the processes of
fiction. The following two chapters will explore the implications of
the dualities expressed in the aoove statement, witn reference to
individual works, and will attempt to show that the apparent literalism
of morality expressed in nis comment is, in several important ways, an
i1lusion.
Stevenson's statement emphasises tne essentially self-ruled nature of
moral behaviour, pointing to a measure of disbelief in the efficacy of
moral rules as laid down by society. Yet nis words, also assume that
an 'inner sense' of morality, wnich conforms to 'seme fixed design of
righteousness', does exist. And his references to the impossibility of
definition througn language, in the course of which he himself defines
morality tnrough linguistic expression, reflects the paradoxical nature
1. Robert Louis Stevenson, 'Lay Morals', The Works of Robert Louis
Stevenson, Skerryvore Edition, 30 vols (London, 192,4-1926), XXII,
155-2u9, p.1t>2. (All further references to Works will oe to this
edition.)
of his viewpoint. In spite of his assumption of moral judgement as
being ultimately attributable to the individual, his language indicates
a belief in the abstract concept of a definite ana aosolute moral system,
at least as a potential. The phrase 'that wnich is right1 strongly
implies the need to recognise good and evil as part of the external
structuring of our universe. The paradoxes evident in a man who
believes that morality resides with the individual but who wishes for a
system of absolutes to which the individual may aspire, wno doubts the
validity of language as a means of moral definition, yet who continues
attempting to define morality in his writing, are contradictions which
find reflection both in the style and the subjects of Stevenson's fiction.
The paradoxes of his moral perception also present certain parallels
with those of Calvinism. Although Stevenson rejected the religiousity
of his parents and the even more fervent zeal of his nurse, Alison
Cunningham, those childhood influences remained a potent force in his
2
mind. And for all his later condemnation of the social manifestations
of Calvinism, his fictions display a clear desire to return to moral
precepts very similar to those of original Calvinism, before it became
a rigid behavioural code for Scottish society. Many of his works
reveal a particular cast of mind which relates closely to that basic
duality of perspective found in the writings of Calvin; and tnose works
operate as the embodiment of an individually developed metaphysical
concept wnicn has many links with a Calvinist outlook on the world.
2. 'For the only grim thing about Cummy was her faith, learned under
the elaborate expoundings of Calvinist doctrine in cold seaside
churches. So, long before he could read, he was two thirds of a
bigot... His parents were seriously religious. She was a daughter
of tne Manse and an enthusiastic amateur of foreign missions... Thomas
was an able amateur theologian.'
J.C. Furnas, Voyage to Windward: The Life of Robert Louis Stevenson
(London, 1952), p.31.
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The view of humankind as existing in a void, an awareness of the Dasic
mystery of personality, and a sense of human limitations in comprehending
both the external world and the inner self, are all mental cnaracteristics
whicn Stevenson shared with the Calvinism he castigated. Altnough ne
did not attribute the omniscience lacking in humanity to any specific
God, he nevertheless used his fiction to point towards an external
structuring of tne world which could allow it to be seen in terms of
absolute moral values. And in his fictions, by recreating that state of
uncertainty which ne perceives to be humanity's, he places the reader
within a context of his own desire for moral absolutes. Lacking that
belief in God or Heaven which provides the ultimate source of inspiration
for any Calvinist, his novels and short stories offer no concrete
resolution of tne dichotomies they create, yet tnrough these fictions
Stevenson instils ; in his readers the awareness of a potential
alternative to tne relativity of 'reality'. Nevertheless, in order to
achieve even that perception, he is forced to signify absolutes within
his work at the same time as he indicates that such insights can only be
temporary, by his stressing of the fictionality of nis own creations, and
nis avoidance of a total commitment to tne reassuring illusions of
'real ism'.
3y way of presenting this dual perspective he uses the distance between
life and art as a means of indicating fiction's central contradiction,
pointing to its failure to encompass all of life's dimensions, but
emphasising its capacity for illuminating definitions of existence which
may be lost in the muddled totality of everyday reality. As a result
ne had no choice but to deny realism total validity as a technique.
'Life,' he wrote, 'is monstrous, infinite, illogical, abrupt and poignant;
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a work of art, in comparison, is neat, finite, self-contained, rational,
flowing and emasculate.1,3 His fiction can be seen as taking this
contradiction, both in form and in metaphysics, as its core. From
this centre he can create those surfaces which explore the significance
of conflicts not only between art and life but between the possible and
the actual, the spiritual dimension and the earthly reality, and, of
course, between the techniques of 'literary realism' and a philosophy
of 'moral realism1. Yet he also avoids limiting the significance of
his fiction to single interpretations which must be directly applicable
to reality. His awareness of this intrinsic 'duplicity' of fiction is
linked to his suspicion of language as expressed in his 'Lay Morals'.
His novels and short stories carbine the awareness of humankind's basic
inability to define, with a demand that definitions need to be made in
order to give some pattern to existence. By linking these two ideas
he offers a fictional recreation of that most essential contradiction
between subjectivity of being (the awareness that ultimately all
perception and valuations are dependent upon self) and the desire for
some external moral objective which will give meaning to life.
The contradictions which Stevenson presents in his work are, arguably,
always evident in the fictional medium to some extent. Nevertheless,
they appear to be more noticeable in the work of those writers who are
interested in philosophies of existence rather than those of social
behaviour. Kierkegaard, for example, struggling to bring his
philosophies into line with his religious thinking, found it necessary
3. Stevenson, ' A Humble Remonstrance', Works, XXV, 155-166, p.160.
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to present his philosophical writings as fiction, illustrating a
dialectic somewhat similar to tnat of Stevenson. As Edith Kern writes
of Kierkegaard:
Thus he believed in an eternal essential trutn of
which the individual in his most passionate
inwardness, was able to partake, a truth which was
totally subjective and yet transcended subjectivity.
Here, in fact, Kierkegaard saw the paradox of
existence; that in man - and in Christ in the most
exalted way - eternal essential truth had come into
being in time. 4
The struggle with such a paradox obviously cannot be satisfactorily
encapsulated by realist techniques of fiction; a realist approach to
fiction will order life into a describable form and in so doing not
only glosses over the deeper dimensions of existence but also helps
reinforce a sense of confidence, even complacency, in a reality which
can be easily accommodated within human frames of reference. In
contrast, fiction which moves away from a complete adherence to tne
techniques of realism may break down beliefs in an order of existence
which can be empirically described, and draws attention to tne
ambiguities and ironies of being. Stevenson's aims in his fiction
therefore appear as ambitious as those expressed by Jean-Paul Sartre's
narrator in Nausea, Roquentin, who gives up his attempt at biography
and decides instead to write a new kind of book:
I don't quite know what kind - but you would have to
guess, behind the printed words, behind the pages, at
something which would not exist, which would be above
existence. A story, for example, something that could
never happen, an adventure. It would have to oe
beautiful and hard as steel and make people ashamed of
their existence. 5
4. Edith Kern, Existential Thought and Fictional Technique: Kierxegaard,
Sartre,Beckett (London and New Haven.. 1970), pp.4-5.
5. Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, translation Robert Baldick (Harmondsworth,, 1965)
p.252.
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Interestingly Sartre, who has claimed: 'A fictional technique always
relates back to the novelist's metaphysics1, suggests much the same
method of providing an alternative to the-restricting codes of a
relative reality as Stevenson finds. Although Sartre's existentialist
solution is obviously very different, tne desire to point at something
'behind tne pages', however, is very similar to Stevenson's aims. And
certainly in nis adventure stories Stevenson does achieve fictions which
as 'beautiful and hard as steel'.
Yet, in spite of this obvious lack of a total commitment to realism in
Stevenson's oeuvre, his moral outlook has usually been discussed in
terms of social elements of his character, experience and behaviour.
His Calvinist upbringing and subsequent reaction against it, his bohemian
youth, marriage to an older woman, and his South Sea Islands paternalism,
have all been explored as both the evidence of, and the reasons behind
nis moral outlook.7 However, it is also possible to see his fiction
as belonging to an important tradition of dramatic presentations of
metaphysical theories. And through this approach a far more complex
moral awareness is revealed than ever becomes apparent through study of
biographical details. It is in this light, therefore, that this thesis
wishes to examine Stevenson's work, his moral perspectives and his
fictional tecnniques.
In looking at Stevenson's work in the light of his metaphysical concerns
6. Sartre, 'On The Sound and the Fury: Time in the Work of Faulkner',
Literary and Philosophical EssaysT translation Annette Michelson
(London, 1955), 79-86, p.79.
7. See Jenni Calder, R.L.S. A Life Study (London, 1980); J.C. Furnas
Voyage to Windward (London, 1552); and Leslie Fiedler, 'R.L.S.
Revisited', Noj ITT Thunder (London, 1963).
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three aspects of his fictional technique reflect his interests:
language, plot and imagery- Like Hogg and Gait, Stevenson displays in
his work a marked distrust of language. As a device of pseudo-definition,
creating tne illusion of power over reality through the act of naming,
it offers reassurance and a sense of identity. It thus can acnieve a
temporary denial of the basic mysteries of life and personality. And it
is the value-laden nature of tne naming process which enables us to
create a system of moral imperatives which are botn within our linguistic
comprehension and our moral capacity. Stevenson, as aware of these
limitations of language as he was of the limitations of fiction, took care
that both should be conveyed to the reader. His linguistic approach
therefore is to create a surface reality of events, as alluded to by tne
words on the page, but to allow this to fall short of the issues raised,
exploiting the deluding consistencies apparently created by the story
telling process. And in this way he achieves that undermining of
apparently fixed linguistic values which is necessary in presenting his
moral perceptions.
Such a technique obviously also has important implications for the story¬
telling process itself, since it must point to some Kind of external
significance oeyond the events of the plot. Here the terms of fabula
and sjuzhet, as used in Russian Formalism, offer a useful distinction,
since the plot presentation of events, the sjuzhet,can be used to
affirm some meaning which is not present in the actual cnronological
sequence of events, the fabula. And since Stevenson tends to write
8. The terms fabula and sjuzhet are taken in tne sense used by the Russian
Formalists; fabula, the story as a series of events, ana sjuzhet, the
story as reported in the narrative.
See Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature,
Deconstruction (London, 1981), pp.170-171.
Culler also describes tne two elements as existing in a state of
'undecidability', which: 'is the effect of the convergence of two
narrative logics that do not give rise to a synthesis.' (p.181)
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adventure stories, or novels with clearly defined plots of action, the
distinction is fairly easy to make. Nevertheless, his fictions lead
the reader into unravelling the connections between the different levels
of discourse, and through that exploration to share in the defining
and interpreting process. By placing us in a position of access to
both fabula and sjuzhet we are given a dual perspective. Altnougn in
the events of the plot, therefore, Stevenson may illustrate tne reasoning
tnat: 'Morals are a personal affair; in the war of righteousness every
9
man fights for his own hand1, ne also allows the reader an understanding
of more complex moral paradoxes wnicn may contradict tne simple dictum.
It is through the use of images which point towards the problematics of
his moral stance that Stevenson creates in the reader the expectation
of some alternative to the significances established by the plot.
Apparently arbitrary images are frequently stressed at the expense of
descriptions of more 'major' events. Moreover, rather than using images
to guide the reader into a single interpretation of events he varies
symbols and their meanings, thus creating a sense of changing potential
and of mutability. Images used in tnis way demand assessment from the
reader not only in terms of their relevance to the events of the plot
but also as general symbols in the context of an external universe, as
part of a pattern that is beyond our more immediate and direct powers of
comprenension. Again, because of his use of adventure story and folk¬
tale formats, he has full scope for introducing a range of such images
which may be alien to our everyday processes of rationalisation.
Stevenson's concerns, therefore, can be seen as centred around the suDjectivity
9. 'Lay Morals', p.176.
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of perception, Doth physical and moral, and in this respect he again
parallels a Calvinist reaction to existence. 'Life,1 ne wrote, 'may
De compared, not to a single tree, but to a great and complicated forest;
circumstance is more swiftly changing than a shadow, language much more
inexact than the tools of a surveyor.' ^ As a novelist, therefore, he
is working with inexact tools to define a shadowy, undefinable entity.
And, with his Calvinist inheritance, he also seems aware of the idea
that the individual has no real fixity, and is incapaole of fully
communicating a sense of identity - a further complication of nis percept¬
ions. 'No man was ever so poor that he could express all he has in him
by words, looks or actions; nis true knowledge is eternally incommunicaDle,
11
for it is a knowledge of himself, he wrote. So, rather than attempting
to force any kind of correlation between such fluid concepts, which
would only lead to ommission and falsity every step of the way,
Stevenson attempts to recreate the flux of humanity's state. A reading
of his novels thus becomes a mimesis not of the empirical world but of
our own attempts to decipner that world. By trying to comprehend tne
polarities which he establishes through a series of shifting significations,
we too reach the point of recognising humanity's failure to encompass
existence in any single understanding. Yet such a recognition also
creates for the reader a momentary appreciation of the ineluctable.
Aware of our own comprenension as limited, we proceed to seex means of
bridging those gaps created by the author throughout the fissures of the
text. And in this attempt we snare with Stevenson the search, and desire,
for some form of external and absolute structuring of the universe.
10. 'Lay Morals', p.166.
11. 'Lay Morals', p.159.
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The essentially ephemeral nature of the experiences offered py
Stevenson's fiction, then, can De seen as bearing certain similarities
to the dream process, witn images and minor incidents apparently assuming
a disproportionate significance. Moreover, the significance nighlignted
may have no direct correlation with the more obvious moral issues raised
by the novel's events. A certain vague yearning after meaning, fulfilled
only by glimpses of truth, with an indefinable sense of recognition,
alien to waKing experience yet familiar in dreams, is a feature common to
all Stevenson's fictions. And he himself discussed the dream process
in relation to his techniques. In 'A Chapter on Dreams', he describes
the 'Brownies' who are the slaves of his imagination, labouring wnile he
sleeps, and tells how they created for him a perfectly worKed story of a
young man, his father and the woman he loves. Relating the tale's neat
conclusion, he adds: 'I could not outdo - could not pernaps equal - that
crafty artifice ... by which the same situation is twice presented and
12
the two actors twice brought face to face over the evidence.'
Obviously tne symmetry and patterning gives him aesthetic delight wnile
the concept of poetic justice appeals to his moral senses. But nis
greatest satisfaction seems to lie in the fact that the suoconscious
mind of the dreamer can throw out a definite meaning from the ineffable
mass of the sleeper's thoughts. The duality of such a process - the
contrast of snarp outlines and a hazy significance - can also be seen in
Stevenson's writing. And, as an author, ne chooses to adopt a position
akin to that of the brownies' 'master'; the images and ideas may derive
from his consciousness but he refuses to interpret tneir meanings,
merely sharing with the reader a stance of naif-understanding helplessness
in a world tnat gains definitions from sources oeyond nis control. Since
12. Stevenson, 'A Chapter on Dreams', Works XXVI, 124-137, p.134.
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the fiction which he descriDes is also part of the dream process, it
cannot be related too closely to tne world of reality and of waking
experience. Dreams may be interpreted but are rarely explained in
terms of direct relevance to the 'real' world; the two realms remain
linxea but separate. So Stevenson likewise leads his reader into a
struggle Detween the universe presented in his fictions - one in wnich
aDSolutes can operate - and the reality that is the reader's experience.
The disjunction thus created then becomes an essential part of the
'meaning' of any of nis works.
A passage from 'Lay Morals' again helps to illuminate the necessary
dicnotomy established by his fictions. In the introduction to tne essay
itself he writes that this book:
is truly secular and temporal, casts not a glance
beyond tne little lit, tumultuous island of man's
life upon the vasty darkness of eternity; and
still forgetful of the great myths or more majestic
and mysterious verities busies itself close at nand
with the pleasures and prudence of today. 13
The narrator's claimed intention to concentrate on the daily and mundane
aspects of life is contradicted by the metaphorical image of an island
against a oackground of eternity, an image whicn, by its visionary
effect, implies that a higher, potentially transfigurative means of
perceiving existence is possible. Furthermore, in its wider context,
the image expresses tne basic contradiction of Stevenson's fictional
approacn, witn the opposition of extravagant language containing a hint
of the fantastic - 'vasty darkness', 'tumultuous', 'majestic and
mysterious verities' - with tne pedestrian conclusion of'the pleasures
13. 'Lay Morals', p.159.
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and prudence of today.1 The poetic language draws upon tne imagination -
contrary to the autnor's purported intention-wnile tne banality of the
final phrase draws only upon received convention and inevitably appears
unattractive in comparison. The dialectic of aim and achievement is
furtner maintained by the phrase 'still forgetful', which is in itself
a contradiction, implying that those 'great myths' and 'verities' must
exist, if to forget them involves an act of deliberate intent. And
the terms of descriptions used in sucn phrases recognise, with obvious
admiration, the potential existence of such absolutes; a strange
admiration coming from a speaker who claims a desire to disregard them.
Language and image thus permit the text to convey a meaning contrary to
its stated intention, while allowing the contradiction itself to carry
significance through the attention that has been drawn to it.
Through the processes described above Stevenson avoids making any
didactic moral comments; and it is this internalisation of morality into
fiction that nas led some of his critics to argue that his fiction is
not concerned witn moral absolutism. Edwin Eigner, for example, points
out: 'Stevenson was sufficiently aware that his belief in pure wicxedness
14
was dangerous to his art,1 and goes on to observe: 'Stevenson is not
busy separating the sheep from the goats. Instead, he observes now
Christians may regard the world, and how their creed sometimes makes
them unable to accept nature, either human or external, incapaole of
living with their own passions or with the passions of the physical
15
universe.' Yet, in spite of appreciating the implications of some




aspects of Stevenson's moral pnilosopny, by perceiving a belief in pure
wicKeaness as inimical to tne novelists art, Eigner is still adhering
to certain critical positions dominated by liberal numanism, whicn demand
that morality be pragmatic and that it be represented in realist terms.
His view tends to ignore the alternative posited by Sartre, tnat different
moralities demand different modes of fictional expression.
Even tnose critics who are directly interested in the links between
Stevenson's moral philosophy and his fiction tend to view both in the
light of established English traditions. Writing on Kidnapped Wallace
Robson presents an interesting case for seeing a movement -from Calvinist
to Aristotelian morality in Stevenson's work, with Kidnapped signifying
16
the point of transition. His argument is based upon those categories
provided by Gilbert Ryle in his article on 'Jane Austen and the Moralists'.
Ryle's definition of the two moralities echoes the division of 'moral
realism' and 'reciprocal' morality as defined by Piaget and discussed in
the first chapter of this tnesis:
A moralist of tne Calvinist type thinks, like a criminal
lawyer, of human beings as either Saved or Damned, either
Elect or Reject, either children of Virtue or children of
Vice, either heading for Heaven ... or Hell, either White
or Black, either Innocent or Guilty, either Saints or
Sinners. The Calvinist's moral psychology is correspondingly
bi-polar ...
In contrast with this, the Aristotelian pattern of
ethical ideas represents people as differing from one another
in degree and not in kind, and differing from one another
not in respect just of a single generic Sunday attribute,
Goodness, say, or else Wickedness, but in respect of a whole
spectrum of specific week-day attributes. 17
16. W.W. Robson, 'On Kidnapped', Stevenson and Victorian Scotland,
ed. Jenni Calder (Edinburgh, 1981), 8b-106.
17. Giluert Ryle, 'Jane Austen and the Moralists', Critical Essays,
Collected Papers vol.1 (London, 1971), 276-291, p.284.
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Ryle supports this distinction with example and evidence of its
correlative effect on fictional technique. It is, however, necessary
to be aware of the direction of his argument; in particular his idea
that Jane Austen's more Aristotelian morality is an advance on that
of the eighteenth century novelists. The distinction therefore implies
approbation for the Aristotelian morality and carries certain notions
of 'progress' which are then carried over into Robson's argument. In
the latter's article on Kidnapped this leads to the condemnation of
Calvinist morality being extended to criticism of its adverse influence
on fictional sophistication. According to Ryle, non-Aristotelian
characters are, if evil; 'black cardboard and nothing more';while:
'The less frequent angelic or saintly characters are equally unalive,
1 ft
flat and forgettable.' Robson, who obviously admires Stevenson,
therefore has good reasons for wishing to see an Aristotelian sensibility
operating in his work.
Such a viewpoint, however, highlights one of the problems created by
writing from a Calvinist or Absolutist perspective. Robson bases his
assessment of moral perspective on the quality of tne rounded character;
yet although a character may be rounded as a creation,it may also be
placed outwitn a realist context, and can be placed in a position where
it should be judged in absolutist terms. Moreover, even an apparently
'rounded' cnaracter can contain extremes of good and baa which are not
integrated and may run contrary to relativist expectations. Robson's
argument about the morality of Kidnapped calls for a more complex
response to the characters of David Balfour and Alan Breck, in light of
the difficult moral decisions they are seen to make, especially after the
18. Ryle, p.284.
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Appin murder. His argument for them as representatives of an
Aristotelian morality will be discussed in more detail in the section
on Kidnapped in the following chapter, but at this point it offers a
useful illustration of the common focus on characterisation as being
the major feature of a novel. Such an emphasis, however, ignores the
fact that characters may be presented within the context of a novel whose
moral code they do not themselves represent, and that the main thrust of
a novel's morality may lie within the perspective which is established by
the whole reading process - a process which may not be intended . to
achieve a direct representation of reality. Accepting that a novel may
involve more than characterisation, it can be seen as a series of
interrelated events, images, descriptions, reflections and characters
which together provides a background for tne search for meaning and for
definition. Stevenson, in fact, appears to present his readers with
situations which cannot be comprehended in terms of a relative,
Aristotelian morality. Yet neither do they directly advocate a
Calvinist outlook. Rather, by a process of confrontation and
reinterpretation they force the reader to seek definitions and to
consider the limitations with which they are faced. In this way
Stevenson succeeds both in indicating the potential for a metaphysical
dimension to existence, and in making us aware of the impossibility of our
ever achieving complete access to that dimension. Therefore, although
Robson may perceive in Stevenson's work a morality which is 'problematic,
19
relative, regionally and culturally conditioned', it may be a type of
morality which the author does not wish us to accept. This morality
cannot offer a total solution since the novel has already made us aware
19. Robson, 'On Kidnapped', p.100.
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of an alternative to it, one wnich - because of the non-realistic nature
of his ideals - cannot be taken outwith the novel and applied to 'reality'
in so far as it is defined by the realist novel.
Through such a method of opposing contradictions Stevenson explores the
implications of his own 'ideal* desire for an immanent structure to the
universe. And in his best works - noticably in The Master of Ballantrae
and in The Ebb-Tide- he allows the reader to share his desire for an
external, absolute morality. There appears, however, to be little
purpose in arguing that this is the expression of a specifically Calvinist
morality (in the sense of the Scottish kirk), or even of Christian dogma.
Critics have attempted to reconcile his opposition to Calvinism with his
moral writings but fail to achieve a satisfactory resolution. In
The Faith of Robert Louis Stevenson John Kelman can only reconcile his
description of himself as a 'youthful -atheist' with his morality and his
sporadic churchgoing in later life by describing his beliefs as a:
'religion of sentiment.'20 Jenni Calder in R.L.S. A Life Study argues
that Stevenson was directly opposed to Calvinism: 'To place any human
being beyond the reach of fulfilment ana salvation, which was precisely
what Calvinism did, was intolerable and destructive. He tried to say
21
this over and over again.' Yet even she cannot deny the influence it
had on his thinking. In talking of'Jekyll and Hyde1, for example, she
states: 'It is the Calvinist view that man must maintain a constant
struggle with evil, that the slightest lapse in vigilance will allow the
20. John Kelman, The Faith of Robert Louis Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1S03),
pp.4-5.
21. J- Calder, R.L.S. A Life Study, p.190.
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Devil to triumph', and she appears to take for granted Stevenson's
understanding of such precepts. Therefore, although it is reasonable
to assume that Stevenson was opposed to the practices of Calvinist
religion as he had experienced them in his childhood, and in the
teachings of the nineteenth century Scottish church and the social codes
of EdinDurgh, it is also clear that his metaphysical concerns were
deeply affected by the most basic Calvinist precepts which lingered on in
the Scottish cast of mind, changing little despite social dilution. And,
although he may have rejected it as a religion, Calvinism still remained
an important structuring element in his world view,expressed as a desire
for moral absolutes; a desire which had a striking effect upon the kind
of fiction he wrote.
The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will be devoted to two novels,
one, Treasure Island, from the beginning of his career, tne other,
The Ebb-Tide, from near the end of his life. In the consideration of
these works, and of his other most notable South Sea fiction, tne short
story 'The Beach of Falesa', the clearest and most successful expression
of his moral concerns, an expression liberated by the foreign location
and unclouded by the problematics of a real Calvinism wnich beset his
Scottish novels, can be found. The Scottish novels, with their less
clearly defined approach to moral absolutism, will then be discussed in
the subsequent chapter.
Treasure Island
Stevenson's disregard for realism has led to his being frequently
described as a writer of romance and, on first impression, Treasure
22. Calder, R.L.S., p.221.
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23Island would appear to provide strong evidence for this view. Yet
altnougn Stevenson may adopt some of the conventions of tne romance
genre, he is not content merely to play by the rules of that form; even
in this apparently simple adventure story he adapts formal elements ....
to encompass a distinctive moral dimension.
The world of Treasure Island, that of sea-captains.pirates, desert
islands and buried treasure, immediately locates itself in the map of
fiction. Stevenson may provide detailed descriptions of setting, may
pay attention to material necessities such as food and clothing, but
such information serves only to facilitate the reader's entry into, and
acceptance of, adventures of the imagination. Only at the beginning
and end of the novel are any pointers given as to considerations outside
the enclosed world of the tale, to that other world in which social
contingencies, financial constraints and legalised justice operate.
In the novel's conclusion it is hinted that Jim will return to a steady,
secure and 'normal' life through choice: 'Oxen and wain-ropes would not
bring me back again to that accursed island.' (p.227). Nevertheless nis
adventures are seen as a necessary step of preparation for that safe
existence. The reader, aware of a relative moral code existing cutwith
the parameters of the story, beyond the comprehension of the buccaneers
who operate in terms of black and white values, can also respond to an
absent 'real world' which is always implied as a correlative to Jim's
experiences. The simple device of first person narration, for example,
acts as a reminder that he survived his adventures and escaped from
'Treasure Island.' The novel therefore operates as a 'Bildungsroman',
23. Stevenson, Treasure Island, Works II. All further page references
are to this edition.
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in the sense that it provides the opportunities for Jim to expiate
inner moral conflicts through encountering various absolute concepts
of murality before taking his place in the world of relativist values.
And the opportunity for a similar experience is given to the reader.
For the duration of the novel we botn accept the adventure world and
the morality wnich dominates it. Yet we also bring to the novel an
awareness of the confines of our own reality, and of the relativity
wnich it tends to impose. A disjunction is thus created between our
awareness of a reality outwith the fiction and our experience of the world
within its boundaries. And tnis disjunction allows the novel to express
a duality of perspective similar to that of an absolute morality which
is continually having to come to terms with disparity between the real
and the ideal.
Stevenson is aole to contain such tensions in Treasure Island because of
its apparent allegiance to the romance form. Northrop Frye defines
24
adventure as 'the essential element of plot' in romance, and Stevenson,
through tne sequence of adventures in the novel, sustains our expectations
of its romance format. However, from this basis of apparent formal
consistence, he can also examine various conflicting perceptions of
morality. The fiction presents the reader with contradictions in iaeas
of morality, yet we are never asKed to choose a single morality and use
it as a means of judging plot events. But from the safety of the formal
conventions, held together by the strong adventure element, Stevenson
can focus on clashing interpretations of morality. The reader, however,
need never extrapolate them from the apparent 'romance' and apply them
24. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, 1957),
p.186.
101
to reality. The effect thus achieved is in marked contrast to later
novels such as The Ebb-Tide, in which the adventure element is not so
clearly distinguished from the moral issues, and in which fragments of the
tale remain unresolved by the artistic scnema, disturbing any attempts
to reacn a coherent single interpretation of the work. Treasure Island
also defies single interpretations of its morality, but its plot and its
form nevertheless operate as means of containing thematic contradictions.
The novel's allegiance to the romance form is also, however, exploitative
in nature, manipulating romance conventions of image and symbol. As
Northrop Frye indicates: 'We may call this major adventure, the element
25
that gives literary form to the romance, the quest.' Although the
title, of 'The Sea-Cook' was originally considered for the novel, 'Treasure
Island' offers a more suitable clue to the tale's central motif: the
treasure, although not immediately of central significance, does serve
to provide an ostensible reason for the 'quest' theme. Yet by linking
the treasure motif with that of the 'island' Stevenson extends the
effect of his image. The concept of an island, an isolated microcosm
framed by tne sea, is of prime importance to his concerns. And the sea
round Treasure Island is restless arid inescapable:
I have never seen the sea quiet round Treasure Island.
The sun might blaze overhead, tne air be without a
breath, the surface smooth and blue, but still these
great rollers would be running along all tne external
coast, thundering and thundering by day and night; and
I scarce believe there is one spot in the island where
a man would be out of earshot of their noise. (p.140)
Not only does the sea-surrounded island indicate an environment outwith
the confines of everyday existence, but the image also presents a
25. Frye, p.187.
102
paradigm of the adventure novel itself, in the concept of a wider,
external and inescapable world, pressing in on and framing an inner world
wnicn has rigidly defined boundaries. In symbolic terms the sea is
also a useful image of flux and lack of definition, providing a
representation of those relative values inherent in the reader by which
the morality of the novelistic experience is framed. uur perceptual
uncertainty emerges in sharp contrast to the definition and clarity with
which Stevenson presents his fictional world.
The use of such images is a recurring feature of the novel. In his
book on Stevenson David Daiches mentions the novel's emphasis on
interiors and exteriors, pointing in particular to the intrusion of 3illy
Bones into Jim Hawkins' secure world, with the Squire's residence offering
2.6
Jim his last chance of a safe interior until he returns from the island.
However, this imagery is also apparent in the more minor incidents: Jim
in the apple-barrel, his walxing into the stockade when it is full of
pirates, Jim and Israel Hands on board the drifting Hispaniola, the image
of Silver standing in the shadow while Jim stands in the light: 'The
sky was bright and cloudless overnead, and the tops of the trees snone
rosily in the sun. But where Silver stood with his lieutenant all was
still in shadow, and they waded knee deep in a low wnite vapour.' (p. 124)
Dominating all, of course, is tne image of tne Black Spot, especially
the one given to Silver by the pirates, cut out of a Bible and, by cnance,
bearing tne message on tne back: 'Without are dogs ana murderers.'
(p.192) It does not, therefore,_ seem too tenuous a connection, to relate
such images to the central theme of the novel, to tne search for a means
26. David Daiches, Robert Louis Stevenson: A Revaluation (London, 1947).
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of resolving moral roles through the creation or destruction of
boundaries, through the merging of internal and external perspectives.
And on a more general symbolic level this would seem to constitute the
most essential quest of all in the novel. Seen in such terms, the moral
quest as represented by the novel as a whole, is based upon the relation¬
ship of text and reader. 3y taking part in the defining and interpreting
of the fictional process, we are enacting our own form of moral quest.
On the level of the plot, however, within the novel itself, the central
figure of any quest motif is that of the narrator, Jim Hawkins. Billy
Bones' intrusion into the world of the Admiral Benbow is only the
beginning of a series of pressures and disturbances placed on the boy.
Initially he can respond to such figures in a fairly confident, if na'ive,
way. His description of the Captain, of the violence of Black Dog, and
the arrival at the inn of Blind Pew, adequately conveys a sense of fear
and, more importantly, indicates his recognition of evil. But at this
stage their savage cnaracteristics, directed towards someone and to a
very specific purpose, can be assimilated into his consciousness by the
act of mentally labelling them 'wicked1. (And, as such, because they
are not like Jim, he believes they are nothing to do with him.)
Textual images, of course, aid this easy identification of evil, since
27
all these figures are depicted as physically mutilated. Moreover, at
this point in the novel Jim is shown to have clear grounds of comparison
for his moral judgements, especially from the encounter between Dr.
Livesey and Billy Bones:
I remember observing the contrast the neat, bright
doctor, with his powder as white as snow, and his
bright, black eyes, and pleasant manners, made with
the coltish country folk, and above all, with that
27. For a discussion of mutilated father-figures see W.W. Robson, 'The
Sea-Cooic: A Study in the Art of Robert Louis Stevenson1, On the Novel,
ed. B.S. Benedikz (London, 1971), 57-74.
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filtny, heavy, Dleared scarecrow of a pirate of ours,
sitting far gone in rum, with his arms on the table.
(PP. 7-8)
Only on meeting the man 'with a face as big as a ham - plain and pale,
but intelligent and smiling1, (p.50) does Jim's compartmentalising fail,
leading to an increased confusion in his moral judgements, until Silver
and Smollett, tne true and false 'captains', are eventually presented as
displaying an almost twin-like resemblance: 'the two men sat silently
smoking for quite a while, now looking each other in the face, now
stopping their tobacco, now leaning forward to spit. It was as good as
the play to see them.' (p.128) Here, although the confrontation is
ostensibly between good and bad, Jim's friendship with botn characters
blurs tne distinctions in his mind.
Long John Silver, indeed, becomes a testing point for Jim's moral judge¬
ment tnrcughout the novel. On first meeting John, Jim is incapable of
making tne obvious connection between a 'one-legged sea-faring man' as
described oy Billy Bones, and tne innKeeper who greets him with such
Kindness, despite the latter's oDvious physical disability. His
retrospective comment: 'he was too deep, and too ready, and too clever
for me' (p.53) throws some light on Silver's character, but does not
effectively excuse Jim's original response. Silver retains an
essential ambivalence throughout the novel. 'Good' characters such as
Or Livesey and Captain Smollett also initially recognise his value, and
tnus reinforce Jim's opinion. Only on overnearing the plan to corrupt
the crew does Jim begin to realise that moral categorisations can oreak
down. And, of course, Silver's betrayal is made more poignant for Jim
by his using tne same language to corrupt the young seaman as he used to
flatter Jim. Even language, tne boy learns, can be untrustworthy. As
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this consciousness impinges upon him, trapped in the enclosed world of the
barrel by his desire for that original symbol of corruption, an apple,
Jim begins to discover the distinction between means and tneir ends.
From this point onwards, Jim is faced not only with a quest for treasure
but also with the need to comprehend and rationalise the figure of
Long John Silver.
Comparing Silver with Israel Hands, Edwin Eigner states: 'Hands' character,
28
unlixe Silver's, is not at all a mixed one.' But the assumption that
Silver's character constitutes a moral grey area is not affirmed by the
pattern of the tale. The Sea-Cook is presented as Deing able to
encompass and assimilate the morality of other characters in the novel,
but does so in a totally committed, if only temporary way. Israel Hands
is perhaps the purest example of evil in the tale, with his dogmatic moral
reasoning: 'I never seen good come o' goodness yet. Him as strikes first
is my fancy; dead men don't bite.' (p.154) Sucn an attitude, however, is
not beyond Jim's powers of comprehension, and through his experiences he
can easily slot Hands into a place on his moral scale. But Silver can
show kindness and even the will to do good - as when he attempts to save
Jim from the pirates before becoming fully aware of the gain to himseif
in the action. Expressing a wish to murder the entire crew, ne can also
show absolute evil. Near to the treasure he aoandcns all his intentions
of saving Jim: 'ne plucxed furiously at tne line that iield me to him, and,
from time to time, turned his eyes upon me with a deadly look.' (p.215)
And yet, after being rescued from his own men, ne adapts easily to his new
allies-: 'And there was Silver, sitting back almost out of the firelight,
2b. Eigner, p.119.
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but eating heartily, prompt to spring forward when anything was wanted,
even joining quietly in our laughter - the same, bland, polite,
obsequious seaman of the voyage out.' (p.221) His moral mutability,
wnicn allows his pleas to the Captain wnen they are bargaining in the
stocKade to be transformed to 'the foulest imprecations' within seconds
(p.12S), means that eventually he comes to represent all points on the
moral spectrum for Jim.
By using such a multivalent figure Stevenson can be seen as reversing the
conventional structure of romance characterisation as described by
Northrop Frye: 'A quest involving conflict assumes two main characters,
a protagonist or hero, and an antagonist or enemy ... The central form
of romance is dialectical: everything is focused on a conflict between
the hero and his enemy, and all the reader's values are bound up with the
29
hero.' This pattern obviously does not apply to Treasure Island, in
that firstly, Silver actively aids tne central protagonist, and secondly,
that Jim is not a hero in the more obvious senses of the term. Although
he helps, and even saves, his friends on more than one occasion, it is
usually more by accident than any heroic intention. Moreover, because of
tne first person narration the reader cannot avoid sharing Jim's sympathetic
identification with Silver. Any dialectic between hero ana enemy there¬
fore, remains purely internal, fixed in Jim's moral consciousness.
Throughout the novel he attempts to maintain a humanist ana relative
morality, but his stance receives a parcdic reflection in Silver's
adaptability. Yet Long John Silver also upsets Jim's moral standards by
forcing him to encounter extremes. And once again the reaaer can only
share Jim's perspective on tnis alternative morality, since we are rarely
29. Frye, p.167.
given access to judgements from those characters, such as trie Doctor
and Captain Smollett, wno are more secure in tiieir own moral values.
Silver, therefore, comes to represent mucn more tnan an enemy or antagonist.
Aware of the complexities of Silver's cnaracter, Jim is not tnreatenea
oy the potential evil in nim so much as by the essence of wnat he
represents - an embracing of trie polarities of the moral spectrum. At
trie close of the novel Silver muses that he and Jim: 'might have done a
power of good together!' (p.1fa4); good and evil are clearly seen in his
eyes as equal forces of positive commitment. However, as Jim realises,
if such an equation were to De recognised in reality it would destroy
all conventions of morality. Such extremity would pose a threat which,
liKe the Elect and Damned dichotomy of Calvinism, could tear apart tne
carefully preserved illusions of tne integration of personality and tne
moderation of moral relativism. Stevenson wrote: 'It is to Keep a
man awake, to keep him alive to his own soul and its fixed design of
rignteousness, that the better part of moral and religious education is
directed.Sucn an awareness can only oe given practical illustration
tnrougn exploitation of fiction or aostract expression in philosopnisiny,
ratner than through a direct mimesis of reality. Jim, therefore, is
faced with moral conflicts but can finally escape from them on leaving
tne island. Significantly not Scottish, he is Kept at a distance from
Stevenson's own contradictions and thus offers an ideal means of
exploring them.
In the context of the novel's moral concerns, therefore, Long John Silver
30. 'Lay Morals', p. 1tsb.
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operates as a focus of Jim's moral dilemmas and also functions as a
way of Keeping tne reader morally awaKe, aware of contradictions,
preventing us from settling into complacency. Such a function
precludes his appearing realistic and also prevents tne usual concept
of a 'cnaracter' being applicable to him. Edwin Signer admits tnat
Stevenson: 'shared to some extent the greatest fault of the romantics -
thinness of cnaracterisation' because, as he explains, 'To the romancer
... tne theme or the vision comes first, and this priority occasions, we
should not say a falsification of character, but certainly a less vital
interest in it.'0^ In this instance an apparent 'failing' of the
romance tradition is particularly suited to Stevenson's purpose. In
realist fiction the concept of 'character' implies a system of mixed
personality traits integrated in a fixed and assessable individual,
capable of operating in a variety of ways according to the constraints
of circumstances and of moral codes. Stevenson is not interested in
such relativity. Instead he wishes to explore tne interaction of various
moralities ratner tnan embodying values to the reader tnrougn any one
character. In the tradition of romance characterisation, as Frye
indicates: 'Characters tend to be eitner for or against tne quest.
If tney assist it they are idealized as simply gallant or pure; if tney
obstruct it they are caricatured as simply villainous or cowardly.
Hence every typical character in romance tends to nave his moral opposite
confronting nim, like black and wnite pieces in a chess game.'0^ Sucn
confrontations occur in Treasure Island but only as a backdrop, and
between tne minor characters,, as in the opposition of tne Squire




relative morality the reader can easily accommodate tnem in the moral
spectrum. Yet, making a chessboard of black and white within nis own
character, Silver remains a cipher wnich Jim must attempt to decode.
His inaoility to do so creates a similar sense of impasse in tne reader.
Aspects of morality and identity are thus revealed as intractable to
assimilation into tne relative morality that Jim brings with him from
tne world he shares with us.
Yet although Jim operates as a representative of relative morality,
tnat of the reader from the world of 'reality1, and althougn we can find
a sympathetic identification with his plight, his many adventures also
allow us to view him in action, with a certain objectivity wnich enhances
our understanding of his plight (and our own predicament.) Throughout
the novel ne is portrayed as being threatened by forces which could
engulf his moral identity, although Stevenson does not allow this to
happen. Indeed, Jim's narrative can be read as an attempt to preserve,
even reconstitute his sense of self, against tne tnreat of both
metaphysical and real dangers. From the very oeginning of the
novel lie is under attack. Blind Pew threatens nim with an Old Testament
morality of vengeance, quite literally an eye for an eye: "I wish I
had put his eyes out! cried the blind man.' (p.32) And a struggle is
constantly taking place for possession of the boy. He is taken
nostage by pirates and passes to and fro between the opposing factions
in much the same way as the various locations of the novel - the ship,
the stockade, even the island itself - shift between the sides. By the
nature of this struggle Jim is forced to recognise a universe in which
laws other than his own previously formed concepts of right and wrong
operate. And while he is on the island, alone, at the furthest remove
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from reality, ne is forced to see these alternative laws invade his own
world. When Tom, one of tne sailors, is shot by Silver, Jim is
amazed ttiat: 'Everything else was uncnanged, the sun still shining
mercilessly, upon the steaming marsh and the tall pinnacle of the
mountain and I could scarce persuade myself that murder had been actually
done, and a human life cut cruelly short a moment since, before my eyes.'
(p.91) He cannot believe that such a deed will not convulse nature,
shaKe the very foundations of reality, since it provokes such a reaction
in his own world of relative and humanitarian morality. Such an
attitude, obviously based upon the expected demarcations of conventional
society, could be that of any character in a realist novel, except for
the fact tnat he expects his reaction to produce some change in his own
perceptual faculties - a change which could only take place in sucn a
fantastic context of the island and within a non-realist fiction. This
kind of double consciousness as a response to moral horror can also be
found in The Ebb-Tide, where the very unfami 1iarity of the setting denies
any reliance on conventions of perception, and appears to evoke a quite
arbitrary response from tne sub-conscious wnicn has no place in reality.
Jim Hawkins therefore provides a vital link for the reader between the
fantasy world of the island and a recognisable reality. His disliKe
of the island, his growing natred of the sound of the waves, and nis
fear of being marooned all serve to symoolise the dangers tnat ne sees
the island as holding for him. Yet Jim's narration, beginning and
ending in a more recognisable 'reality' means that we can also see him
as belonging to our more familiar world. Only at one point in the novel
does nis link between a normative reality and the extremes of tne islana
world seem in danger of breaking down. When ne is wandering alone on
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tne island we lose nis perspective on events for a snort time and iiave
to rely on Dr Livesey's somewhat stolid account of their taking of the
stocKade. His narrative, however, tends to be mainly functional; it
is only wnen Jim re-enters tne stocKade that we are given any visual
description of tne place. Therefore, althougn Dr Livesey acts as a
reassurance of the world of practical realism at the very moment wnen
Jim, uncertain of his reception from eitner the pirates or the sailors,
and overwhelmed by the strangeness of his surroundings, is most in
danger of being immersed in the otherness of the island world, his
narrative leaves the reader with only a partial perspective on events.
We are thus in almost as much danger of being lost as Jim. And later
in the novel we are in a position of ignorance equal to his, experiencing
nis sudden shock on finding the stockade taken by the pirates: 'The
red glare of the torch, lighting up the interior of tne block-nouse,
showed me the worst of my apprehensions realised. the pirates were in
possession of the house and stores; there was the cask of cognac, there
were tne pork and oread, as before; and, what tenfold increased my
horror, not a sign of any prisoner.' (p.177) Thus, although we view
events from tne safety of our familiar world, we share with Jim the
terrors of the unfamiliar and experience with him a sense of loss and
confusion.
Tnis uncertainty in Jim also provides the novel's moral dynamic. Although
his initial judgements on the characters are vindicated Dy the plot,
while on the island he is continually being forced to reassess both the
world around him and his own values. And once again the reader may.
both identify with him and take an overview of the contradictions in his
experience. We can see the various shifts of stance involved in Jim's
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attempts to reconcile his previous code of morality with the events
around him. Through this dual perspective we gain a sense of the
immense difficulties involved in moral assessment, in the attempt to
reconcile the extreme and unfamiliar into a code established oy
conventions. In a sense, of course, Jim never does fully resolve
the implications of his experience. Although he returns to safe
land, the heightened dimensions of the island world remain in his
imagination: 'the worst dreams that I ever have are when I hear the
surf booming about its coasts, or start upright in bed, with tne sharp
voice of Captain Flint still ringing in my ears: "Pieces of eightl
Pieces of eightl'" (p.227) And of course, the most intractable puzzle
with whicn Jim was confronted does not disappear when he returns to nis
'real' life, ashore:
Of Silver we heard no more. That formidable seafaring
man with one leg has at last gone clean out of my life;
but I dare say he met his old negress, and pernaps still
lives in comfort with ner and Captain Flint. It is to
be hoped so, I suppose, for his cnances of comfort in
another world are very small. ^ ^£7)
For the reader Silver also remains an unknown quality and the patterns
of trie novel as a whole remain centred around his ambiguous figure.
Until we are aDle to leave or forget the novel his image persists
as a force of mental and moral subversion - just as, even on safe land,
Jim cannot escape having nightmares aoout nis adventures.
If the novel's plot provides little solution to the issues it raises,
the novel's imagery serves to deepen the ambiguities. The images, tne
symbols and tne moments of significance within the tale all ccmoine to
empnasise tne existence of depths of experience beyond the limits of
linguistic description, Dy acquiring a power that would appear to be
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. 1indefinaole'. In Treasure Island it is often the minor moments
wnicn illustrate this feature. On his first meeting with Ben Gunn,
for example, Jim states: 'What it was, whetner pear or man or monkey,
I could in no-wise tell. It seemed dark and shaggy; more I knew not.1
(p.93) Although he then does discover that Ben Gunn is, in fact, a
man, the impact of the initial description and its significance is in
no way mitigated by the suDsequent explanation. Epitomising Jim's
fear of Qeing marooned, the moment remains a confrontation with the basics
of existence and a return to the primitive. Indeed, in nis narration
I
Jim can only accept the image Gunn presents by dealing with it in terms
of relativity, through comparison: 'Silver himself appeared less
terrible in contrast with this creature of the woods.' (p.93) Jim's
encounter witn sea-lions for this first time produces a similar effect
of norror: 'I beheld huge slimy monsters - soft snails, as it were, of
incrediDle bigness - two or three score of tnem together.' (p.149) Tne
language here ('soft' is used throughout the novel as a term of disgust,
and Silver is at his most dangerous when his voice is 'soft') ensures
thai Jim's suosequent knowledge of the nature of these creatures does not
detract from the power of tne image in conveying a sense of fear ana
disgust. And even before Jim reaches tne islana, ne experiences a
hint of future horror at the sound of Blind Pew tapping on the road witn
nis stick:
When we were about half-way through, I suddenly put my
hand upon her arm; for I had heard in the silent,
frosty air, a sound that Drought my heart into my mouth
- the tap-tapping of the blind man's stick upon the
frozen road. It drew nearer and nearer, while we sat
nolaing our breath. Then it struck sharp on the inn-
door, and then we could hear the handle being turned,
and the bolt rattling as tne wretcned oeing tried to
enter; and then there was a long time of silence both
within and without.. At last tne tapping recommenced,
and, to our indescribable joy and gratitude, died slowly
away again until it ceased to oe heard. , ?A\
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The single sound in tne still nignt, tne description of Pew as a
'wretcned being', and Jim's 'indescrioaole' relief at his departure, all
serve to indicate a dimension both outwith tne boundaries of conventional
experience and Deyond the powers of description.
The images in Treasure Island thus add to the novel's empnasis' on
alternative perceptions of reality's dimensions. In Philosopny in a New
Key Su.sanne Langer writes: 'Images are ... our readiest instruments for
abstracting concepts from the tumbling stream of actual impressions.
They maKe our primitive aostractions for us, they are our spontaneous
embodiments of general ideas.In Treasure Island this effect nas
obvious relevance for the reader in our relationship to Jim's perceptions.
The images wnich he perceives come to represent not only his alienation
Decause of the unfami1iarity of his surroundings, but also his moral
bewilderment whicn increases as he becomes more distanced from convention.
And it is on this more metaphorical level that the novel's images assume
a significance of their own. Su.sanne Langer adds:
It is characteristic of figurative images that their
allegorical status is not recognised In our most
positive primitive presentations - the metapnorical
imagery of dreams - it is the symDol, not the meaning,
that seems to command our emotions. We do not Know it
as a symbol. In dream-experience we very often find
some very commonplace object ... fraught with intense
value or inspiring the greatest terror. We cannot tell
what maxes the tiling so important. It simply seems to
De so in the dream. Tne emotional reaction is, of course,
evoxed Dy the idea emDodiea in tnat object, but so long
as tne idea lives only in tnis body we -cannot distinguish
it from its symbolic incarnation wnicn, to literal-minded
common sense, seems trivial. 34
33. Su.sanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the SymDolism
of Reason, Rite and Art (Cambridge, Massacnusetts, 1542), p.US.
34. Langer, Philosopny in a New Key, p.149.
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It is precisely tnis disjunction between image as the vehicle of
definite meaning and image as vague, indefinable symDol, tnat Stevenson
exploits. Characters may offer interpretations of tne incidents wnicn
provide tne images, Dut the symDolic significance remains undisturbed,
and the reader's attempts to decipner tneir 'meaning' only ensure that
they remain some of the most vivid images to be taKen from tne novel.
Such a process is ideally suited to Stevenson's expression of his own
attitude to tne dimensions of existence, since the interplay Detween
reader and text, symbol and meaning becomes analogical to the disjunction
between literal, pragmatic interpretations of reality and those wnicn
attempt to encapsulate a further, metapnysical structuring to the universe.
Through imagery and plot, therefore, the novel defies any attempts to
impose upon it a satisfactory resolution. The reader can participate in
the quest with Jim, share the discovery of the treasure, and return to
safety, but the problematics of morality encountered in tne process are
neitner explained nor resolved. We may discover all Blind Pew's motives,
even learn where and wnen ne received his disfigurement, out tne norror
of 'that soft eyeless creature' remains. The island may finally be
left behind, its treasure removed, but the image of a melancholy place,
surrounded oy the ceaseless booming of tne surf and by a sense of evil,
remains to haunt tne reader as well as Jim. Thus, although we trace
our way through tne map of the island, and tne map of the tale, oy way
of plot events, the central significance of the tale remains in tne
minor incidents and images. And it is through the struggle to ma<e sense
of sucn elements that we gain our understanding of tne moral problematics
expressed oy trie novel.
116
Stevenson's tactics therefore appear to contravene the usual reading
process wnereDy our response to later events is conditioned Dy the
experience of, and expectations created oy earlier events. Stevenson
avoids such a mooile relativity, and aims for static moments of
recognition ratner tnan a process of learning. however, since sucn
moments are not the major plot events they do not impede tne novel's
dynamic. Indeed, it is the impetus of tne plot action itself, rather
tnan any psycnological or social conf1icts, wnicn carries tne novel
forward. The function of this technique is two-fold. Firstly, it
keeps the novel firmly placed within tne adventure story and romance
genre. Through this generic consistency a certain unity is maintained
which might otherwise have Deen threatened by tensions created by tne
novel's suoject matter. Secondly, the recognisable form of tne novel
affirms the overt '1iterariness' of the work, denying any claims to be
seen as specifically relating to an external reality. The reader can
therefore confront the same moral contradictions as Jim but with a much
more secure footing in reality, at some distance from the fiction. And,
wnatever our own morality, we can view his situation with a certain
detacnment.
The reader's dual involvement and detachment from tne dilemmas of Jim,
however, highlights tne possible disjunction between different Kinds of
perception. Stevenson therefore exploits this to tne full, by
emphasising the limitations of the fictional 'solutions' wnicn provide no
answer to the questions tnat have raised through the heightened dimensions
of the fiction. He wrote in 'Lay Morals' of: 'that supreme self-
dictation whicn Keeps varying from hour to hour in its dictates with the
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variation of events and circumstances', and states: 'it may De founded
on some reasonable process, but it is not a process which we can follow
\ K
or comprehend.' Tne reader therefore is temporarily immersed in tnat
process and made to see wnat it consists of; we are not only presented
with a fictional map of our moral environment but are also asKed to
decipher tnat map's iconograpny. And it is only tnrougn our failure to
Dreak this code - inevitable since we are ultimately oound by the
conventions of reality - that we can gain some sense of a 'fixed design
of righteousness' and the flux in which it operates.
Treasure Island, of course, is given no identifiable descriptive details,
it is a place without any recognisable location. It is for this reason
that Stevenson can create a series of events outwitn the codes and
conventional of the morality operative in everyday reality. Later, in
his South Seas tales, he was to exploit again the strange and exotic,
although the alien environment described was by then of real familiarity to
him.
'The Beacn of Falesa'
As Stevenson's best known short story set outwitn the Britisn Isles, again
36
in an exotic location, 'The Beacn of falesa1 not only provides an interesting
introduction to the issues raised in The Ebb-Tide, but also illustrates
Stevenson's reasons for using a South Sea setting in his fictions - apart
from tne most obvious biographical one. 'The Beach of Falesa' indicates
three important areas in wnicn Stevenson's South Sea experiences served
him well in nis fiction: firstly, as seen in Treasure Island, an alien
location provided an ideal context in which to examine moral issues away
35. 'Lay Morals', pp.193-1S4. See also p.155.
36. Stevenson, 'The Beach of Falesa', Works XII, 3-o6. All further page
references are to this edition.
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from the familiar codes of convention; secondly, through his character¬
isation of the island's natives he could explore the paradoxes and
problems of the concept of innocence and, of course, the nature of
corruption; thirdly, in describing the islands he found a new and exciting
range of visual symbols. The short story also provides an ideally
limited context, in which Stevenson could concentrate on the moral issues
which so much concerned him. In 'The Beach of Falesa' he does so by
bringing together two different types of morality, and two different levels
of fictional experience, placing them in a situation of confrontation
without allowing them ever to become totally divisive.
At a first reading it would appear that the first-person narrator of the
tale, John Wiltshire, provides a humorous and realistic perspective on
/
events that take place on Falesa, and represents a relative moral outlook,
while the villain of the piece, a man known as Case, who tricks the
natives with so-called magic, exploiting them and Wiltshire in pursuit
of his own evil ends, belongs to the world of a more absolute morality as
one of the Damned. The dichotomy, however, is not quite so simple.
Although a conflict does exist between these two central characters,
contradictions in attitude may also be traced within the personality of
Wiltshire, as they emerge through his experiences on the island.
Wiltshire is an unusual narrator for Stevenson. His account of events
is colloquial and, at times, crude - a voice far removed from Stevenson's
own. Moreover, he is a character who appears to learn from the events
of the tale. On his arrival in the island he is presented as an ill-
educated, Digoted white man, the epitome of exploitative colonialism.
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And yet, as the tale progresses he seems to improve in his attitudes,
learning from his experiences,which include falling in love with
his native 'bride', falling out with those other whites on tne island
wno are even mere exploitative than himself, adopting new patterns of
behaviour and, finally, settling down to a fairly respectable existence.
He would appear, therefore, a perfect illustration of a 'realist' charac¬
ter, being educated into social responsibility, and estaDlishing a
successful, Aristotelian morality by which to operate. Indeed, Wiltshire
himself seems eager to present sucn a picture of events for he is, above
all, a man wno favours relativity.
His sense of relativity emerges through tne tale as one of the oases from
which he can face up to iiis alien experiences on the island. On meeting
nis native wife Uma, he is amazed at the innocence of her immediate
judgement: 'You good!' (p.14), and the compliment which ne later returns:
'I would rather have you than all the copra in the Soutn Seas', is
qualified by his sense of tne statement's extravagance: 'wnich was a
very big expression, and the strangest thing was that I meant it.' (p.35)
Obviously this is as near absolute praise as his relativity will permit.
Similarly, he can quite easily believe the missionary's description of
the chief Faiso as: 'a great formenter of rebellions, and a thorn in
the side of the mission. For all that lie is very snrewd, and, except in
politics and aoout his own misdemeanours, a teller of tne truth.' (p.48)
He even describes himself to Uma as: 'a good sort of fellow, uma, as
fellows go.' (pp.57-58). And in the resolution to tne story, even nis
comments on island life can be seen as the judgements of a relative mind:
'but wnat bothers me is tne girls. They're only naif-castes, of course;
I know that as well as you do, and tnere's nooody thinxs less of half-
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castes than I dc; but they're mine, and about all I've got. I can't
reconcile my mind to their taking up with Kanakas, and I'd like to know
where I'm to find the wnites?' (p.66) If moral relativism provides the
code by which Wiltshire forms his opinions, it is also the mode in wnicn
his actions operate. He can disassociate himself from the evil Billy
Randall, for example, and in Lima, find a wife who demands the treatment
accredited to wnite women; in both instances he reveals a genuine
adaptability. His confrontation with Case, too, can be seen as stemming
from a desire to differentiate himself from him as a man. And he is
able to reason out his pledge of honesty given to the missionary:
I used to be botnered about my balances, but I
reasoned it out this way. We all have queerish
balances, and the natives all know it and water
tiieir copra in a proportion so tnat it's fair
all round; but the truth is, it did use to bother
me, and, though I aid well in Falesa, I was naif
glad when the firm moved me on to another station,
where I was under no kind of pledge and could
Iook my balances in the face. ^ ^
Even here he can be seen as attempting to justify his actions as right
or wrong according to an extremely relative code of morality, since even
wnen 'reformed' he finds it difficult to be totally honest.
Yet, throughout the tale, running contrary to this relativity, there is
another perspective on tne world of Falesa whicn is presented tnrough
Wiltshire's less conscious response, and through tne context of magic
and the supernatural establisned by the plot events. Moments at wnicn
Wiltshire's relativism breaks down, failing tiim as a means of ordering
his universe, are signalled by a change in tone, a move towards less
prosaic language, and an attention paid to tne alien and aosolute aspects
of trie landscape. Tiie island itself immediately creates in him a sense
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of unfami1iarity and otherness; 'I saw that island first wnen it was
neither night nor morniny. The moon was to the west, setting, but
still bread and bright. To the east and right amidsnips of the dawn,
wnicn was all pink, the daystar sparkled like a diamond.' (p.3) And
after this strange half-light gives way to day he remarks that: 'trie
world was like all new painted.1 (p.7) Experiences on the island, such
as the taboo put on him Decause of Lima, and tne scare stories put around
by Case, lead him to philoscpni.se further on human recognition of
elements over wnich we have no control, on the threat of the unKnown:
,'They say it scares a man to be alone. No such thing. What scares him
in the dark or the high bush is that he can't make sure, and there might
be an army at his elbow.' (p. 19) The uncertainty whicii tiiis statement
indicates can thus also become the Dasis of an impulse towards definition,
a desire for the clarification of absolutes. And although he may not be
aware of it, Wiltshire's language does carry an implication of uncer¬
tainty, a fear of forces whicii cannot be accommodated within tne degrees
of categorisation which form his own relative morality. The bush, for
example, creates just such a confrontation with the confines of existence:
'The brightest kind of a day it is always dark down there. A man can
see to the end of nothing; whichever way he looks the wood shuts up, one
bougn folding with another like the fingers of your hand; and whenever he
listens ne hears always something new.' (p.62) Here Wiltshire's determined
efforts to assess everything with reference to man - comparing oougns to
fingers and so on - has little effect in face of the rhythm and poetic
imagery of his words, so different from his usual slanging prose.
Tiie juxtaposition of the exotic ana the familiar tnus becomes both the most
powerful force for realising alternative perspective in tne story, and
the most potent threat to Wiltshire's complacency. With Case and lima he
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may be faced with extremes of good and evil out he can accommodate them
by concentrating on their human failings. Case tricks the natives with
false images - ana Wiltshire can reveal how petty and trivial these
images really are. Case is thus defeated but tne power of the images
presumably still remains for the natives. Uma he can tease and annoy,
in addition to acknowledging ner undouDted heroism. But he cannot so
neatly defuse or accommodate tne power of tne landscape; and it is
through his description of such features that Stevenson helps to break
down our own categorisation processes, making us aware of potentially
new significances in objects. Thus when Wiltshire is visiting Case's
hideaway he notes a 1green-and-yellow bird1 that 'began to tear the
hair off the head of one of the figures.1 (p.66) The image is not
mentioned again but that single moment serves to epitomise the real
savagery lurking behind Case's cardboard terrors. It also remains an
image for which no explanation can be given, so again it belongs to the
realms of tne unknown, of that world which demands definitions beyond
those of our relativist outlooks.
Through tne plot, Wiltshire nere too moves beyond his stance of relativism.
By destroying Case's magic he assumes an even greater power himself, a
power which bears little relation to his own plodding attempts to
understand the nature of good ana evil. Failing to educate the natives
out of tneir superstitions, he can only meet one form of absolutism -
that of tyranny, - witn another, by destroying Case's artefacts. Ana it
is this act which finally triumphs, ratner than any obviously moral
confrontation; a fact which Mr Trevelyn, tne missionary, recognises as
he bemoans the fact that when Case won respect oy pretending to pluck
coins from his ears, he could not perform the same feat and thus lost
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respect for his god. Through such incidents the reader is confronted
with elements that cannot be fully explained by Wiltshire's somewnat
limited narrative, and which we cannot assimilate into our own experience
of a relative reality.
'The Beach of Falesa' indicates salient features of Stevenson's South Sea
fiction - the use of vivid topographical imagery conveying a sense of
alienation from the conventional orderings of existence, contradictions
within the text wnicii lead to the recognition of limitations in
comprehension and definition, a gradual undercutting of relativist
processes of assessment - but perhaps its greatest triumph is Stevenson's
success in indicting a relativist morality Dy the lips of one wno
professes to hold and act by it. Moreover, the contradictions inherent
in Wiltshire are analagous to those which we experience not only in the
attempts to decipher fiction Put also to comprehend and define existence.
And, as the story indicates, sucn attempts can only meet with success
if the traditional boundaries of judgement and perception are shifted
in order to incorporate the extreme dimensions of an apsclutist
perspective.
The Ebb-Tiae
Building, perhaps on the successes of Treasure Island and 'The Beacn of
Falesa', Stevenson attempted his most ambitious exploration of a South Sea
location in The Ebb-Tide, co-written with Lloya Osoourne.^ Yet he was
well aware of the problems intrinsic to his aims. In a letter to
Edmund Gosse ne describes the novel: 'The Eoo-Tide: a dreadful, grimy
business in the third person, where tne strain between a vilely realistic
37. Stevenson, and Lloyd Osbourne, The Ebb-Tide, Works X, 201-353. All
further page references are to this edition.
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dialogue and a narrative style pitched about (in phrase) "four notes
38
higher" than it should have been, has sown my head with grey hairs'.
Yet, in spite of his own disquiet, in The Ebb-Tide he finds a more
cohesive way of relating fictional concepts to the dimensions of reality than
in many of his earlier works. The novel is based on Stevenson's
acknowledgement that humankind will inevitably rely upon relative
moralities as a defence against our natural position of innerent
subjectivity, our essential inability to understand the machinations of
our universe, and our basic uncertainty as to self-identity. Yet, from
this position, it moves towards postulating an absolute morality as a
means of alternative. It is through the dialectic-thus created that
Stevenson explores the effects on moral precepts of having to adapt to
circumstantial conditioning.
His acnievement in The Ebb-Tide is partly due to a more direct correlation
between plot and theme than is usual in Stevenson's other novels. The
simple narrative device of naving the sympathy shift between the four
central characters of the novel - the drifters, Herrick, Huish, Davis,
and the 'missionary', Attawater, gain and lose moral approbation at
various points in the story - ensures that the essential mutability of
self is emphasised. And once again, Stevenson exploits the.exotic loc¬
ation to.the full through his descriptions of unfamiliar, almost animated,
surroundings which demand new efforts of perception from botn the
characters and the readers, and which offer the author a wide range of
images for conveying significance in symDolic terms. The cohesion of
the novel can be partly attributed to the fact that setting and scenery,
as a repository of meaning, is not only important for the autnor and the
58. Stevenson, Letter to Edmund Gosse (June 1Gtn, 1893), Letters, vol.4,
1891-1894, Works XXX, ed. Sidney Colvin (London, 1926), p.206.
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reader, but also provides signposts witnin the text for the characters
who, as morally and financially impoverished drifters, are continually
seeking some signs of significance in their existence. And in their
search for the elusive goal of final definition that will allow them to
rise aoove the flux and change of life, they become mimetic of our role
as novel readers, looking for an ultimate meaning. Finally, Stevenson's
success in the novel may also be due to his ability to move between four
characters, but to retain identification - although not necessarily our
approval - with one character, Herrick. More highly educated and
supposedly more sensitive than the others, his attempts to resolve the
contradictions inherent in his own nature present a reflection of
Stevenson's own concerns and conflicts. Moreover, the moment of recognit¬
ion which he does achieve following his attempted suicide both indicates
that clarification of human uncertainty can be achieved through extremes,
and shows that sucn clarification can only be temporary, that no credible
final resolution can be achieved, and that, in the struggle with the
contradictions of human nature and the environment of morality, only a
momentary and non-pragmatic understanding is possible.
The novel therefore operates through a subtly interrelated structure of
situations and characters, with a plot that is held together by the idea
of contingency and of chance. Its three main characters, Davis, Huish
and Herrick, are found 'on the beach' at the opening of the tale; both
literally and figuratively they are on the peripheries of society.
Without money or occupation they are unable to admit their real names -
and this loss of identity is a significant indication of their position.
We are told of Herrick, for example, that 'the alias betrayed his moral
bankruptcy.' (p.207) The novel thus begins with these three individuals
12b
maKing one last attempt to write to their relatives at heme, to
establisn contact witn the world of recognisable social codes and
moral allegiances; if you can't write a lettermuses Davis, tne
Captain; 'it's aDout the hign-water mark of oeing a bruie beast', (p.222)
Even in the practical sense, therefore, the men are presented as seeking
a function - although 'seeKing' is perhaps too active a term for their
despondent aimlessness. They are also searching for some escape from
tneir present existence and, at the beginning of the novel, derrick
encourages them to achieve this by imagining ideal situations for tnem-
selves, creating an alternative existence through tne words of tneir
fictions. Herrick, however, realises that such visions of anotner lost
world will not help tnem in this, especially since tne dreams of Davis
and Huish are essentially materialistic. Herricx nimself can only
acnieve any sense of clarification or escape oy drawing on the walls of
tne calaboose where they are hiding a musical symbol denoting, 'Destiny
knocking at the door.' Such an action is shewn as the only response to
reality left nim: 'it was the bare sense of his existence prompted him.'
(p.22b) The incident serves to give the reader some indication that any
real escape for these men, any 'success1 in the terms of realism, is
unlikely. What the novel itself will offer, however, is some kind of
symbolic representation of their state of existence and, beyond tnem, a
paradigm of humanity's position witnin the confines of reality.
For Huish and Davis, however, derrick's symbol-drawing has little
significance and is of no practical help. Therefore, when they are hired
to crew the schooner Farallone, whose previous crew have all taken fever
and died, they welcome tne chance of a function and persuade Herrick to
join tnem. Their sense of purpose is furtner increased wnen tney
decide to steal tne scnooner's load of champagne; nor do they see this
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decision as particularly evil for, as they persuade Herrick, they are
merely adapting to circumstances. UnliKe the reader, the men feel no
sense of foreocding either at the ship's name, or her entry in trie harDOur
with: 'the yellow flag, the emblem of pestilence' flying upon her mast,
(p.216) Herrick at first does attempt to maintain some adherence to
conventional morality despite his circumstances but comes to realise that,
in the abyss he inhabits, such systems no longer apply, since the only
alternatives to crime are prison or death. And although HerricK may
believe that he possesses a standara of moral consciousness, nis attitudes
are continually shown to change, as he justifies each response according
to circumstances. As such, his morality can be seen as only a more
extreme version of the relativism of conventional morality; one nature of
the void in which he finds himself illustrates the dominant effect of
circumstance and the arbitrariness which lies behind so-called moral
'judgements'.
The dangers of moral relativity may be seen having a particularly corrosive
effect when the men discover that the champagne they planned to steal is,
in fact, only water: 'The difference between a bottle of champagne and
a bottle of water is not great; between a shipload of one or of the other
lay the wnole scale from riches to ruin.'(pp.267-268) By exploiting
contingency in this way Stevenson reveals relativity as breaking down
when faced with extremes, much as he aid in 'The Beach of. Falesa.'
Relativist concepts are presented as a means of concealing the real
positives of good and evil. And once relativity has been lost, any
validity in comparisons between the three men also disappears. Rather
than possessing mixed qualities of good ana evil which provides them with
a fixed reaction to each event, all, like the character of Long John
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Silver, are capable of assuming,with complete commitment, various
different points on the moral compass. Even Herrick's comparison of
the tiiree white men with the natives on the schooner: 'It was thus a
cutting reproof to compare the islanders and the whites aboard tne
Farallone 1 (p.257), is of little value, since by tnis time he is so
conscious of the positive and irremediable capacity for evil in his
companions that he cannot place them on a sliding scale of values. In
the first part of the novel, therefore, Stevenson aims at revealing now
humankind imposes structures of values on existence and then inevitably
betrays these values when tne restrictions they create are found to be
too great.
The second part of the novel contains an even more explicit and dramatic
confrontation with relative values. On arriving at 'New Island', owned
by Attwater, the three men are able to escape from the shifting moral
balance of their relationships and each sees the mysterious Attwater as
a static point in a world of flux and uncertainty, imbuing the pearl-
fisner with all the power and ambiguity of an immovable figure of justice.
Attwater's own deliberate presentation of himself as a God-like figure:
'He was dressed in white drill, exquisitely made; his scarf and tie were
of tender-coloured silks; on the thwart beside him there leaned a Winchester
rifle' (p.285), and nis proud stance of possessing in his island paradise
all that the drifters lack, in both spiritual and material senses, is
reinforced Dy his apparent ability to assimilate contradictions within
himself and yet survive. Even his external appearance seems to testify
to this capacity:
He was a huge fellow, six foot four in height, and of
a build proportionately strong, but nis sinews seemea
to De dissolved in a listlessness that was more than
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langour. It was only the eye that corrected this
impression; an eye of an unusual mingled brilliancy
and softness, sombre as coal and with lights that
outshone the topaz; an eye of unimpaired health and
vitality; an eye that bid you beware of the man's
devastating anger. ,
The description serves to indicate even the physical contradictions that
ne can accommodate within his person.
Attwater's alternating cynicism and Christianity, revealed through his
conversations with Herrick, and the mixture of Denevolence and cruelty
expressed by his actions, likewise present paradoxes within a single
personality. In his religion too, ne appears to be happy with
contradiction. The notion of grace he illustrates by a parable of the
diving machines: 'Well, I saw these macnines come up dripping and go
down again, and come up dripping and go down again, and all the while
the fellow inside as dry as toastl ... and I thought we all wanted a
dress to go down into the world in, and come up scatheless.' (p.297)
Nevertheless he later refutes this not only by his primitive and Old
Testament view of justice, shown in the tale of the native ne punished
by a cruel death, Dut also in the anger he expresses at seeing the work
of his mission struck down. Such a fate seems to him an insult to his
endeavours: 'I was making a new people here; and behold, the angel of
the Lord smote them and they were not!' (p.299) Attwater's extremes of
passion and his fatalism can be seen in polar opposition to the relativism
which the Farallone's crew attempted to maintain. Certainly tnis is a
view whicn appears to be vindicated by the events of the novel in that,
supported by his strong belief in his ability to save all tneir souls,
Attwater does win one man for nis god. In this respect, at least, he
can be viewed as bearing a parodic resemolance to the Calvinist yoa.
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His sense cf justice and nis belief tnat: 'reliyion is a savage tiling,
liKe the universe it illuminates; savage, cold and care, but infinitely
strcny1 (p.256) adds credibility to this perspective. Vet,although the
potential for absolutism expressed in Attwater remains of significance
in itself, his system—being only that of a man—is ultimately shown to
breaK down. By assuming that he himself possesses the power of
removing burdens from people, and of acting as intermediary between tneir
external selves and the sense of tneir own deepest existence, ne is
acting contrary to a truly absolutist perception and must be rejectea as
such by anyone who believes that numankind exists in a universe over
which they have very little control. And this, finally, is tne
perception of HerricK who rejects Attwater, deciding that: 'I must
struggle on to ttie ena witn tne pack of my responsibi 1 ity.1 (p.302)
Nevertheless, althougn Attwater is ultimately revealed as offering only
an illusory solution, the importance which he assumes for the three men
dues indicate a response on tneir part to tne aosolutism he appears to
represent, and of which, in terms of his initial symbolic impact, ne
does remain an image. Althougn Davis, Huisn and HerricK all begin by
wishing to exploit or even rob nim, according to their individual
inclinations, tne contingency plans adopted oy each come to an end in
direct confrontation with Attwater. And in each man he arouses a
reaction of extreme dimensions. Huish tries to Kill him, Davis surrenders
nis soul to him, and herricx is forced into an attempted suicide. The
actions of each also indicate the development of their individual
philosophies. Huish shows the forces of positive evil in action; in
many ways his attitude shows similarities to Attwater's whom he tries to
draw into tne circle of complicity oy referring to nim as nattwater.
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His admiration of the aDility to put extreme actions into practice:
'Murder ain't genteel, it ain't easy, it ain't safe, and it tykes a
man to do it1 (p.340) indicates his recognition of similar qualities in
Attwater. Yet tne actual murder attempt on Attwater reveals jusi how
destructive such a philosopny can be when it is allowed to enter tne
realms of reality, rather than remaining a conceptual positive:
And then, at almost tne same moment, tne indomitable
Huisn decided to throw, and Attwater pulled the trigger.
There was scarce the difference of a second between tne
two resolves, but it was in favour of the man with the
rifle; and the jar nad not yet left the clerK's hand,
oefore tne ball snattered both. For the twinxling of
an eye tne wretch was in hell's agonies, bathed in liquid
flames, a screaming bedlamite; and then a second and more
merciful pullet stretched him dead. , ~nN
The destructive nature of falsely imposed apsolutes is also revealed
tnrougn Attwater's conversion of Davis who, at gunpoint, nas no choice
put to pe saved:
The memory of that dreadful passage returned upon nim in
a clap; again ne saw Huish lying dead, again he seemed
to himself to totter on tne brink of an unplumped eternity.
With trembling hands he seized hold of the man whom ne nad
come to slay; and his voice broke from him 1iKe that of a
child among the nightmares of fever: "Ohi isn't tnere no
mercy? Ohi what must I ao to be saved?"
"Ah!" thought Attwater, "here's tne true penitent."
(p.352)
And after this conversion Davis completely loses all independence of
personality, preferring Attwater's service to tne hell he had glimpsed.
derrick's reaction to the figure of Attwater is a more complex one, since
Attwater initially pays him more, and latterly less, attention that ne
gives to tne other men. derrick's failed suicide indicates the
impossiDi1ity of realising absolutes of experience within tne realms of
reality; nevertheless, he does reacn an awareness of some dimension of
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existence outwith himself. In pondering tne sequence of past events,
for example, he realises: 'He had complied with tne eDb-tide in man's
affairs, and the tide nad carried him away; he heard already tne roaring
of tne maelstrom tnat must hurry him under.' (p.304) He can also
perceive that tne failure of his suicide attempt was due to his being in
'tne grasp of an external fate ineluctable as gravity.' (pp.327-32b)
Throughout the novel's events he has attempted to judge his experiences
according to an increasingly fluctuating standard of moral values, but
Dy this stage he is prepared to reject the conventional moral spectrum
in favour of any form of absolute alternative; and at this point in the
novel the choice appears to be between Attwater and death. Both,
however, elude him. Death, is unattainable because to achieve it he
would have to rely on his own vacillating and unreliaole cnaracter.
And Attwater is revealed to Herrick as a religious tyrant, an illusory
figure of a false absolutism. Yet, although in both instances he
reaches the conclusion tnat absolutes are unattainaDle, tnat human nature
prevents their existence operating within our limited conception of
reality, Herrick achieves a valid sense of the need to acknowledge and
be aware of such limitations. Within the novel his
desire for some absolute of morality which would define his existence is
shown to be an essential element of the human psyche. Moreover, in
spite of Attwater's failure as an absolute, he performs tiie function of
a testing point in the novel, a means of revealing cnaracter, and
becomes a significant image for tne reader, one wnose power is not wholly
mitigated by the subsequent exposure of character flaws.
Apart from plot and characterisation Stevenson also points to the
significance of aosolutes through his use of images, especially those
133
whicn indicate a surprising mutaDility in an apparently fixed reality.
Alastair Fowler, wnile putting forward a specifically Christian
interpretation of the novel which can, and has Deen, questioned,
nevertheless offers a convincing analysis of its technique: 'The
reader may never resolve tne quartette into a settled scheme of
relations. Partly because he is reading about cnange, his feelings
are perpetually disturoed by some unanticipated turn, or some new valuat-
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ion, which forestalls the equilibrium of their understanding.'
Througnout the novel the aura of moral superiority shifts from one
character to anotner, emulating their cnanging fortunes as described by
Herrick: 'The three lives went up and down before him lixe Duckets in
a well, or lixe the scales of balances.' (p.303) Moving from one
position of sympatny to another, with the shifting narrative allegiance,
tne reader begins to distrust tne relativity which the novel is
establishing since we are left no real grounds for forming conven¬
tional character judgements. The search therefore begins for some form
of absolute definition; either for a static point to which we can nold and
from tnere form some moral assessment, or for a moral pnilosopny wnicii
can accommodate the extremes with wnicn we have been presented. The
macninations of circumstantial morality are thus seen as a terrain wnich
we explore in searcn of absolutes.
As in Stevenson's other novels this searcn for significance is botn
encouraged and confused oy tne continual emphasis on images and symools.
And once again tnis is most clearly noticeable in the passages of scenic
description. A comment on tne schooner Farallone, lying at ancnor in
3S. Alastair Fowler, 'Parables of Adventure: The Deoataole Novels of
Robert Louis Stevenson', Nineteenth Century Scottish Fiction:
Critical Essays, ed. Ian Campbell f 1979), 10b-129, p.124.
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tne Day at Papeete, indicates tne techniques used:
Seen from tne Peach tnrough tne thin line of
shipping, two opjects stood conspicuous to seaward:
the little isle, on trie one hand, with its palms
and the guns and oatteries raised forty years before
in defence of Queen Pomare's capital; the outcast
Farallone, upon the other, banished to the threshold
of ttie port, rolling there to her scuppers, and
flaunting the plague-flag as sne rolled. A few sea-
Dirds screamed and cried about the ship; ana witiiin
easy range, a man-of-war guard boat hung off and on
and glittered witii the weapons of the marines. The
exuberant daylight and the blinding heaven of the
tropics picked out and framed the pictures.
(p.236)
Not only is the passage visually vivid and superbly atmospheric in its
yoking together of incongruous images, but it offers in microcosm a
reflection of the devices Stevenson uses throughout the novel. The
intensity of the scene, and tne definition of each object by its
dissimilarity to those around it, creates a process of signification
framed oy the alien tropical surroundings. In this respect Stevenson
can oe seen as a forerunner of such early twentietn century novels as
Josepn Conrad's Heart of Darkness, E.M. Forster's Passage to Inaia and
D.H. Lawrence's The Plumed Serpent, which set spiritual quests in alien
environments containing tne power to destroy conventional expectations
of character, disturb traditional means of assessment and prevent reliance
upon personal experience on the part of the reader. Stevenson, however,
is less interested than these writers in the realities of the culture
clasn, but concentrates on the alien location as a metapnor for his
metaphysical concerns. The artefacts of landscape are thus used tc
exploit a suD-conscious response, to connote dream images and to widen
tne significance of the language in the text by encouraging the potential
for almost allegorical interpretations.
Tne images of location also provide shifting avenues of response which
support the sense of mutaDility establisned Py tne novel. This
effect can De most clearly traced in the descriptions of HerricK's
responses to the alien environments. derrick's first reaction to
Attwater's island indicates how the process operates on both tne level
of a moral sign being given to the characters, and of signifiers of the
textual quest oeing presented to the reader. We are tola: 'Trie isle -
the undiscovered, the scarce - believed in - now lay before tnem and
close aboard; and HerricK thought that never in his dreams had he Deheld
anything more strange and delicate.1 (p.279) The situation is at once
removed from the level of pure reality, and is imbued witn expectation,
derrick tries to find seme means of relating the vision to his own
experience: 'He tortured himself to find analogies. The isle was liKe
tne rim of a great vessel sunken in the waters; it was like tne emoankment
of an annular railway grown upon with wood1 (p.280). In this way tiie
significance of tne natural world of the island is stressed at tne
expense of numan limitations in comprenending it. And derrick's plight
is shared by the reader who searches the textual descriptions for any '
explanation or continuation of this apparent significance. derrick's
traversal of the island, when on his way to meet Attwater; offers another
illustration of this process:
When ne now went forward,_it was cool with the shadows
of many well-grown palms;'draughts of the dying breeze
swung them together overnead; and on all sides, with a
swiftness beyond dragon-flies or swallows, tne spots of
sunshine flitted, and ncvered, and returned. Underfoot,
the sand was fairly solid and quite level, ana derrick's
steps fell there noiseless as in new-fallen snow. It
oore the marks of having oeen once weeded like a garden
alley at nome; but the pestilence nad aone its wcr;<, ana
tne weeds were returning. ,a (p.z54)
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This passage opens itself to readings on several levels; already the
island is being presented as a place of retreat from the heat of the
snip, with its shadowy paths implying a potential hiding place. The
hovering sunshine adds to the sense of unreality, as if the whole
island is transient, liable to disappear at any moment, with tiie
apparently solid land vanishing in much the same way as Attwater's supposed
reliability does. The terms of description also imply a certain animism
in the scene, again indicating natural forces wnich are cutwith human
control. Enhancing the novel's moral preoccupations in a more direct'
way, images such as Merrick's steps oeing as m new-fallen snow serve'to
remind us of his deep desire for some form of purity or innocence.
Even his view of the island as having been tended like a garden can be
seen as stemming from his desire for order, tiie attempt to impose
civilised conventions upon tne wilderness. Only the mentions of weeds
ana pestilence give some idea of the contradictions of innocence and
civilisation,.hinting at Merrick's future disillusionment.
Such textual analysis leads us into paralleling the actions of the
characters oy attempting to impose moral significance upon the natural
world, trying to find in the scenic descriptions some inaication of
meanings external to our conscious awareness. Yet it is for this very
reason that the process does yield a temporary significance, since we
learn that the import of the images cannot be extrapolated from the text
as a whole, nor related to our own experience of reality. This does
not mean, however, that the images lose their metaphysical significance.
One final illustration - the appearance of Attwater flanked oy two
natives - snows just now effective the original impact of an apparently
reasonable description can oe:
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The sun glistened upon two metallic objects, locomotory
like men, and occupying in tne economy of those creatures
the places of heads - only the heads were faceless. To
Davis between wind and water, his mythology appeared to
nave come alive, and Topnet to De vomiting demons.
(p.346)
Despite the fact that such strange Deings are identified as natives in
diving suits at the next instant, the language and tne image is
sufficiently powerful for them to impress upon tne reader an impression
of alien beings from anotner world. The 'realistic' explanation in no
way mitigates their impact. The image also indicates how the reader
has, by this stage, come to accept a certain extra-realistic form of
perception, and to understand a register of thought which actually seeKS
metaphysical significance rather than normative interpretations.
Although such moments appear to have only a temporary meaning they also
arouse the expectation of significance whicn is central to the tale's
dynamic. In the search for ways of achieving imaginative transformations
of reality through description, Stevenson is paralleling the search-of
tne cnaracters for external significance to tneir existences. Tne
unity thus achieved must also, however, be reflected in the limitations
of both tne fiction and its moral concerns. The power of the image, therefore
is only temporary, and the various identities which the characters
attempt to create for themselves are snown simply as fictions. The
failures of Attwater, Herrick, Davis and Huish, and of their dreams, are
necessary illustrations of the dangerous ways in which fictions can
bolster an illusory sense of self. The tale tnus denies not only the
possibility of any concreteness of perception in interpreting the physical
environment, out also prevents us from forming any consistent moral
assessments. The reader is left to fall bac;< upon Stevenson's maxim:
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'We must walk by faith indeed, and not by knowledge.1 By pointing
to the potential for absolutism and then attaching the attempt to put
such a philosophy into practice on purely human terms, Stevenson creates
the awareness of a lack in human consciousness and human powers of
comprehension ; it is around tnis dimly perceived aosence that the
tale is centred. And this aosence comes to assume its own significance
as a symbol of human limitations.
The story also increases the sense of limitation by denying us any
satisfactory resolution to the fictional plot. Davis loses his identity
while Attwater's false sense of self is reinforced by his saving of a
sinner's soul. Triumphantly he has the last word in the novel, through
the mouthpiece of his victim, Davis:
But, 01 wny not be one of us? why not come to Jesus
right away, and let's meet in yon beautiful land?
That.'sjust the one tning wanted; just say; Lord, I
believe, help tnou my unbeliefl And he'll fold you
in His arms. You see, I know! I been a sinner
m>'self: {p. 355)
derrick, however, who has been previously told by Davis before his
conversion 'Go to Hell in your own way!' finds that he can no more
achieve Heaven than Hell on his own. He remains fixed within reality,
realising that from now on: 1 he must go back into the world and amongst
men without illusion.' (p.32b) The grim cognition that in order to
survive he must acknowledge the limitations of his own nature snares
with Calvinism a sense of Original Sin, of the flawed nature of humanity.
But it also indicates a recognition that in order to survive happily
within reality all absolutist ideals should be rejected and that
flexibility, self-justification, even hypocrisy - trie expressions of a
40. 'Lay Morals', p.1S3.
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relative morality-are necessary for a comfortable existence witnin tne
confines of this world. Hence the note of sadness, and of anti-climax
•at the novel's end, for here Stevenson comes close to a weary acceptance
of the limitations of human reality, and a resigned understanding of tne
human condition.
Nevertheless, the ideal that has been 'realistically' rejected remains
a potent force as projected not only by the contents of the fiction but
by the reading processes involved. By indicating the reductive quality
of circumstantial reality, and the illusions of numan attempts to create
absolutes, the novel forces the reader to become involved in the process
of searching for some solution, ana thus to recognise limitations in
self as well. Moreover, the exotic location easily establisnes a
recognition that,on completion of the text, the reader will return to his
or her relative reality. Through our response to tne fictionalisation
of an extreme state of subjectivity, which is placed in contrast with
'a fixed design of righteousness', we gain a sense of the dichotomy
which interests Stevenson. Yet after dramatising his sense of limit¬
ations, imperceptions and the problems inherent in moral judgement, he
then leaves his reader to re-enter the world of reality with a feeling of
impotence and uncertainty. Only by internalising the search for
absolutes in tne fictional process can the subject even be broached: to
depict the human desire for, and loss of aosolutes in any realist form
would be both difficult in technical demands and depressing,- even
destructive,in content. As it is, by circling around the loss of
absolutes, presenting them as an absent centre, Stevenson can achieve a
temporary understanding of aosolutes, presented to the reader in terms
of comprehension on an imagistic level rather than through concrete
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analysis or didactic discussion. For, as he himself wrote: 'It is
only by some bold poetry of thought that men can be strung up above the
level of everyday conceptions to taKe a broader look upon experience
41
or accept some higher principle of conduct.1
Stevenson's Soutn Sea novels nave been criticised for Deing merely exotic,
for aodicating their responsibilities to realism. Andrew Noble, for
example writes of: 'the manner in which, arbitrarily and often
consciously, Stevenson aborts a serious enterprise into escapist,
picturesque adventure. 'The Merry Men', 'The Beacn of Falesa' and
The Ebp-Tide are outstanding examples of other stories which share this
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auto-destructive capacity'. Yet it is possible to see that only by
such 'bold poetry of thought', by exploration of alien, 'escapist'
environments, can Stevenson explore issues wnich are every bit as
'serious' as those expressed in realist fiction.
41. 'Lay Morals', pp.163-164.
42. Andrew Noble, Introduction, Robert Louis Stevenson ed. A. Noble
(Mevoftvk., 19b3), p.11. """" '
CHAPTER THREE
ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON: THE SCOTTISH NOVELS
In the preceding chapter I discussed tne various ways in wnich
Stevenson transposes his moral concerns, and that aosolutist
perspective which owes much to iiis Scottish upbringing and the
influence of Calvinist theology, into exotic settings which permit
topographical, incidental and symbolic representations of those
dichotomies which are part of his pnilosopiiical vision. By using such
locations he could create that, 'personal poetry, the enchanted
atmosphere, that rainbow work of fancy that clothes what is naked and
1
seems to enoble what is base,' which he saw as missing in the 'haunting
2
and truly spectral unreality of realistic books.' The three fictions,
with their adventure plots, the unfami1iarity of the world wnicn they
descriDe, and the clear distinction of fabula and sjuznet, illustrate
Stevenson's belief that: 'no man lives in the external truth, among
salts and acids, but in tne warm, phantasmagoric chamber of his brain,
witn the painted windows and the storied walls.' Yet net all Stevenson'
novels point towards this phantasmagoric world; within his oeuvre a
noticeable difference exists between those fictions set in foreign
locations and tnose witn more recognisably local situations. This
chapter therefore considers what effect writing in a context familiar
not only to himself but probably also to his readers nas on the author
wno gave the injunction: 'Continue to testify boldly against realism!'
1. Stevenson, 'The Lantern Bearers', Works XXVI, 110-125, p.122.
2. 'The Lantern Bearers', p.121.
3. 'The Lantern Bearers', p.122.
4. Stevenson, Letter to W.H. Low (GctoDer, 1685), Letters vol.2, 1880-
1687, Works XXXVIII, ed. Colvin (London, 1S26), p.172.
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How does he fulfil this demand wnen the suDject matter of his
fictions is so much nearer his own experiences - geograpnically,
historically and emotionally?
The novels which do have more familiar locations appear to offer a less
consistent indication of his interests than his foreign fiction,
even the finest works within this group contain more contradictions, in
botn artistry and intent, than his more exotic tales. And the very
fact that such conflicts are more noticeable would seem to indicate
that the author is less able to distance himself from tiie fictional
world, since that world is closer to his own experiences of 'reality1.
His Scottish novels, and in particular Kidnapped and The Master of
Ballantrae, clearly reveal the nature of tne demands which realism can
make upon tne novel term and partly explain Stevenson's reasons for
aoandoning that method. Yet tiiey also show the- pressures of a
philosophy of 'moral realism', tne consciousness of aosolutes which,
when linked witn the complicating factors of personal experience, with
nostalgia and with national myth, force Stevenson into a variety of
formal and generic experiments.
The degree of literary realism used by Stevenson, especially in his
Scottish and more 'adult' novels, has been much argued over oy critics.
Stevenson, himself, however, is quite explicit about his own attitude.
Giving advice to the 'young writer' in 'A Humole Remonstrance', he
writes: 'And as the root of tne whole matter, let him bear in mind
that nis novel is not a transcript of life, to be judged oy its
exactitude; but a simplification of some side or point of life, to stand
5
or fall by its significant simplicity.' Nevertheless, in writing
5. 'A Humble Remonstrance', p. 166.
143
about areas and periods close to him - imaginatively if not always geograph¬
ically -• Stevenson opens his work to interpretations wiiicn
overlook the serious nature of his concerns, and forget the concept
of 'significant simplicity1. Despite the fact that many of the same
generic features are present, and in greater abundance in nis South:
Sea fictions, certain romance elements in his Scottish works nave lea to
his being viewed as a writer of nostalgia. Ana,by way of pseudo-
psychological criticism, he has been accused of trying to re-enter the
world of ins childhood - a criticism levelled at him by G.K. Chesterton
and Robert Kiely, amongst others.0 Kiely, however, does link Stevenson's
searcn for a child's perspective on the world with his desire for
'significant simplicity'. And in an unpublished thesis which develops
the concept of a child's viewpoint, Daniel Balderston draws interesting
paraallels with post-modernist fiction by building on the idea of play
in Stevenson's wcrk.^ Certainly, if Piaget's argument on 'moral
realism' is to be accepted, analogies existing Detween Stevenson's moral
out 1ook and that of a child, could be reflected in nis fiction. Yet,
without disregarding the elements of adventure and play in Stevenson's
Scottisn fiction, it is also important to recognise the complexity of
his aims in these works and to be aware of the conflicting influences
which oeset him. In the South Sea fiction we can see now he de-
contextualises his fiction by placing it in an alien environment which
easily Decomes imbued with symbolic significance. Such a context,
therefore, appears well suited to the integration of an extreme and
6. See both G.K. Chesterton, Robert Louis Stevenson (London, 1927),
pp.49-57, and Robert Kiely, Robert Louis Stevervson and tne Fiction
of Adventure (Massachusetts, 1964), pp.61-105.
7. Daniel Salderston, 'Surges' Frame of Reference: The Strange Case of
Rooert Louis Stevenson' (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 19S1,
Ann Arbor Mi. University Microfilms).
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aDsolutist moral perspective. Obviously sucn a process of
defamiliarisation is not so easy in a Scottish (or even a British]
situation. In contrast witn the South Sea worKs, his techniques in the
Scottish novels appear as either immensely subtle or as confused; yet
in either case they can be seen as an accurate reflection of his own
conflicts. For rather tnan stripping away all that is familiar, ne
achieves a perspective of 'otnerness' by juxtaposing relative and
absolutist perceptions, realist and romantic contexts, thus creating a
sense of duality and difference. Perhaps here the child analogies are
of most use as a metaphor for his technique, for trie positing of innocence
and knowledge in a contrast from which neither emerges as superior.
Writing on what can be lost in the development from childhood to adult¬
hood, Stevenson comments:
At the same time, and step by step with this increas'e
in the definition and intensity of wnat we feel wnich
accompanies our growing age, another cnange takes place
in tne sphere of intellect, Dy whicn all things are
transformed and seen through theories and associations
as through coloured winduws. We maKe to ourselves, day
by day, out of nistory, and gossip, and economical
speculations, and God knows wnat, a medium in which we
walk, and through which we Igok aoroad. 8
in his South Sea novels Stevenson removes the coloured windows of our
conventional perceptions and allows us to be dazzled by tne light this
lets in. In his Scottish novels, whether by conscious decision or
failure of nerve, he permits us to Iook through one coloured window, tnat
of our own realist and relativist perception, and tnrough one clear
window wnich again lets in new light. Through trie interaction thus
created we gain a new perspective but also an awareness of tne essential
conflict between tne two views, at least in terms of our 'real' existence.
8. Stevenson, "Child's Play1, Worxs XXI1, 122-133, pp.123-124.
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The manipulations of form and of realism as a technique which arise in
Stevenson's Scottish novels have lea to mucn biographical speculation.
RoDert Kiely, for example, hazards, somewnat vaguely: 'pernaps his
Scotch Presbyterian training made him too mistrustful of the possibility
9
of representing ideal reality in concrete terms.1 Unfortunately
Kiely offers this idea in a dismissive rather than introductory fashion.
Anotner potentially fruitful allusion to Stevenson's situation is made
Dy V.S. Pritchett: 'When we complain of Stevenson's mannerisms and of
his artificiality, we ought to distinguish between the purely mannered,
and that ingrained love of the devious and elaborate which comes naturally
from the rich and compressed scruples of the Scottish cnaracter and from
the tribal ironies of Scottish religious nistory.' 0 Despite the rather
rash generalisations about the 'Scottish character', Pritcnett does
indicate philosophical reasons for Stevenson's method: again, however,
the comment is never followed up in his essay on the subject. And,
indeed, it could be argued that Stevenson's Scottish fictions are, in
fact, less 'mannered' than nis others. Furthermore, it would appear
that the strongest linK between the works set in familiar ana in alien
locations _i_s the element of adventure, the significance of plot:
it is this emphasis which indicates most clearly Stevenson's continued
avoidance of a complete commitment to realism.
Indeed, Stevenson's use of adventure earns him a place with other great
writers wno illustrate their moral concerns through plots of action.
As Leslie Fiedler has pointed out, Stevenson's artistic approacn can be
9. Kiely, Rooert Louis Stevenson and the Fiction of Adventure, pp.61-62.
10. V.S. Pritcnett, Introduction, Novels and Stories by Robert Louis
Stevenson (London, 1S45), p.ix.
seen in tne context of writers such as Melville, Conan Doyle and Graham
Greene, wnc begin with outward romance of incident in their novels and
tnen move througn allegory into 'tne na'ive or unconscious evocation of
11
mytn." Indicating tne moral nature of literary form, tne aivergence
Detween what can be idealised in art as opposed to nature, Fiedler
comments on tne potential of seeing sucn writers in a definite category:
such an understanding may lead to tne more general
appreciation of an honourable alternative to realism,
somewhat out of fasnion but by no means exnaustea in
its possibilities, a game in wriicn the serious
contemporary fictionist may find a strategy for closing
the distance between himself and tne large audience of 9
novel readers ordinarily immune to serious literature.
In his subsequent discussion of individual Stevenson novels, however,
Fiedler does not build on this connection Detween mural form and tne
lacK of realism. Yet, following his idea of an 'nondurable alternative
to realism', this chapter will concentrate once again on tne interaction
Detween Stevenson's 'moral realism' and nis fictional techniques, but
this time examining them within a familiar, culturally and nistorically
oound, context. It will also consider tnose short stories - sucn as
'JeKyll and Hyde1 and 'MarKheim' whicn, altnougn context-less,
obviously have local ratner than exotic settings.
Althougn recognising changes in Stevenson's aims, approacnes and position
as a writer in tne course of nis career, in this cnapter I will follow
an achronological order, necessary for exploring tne nature of nis
concerns and tne variety of his tecnniques. It siioula be emphasised
however, ttiat my aim is not to categorise the wcrxs in any definite
11. Leslie Fiedler, 'R.L.S. Revisited', Nol In Thunder: Essays on
Mytn ana Literature (London, 1S63), 77-91, p.7a.
12. Fiedler, 'R.L.S. Revisited', p.79.
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pattern, ratner to explore tneir configurations for, as Stevenson wrote:
'in the nignest achievement of tne art of words, the dramatic and tne
pictorial, tne moral and romantic interest, rise and fall togetner oy a
1 ^
common and organic law.1 0 Tne snort stories, as brief experiments in
narrative, will be considered first. Kidnapped will then be discussed
as one of Stevenson's most equivocal examinations of morality. His
follow-up to tnat novel, however, Catriona, indicates a movement away
from 'moral realism1 and, to a certain extent, towards literary realism
in its tecnnique. It therefore merits a brief consideration Defore
moving on to The Master of Ballantrae. Possibly Stevenson's finest
work in a Scottish context, this novel also offers the most complex
representation of his moral concerns and provides the greatest cnallenge
to realism.
'The Strange Case of Dr Jexyll and Mr Hyde'
Stevenson's short stories, altnough very much expressions of the dialectic
between a suDjective awareness of reality and the desire for an external
and morally objective dimension to existence, tend to adopt the approach
of Treasure Island, in that a specific literary generic form is used in
order to contain tne dicnotomies and prevent them becoming too
destructive. The short story form - ideally suited to accommodating
ambiguity - contains the conflicts to such an extent tnat no clear
resolution is expected or given; tne amDiguity itself becomes part of
tne conclusion. Stevenson, a master of the form, also uses it to
develop his techniques of deliberately displaying narrative as a self-
conscious artefact, thus creating significance through the reading process
as a whole - a significance wnich may contradict tne ostensible meaning
of the text.
13. Stevenson, 'A Gossip on Romance', Worxs XXV, 140-154, p.147.
In any discussion of morality "The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr
Hyde1 is the Stevenson text that immediately comes to mind.^ Altnough
still divided aDout tne elements of detective mystery in tne tale, most
critics have now dismissed the assumption that tne story is merely an
allegory intended to prove: 'tnat if you weren't careful, the evil
15
in you would swallow up tiie good.' Nevertheless, many still settle
for the explanation that Stevenson is depicting moral conflicts in terms
of a single divided self. Certainly such a view allows for tne autnor's
alignment with the traditions of the period, of tne double self as
presented by Dickens, Wilkie Collins, Mary Shelley and, of course,
16
Edgar Allan Poe's Willi am Milson. Yet in none of Stevenson's fiction
is tne self simply-divided into two: ratner it is dramatised into a
series of characterisations through a holistic approach to the fiction.
His figures are presented and re-presented, defined and redefined oy
tneir situations. And nowhere is this more explicitly indicated by
tne structure tnan in 'Jekyll and Hyde'.
'The harm was in Jekyll, because he was a hypocrite... The hypocrite
let out tne beast Hyde,' wrote Stevenson in a letter.1^ The text
itself makes it quite clear that the central cnaracter Jekyll, althouyn
a respectable doctor, is falling far short of leading a saintly life
14. Stevenson, 'The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde', Works IV,
3-b5. All further page references are to this edition.
15. Signer, p.149, quoting from C. Kieth, 'Stevenson Today', Queen's
Quarterly (Winter, 1950-1951), p.456.
16. See discussion of tnis by Andrew Lang, after a correspondence witn
Stevenson on the suoject, 'Unsigned Review1, Saturday Review (9tn
January, 1bb6), Lxi 55-56. (In Paul Maixner, Stevenson: Tne
Critical Heritage (London, 1Sb1), pp.199-202).
17. Stevenson, Letter to John Paul Bocock (November 18b7), Huntington
Library, H.M. 2414, Maixner, Tiie Critical Heritage, pp.230-231.
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even before ne oegins his experiments. Enfield, an acquaintance, on
hearing of Jekyll being indebted to the character known as Hyde, remarks:
'An honest man paying tnrougn the nose for some of the capers of his
youth' (p.8). And Utterson, the cnaracter closest to tne narrative
consciousness, also gives credence to the blackmail theory: "'I thought
it was madness" ne said, "... and now I begin to fear it is disgrace",'
(p.12) Even on this most basic level of interpretation there exists
no 'good' Jekyll and 'bad' Hyde. Jekyll himself, in his confessional
statement, admits to his behavioural hypocrisy: 'Hence it came aocut
that I concealed my pleasures; and then when I reacned years of
reflection, and oegan to look round me, and take stock of my progress
and position in the world, I stood already committed to a profound
duplicity of life.' (p.65) In considering Jekyll's character therefore,
it is important to remember another of Stevenson's remarks made in the
letter quoted above: 'I dare to say, you know as well as I, that bad
and good, even to our human eyes, has no more connection with what is
18
called dissipation than it has with flying 'kites.' The relatively
cliched expressions of Jekyll's dissipation, only darKly iiinted at and
vaguely defined in the story, can therefore be seen as merely super¬
ficial indications of his flawed moral condition. The empnasis in
Stevenson's statement of 'to our human eyes' is a significant guide to
the distinctions he makes regarding moral purpose and human judgement.
It also provides some indication of the purpose behind tne complex
narrative structure - that of illustrating to us a wider perspective on
morality tnan is usually apparent to our 'human eyes'.
Although the story is written in tne third person, the character closest
to the narrative is Mr Utterson. We are obviously intended to identify
16. Letter to John Paul Bocock.
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witti him, being given a lengtny description cf iiis person at trie
beginning of the tale, as well as having access to his opinions and
interpretations. Through Utterson we also have access to tne
narratives of Dr Lanyon and Jekyll himself. Tiiis funnel effect creates
the impression of a multiplicity of perspective but also draws attention
to tne element of interpretation based on 'human eyes'. The narrative
can thus be read as a process of attempting to define moral consciousness
with reference to a series of situations in which tne moral character
of participant and spectator (and, ultimately, reader) is tested. This
pattern of reflection means that not only Jekyll's statement itself can
be read as an exposition of his moral perceptions, extending into a
justification of them, but also that the tale as a whole may be seen as
an attempt in a similar vein, by Utterson, trying to come to terms with
nis own consciousness of morality by defining it through external
fictionalising rather than introspection. Jekyll, after all, adopts
the third person approach in his confession wnen talking about Hyde.
Presumaoly the wnole group of bachelors in tne story would not oe
totally averse to Jekyll's 'vices' ana even Utterson admits to a milaer
version; ne 'drank gin wnen he was alone, to mortify a taste for
vintages.' (p.3) Moreover, when Utterson considers Jekyll's possiDle
'disgrace' he becomes aware of nis own vulnerabi1ity: 'his past was
fairly blameless; few men could read the rolls of their life with less
apprehension; yet he was humbled to the dust by the many ill things he
had done.' (p.1S) Although nis deeds may oe innocuous, there is an
obvious similarity here with Jekyll's focus un and fascination for the
potentiality of evil. And while Uttersun may assert his respectability,
are we to taxe as morally viable a man who states: 'I let my brother go
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to the devil in his own way1 (p.5), especially when considering the
apparent fate of Jekyll? Expiation of guilt through the act of
narration is net confined to Utterson. Dr Lanyon's narrative, although
it deals with an experience which forces him to recognise deeper aspects
of human nature than ne would care to acknowledge, can also oe seen as
an attempt to rationalise and externalise his response. The very act
of writing gives him a pause to reflect on what has happened to himself:
'My life is snaken to its roots-; sleep has left me; the deadliest
terror sits oy me at all hours of the day and night.1 (pp.53-54).And the
full import of the encounter with Hyde cannot be described; 'What he
told me in the next hour I cannot bring my mind to set on paper.' (p.53)
Nabakov offers an explanation for this proliteration of marginally
involved bachelor characters, seeing tnem as providing a middle ground
between reality and fantasy, so that the reader may achieve the
19
requisite amount of recognition and identification with the tale.
Without discounting this explanation, however, it is also possible to
emphasise the integrated nature of the narratives. Despite the fact
that, if we Qelieve in Jekyll's plight Utterson's account must oe reaa
as valid, and if we see Utterson as self-delusory tnen we cannot trust
nis account of Jekyll's transformation, no single interpretation of the
tale can be achieved. A variety of readings continues to co-exist yet
they also continue to be mutually destructive; this dialectic, more than
anything else in the tale, expresses tne duality - not of the self -but
of the position of the self trying-to make sense of the surrounding
moral universe.
15. Vladimir Nabokov, 'The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde1,
Lectures on Literature, ed. Freason Bowers, introduction Jciin UpdiKe
(London, 19b0), 175-204.
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At the centre of tne fantasy, however, and as the clearest expression
of that duality in one cnaracter, stands Jekyll's narrative. It also
serves to indicate another mode of concealment; by recognising the
extreme nature of good and evil as concepts, Dut Dy seeding to inter¬
nalise them within his character, Jekyll sees the moral polarities of
the universe exemplified in tne drama of his own persona. Despite
its melodramatic nature, his narrative can be read as an attempt to
mitigate the significance of such external absolutes. 'It was on tne
moral side, and in my own person,1 he writes, 'that I learned to
recognise tne thorough and primitive duality of man.' (p.56) Yet
through his experiments we can see him not only attempting to reacn a
recognition of human potential for evil but also trying to place sucn
an awareness within the context of science, to translate it into terms
wnicn can achieve a concrete existence within his own frame of
reference. His attempt to resolve such dualities in this way, however,
fails, and in the language of his narrative we can near the metapnysical,
emotional dimension of his experiences breaking through, powerfully
conveying the real sense of evil that he is afraid to acknowledge. The
effect is partly due to the Gotnic violence of his description: 'Certain
agents I found to have the power to shake and to pluck back that fleshly
vestment, even as a wind might toss the curtains of a pavilion' (p.67);
'The drug ... shook tne doors of the prison house of my disposition.1
(p.70) And here we can see tnat the actual process of transformation
is more to De feared tnan what ne might eventually Decome. His style
also evokes a consciously self-dramatising tone of despair: 'Instantly
tne spirit of hell awoke in me and raged... A mist dispersed; I saw
my life to be forfeit.' (p.77) His voice, while admitting that 'the
veil of self-indulgence was rent from head to foot' (p.77), also
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glorifies a strong sense of self-importance: 'I saw my life as a whole:
I followed it up from the days of childhood ... to arrive again and
again with the same sense of unreality, at the damned horrors of the
evening.' (p.77) In so doing, Jekyl1 can be seen as attempting to set
up barriers against that disintegration of perception, the fragmentation
of a unified self, that emerges as one of the main fears of all the
characters in the tale. Jekyll fears above all the otherness that will
face him if he can no longer distinguish between the Jekyll and Hyde
parts of his character; even when he can no longer maintain a physical
distinction between the two, he attempts to keep them separate in prose.
As his end draws near even this solace will be denied him: 'It is
useless, and the time awfully fails me, to prolong this description.'
(p.84) Significantly, the tale ends with the close of Jekyl1's
narrative; there is no narrative conclusion provided by Utterson. The
various narratives can thus be seen as providing the last bastions
against the unknown with which we are finally faced, while, at the same
time, the language they use gives some sense of the horrors concealed
behind the apparent verbal control.
The world of an unknown moral dimension, and the world of narratable
experience also succeed in intersecting through points of imagery in the
tale. This is most noticable in Utterson's dream which, apart from
indicating an altering environment of existence, also creates a
reflection of the story's patterning; he sees the figure of the troglodyte:
'glide more stealthily through sleeping houses, or move the more swiftly
and still the more swiftly, even to dizziness, through wider labyrinths
of lamp-lighted city.' (p.14) This image of the labyrinth is a
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recurring feature, pointing not only to the confusion of narrators in
their search for definitions, but also to our own attempts, as readers,
to make our way through a variety of accounts, never reaching a point of
clarification. Such a feature, of course, is not restricted to this one
tale; recent work has examined just how much an element of Stevenson's
work this was, and how it relates him to post-modernist writers such as
Borges. As Daniel Balderston remarks in a comparison between the two
authors: 'In their fiction the act of duplication usually generates a
momentum which causes it to happen again and again, and hence, sometimes,
20
to form an endless chain.' Images of fog in 'Jeky11 and Hyde' add to this
sense of an endless multiplicity: 'A great chocolate-coloured pall lowered
over heaven, but the wind was continually charging and routing these
embattled vapours' (p.25) while also providing a contrast with the sudden
shafts of sunlight that reveal the full horror of Hyde. Once again the
process is a dual one of revelation and concealment.
By bringing together such images, by breaking down interpretations
almost as soon as they are made, Stevenson both indicates the
limitations of language and of humanity's experience, but also points to
the void existing behind our world of words. It is not surprising that,
of all Stevenson's works,' Jekyll and Hyde' should have attracted the
greatest diversity of interpretations - for in themselves these
analyses are attempts to rationalise and explain. Yet the void the
tale creates, by virtue of its tightly integrated structure which
prevents any one explanation from being totally satisfactory, has been
responsible for its transportation into the realms of myth. The story
20. Balderston, p.185.
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plays upon the reader's desire to be given a verbal explanation of a
mystery, but also emphasises the impossibility of such interpretations
ever being totally valid for our reality.
In 'Lay Morals' Stevenson wrote of the limits to human comprehension of
morality and stated: 'His inner soul appears to him by successive
revelations and is frequently obscured. It is from study of these
alternations that we can alone hope to discover, even dimly, what seems
21
right and what seems wrong to this veiled prophet of ourself.' In
'Jekyll and Hyde' he succeeds in representing our relationship with
this 'veiled prophet', but not simply through the duality and enigma of
'Jekyll and Hyde'. The tale itself is fully entitled: 'The Strange
Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde', and it is the intransigence of that case
to the efforts of all the narrators/bachelors to solve it, along with
our own inability to penetrate the web in which they are enmeshed, that
finally defeats us but also brings some enlightenment to the 'veiled
prophet'. The bottomlessness of the fiction itself offers a recreation
of the universe in which humankind, with all its uncertainty, searches
for points of definition but cannot find such absolutes except in
extremes which are unacceptable to our reality. And yet, through the
fiction, we are also offered a fairly 'safe' means of facing up to
that consciousness without threatening-our everyday 'reality'.
Short Stories
22
A remark made by a character in 'Will 0' the Mill', another of
Stevenson's short stories, helps elucidate his method within that genre.
21. 'Lay Morals', p.183.
22. Stevenson, 'Will 0' the Mill', Works VII, 55-95.
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The tale's central character, Will, who lives in a valley among the
mountains and is feeling restless with his lot in life, is visited by
a young man from the outside world. The stranger begins his
philosophising on existence by asking Will: 'Can you apply a parable?',
proceeding to explain: 'It is not the same thing as a reason, but
usually vastly more convincing.' (p.74) In this particular instance the
parable is achieved by contrasting a squirrel who turns a wheel in his
cage all day with another who sits contemplating the nuts in his
possession. The image has a profound effect upon Will, who takes it to
mean that contemplative passivity can equal possession of the world, and
is as valid a means of assimilation into it as any illusion of useful
activity. This small incident not only indicates the way in which
Stevenson, too, would desire his fiction to be interpreted - as an applied
image, more convincing than the processes of reasoning - but also
indicates the nature of the effect for which he is aiming. The parable,
the impact of its image, is of meditative significance; there is little
point in forcing a correlation between the image and our actions in
reality. And, as the stranger claims, the act of contemplation may be
of greater value than the illusion of activity: an attitude which Will
himself learns to appreciate.
Yet the tale offers more than this single moment of wisdom. It also
provides an interesting example of the type of reaction often provoked
by Stevenson's fiction in general and his short stories in particular.
David Daiches is not alone amongst critics when he complains that
although the tale is a superbly atmospheric piece, it does not sufficiently
23
realise the allegory it purports to contain. The loading of
23. Daiches, Robert Louis Stevenson, p.12.
157
significance in Stevenson's work, indeed, often seems almost to demand
allegorical interpretations for it certainly contains no immediate
relevance to, or direct discussion of, reality. Yet to read his work
as 'allegorical' in this way would be to draw as direct a correlation
between life and art - although in a purely symbolic way - as any
reading which perceives his work to be'realist?. Stevenson is not
concerned to create characters, events and settings which only represent
meanings independent of the action in the story, to convey a definite
structure of ideas by his fiction. His projection of significance
would seem to elude such a formulated approach.
Therefore, although the strength of his arguments against realism forces
us to look for alternatives to it, careful assessment must be made of
exactly what it is that he sets up in place of it. 'Our art,' he
wrote, 'is occupied, and bound to be occupied, not so much in making
24
stories true as in making them typical.' As he points out,
'typicality' involves a fusion of all elements of experience, creating
an image which allows a clarification - not a representation - of life.
As he continues: 'The novel which is a work of art, exists, not by its
resemblances to life, which are forced and material, as a shoe must
still consist of leather, but by its immeasurable difference from life,
which is designed and significant, and is both the method and the
25
meaning of the work.' The dimensions of existence as he views them,
heightened by his moral perceptions, cannot be given concrete
realisation either through allegory or through realism, but must be
projected through a more flexible form of fiction, able to
24. 'A Humble Remonstrance', p.159.
25. 'A Humble Remonstrance', p.160.
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create new perspectives, which then bring their own insight into life.
'Markheim' provides another illustration of this fictional process.
The tale, with its obvious resemblances to Dostoevsky's Crime and
Punishment, centres round a dialogue between Markheim, a would-be robber
and a murderer, and a mysterious stranger, an apparition who suddenly
confronts him as he carries out his evil deeds, demanding that Markheim
attempt to justify his criminal intentions. Much debate has focused
on the identity of this stranger - an angel or devil, a mirror image of
himself, his conscience, or even a figment of his tormented imagination,
have all been offered as possible explanations, whether the advice
given by the stranger is good or bad has also aroused discussion.
Such speculations, however, evade the central significance of the tale
for it is the very appearance of the stranger, the illusion itself, which
provides the essential image with a function of destroying Markheim's
complacent self-justifications. And, in this process, the apparition
indicates how the way in which humankind places security in self-created
moral contexts and in explanations which can be contracted or expanded
as expediency demands, can be easily broken down; the very essence of
relative morality is thus revealed as fallible.
But in this tale it is not only the 'ghost' that breaks down Markheim's
sense of an established moral identity, so carefully built up through
his recounting of the circumstances which led to his present low
situation. The extremity of his criminal act, the awareness of his
evil actions, also leads Markheim into feeling that his whole perception
26. Stevenson, 'Markheim', Works VII, 99-118.
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of reality is threatened. Even before the ghost appears we are told
that Markheim: 'feared tenfold more, with a slavish superstitious
terror, some scission in the continuity of man's experience.' (p.109)
Reality, it seems, carries a built-in supposition that there is a
continuity to being, and that humanity's progress within reality is
dynamic, avoiding points of stasis which may call for contemplation of
extremes alien to reality and demand recognition of external absolutes.
Markheim's fear, therefore, has a moral basis, stemming from the fear
of confrontation with the extreme and absolute nature of his deed in
murdering the old shop-keeper. This fear leads him to see the world
as mutable; he believes; 'that the solid walls might become
transparent and reveal his doings like those of bees in a glass hive;
the stout planks might yield under his feet like quicksands and detain
him in their clutch; ay, and there were soberer accidents that might
destroy him; if for instance, the house should fall and imprison him
beside the body of his victim.' (p.109) His fear of the unknown here,
although located in a fairly ordinary house, is similar to that
experienced by Herrick on his alien island in The Ebb-Tide, and the
images used - of softness and mutability - are very similar. When the
'ghost' does appear, therefore, we have been prepared for the sensations
of strangeness, and the apparition simply draws together and clarifies
the various strands of Markheim's fear.
In spite of the apparition's strangeness, Markheim, by the end of a
dialogue in which he has narrated his plans, his experiences and his
regrets, and has talked over his future, is able to: 'steadily regard
his counsellor', and to state: 'If I be condemned to evil acts
there is still one door of freedom open - I can cease from action.'
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(p.118) Having gone through this process of narration, the dangerous
mutability of his world seems to have disappeared for Markheim;
he can return to a decipherable reality. And indeed, it is soon
after his story is completed that the mysterious stranger disappears.
In this tale, therefore, Stevenson represents the horror of evil acts
and the devastating effect a moral awareness of such acts can have on
our secure acceptance of reality, as extremes destroy the solidity of
the world in which we believe we operate. But he also incorporates
into the tale his own suspicion that the act of narration, of represen¬
ting such evil in fiction, is in itself an attempt at expiation,
that it mitigates our deeper awareness of moral polarities - just as
telling his tale relieves Markheim's imagination. The confrontation
of such forces in fiction, however, paradoxically clears the way for a
return to reality. A double process is thus in operation. The
powerful imagery, the expressions of mutability, destroy our sense of
security and convey Stevenson's pessimism as to our potential for a
valid functioning within reality. Yet the continuity and dynamism
established by the organisation of events in the narrative, that is, by
the sjuzhet, creates suspense, and an expectation of progressive action
which carries the reader through the story and out of its horror. The
sjuzhet thus prevents us being caught up in the mythic implications of
elements of the fabula. And here the term fabula is used in an
extended sense of not merely the events behind the narrative but also
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as the matter behind it, the mythic aspect. Perhaps, too, this
conjunction of fabula and sjuzhet may account for the face that
'Markheim1 has never been seen either as a successful ghost story or
as a convincing psychological exploration.
A story such as Markheim shows Stevenson experimenting with the tensions
of literary form and moral philosophy, but the short story which comes
28
closest to his later works in its complexity is 'The Merry Men.'
Prefiguring the achievements of The Master of Ballantrae and The Ebb-Tide,
the tale stretches form to the limits in order to contain those elements
which represent Stevenson's concerns and fears at their most destructive.
'The Merry Men' is also fairly typical of Stevenson's work in that it
uses the topographical conjunction of two physical worlds as a means of
setting out the problematic of an absolute morality against the various
dimensions of relative experience. Aros, the location of the tale, is
27. In one sense the definition of terms I am aiming at here comes close
to Edwin Muir's distinction of 'the story and the fable'. In An
Autobiography he describes how: 'our first intuition of the world
expands into vaster and vaster images, creating a myth which we act
almost without knowing it, while our outward life goes on in its
ordinary routine of eating, drinking, sleeping, working and making
money in order to beget sons and daughters who will do the same.(p.48)
And he continues:
In themselves our conscious lives may not be particularly
interesting. But what we are not and can never be, our
fable, seems to me inconceivably interesting. I should
like to write that fable, but I cannot even live it; and
all I could do if I related the outward course of my life
would be to show how I have deviated from it; though even
that is impossible, since I do not know the fable or
anybody who knows it. One or two stages in it I can
recognize: the age of innocence and the Fall and all the
dramatic consequences which issue from the Fall. But these
lie behind experience, not on its surface; they are not
historical events; they are stages in the fable. ^
It could be suggested, therefore, that the distinction of story and
fable, of sjuzhet and fabula, is particularly appropriate in reflect¬
ing the functioning of the Scottish imagination.
Edwin Muir, An Autobiography (London, 1954).
28. Stevenson, 'The Merry Men', Works VII, 3-62.
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not quite a piece of the Ross - the mainland: 'nor was it quite an
islet. It formed the south-west corner of the land, fitted close to
it, and was in one place only separated from the coast by a little gut
of the sea, not forty feet across the narrowest.1 (p.5) This little
world is therefore connected to the land, but totally surrounded by
the sea - a feature which emerges as significant in the course of the
tale. And to this location comes the youthful Charles Darnaway -
another familiar device for Stevenson, since,as a first-person narrator,
he is representative of an apparently mundane normality, like that of
Utterson, and of MacKellar in The Master of Ballantrae, whose normality
is not quite the immediate guarantee of virtue that it might at first
appear.
Indeed, the degree of self-interest in the narrator, Charles Darnaway,
is soon made evident. A nephew of the island's inhabitant, Gordon
Darnaway, he has temporarily left the world of everyday experience to
visit his uncle on isolated Aros but still holds very much to the
conventions of the world he has left. Like his uncle, he is attracted
to the idea of treasure to be found from the ships that have perished
on the hueJfrfs around Aros - the Merry Men. But unlike his uncle he is
able to rationalise this desire, saying: 'I must acquit myself of sordid
greed; for if I desired riches, it was not for their own sake, but for
the sake of a person who was dear to my heart - my uncle's daughter,
Mary Ellen.' (p.9) His determination to rationalise, to purge himself
of any dangerous traits of character, and to maintain a secure,
adaptable and relative morality, ultimately leads, however, to the
destruction of his uncle. Gordon Darnaway is obsessed with treasure, but
is also maddened by guilt at his supposed murder of a seaman, wrecked
from one of the ships. Yet as far as we can tell from the narrative
this deed is mainly impugned him by the suspicions of his nephew.
By the end of the tale he is driven mad by guilt and greed, unable to
stand that knowledge of himself which appears to be epitomised by a
strange black man, another shipwrecked mariner, who arrives on the island.
Attempting, on Charles' instructions, to catch the madman, the black man
finally chases Gordon Darnaway into the sea, where both men drown. On
one level, therefore, tne tale can be seen as representing Charles'
continued purgation of all such threatening features from his conscious¬
ness and his life; a furtherance of his own success. Inadequate as it
is, his final explanation of events is clearly aimed at revealing his
deliberate uninvolvement: 'The thing was now beyond the hands of men,
and these were the decrees of God that came to pass before my eyes.'(p.61)
In contrast to Charles, Gordon Darnaway, both villain and victim of the
piece, personifies the tensions created for existence oy the dichotomy
between absolutes of morality and the relativity of reality. He cannot
move outwith the world of Aros; 'He feared, cumbered as he was with the
young child, to make a fresh adventure upon life; and remained in Aros,
biting his nails at destiny.' (p.3) His conception of the moral
dimension to existence would render him immobile in the real world -
since he lacks the ready adaptability of Charles - and he remains on Aros,
creating an environment in which his strict Calvinist adherence to
religion and his Bauaelairean delight in evil as a positive force, can
find full expression. And he focuses, with a wild delight, on the
malevolence of lonc^u^ called the Merry Men, on whicn ships come to
destruction:
There, it seemed, was my uncle's favourite observatory.
Right in the face of it, where the cliff is highest and
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most sheer, a hump of earth, like a parapet, makes a
place of shelter from the common winds, where a man may
sit in quiet and see the tide and the mad billows
contending at his feet. As he might look down from the
window of a house upon some street disturbance, so, from
this post, he looks down upon the tumbling of the Merry
Men. On such a night, of course, he peers upon a world
of blackness, where the waters wheel and boil, where the
waves joust together with the noise of an explosion, and
the foam towers and vanishes in the twinkling of an eye.
(p.44)
Here Darnaway finds a conjunction of his Calvinism and his admiration
for evil and violence, which threatens to overwhelm him. And as soon
as a glimpse of the external world, that of normative morality, is let
in through the advent of his nephew, he perceives the conflict between
the forces of evil and righteousness in him. This clashing of
metaphysics in one person is too much, both for his nephew and for human
experience; he is therefore driven from the recognisable world into the
undefinable, into the sea, by the avenging figure of the black devil.
Charles Darnaway's sanctimonious absolution of any responsibility for
his uncle's death reveals the limitations of conventional understanding
when faced with such extremes; and yet he is also partly responsible;
I took to my heels to interfere, and perhaps I had done
better to have waited where I was, for I was the means
of cutting off the madman's last escape. There was nothing
before him from that moment but the grave, the wreck and
the sea in Sandai g Bay. And yet Heavens knows that what I
did was for the best. , c„\
Charles Darnaway himself is open to thoughts of extremes, of visions
from outwith the definable world, but he is always able to control or
repress them. At one point for example, we are told: 'Sad sea-feelings,
scraps of my uncle's superstitions, thoughts of the dead, of the grave,
of the old broken ships, drifted through my mind. But the strong sun
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upon my shoulders warmed me to the heart, and I stooped forward and
plunged Into the sea.' (p.29) He can therefore shake off the kinds
of thoughts which torment his uncle. In the course of the tale, the
reader is presented with two worlds, two outlooks and, once again, is
finally left to balance the contradictions between them,while presented
simultaneously with descriptions of an insupportable fear and unconvincing
narrative reassurances. The narrative of Charles Darnaway thus operates
to quell the images projected in the tale of Gordon Darnaway itself.
And in this particular instance, the imaging of fear, of the vision of
an extreme and alternative world, is so powerful - centred as it is
round the symbol of the wild that narrative reassurances seem
inadequate. Yet once again it is possible to see that the fabula is
raising issues not resolved by the sjuzhet ; it is around this
contradiction, this tension, that the success of the tale lies. And,
in this story Stevenson's techniques can be seen as prefiguring those
used in The Master of Ballantrae.
Before moving on to the specifically Scottish novels, however, two other
29
short stories demand some attention. 'Thrawn Janet1 and 'The Tale of
30
Tod Lapraik', from Catriona, are both tales in Scots dialect which deal
more openly with the supernatural than any of Stevenson's other works.
Stevenson himself appears to have been well satisfied with them
artistically; talking of 'Tod Lapraik', he comments: 'If I had never
31
writ anything but that and 'Thrawn Janet', still I'd have been a writer.'
29. Stevenson, 'Thrawn Janet', Works VII, 112-133.
30. Stevenson, 'Black Andie's Tale of Tod Lapraik', Catriona: A Sequel
to Kidnapped, Works VI, 136-146.
31. Stevenson, Letter to Colvin (April, 1893), Letters, vol.4, p.182.
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Although both tales deal with the fantastic and, in both instances, a
narrative frame is used around the supernatural events to lead into
the story, the tales themselves appear to possess a greater degree of
realism in their technique than most of Stevenson's other short stories
and novels. This is partly attributable to their use of dialect,
which prevents any distance being created between the narrator's mode of
speech and that of the characters. Each tale is also given a very
specific location, within a small community, at a point in the narrator's
past; the geographical, social and historical situation is therefore
clearly identifiable. This impression of realism3however, might seem
to be at odds with the actual events of the tales which, in each case,
are of a supernatural, extraordinary nature. Indeed, both stories deal
with the break in experience which occurs when supernatural events
take place, and when usual interpretations of reality can no longer
operate. Yet, in spite of this, the tales have never been seen as
essentially problematic: neat and coherent, they have remained popular
'ghost stories' rather than puzzling explorations of reality. And,
I suggest, it is precisely because both the real and the supernatural
are so clearly defined in them that they pose no threats. The
supernatural remains alien to the'reality', and 'reality'is clearly
located within a recognizable context. Although both stories concern
the punishment of evil, the external justice which is invoked is placed
in each case as an intrusion of a strange element into an essentially
familiar world. The supernatural elements remain 'strange', but we
are not asked to assimilate them into our own idea of reality; that
remains untouched by the element of the unknown.
The second reason for the tales presenting no real threat to our sense
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of 'reality' is that their general applicability is limited by that
very realism of technique which places them within such an identifiable
world. Stevenson himself acknowledges this with reference to at least
one of them: "Thrawn Janet' has two defects; it is true only
historically, true for a hill parish in Scotland in the old days, not
32
true for mankind and the world." And, of course, it is this limitation
which makes the tales so successful as short stories, rather than
explorations of more general tensions and contradictions. Yet the two
tales also indicate a problem which Stevenson faces in his Scottish
novels. If he wishes to make some expression of the nature of universal
dichotomies, he must broaden the implications of his material beyond
their context, avoiding any accusations of parochialism and achieving
more than a credible historicism. In a Scottish setting he is in
danger of limiting himself by the 'reality' of his fictional locations,
of settling for a cosy consistency of place and time, and of losing the
impact of the unknown and unfamiliar. He must also avoid being seen
merely as a writer of nostalgia. In his Scottish fictions, therefore,
he has to find new w^iys of creating significance and of emphasising the
power of the 'brute incident'.
Kidnapped
In his essay 'Lay Morals', drafted in Edinburgh seven years before the
33
publication of Kidnapped in 1886, Stevenson described: 'a type of that
righteousness which the soul demands'; 'It demands that we shall not live
alternately with our opposing tendencies in continual see-saw of passion
and disgust, but seek some path on which the tendencies shall no longer
32. Stevenson, 'Note for 'The Merry Men11 (1887), Maixner, The Critical
Heritage, pp.250-251.




oppose, but serve each other to a common end.' And bringing together
the concerns of 'The Merry Men' and the techniques developed in 'Thrawn
Janet' and other short stories, this union is what Stevenson seems to
achieve in Kidnapped. Yet in discussing the novel critics have
continually emphasised the opposing tendencies rather than their conjunction.
As previously mentioned, Wallace Robson sees the novel as signalling a
transition from Calvinist to Aristotelian morality through the development
of David Balfour; Edwin Eigner contrasts the character of David, the
Lowlander, 'paralysed' by his conscience, with Alan Breck, the Highlander,
35
possessing the courage for action but lacking in moral purpose; and
David Daiches points out that while David's character develops, Alan's
remains static. All three arguments offer relevant insights, as each
perspective intersects validly with a different point in the novel's
overall pattern. However, by viewing the novel as a whole it is also
possible to see such thematic contradictions as operating within a web,
which is created and set in motion by the tension between the adventure
story form and the narrative voice.
From general criticism on the novel, however, four significant features
emerge. Firstly, throughout the novel, David Balfour, that: 'steady
lad and a canny goer' (p.4) does struggle with an Aristotelian
37
morality as defined by Gilbert Ryle. However, his confrontation with
34. 'Lay Morals', p.184.
35. Eigner, p.95.
36. Daiches, Robert Louis Stevenson, pp.51-73.
37. See Chapter 1, p.35.
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such a morality does not necessarily mean that he eventually assimilates
it or totally accepts it as a code. His encounters with various
characters representing extremes of morality - Ebenezer Balfour, Mr Riach,
Cluny, Alan Breck himself - who operate in a world of absolutes, force
him to draw upon his limited experience, his moral teaching, and his
religion, in an attempt to place them within a certain world view. Yet
his world view is also frequently incapable of accommodating such
extremes - a fact which has significance both for the development of the
plot and the tenor of David's narrative. Secondly, his inability to
assimilate such extremes, and their persistent strength which is
maintained through images embedded in the text, contributes to the novel's
dynamic, reflecting the balance between motion and stasis noted in
Treasure Island. On one level the historical adventure story is
unrolled but its flow is interspersed with static moments of significance
in which the absence of action permits important moral recognitions to
emerge, indicating the more mythic aspects of the adventure/quest motif.
A third feature of the novel is the support given to such moments of
significance by the use of recurring images, the most common being that
of the image of an enclosed world into which the hero is thrown. Again
obvious similarities exist with Treasure Island. Images of darkness,
of the indefinable, rendering all attempts at relative explanation
futile, are also common and are closely linked to the pattern established
by the fourth important aspect of the novel - David's first person
narration.
The four features are obviously integral to the novel's overall effect
but nevertheless merit individual examination. The novel's pattern, which
reflects and enacts the struggles with an Aristotelian morality, consists
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of David being pitched into various adventures, travelling across country
from one incident to the next, in an attempt to re-establish his lost
inheritance. In each adventure he escapes only through the help of an
outside agent; not only Alan Breck but various other characters, who are
also alien to his cautious Protestant ethics, come to his aid. Mr Riach,
for example, helps him escape when he is actually kidnapped and twice on
his journey he is forced to rely on obvious rogues for guidance. Even
the outlaw Cluny provides shelter for him in his Den. Edwin Eigner
believes that such events raise the question of whether David is capable
of transcending his conscience in order to accept help, and obviously
this is an element in such situations, when viewed from the stance of a
sympathetic identification with the narrator. Yet from an external
point of view, in terms of the events alone, David actually becomes part
of that world of dubious morals; as he himself realises: 'So we sat
again and ate and drank in a place where we could see the sun going down
into a field of great, wild and homeless mountains, such as I was now
condemned to wander with my companion.' (p.141) And it would appear
that only through encounters with an alien, 'homeless' experience can he
be galvanised into action. To those in pursuit of him, believing him
part of the Appin murder plot, he is seen totally as one of the rebels
and as a wrong-doer. Naive expectations held by David, that the
innocent will ultimately be vindicated, are soon quashed by Alan Breck:
"Justice, David? The same justice, by all the world, as
Glenure found a while ago at the roadside."
This frightened me a little, I confess, and would
have frightened me more if I had known how nearly exact
were Alan's predictions; indeed it was but in one point
that he exaggerated, there being but eleven Campbells
on the jury. (pJ39)
No matter how much David may believe he is clinging to an Aristotelian
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form of morality, and may seek a world in which it operates, he is
also always conscious of travelling through a terrain of extremes and
oppositions. He therefore cannot avoid becoming part of its
patterning.
An essential part of the patterning of that world is the balance of
motion and stasis which emerges from the novel. As recent work by
Mary Mckenzie has shown, this can be seen as a characteristic of
38
Stevenson's fiction in general. David may travel onwards on his quest,
but the truly significant events - those which Mckenzie refers to as
'epoch-making scenes' - are those scenes which give the greatest shock to
his moral assumptions.They are also the scenes in which the most vivid
images occur within the text at those moments when the action has ceased.
In David's case it is often in reaction against the moral or immoral
forces represented by such scenes that he is spurred into continuing
his journey. His quarrel with Cluny is perhaps the most specific
example of the impact of such a moment; David has been lying on his sick¬
bed but after what he sees as Cluny's infamy, he is encouraged to make a
stand:
I am sure if ever Cluny hated any man it was David
Balfour. He looked me all over with a warlike eye,
and I saw the challenge at his lips. But either my
youth disarmed him, or perhaps his own sense of
justice. Certainly it was a mortifying matter for all
concerned, and not least for Cluny; the more credit that
he took it as he did. , -
And after this encounter David can continue on his journey.
Such encounters are frequently signified in the novel by variations on
the image of an enclosed space in which extremes operate. In such
38. Sister Mary Louise Mckenzie, 'Experiments in Romance: Theory and
Practice in the Fiction of Robert Louis Stevenson' (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1974).
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circumscribed settings most of the novel's climactic moments take place:
David's entering of the House of Shaws; his capture in the hold of the
'Covenanter'; the fight aboard ship which takes place in the confines
of the Roundhouse; David's stay upon the 'island' of Earraid; his time
in Cluny's 'cage'; and, in a slightly different form of enclosure, his
day spent with Alan on top of the rock, all provide reinforcements of
this theme. In each of these situations he comes into contact with
forces of positive action - whether for good or evil - and is made to
come to terms with them. In the hold of the ship he survives only because
of Mr Riach, and in the Roundhouse he is obligated to Alan for his safety.
The House of Shaws forces him into definite contact with evil, in the
shape of Ebenezer. And in Cluny's cage, where he becomes totally passive,
physically unable to move, partly because those allies who can protect
him are quarrelling amongst themselves and are, in fact, doing him harm,
he is at his most vulnerable. Through such moments within the plot
Stevenson appears to be indicating that only those with primitive
resources for action, the more 'unrealistic'characters, can survive
within a world of moral extremes, and that David's relative morality is
unable to deal with such different frames of existence. Significantly,
it is his experiences upon Earraid, when he is completely isolated in an
environment governed only by natural laws which he cannot comprehend,
where the morality he has been taught has no function, that he describes
as, 'the most unhappy part of my adventures.' (p.100) And through such
images of enclosed worlds the reader receives some clarification of
humankind's presence within a universe which it cannot comprehend, and
which our rules cannot deal with.
Although David himself may refuse to face up to the full implications of
such encounters, which highlight the insubstantiality of his faith in
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his own perception of the world and which point to that void which exists
at the centre of self in spite of society's compensatory and preventative
structuring, the reader is immediately alerted to their significance
within the novel by the use of textual images. The most evident of those
is that of darkness, which hints at the undefinable and, when used in
contrast with light, reinforces the idea of opposing forces in conjunction.
Our first encounter with this image is David's experience in the House of
Shaws, when he is sent to climb the stairs in the deserted tower adjoining
the house:
The house of Shaws stood some five full storeys high, not
counting lofts. Well, as I advanced, it seemed to me the
steps grew airier and a thought more lightsome; and I was
wondering what might be the cause of this change, when a
second blink of the summer lightning came and wBnt. If I
did not cry out, it was because fear had me by the throat;
and if I did not fall, it was more by Heaven's mercy than
my own strength. It was not only that the flash shone in
on every' side through breaches in the wall, so that I seemed
to be clambering aloft upon an open scaffold, but the same
passing brightness showed me the steps were of unequal
length, and that one of my feet rested that moment within
two inches of the well. , ooX
Although his slow progress up the stairs after this realisation can be
seen as mimetic of his apparently cautious and convoluted movements
throughout the novel, the real impact of the incident is made clear when
he becomes aware of an abyss of darkness lying before him:
Well, I had come close to one of these turns, when, feeling
forward as usual, my hand slipped upon an edge and found
nothing but emptiness beyond it. The stair had been carried
no higher: to set a stranger mounting it in the darkness
was to send him straight to his death; and (although, thanks
to the lightning and my own precautions, I was safe enough)
the mere thought of the peril in which I might have stood,
and the dreadful height I might have fallen from, brought
out the sweat upon my body and relaxed my joints. ^ 28-29)
The danger of the stair is revealed to David by a flash of light, the
opposite of the dark, but a force which is in itself capable of
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destruction. The moment thus forces David into recognising the
existence of extremes and the vulnerability of his own creeping motions -
a recognition which is shared by and amplified in the reader. Darkness
may be a force which this hero does not wish to recognise, even in
himself, yet it is just such a recognition which confronts him through the
novel's development.
The reader, of course, receives even greater clarification from such
moments through an awareness of the overall pattern which they create.
Through cognizance of the novel's patterning we can appreciate the
continued oppositions set up in the images and incidents. Daniel
Balderston, quoting Stevenson's comment that: 'It is not character but
<3Q
incident that woos us out of our reserve. points out: 'the anetma-lous
detail which carries the reader outside or beyond the text ... is clearly
linked with the attempt to 'woo' the reader, to challenge or tease the
40
imagination, and to elicit participation in the creative process.'
The incidents described in Kidnapped not only elicit participation but
force upon us a recognition of significance greater than that which is
experienced by the character. The author is thus creating a context in
which we are liberated to a certain extent from the constraints of the
characters' moral reactions.
Otner images, such as the blind beggar, and Alan and David's sojourn on
the rock,are also used to illustrate the paradoxical dimension of the
world in which David finds himself. He meets the blind beggar after his
escape from the island of Earraid:
In about half an hour of walk, I overtook a great, ragged
man, moving pretty fast but feeling before him with a
39. 'A Gossip on Romance', p.151.
40. Balderston, p.56.
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staff. He was quite blind, and told me he was a catechist,
which should have put me at my ease. But his face went
against me; it seemed dark and dangerous and secret; and
presently, as we began to go on alongside, I saw the steel
butt of a pistol sticking from under the flap of his coat-
pocket. To carry such a thing meant a fine of fifteen
pounds sterling upon the first offence, and transportation
to the colonies upon a second. Nor could I quite see why a
religious teacher should go armed, or what a blind man could
be doing with a pistol.
(p.115)
The beggar brings into collusion two of the novel's important images. He
is travelling along a road, and therefore represents motion, and would
seem to be operating in the world of progress and relativity, but in his
blindness he inhabits a static and enclosed world. The encounter with
him is one from which David cannot simply 'move on', since both are on
the same road, and the conjunction of absolute evil in nature as well as
in person, combined with his ability to move in the world of concrete
existence, makes the beggar one of the most threatening figures in the
novel - more powerful than Blind Pew, his counterpart in Treasure Island;
perhaps more on a par with Long John Silver. For once, David is forced
to adapt his own standards in order to cope with such a creature,
eventually descending to his level. David is amazed that anyone can
travel simply by reassuring himself of the solidity of his surroundings
with a staff: 'I said I did not see how a blind man could be a guide:
but at that he laughed aloud, and said his stick was eyes enough for
an eagle.' (p. 115) However, it is this same reliance on instinct
which leads David into recognising the beggar's inherent evil by
noticing tne pistol, protruding from the pocket to its owner's ignorance,
pure evil, it seems, cannot exist openly in the context of everyday
reality but requires some form of concealment. Yet the imminent
threat of the pistol leads David into exploiting darkness, making
use of the beggar's olindness, oy pretending that he too has a
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pistol. In so doing he is abandoning his own standards of truth to
ensure survival. To the reader this incident not only conveys a
powerful impression of the sense of evil, but also indicates the
ambiguous nature of the moral standards adopted by convention, determined
by the outward appearance of behaviour.
Similar contradictions are apparent in the incident when Alan Breck and
David take refuge from the searching soldiers upon a large rock:
You are to remember that we lay on the bare top of a rock,
like scones upon a girdle; the sun beat upon us cruelly;
the rock grew so heated, a man could scarcely endure the
touch of it; and the little patch of earth and fern, which
kept cooler, was only large enough for one at a time. We
took turns about to lie on the naked rock, which was indeed
like the position of that saint that was martyred on a
gridiron; and it ran in my mind how strange it was, that in
the same climate and at only a few days' distance, I should
have suffered so cruelly, first from cold upon my island
and now from heat upon this rock. ^
In order to escape detection Alan and David must place themselves in the
most exposed position possible; although they gain a vantage point above
the soldiers it is that very position which traps them, preventing their
escape from danger. The extremity of such an incident, symbolised in
David's mind by the transition from hot to cold, obviously upsets his
notions of right and wrong, teaching him a new code of survival in which
conscience and justice have only limited roles. And for the reader the
incident provides yet another insight into the contradictions of
existence, the paradoxes of being, as well as disturbing our fixed moral
codes.
Although such incidents, and the powerful effect of the images they create,
are an essential part of David's adventures seen in the overall context
of the novel, they are always balanced by his own account of events and
by his presence as the central character. His development therefore is
signalled only in terms of what he chooses to reveal and, more importantly,
the way in which he reveals it. David's role in the novel thus
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requires consideration on two levels: the degree of narrative control
which he exerts; and the kind of characterisation possible in a first
person narrative within the adventure story form. Use of the adventure
mode and of a historical context means that David is established in a
framework within which he can relate events without having to consider
their specific moral implications. Conversely, however, it is the
adventure format that draws the reader's attention to certain images and
incidents. And the images used quite often create a significance whicn
acts in opposition to David's interpretations, a feature which is made
possible through the novel's particular mixture of adventure and realism.
It is also through David that Stevenson illustrates the inadequacies of
a relative morality which tries to accommodate extreme external circum¬
stances into an internal pattern based upon the conventional operations
of morality. His real condemnation of such manipulations of moral and
social conventions, however, is reserved for David's pursuers. (And
in Catriona the dangers of such a viewpoint are made even more explicit
in the character of Prestongrange, who displays all the worst aspects of
civilised adaptability.) Yet although David is shown as experiencing
the dialectic between forces of absolute good and absolute evil, and
feels the need to establish some comprehensible and relative moral
pattern for himself in order to diffuse the threat of aosolutes, he is
less susceptible to this other dimension of existence than his counterpart
in Treasure Island, Jim Hawkins. David is portrayed as almost an adult
and therefore more sophisticated in his moral perceptions; he is less
willing than the cabin boy to accept the idea of an external structuring
to the world, whereas Hawkins does recognise the existence of an
alternative to the relativism of reality - even if he ultimately rejects
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it. David's narrative, in comparison, is firmly rooted in reality.
Through it he convincingly describes specific historical events,
recognisable places, and portrays such unglamorous characters as Mr
Campbell, the minister. His narrative can, therefore, be seen as an
attempt to deny any need for accepting alternative dimensions to nis
experience, in spite of the extremes which he does encounter in the course
of his adventures.
By virtue of his narrative role, and as a representative of a realist
perspective confronted with absolutes, David is characterised in a fairly
full manner. The same cannot be said, however, for all the other charac¬
ters in the novel. Kurt Wittig complains of the 'staginess' of Alan Breck
as a character, while David Daiches describes him as 'an artificial,
41
mechanical construction.' Yet it should be remembered that he is
described in the terms of David as narrator, discussing a person on whom he
depends but who represents a structuring of the universe that is morally
anathema to him. (He is, for example, completely shocked by Alan's
apparently trivial hatred of all Campbells, expressed in his flippant
comment after the murder of the Red Fox: '"And here is a great deal of
work about a Campbell!" said he. "They are not so scarce, that I ken!"'
(p.137)) Alan Breck cannot be easily accommodated within David's
conception of a 'real world', nor can he be given the profundity of
character for which Daiches and Wittig wish. From the beginning of
their relationship David tends to see Alan in a romantic light; on their
first encounter he describes him as possessing eyes which: 'were unusually
light and had a kind of dancing madness in them, that was both engaging
and alarming.' (p.60) By making Alan into a figure of romance David can
avoid the dangerous aspect of the dancing eyes, convincing himself
that Alan has no place within the reality which, it is implied, exists
41. Wittig, The Scottish Tradition in Literature, p.261; Daiches, Robert
Louis Stevenson, p.54.
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in the world outwith their adventures - the normality to which David
wishes to return. As Leslie Fiedler writes: 'The characters of Stevenson
seem to have an objective existence, a being prior to and independent of
any particular formal realization. They are, in short, not merely
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literary creations, but also embodiments of archetypal themes.1 Such
a feature may be partly attributable to stylisation of character, but in
Kidnapped can also be seen as a result of the narrator's perceptions.
For David, the world which Alan represents may be admired for the quality
of its adventures but, like the adventure story itself, must always
remain at a distance. And only from that distance does he feel safe to
contemplate the embodiment of 'archetypal themes'.
Yet the approach of David as narrator to the characters which he describes
finds a curious parallel in the characterisation of the narrator himself.
For Stevenson, well aware of the illusory elements of the fictional
process, only goes so far in making even David a fully rounded character.
Once again he focuses on the degree of distance between reality and
fictionality, exploring the implications of the difference. The dialectic
established by his technique is illustrated by Stevenson's comments on
character in the essay 'Some Gentlemen in Fiction': 'At bottom what we
hate or love is doubtless some projection of the author; the personal
atmosphere is doubtless his; and when we think we know Hamlet, we know
43
but a side of his creator.' He then proceeds to disparage the reality
of those 'verbal puppets' which are:
things of a divided parentage: the breath of life may be
an emanation from their maker, but they themselves are only
42. Fiedler, 'R.L.S. Revisited', p.78.
43. Stevenson, 'Some Gentlemen in Fiction', Works XXII, 269-279, p.271.
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strings of words and parts of books; they dwell in,
they belong to, literature; convention, technical
artifice, technical gusto, the mechanical necessities
of art, these are the flesh and blood with which they
are invested. 44
Although the essay itself is fairly inconclusive, it expresses a definite
and almost cynical awareness of the artificiality behind tne concept of
'character' which indicates that Stevenson himself would not
necessarily see Daicnes' view of Alan Breck as criticism. Daiches notes
that as a character Alan is static while David develops; their different
functions however can be seen as analogous to the different movements
and moments of the text. In 'A Humble Remonstrance' Stevenson makes
his attitude to the role of 'character' even more explicit. Pleading
with the author to: 'allow neither himself in the narrative, nor any
character in the course of the dialogue, to utter one sentence that is
not part and parcel of the business of the story or the discussion of
the problem involved', he points out: 'a passion or a character is so
45
much the better depicted as it rises clearer from material circumstance'.
Quite clearly he does not perceive character in fiction as a fixed entity.
David is as much a figure of artifice, in embodying the author's own
moral dichotomies, as Alan Breck is in representing to David one type of
morality.
With its emphasis on dichotomies, the novel inevitably ends on an
unresolved note. David claims his identity and inheritance, securing
a place in the world implied to exist outwith the novel's parameters;
Alan is forced to disappear, to go into exile. Vet his exile also
44. 'Some Gentlemen in Fiction', p.277.
45. 'A Humble Remonstrance', p.166.
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gives his role in the novel some form of conclusion, whereas the openness
of David's fate - with the last sentence in the book reading: 'The hand
of Providence brought me in my drifting to the very doors of the British
Linen Company's bank.' (p.251) - not only leaves room for a sequel, but
also implies a return to a form of reality that can no longer be
fictionalised within this particular context. T.he novel thus runs up
up against its own boundaries. Yet the moral dilemmas raised by David's
experiences are also left unresolved. Alan is successfully embedded in
the mind of the reader, through the images surrounding him, as part of
the adventure fiction and its world. David, however, is left in a
kind of limbo, creeping out of the novel, and coming disturbingly close
to the reader's own uncertain, non-fictional reality. And this aspect
of the conclusion is made all the more poignant because of our
sympathetic identification with David that has been evoked from the
start through the first person narration. David, therefore would finally
appear to represent our own difficulties in reconciling the dimensions of
fiction and reality and the potentially very different moral perspectives
of each.
In utilising his concept of fiction as a defence against reality and an
escape into romance, and by emphasising it in Kidnapped through the
juxtaposition of an apparently 'realist' narrator and an adventure story
sequence of events, Stevenson indicates both the power of his alternative
vision and the temporary, even dangerous, nature of the insights it
offers. The novel's adventures provide David with glimpses of new forms
of experience, and affirm to the reader the potential for alternatives
to our restricted view of existence. And the conflicting affirmation
and denial of the 'otherness' present in fiction, the contradictions of
movement and of stasis, both represent and are determined by Stevenson's
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outlook on moral issues. Neither 'realism' nor the presentation
of a single truth can be seen as the aim of the novel. Instead
Stevenson appears to be striving for what he describes as 'fitness':
'One thing in life calls for another; there is a fitness in events and
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places.' His intention that: 'The right kind of thing should fall
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out in the right kind of place', indicates his desire that the novel
should both be aesthetically consistent in its adventure form - which
Kidnapped certainly appears to be - and that it should offer some
expression of the conflicts and contradictions which he saw as an
inherent part of existence. By both seeking to achieve this latter
aim within the novel, through David Balfour's experiences, and through
the process of reading the novel as a whole, he does create a certain
tension between realism and the challenge to it, just as he brings
different moralities into confrontation. But it is also through this
tension that he achieves his other aim;once again that of a 'bold
poetry of thought'.
Catriona
Before moving on to The Master of Ballantrae it is worth considering
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Catriona, the sequel to Kidnapped, since it indicates a direction
that Stevenson's Scottish writing took towards the end of his career
and which, by its departure from his previous style, reveals the nature
of the problems he had encountered. Kidnapped shows an awareness of
moral relativism but one which is contained within the adventure form.
In Catriona Stevenson moves away slightly from this genre, from the
visual glamour and the action of romance, to a more subdued plot
46. 'A Gossip on Romance', p.142.
47. 'A Gossip on Romance', p.144.
48. Catriona: A Sequel to Kidnapped, Works VI. All further page
references are to this edition.
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and a serious attempt at characterisation, which almost contradicts
nis previously stated views on the matter. His former concerns,
however, are still apparent; indeed they appear to become more prob¬
lematic once outwith the framework he had specifically established for
them, with the result that Catriona as a novel is curiously fragmented
and somewhat unsatisfactory. The main problem seems to lie in the
fact that the author seeks to resolve, in relative terms and in the
context of a greater degree of literary realism, situations which still
point towards absolutist issues. And, as if in response to this problem,
the judgements made by David also seem to fall short of his own
awareness as a narrator.
Arguably Stevenson found it difficult to recapture the Scottish
atmosphere in his South Sea retreat. Nevertheless, the novel seems
not so much a chance failure, but a deliberate attempt to create
something different. Stevenson even anticipates the reaction of his
public to the novel, by defending his use of David Balfour; 'One thing
is sure, there has been no such drawing of Scots character since Scott;
and even he never drew a full length like Davie, with his shrewdness
and simplicity, and stockishness and charm. Yet, you'll see, the
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public won't want it; they want more Alani Well, they can't get it.'
An obvious change can be seen here from the concept of characterisation
as indicated in Kidnapped. Another noticable feature of this novel
is its lack of visual elements - a point which drew comment from Henry
James and, as a result, again elicited a response from Stevenson:
'Your jubilation over Catriona did me good, and still more the subtlety
and truth of your remark on the starving of the visual sense in that
49. Stevenson, Letter to Colvin (April, 1893), Letters 4, pp.182-183.
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book.' He then goes on to describe his aim as 'death to the optic
nerve ' - a development in his writing which also has interesting
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implications for Weir of Hermiston. It is therefore worth examining
the effect of this aim in Catriona.
The desire for greater characterisation and the emphasis on moral
judgement in the individual according to circumstance, argues for a
greater moral relativism in the novel - a feature noted by most critics.
F.R. Hart, for example, writes that: 'Balfour has become quite
sophisticated; unpolished still, but bravely ethical in a world where
simplicity and innocence are duped and endangered, and where a desperate
realpolitik. not only forestalls David's efforts to see justice done,
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but is more or less understood and half accepted by him.' Here he is,
of course, referring to Prestongrange's prevention of David's testimony
being heard. Yet a certain divergence exists between form and
response. David may be more perceptive with regard to the devices that
are used against him, he may even be glad of the fact that he does not
need to make any moral decision; contrast his conscious passivity and
acceptance of it: 'I should trifle with my conscience if I pretended my
stay upon the Bass was wholly disagreeable. It seemed to me a safe place,
50. Stevenson, Letter to Henry James (December, 1893), Letters 4, p.272.
51. In Weir of Hermiston realism and moral relativism are certainly more
in evidence than in Stevenson's other works. Like 'Thrawn Janet1
and 'The Tale of Tod Lapraik', the novel relies on conventional story¬
telling devices and on folk-lore;, it is also placed very definitely
in a historical past, thus allowing for a certain element of nostalgia.
The tale's implications are therefore more successfully contained
within the fiction. Yet Stevenson's moral concerns are still evident
in his questioning of earthly justice (ironically represented by
Hermiston, the Lord Justice-Clerk) and it seems possible that, following
such implications, the novel in the end would still have relied on
elements of adventure and fantasy, as in the suggested hints about the
ultimate role of the Four Black Brothers. It therefore appears unlikely
that Stevenson could have kept wholly within the realist mode, despite
his apparent intentions of so doing. As the tale is unfinished, however,
this suggestion can only remain conjectural.
52. Hart, The Scottish Novel, p.160.
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as though I was escaped there out of my troubles.' (p.132), with his
railing against the enforced passivity of Cluny's cage in Kidnapped.
Vet, in terms of the novel, his actions are nearly all enforced and,
structurally, can be seen as externally imposed. Stevenson's only way
of coping with the need for relativity he has set up by the device of
the trial, is to divorce completely the elements of action from the
responses of the characters. Therefore, although a relative morality
is implied more strongly than in previous novels, it is not shown in free
operation.
The essential structure of the novel, of course, is also very different.
As David Daiches notes: 'Stevenson has moved further from the pattern of
adventure as originally laid down in Treasure Island than he did in
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Kidnapped.' Certainly the movement of the book does show alteration.
David is no longer hunted by external law so much as forced into action
through moral obligation. The hide and seek pattern is still present
to an extent but each refuge - the Bass rock, the house in Holland,
Prestongrange's home - enforces conditions which demand not that specific
escape action be planned but rather that means of assimilation to the
current situation is required. Even the element of moral relativism
in the novel can be seen as entrapping rather than liberating. As
Eigner points out of David: 'his virtue does not lead to action, for the
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path of duty, in Stevenson's works, clearly is not the road to glory.'
Yet, in considering the moral decisions that David makes, a duality can
again be noted. We are presented with David's difficulty of reconciling
Prestongrange's paternalism and pragmatism with his manipulative control
53. Daiches, Robert Louis Stevenson, p.87.
54. Eigner, p.116.
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of justice, an effort which leads him, with all the force of his moral
relativism, to moderate his attitudes to that master of the adaptable
moral outlook. Stevenson allows David to express disquiet at this
character through the use of a powerful image in a statement which appears
to make his attitude perfectly clear: 'He was kind to me as any father,
yet I ever thought him as false as a cracked bell' (p.183), yet does not
fit in with his subsequent behaviour in accepting Prestongrange1s charity.
Catriona's father, James, provides another focus for such contradiction.
David's attempts to come to terms with the man and his weaknesses, for
the sake of Catriona, seem curiously at odds with the harshness of his
final comment on him: 'But even now I find I can scarce dwell upon his
end with patience ... and when after some four days he passed away in a
kind of odour of affectionate sanctity, I could have torn my hair cut
for exasperation.' (p.311) Although James was never so evil in his
actions as, say, Long John Silver, such condemnation is much more severe;
as if Stevenson was permitting his characters to rail against the
expedient action they were forced into in order to establish a relative
resolution to plot events.
Despite their differences in approach, critics have tried to transfer
character roles in Kidnapped to Catriona, but without any real conviction.
To repeat Stevenson's dictum: 'It is not character but incident that
woos us out of our reserve'; and incident is never really allowed free
play in Catriona, never pushes beyond any moral boundaries or reserves.
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F.R. Hart sees Prestongrange as a counterpart of Alan Breck, but surely
a significant difference is created between them by the fact that the
former operates within society, in a position of responsibility, and
55. 'Prestongrange replaces Alan in the book as a counterforce to
David's brave and pious civility.'
Hart, p.161.
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therefore cannot point to those external dimensions indicated by the
outlawed Alan. Significantly, Alan is pushed to the peripheries in
Catriona ; the only other character who threatens established moral
concepts is the unattractive, almost laughable, James More. And the
fact that James is so closely linked to Catriona prevents him from being
seen as any real danger. As for Catriona herself, whom some critics
56
have described as romantic a figure as Alan, she remains so idealized
and stereotypic, that she acts only as a motivating force for David's
action. (Note how love is the galvanising force here, whereas in
Kidnapped it was the threat of danger.) Perhaps the greatest actual
threat to the relative morality which dominates so much of the novel is
posed by the scene when David finally escapes and makes his way to take
part in the trial of James Stewart. For a short while it would appear
that David has the potential for anarchy but this possibility is soon
defused, partly through his dislike of the intrigues of those around
him, and partly through his own caution. And yet the trial motif, almost
in spite of, yet also because of, its crooked and disillusioning nature,
becomes in itself a plea for some form of external justice outwith the
world of relativity. This plea is rei terated by David in his own
disillusionment with: 'the detestable business they call politics.'
(pp.203-204) 'Innocent men,' he remarks, 'have perished before James,
and are like to keep on perishing (in spite of all our wisdom) till the
end of time.' (p.203)
Robert Kiely sees a disillusionment in Stevenson with his authorial role
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Yet it could be argued that this novel still represents another means of
exploring the issues with which he was concerned in his other works.
By entering into a world closer to the relativism of reality, and
reflecting a profound pessimism in so doing, Stevenson can be seen as
still projecting the necessity of some kind of absolute morality, by way
of depicting its absence. And in the novel he also comes closer to
revealing the impossibility both of achi-eving such absolutes within reality,
or of resolving the dichotomy between them in fiction. David's final
resolution reflects, by its tone, the authorial attitude:
a plain, quiet, private path was that which I was ambitious^
to walk in, where I might keep my head out of the ways of
dangers and my conscience out of the road of temptation.
For, upon retrospect, it appeared I had not done so grandly,
after all, but with the greatest possible amount of big
speech and preparation had accomplished nothing. ^ 204)
Perhaps the inserted story of 'Tod Lapraik' acts as a small gesture of
defiance against this resignation to the mundane, pointing towards
another dimension through its use of the supernatural but, like Catriona
itself, it still serves to indicate an awareness of a vast divergence
between two worlds and the impossibility of reconciling them in reality -
or even in fiction.
The Master of Ballantrae
'Thus in the best fabric of duplicity, there is some weak point which,
if you strike it, will loosen all.' So writes Ephraim MacKellar, the
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narrator of The Master of Ballantrae. In this novel, first published
in 1889, Stevenson both weaves a fabric of duplicity and guides the
reader to those points at which it is at its weakest; a contradictory
process which reveals the intractability of his moral and literary concerns.
58. Stevenson, The Master of Ballantrae, Works IX,^103,All further page
references are to this edition.
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And,with the role of narrator once again being exploited to the full,
the disjunction between the attitudes of MacKellar and the contents of
his narrative becomes in itself the'weak point which loosens all1.
The novel has certainly caused considerable debate amongst critics
trying to account for its disparate structure: a beginning in Scotland,
heavily weighted with burdens of the past; an inserted account of 'the
master of Ballantrae', the eldest and disinherited son as he journeys
amongst pirates and indians, in a style familiar from Stevenson's
adventure tales; a climax in the wastes of North America; and, pervading
all, as dry and conventionally couthy a caricature Scot as one could
wish for, as narrator. Overwhelmed by the peculiarity of this mixture,
many critics have deemed the novel a failure. Alex Clunas views
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Stevenson as being reluctant to release his hold on the adventure story;
David Daiches believes that the author, unable to come to terms with
his relationship both to his family and his native land, had 'delved
too deeply into character and destiny to be able to come easily again
to the surface'and a recent study by Carol Mills, whose title
'The Master of Ballantrae: An Experiment with Genre' appears to offer
a more interesting line of argument than is perhaps achieved, ends her
essay by attributing the novel's peculiarities to the author's mode of
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existence at the time of writing. Playing on Stevenson's own comment
CO
that: 'the devil and Saranac suggested this denouement', she concludes:
59. Alex Clunas, 'R.L. Stevenson: Precursor of the Post-Moderns?',
Cencrastus 6 (Autumn, 1981), 9-11.
60. Daiches, Introduction, Robert Louis Stevenson (Laurel Reader
edition, New York, 1959), p.16.
61. Carol Mills, 'The Master of Ballantrae: An experiment with Genre',
Robert Louis Stevenson, ed. A. Noble, 118-133.
62. Stevenson, Letter to Henry James (March, 1888), Letters vol.3,
188 7-18.91, Works XXIX, p.54.
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'The devil and Saranac' have something to answer for; he might have been
c o
advised to ignore their suggestions.' Stevenson's own remarks on
the conclusion also appear critical and have often been read as
apologetic: 'For the third supposed death and the manner of the third
reappearance is steep: steep, sir. It is even very steep, and I fear
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it shames the honest stuff so far'. However, his comments do not
necessarily mean that the violence of the last few chapters has no
place if one considers his aims as being directed at the reading of the
novel as a whole, including the interaction of the various elements.
Within a firmly located, nostalgically familiar environment, yet with
elements of a romance and adventure mode, he was creating a dialectic
of good and evil capable of breaking the moulds of both, and within
the narratorial conflicts he was pushing even further the conflicts
between sjuzhet and fabula; the 'steepness' would therefore appear an
intrinsic part of the novel's final effect.
One of the most stimulating interpretations of the novel - although
perhaps also ambitious and contradictory in itself - is that of Douglas
Gifford in his essay 'Stevenson and Scottish Fiction; The Importance of
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The Master of Ballantrae. Acknowledging the contradictions inherent
in the work, Gifford nevertheless sees them as Stevenson's implicit
recognition of conflicts in his own attitudes to Scottish history and
to morality. Gifford finally interprets the novel in the light of
63. Mills, p.132.
64. Letter to James (March, 1888), p.54.
65. Douglas Gifford, 'Stevenson and Scottish Fiction: The Importance
of The Master of Ballantrae', Stevenson and Victorian Scotland,
ed. J. Calder (Edinourgh, 1981), 62-87.
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father and son conflicts in the author's life, but by way of arriving
at this viewpoint he makes several interesting points as to the work's
moral ambiguity. He believes that two interpretations of the tale are
possible: either that Henry, the younger and supposedly 'good', steady,
brother, is a victim, that the mysterious James is the villain, and
that MacKellar is a reliable narrator; or that James and Henry are not
dissimilar and that MacKellar is as much the familiar of Henry as Secundra
Dass, the Indian with strange powers, is of James. MacKellar in this
light could no longer be seen as a reliable narrator. Creating these
alternatives, Gifford argues, 'would release Stevenson from all his
previous needs to struggle confusedly with emblems of a shifting moral
consciousness',^ and he concludes: 'Stevenson thus rose above his own
personal divisions on this one occasion, transforming what, on the whole,
was a confused and immature vision into a remarkably modern and widely
applicable comment on the difficulty of arriving in a Godless age at
moral conclusion.'^ This holistic interpretation certainly seems a
more convincing view of the novel than seeing it as a series of parts
which fail to unite. Moreover, it allows for the ambiguities and
openness of the tale to be recognised. However, it is also worth
considering that Stevenson may still De struggling with 'emblems of a
shifting moral consciousness' even if they are deliberately inserted
into the plot, and to discuss both the ways in which such conflicting
emblems operate and the purposes to which Stevenson puts them.
To make such an interpretation is, of course, to put more emphasis on




innerent tensions derive from the form. The use of first-person narr¬
ation is especially important, as the relationship between the narrator
and his material pulls apart the various strands of the fiction and
again creates a distinction between the description of events within
the tale, and the significance of the events themselves. MacKellar1s
narrative operates on a level in which the various moral cnoices, created
by the conflicts over money and a woman between the two brothers, are
clearly presented but are still seen very much within the terms and moral
vision of the narrator, their steward. The events of the plot, however,
and the interaction of Henry's and James' moral values, succeed in
opening up a wider moral dimension; and many of tne images used in
narrating events also contribute to this alternative significance which
is beyond the limits of MacKellar's comprehension. The form of the
novel thus raises very different questions from the narrative, although
botn aspects operate in conjunction since the perspective gained from
the form of events inevitably affects the meaning of the narrative and
vice versa.
According to the novel's conclusion a relative morality triumphs - with
inscribed gravestones (raised, of course,by Meckellar) being all that is
left of the extremes represented by the two brothers. And the morality
which remains is nearest to the cautious evaluations of MacKellar, the
survivor, tne man who first appeared at the house of Durrisdeer
appropriately, 'in a migntydry day of frost.' (p.16)ot> Yet even he is
at times willing to share nis master Henry's view of his brother James
68. Notice that in some editions,the Skerryvore included, the novel
has the subtitle of 'A Winter's Tale'. This could be seen as
pointing to the thane of 'Scotland's winter'.
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as the devil, and thus occasionallyLaccept concepts of good
and evil in absolute terms. The two brothers who indulge in
more absolute perspectives for most of the novel destroy each
other, as both fail to adopt their moral behaviour to circumstances:
James unashamedly glories in his evil; Henry conceals the darker side of
his nature until it breaks through with fearful effect. Only the
faithful steward is left to ensure the continuation of the ancient house
of Durrisdeer. And the defeat of the brothers and their unacceptable
philosophies becomes all the more damning when it is implied that
MacKellar- cannot even ensure the survival of the house as it was in the
days of 'the old Lord.' 'My old lord, eighth of that name, was not old
in years, but he suffered prematurely from the disabilities of age; his
place was at the chimney-side; there he sat reading, in a lined gown,
with few words for any man, and wry words for none: the model of an old
retired housekeeper; and yet his mind very well-nourished with study and
reputed in the country to be more cunning than he seemed ' (p.4) is how
the head of the Duries appears to MacKellar on his first encounter. Yet
the last of the line, although also old, possess none of this dignity or
wit, and are described almost in terms of Kailyard pathos: 'the last
lord and his old maid sister who lived in the back parts of the house,
a quiet, plain, poor, humdrum couple, it would seem - but pathetic too,
as the last of that stirring and Drave house - and, to the country folk,
faintly terrible from some deformed traditions.' (p.xxiii) Yet in a sense
the ending is a complete vindication for MacKellar' since the house of
Durrisdeer loses all traces of absolutism, with neither of the brothers
being allowed to return to the so-called civilised and liberal world.
Their passions have taken them outwith Scotland and they can only confront
each other within an area as large as America; Scotland itself is seen
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as weakened by their loss, becoming the province only of McKellar's and
old 'humdrum', sterile, couples.
The conflicting moral polarities expressed through the feud of the two
brothers cannot be accommodated within MacKellar's narrative, so in some
ways he is as much of a moral failure as either of his 'masters'. All
three men adopt sets of rules by which they imagine they could live;
and all fail in the attempt. In this common failure the novel seems to
point towards an external moral spectrum which supersedes that established
by the characters themselves - a spectrum, however, which does have a
potential for realisation within those parts of their natures that each
have suppressed. As the conclusion indicates, once James and Henry
recognise the moral vacuum in which they operate, death is the only
possible answer, so for most of their lives they attempt to avoid know¬
ledge of themselves. The brothers converge on the same point, towards
the same abyss, but from opposite perspectives on life. Yet the means
by which they reach this point is the same in that both label their
actions in such a way that they can gain the apparent security of being
given tags of 'good' or 'evil', externally imposed upon their behaviour
by society. In so doing they can avoid recognition of the polarities
within their own natures.
The novel makes quite clear from the beginning the dangers of ignoring
extremes in character and of over-easy moral categorisation. The
political allegiances of the two brothers, for example, is decided in a
quite arbitrary manner: 'It took the three a whole day's disputation,
before they agreed to steer a middle course, one son going forth to
strike a olow for King James, my lord and the other staying at home to
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keep in favour with King George.' (p. 5 ) In such a fashion Henry
becomes a Loyalist and James a Jacobite. Initial ly, too, it appears that
James is popular in the countryside around whereas Henry is at first
forgotten, and then becomes generally disliked:
The Master of Ballantrae, James in baptism, took from his
father the love of serious reading; some of his tact perhaps
as well, but that which was only policy in the father became
black dissimulation in the son.... I think it notable that
he had always vaunted himself as quite implacable, and was
taken at his word; so that he had the addition among his
neighbours of 'an ill man to cross'. Here was altogether a
young nobleman (not yet twenty-four in the year '45) who had
made a figure in the country beyond his time of life. The
less marvel if there were little heard of the second son,
Mr Henry (my late Lord Durrisdeer), who was neither very bad
nor yet very able, but an honest, solid sort of lad like many
of his neighbours. , .1t-\
James, because of his social prominence, is obviously easier to label
at this stage in his life, whereas it is only when he becomes more of
an active figure locally that Henry becomes unpopular. And yet from
these two different points both arrive at the same state. . Henry,
passive at first, conceals his feelings of jealousy, even hatred, and
asserts his will to do good, aiming to be generous to his brother for
the family's sake: 'Besides which, although I speak little of my family,
I think much of its repute.' (p.24) However, the need to prove that he
is indeed a virtuous man forces Henry into escape to America. There he
sets a whole state against his brother and, tortured by plans for revenge,
finally arranges his brother's murder. In contrast, James begins the
novel setting the people of Durrisdeer against Henry, arranging a duel
with him, and is seen as being actively evil in both his person and his
plans. Yet he eventually decides to lead a passive existence abroad
since all that he hoped to achieve - wealth, fame at court and other
worldly gains - has fallen through; becoming a tailor in America he appears
content until his brother's anger forces him into again adopting his old
diabolical ways and taking action. The progress of the brothers can
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thus be seen almost as mirror images reversals of each other's actions.
Each galvanising the other into action, pushing each other through the
whole moral spectrum from good to evil, proves that none of the
categories of 'good' or 'evil' given to them in the process are ever
totally accurate, since each brother is capable of accommodating both
extremes. And in this way they push beyond the limits of MacKellar's
comprehension, just as the character of Long John Silver escaped the
boundaries of Jim Hawkins understanding.
No diametric opposition which is totally conclusive can ever be made
between the brothers they finally defy both the conventions of
labelling morality and the limits of socialised moral behaviour. Their
death scene, when they are surrounded by onlookers clad in animal skins,
signifies an absolute and atavistic morality. The journey taken by
M acKellar and the now seriously disturoed, Henry, through the wilderness,
leads them to the Master's grave:
The situation of the Master's grave was, between guides,
easily described; it lay, indeed, beside a chief landmark
of the wilderness, a certain range of peaks, conspicuous
by their design and altitude ... Our boats we left under
a guard upon the river; it was, indeed, probable we should
return to find them frozen fast; and the small equipment
with which we set forth upon the expedition, included not
only an infinity of furs to protect us from the cold, but
an arsenal of snow-shoes to render travel possible, when
the inevitable snow should fall. , 251-252)
The naked primitivism of the moment when they reach the grave and find
Secundra Dass trying to dig his master up and resurrect him, seems again
to point towards a different, asocial, moral code. Amidst the
uncivilised surroundings Dass is seen practicing his unsophisticated
magic:
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It is always moving to come upon the theatre of any tragic
incident; to come upon it after so many days, and to
find it (in the seclusion of the desert) still unchanged,
must have impressed the minds of the most careless. And
yet it was not that which struck us into pillars of stone;
but the sight (which yet we had been half expecting) of
Secundra ankle deep in the grave of his late Master. He
had cast the main part of his rainment by, yet his frail
armsand shoulders glistened in the moonlight with a copious
sweat; his face was contracted with anxiety and expectation;
his blows resounded on the grave, as thick as sobs; and
behind him, strangely deformed and ink-black upon the frosty
ground, the creature's shadow repeated and parodied his
swift gesticulations. ^ 256-257)
The moment not only points towards a world of 'moral realism' in which
such magic might work, in which black and white can be clearly
distinguished in relation to each other, but also indicates the very
basic revenge which the Master will have on Henry, when the threat of
his resurrection kills him with shock.
There is, of course, a certain fitness in this concluding scene, since
Henry, closer to .MacKellar than James, is less capable than James of
accepting potential absolutes. James belongs more. to.the.world
of fantasy, as is indicated by the adventures he has with pirates
and Indians, in best adventure story style - told through the narrative
of the Chavalier Burke - at the same time as Henry is enduring domestic
dramas described in the best realist manner by MacKellar. Although the
brothers act as mirror images, it is implied that from his adventures
James has gained an awareness of evil as a positive force, and therefore
is more conscious than Henry of his own nature and his self-delusions.
His statements on morality reveal his awareness of the complexity of the
subject; 'A bad man, am I? Ah 1 but I was born for a good tyrant!'
(p.197) For most of the novel, however, he also refuses to recognise
nis own insights, by postulating worldly oDjectives for himself towards
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wnich his 'wickedness' can be directed, and thus mitigating by
justification, his own actions. Nevertheless, his policy of tossing
a coin to make major life decisions reveals how deep is his awareness
of the arbitrary nature of moral codes. Just as he undermines relative
decision-making processes by parody, so he undermines conventional
moral judgements. As he says to MacKellar: 'You suppose yourself to
love my brother. I assure you, it is merely custom ... Had you instead
fallen in with me, you would today be as strong upon my side.' (p.195)
Yet, in spite of his dislike of circumstantial morality he is quite
content to exploit his brother Henry's attempts at a respectable and
accommodating relativity, which goes against his own brooding inclinations.
Both brothers thus collude in concealing the absolutes within their
nature.
The brothers continued refusal to recognise absolutes within themselves
contrasts sharply with the courses of action which they take as the
novel progresses. Through this contrast the reader can recognise the
falsity of their reasoning and becomes aware of the absolutes which lie
behind the facade of relativity. The void which is pointed to as lying
behind the brothers' behaviour is further emphasised by the images and
incidents described in the novel, and in particular by the highly
'unrealistic' and 'steep' conclusion. This element of contradiction,
however, which lies between the way in which the characters wish to see
themselves - in a 'realistic' and relative way - and the significance of
their actions, which point towards extremes of morality, is further
complicated by being encompassed within the narrative of MacKellar, which
is in itself, an attempt to deny the absolutes that appear to break
through in the course of events. The sjuzhet, the patterned narrative
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of events, therefore can be seen as attempting to impose restrictions
upon,or even to deny the import of the fabula - the events themselves,
which are, by now,full of contradiction, as the distinction between
action and interpretation of action becomes blurred. The 'fabric of
duplicity' can, in one sense at least, be seen as disintegrating before
the reader's eyes. Even MacKellar's narrative, which at first appears
familiar and securely structured by his moral perceptions and religious
principles, is revealed as untrustworthy.
Yet despite the divergence of fabula and sjuzhet, the two worldswhich
they indicate are' not separate but are united by incident and allusion.
MacKellar, for example, may call James a 'devil', mainly because of the
stereotyped shallowness of his moral reasoning, yet by naming him as
such he gives to the reader an archetypal resonance to James' actions.
And James' trick of coming back to life may eventually be explained by
the narrative to be simply a clever illusion, but the impact of the
instances when he achieves the trick are not diminished.
MacKellar's cautious, 'square-toes' attitude to life, which makes him
see all action in terms of extreme melodrama, aids the impact of such
incidents. Through his horror at the brothers' feuds, Stevenson can
convey a sense of excitement equal to that generated by the exotic
locations of his South Sea novels. MacKellar's description of the duel
between the brother indicates how effective this technique can be:
I took up the candlesticks and went before them, steps
that I would give my hands to recall; but a coward is a
slave at the best; and even as I went my teeth smote
each other in my mouth. It was as he had said: there
was no Dreath stirring; a windless stricture of frost had
bound the air; and as we went forth in the shine of the
candles, the blackness was like a roof over our heads.
Never a word was said; there was never a sound but the
creaxing of our steps along the frozen path. The cold of
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the night fell .about me like a bucket of water; I shook
as I went with more than terror; but my companions, bare¬
headed like myself, and fresh from the warm hall, appeared
not even conscious of the change.
"Here is the place", said the Master. "Set down the candles."
I did as he bid me, and presently the flames went up, as
steady as in a chamber, in the midst of the frosted trees, and I
beheld these two brothers take their places. ^
His horror, his fear, and the melodramatic quality of his language, all
combine to lend the scene an air of unreality, and to emphasise the mythic
dimensions of this Cain and Abel conflict. Paradoxically it is
MacKellar's fearful nature and mundane morality which conveys to the reader
the power of absolutes, the alternative dimensions of the world which the
brothers inhabit - although MacKellar himself is resolutely determined not
to appreciate events on this level.
Without the resonances created by MacKellar's response to incidents,
without the images he allows into the narrative in spite of himself, the
reader would have to rely purely on MacKellar's morally relative code for
assessing the behaviour of the characters, seeing them in the only weo
of circumstances, aims, desires, and social pressures which
MacKellar would like to establish. The events themselves, however,
continue to break through this mesh. The novel,therefore, not only allows
for an . appreciation of the narrator's account, but also for an
awareness of his character, and the inconsistencies in his narrative to
develop. Yet, unlike a similar technique used to deal with extremes in
Wuthering Heights, no alternative narratives exist to contradict each
other. The reader is forced to rely on MacKellar's narrative, as well
as looking for significance beyond it. A tension between our reading of
the account and our reaction to it can thus never be satisfactorily
resolved. We may be shocked at James' actions, disapprove of MacKellar's
attitude towards him, and still perceive behind his adventures a world
of absolutes which totally escapes our attempts to comprehend or
judge. Rather than Stevenson struggling with confused 'moral emblems'
the struggle becomes that of the reader with the text.
The contradictions of fabula and sjuzhet which thus permeate the novel
can also be found in its conclusion. In terms of narrative progression
the novel ends with MacKellar's return to Scotland, yet in terms of a
strong concluding image the novel ends with tne death of the brothers in
America. By providing this duality of ending, Stevenson would seem to
be anticipating the 'open-ended' novel, which began to appear in the
late nineteenth century. Indeed, he appears to offer both a 'closed'
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ending - defined by Alan Friedman in The Turn of the Novel, as one in
which the flow of ethical experience and the novel's dynamic is finally
contained, and in which climactic moments of moral expression will be
followed regularly by a limited moral situation leading to a final
recognition of experience which ultimately restricts - in MacKellar's
return to Scotland^ and an 'open' ending in the continuing significance
of questions raised by the brothers' deaths. Their fate produces a
sense of horror, of the unexplained, which cannot be contained within
direct interpretations of motive and causality, and which finally defeat
relative morality. This final event can only create what Friedman
describes as characteristic of the 'open.ending', namely 'unleashed
70
experience1 and 'unrelieved tension.'
In the conjunction of the two endings Stevenson creates a work which fits
very neatly into his description of fiction as 'the tying and untying of
a xnot.' And, paradoxically, it would seem that by choosing a Scottish
69. Alan Friedman, The Turn of the Novel (New York, 1966)
70. The Turn of the Novel, p.26 and p.33.
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setting for The Master of Ballantrae, he gains a greater scope for
establishing the complexity of his moral dichotomies. It brings
together two opposed perspectives which would be irreconcilable in
reality - MacKellar's stereotypic and stultifyingly social version of
Calvinist ethics, and the metaphysical expression of moral absolutes,
nearer to the implications of Calvinist philosophy, through Henry and
James - and unites them momentarily in fiction. The novel therefore
can be seen as yet another confrontation with that dialectic of
absolutism and relativism, of the limits of fictional realism and the
projection of significance reaching beyond the boundaries of fiction,
which characterises all Stevenson's work and which makes tne tension he
creates a continued challenge.
'Man's one method, whether he reasons or creates,' wrote Stevenson, 'is
to half shut his eyes against the dazzle and confusion of reality.'71
Once again his prose writing provides a valuable insight into his
fictional techniques. In both his foreign novels and his Scottish
fiction Stevenson faces the reader with the dazzle of a meta-perspective
on reality. Through the use of images, incidents, and exploitation of
narrative, he allows this perspective to undermine the surface of the
text, and reveals an underlying significance. Edwin Eigner describes
the romance writer as someone who: 'tries to capture an internal vision,
71
never expressed on the surface of the real world.'" Stevenson's
interests lie not so much in 'capturing' that vision - he is only too
well aware that it can never be realised - but in conveying an under¬
standing of the terms of that vision. Rather than attempting to render
the conditions of life in dramatic form, in order to enhance our
71. 'A Humble Remonstrance', p. 159.
72. Eigner, p.13.
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understanding of them, he transforms the events and incidents of his
adventures into correlatives of our deepest awareness of moral
contradictions, revealing ontological threats which we normally avoid.
Although he accepts that a relationship between circumstance and a
socially contingent morality may exist in reality, it is neither the
subject of his fiction, nor his philosophical concern. Through the
'poetry of circumstance1'7'5 he dramatises the concept of humanity's
essential indefinabi1ity ; his moral punctum emerge from a fictional
topography that encompasses and represents life's fluidity without
imposing upon it static restrictions of realism. His concessions to
realism may vary according to the particular genre in which he is
writing, but he always questions its premises and allows his fiction
to posit alternatives to its relativity - alternatives that are not
possible within 'reality.' Therefore, although his techniques and his
subject matter may develop in the course of his career, the thematic
and literary concerns to which he is committed remain essentially the
same.
73. 'Romance is the poetry of circumstance', 'A Gossip on Romance',
p.141.
CHAPTER FOUR
ROBIN JENKINS: CONFRONTATIONS WITH LITERARY REALISM
204
In moving from a consideration of Robert Louis Stevenson's fiction to
an examination of the novels of Robin Jenkins, certain basic differences
between tne two writers must be acknowledged. In focusing on Jenkins
I am making the transition from a writer who was, ana is, internationally
recognised, to one who is little known outwith Scotland, whose novels
are often out of print, are difficult to find in the libraries even of
Scottish universities, and are usually relegated to the popular fiction
shelves of public libraries. Moreover, Stevenson was an author in
personal contact or in correspondence with many of the major literary
figures of his day, while Robin Jenkins, although one of Scotland's
most prolific writers in this century, lives in relative obscurity;
a retired headmaster who admits that he sees his novel writing as mainly
a hobby. And, of course, the two writers are separated by almost a
century; Stevenson wrote until his death in 1894, while Jenkins, born
in 1912, is still writing novels in 1984. In Stevenson's novels the
legacy of Scott and Hogg, the influence of a childhood and adolescence
in post-Enlightenment Edinburgh, is still evident. Growing up in
Lanark, teaching in the West of Scotland, living through two World Wars,
Jenkins inherits a very different set of influences. . His view of
a Scottish literary 'tradition' must also differ, since he emerged
onto a scene in which the Literary Renaissance of the 1930's had done
much to change the face of Scottish poetry, but in its revaluation of
the Scottish novel had done little more than reinforce a sense of
inadequacy. Yet in spite of coming from such very different backgrounds,
these two writers share the absolutism of their moral outlooks, linked
by concerns which can be seen as reflecting a Calvinist cast of mind.
Moreover, in both cases the expression of their metaphysical concerns
has had a profound effect on their use of the conventions of realist
fiction.
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Jenkins' first novel, So Gaily Sings the Lark,1 was published in 1950,
at the beginning of a decade in which an increasing emphasis on social
realism and the proletarian experience led to the fashion for 'angry
young men' and 'kitchen sink drama'. In both Scotland and England the
modernist experiments of the 1920's had been assimilated into the
literary establishment but appeared to have had little influence on the
novel's form; realism remained the dominant mode. Scotland's finest
innovative work of this period, A Scots Quair (1932-34), offers a
clear illustration of this pattern. Although writers such as Neil
Gunn, Ian MacPherson, and Fionn MacColla learned from its linked vision
of the people and the land, few - if any - faced up to the challenge of-
its narrative experiments. And even those writers who followed the
other avenue opened by Gibbon, the depiction of an industrialised world
and an urban proletariat, did so in the prevailing mode of social
realism, ignoring Gibbon's radical experiments with the voice of the
W
'folk'. So in George Blake, Fred Urqujart and Archie Hind, we can
see writers making a genuine effort to chronicle working class Scottish
experience, but finding that the language and the forms they use serve
only to distance themselves from that experience. Yet to use that
form at least offered some reassurance that their experiences could be
'described'. As Malcolm Bradbury points out, in an 'afterword' to
Eating People is Wrong, his own novel of the 1950's: 'it is worth
remembering tnat realism represents a serious propensity of fiction, but
one most easy to achieve in a phase of culture when people do have a
sense of possessing a common and shareable reality, as I think the
2
'fifties did.' Whether Scots writers of the period did enjoy this
1. Robin JenKins, So Gaily Sings the Lark (Glasgow, 1950).
2. Malcolm Bradbury, Eating People is Wrong: with an afterword by the
author (London, 1978), p.295.
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shared reality with their English counterparts is debatable, but it
certainly appears as if they wished to do so. Thus both in those
novels which turned to the land, to the golden rural past, and in
those which faced a sordid urban present, few alternatives were
provided to the given 'reality' presented by the fiction; the moral
and political outlook of the writers tended to remain confined to this
world of solid, describable circumstance.
Nevertheless Robin Jenkins chose Scotland, at least initially, as his
setting and his subject, and appeared to settle for established realist
conventions in form and technique. In this respect he
again differs from Stevenson - and also from Muriel Spark. Both
Stevenson and Spark can be seen as writers who make their distrust of
fiction quite explicit, openly challenging the realist form. Stevenson's
generic experiments always provide him with the means of evading a total
commitment to realism, wnile Spark, making radical narrative experiments
for her own particular reasons, is nevertheless seen as part of a post¬
modernist reaction against realism in which fictional manipulations
are almost the norm. Both writers, therefore, are free to use language
to draw attention to itself, to highlight discrepancies between fiction
and reality, and to express their awareness of the indeterminacies of
existence. Through such individual devices their absolutist perspect¬
ives emerge. Jenkins, however, who, I would suggest, shares certain
aspects of their moral outlook, has chosen to work within a narrower
framework and within an ostensibly less radical form. And it is
because his work does appear closer to realism tnat he occupies such a
significant position in my argument.
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Certainly in all his early works Jenkins shows a greater sense of social
determinism, a more active engagement in ideological debate, a greater
reliance on apparently 'omniscient' narrators and a stronger sense of
'character', than either Stevenson or Spark. Yet these features of his
work which would appear to indicate an attitude to, and assumptions about
reality which, translated into fictional terms, become the characteristics
of realism, are in fact deceptive. Moving away from the specific social
and political issues with which they initially appear concerned, his
novels frequently veer towards more ambiguous concerns with the metaphysics
of morality, and in particular with the potential existence of absolutes
of pure good and pure evil. And in the process the apparent conventions
of realism are adapted to suit his particular moral outlook to such an
extent that their limitations soon become evident. His novels thus test
the very conventions on which they appear to be based.
Jenkins' explorations and manipulations of the realist novel in this way,
being fairly subtle, are obviously best discussed in relation to the
individual novels. Yet in general his experiments lie in three main areas.
The position of the narrator is perhaps the most perplexing area of
development in his work, since it incorporates two deviations from the'norm1
of realism. Firstly, except in Fergus Lamont, Jenkins uses third person
narrators, capable of describing all events and characters pertinent to
the story. As in most realist novels with tnird-person narration the
narrator is shown as possessing a perspective superior to tnat of the
characters involved in events, both sharing and understanding their human
response, but also elevated or detached from them. Moreover, this
'omniscient' narrator is usually seen as being in command of a describable
reality and may even, if narratcrial and authorial roles are blurred - as,
208
for example, in Middlemarch or, with some irony, in Vanity Fair - appear
to control the characters- Yet although Jenkins1 narrators at first
appear to conform to the convention of omniscience, they are frequently
exposed at a later point in the novel as being fallible in their judgements-
Revealed as uncertain about the world being described, as lacking in insignt
into the characters, they are, at times, even shown to be suppressing
information tnat we, the readers, feel we require. In spite of this,
having first created the impression of omniscience through the dominant
uniformity of the narrative voice, Jenkins maintains our expectations of
realism - and hence increases his power to disorient and unsettle the
reader. Any reading of the review^of his novels will show just how
successfully he defeats categorisation and creates a sense of puzzlement
and uneasiness.
Yet, paradoxically, the other area in which Jenkins deviates from realism
through the use of the narrator is in his pushing of the conventions of
omniscience to their limits. For, if the narrative voice in his novels
is often ambiguous and fallible, it also exploits to the full the capacity
of omniscience to change perspective at will. Frequently changing its
allegiance in identifying with the various characters, the narrative voice
gains and loses access to a variety of perspectives. Thus it often
appears urrable to interpret equivocal actions in those characters witn whom
it has 'lost1 access. So once again tne realist conventions disintegrate
since, through this process, the reader not only loses confidence in the
narrator but also in the consistency of the characters and situations
themselves as they shift before us.
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In both these aspects of his use of narrative voice JenKins is able to
manipulate perceptions of reality itself in a moral context. By his
ambivalent use of the omniscient narrator he avoids committing himself to
a position of God-liKe power, but also prevents himself from being
restricted to the constraints of human perception. Moreover, by denying
our sense of character he helps maintain a sense of the essential and
undefinable mystery of personality, the inner essence of the human being
which is inaccessible to other humans. And as well as showing his
narrator to be fallible, Jenkins places his characters in conjunctions which
reveal how little they understand one another. Through this shifting
process, Jenkins also reinforces our.sense of-the subjectivity
of perception in ourselves, by emphasising our inability to 'know' others,
even in fiction."3 He-thus denies us the usual fulfilment given by
realist fiction in which the narrator appears capable of giving the reader
all the information necessary for deciphering the world of the fiction.
The third area affected by JenKins1 challenging of realism is that of the
plot and suoject matter in his novels. Here too his techniques may
initially appear to conform to our expectations of realism. However, the
attention of the reader is once again side-tracked, as those events which
appear to be of major significance are eventually shown to be of little
importance, while the more minor incidents become the main vehicle of
meaning. (In this respect noticeable similarities do exist between
Stevenson and Jenkins.) Yet although the settings which he chooses - central
Scotland against a background of urban poverty or, in those novels written
after his return from teaching in Afghanistan and Malaysia, tne colonial
3. Expressing nis disquiet with the American habit of asking 'Who am 11,
Jenkins appears to see such definitions as limiting ana restrictive, and
the attempt to reach them a process of illusion. Even in his use of third-
person narrative, therefore, he tends to be selective in nis supply of
information, frequently implying that the narrative perspective may be
lacking in knowledge or may even by wrong in its interpretation. He thus
denies the reader that degree of sympathetic identification with either
narrator or characters that we expect from realist fiction and which
palliates and justifies our own sense of self. See the interview with
Robin Jenkins, Appendix p.441.
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world of expatriates - appear to be very similar to those of many otner
writers of his generation, the situations which he creates within these
environments almost seem to be parodies of the conventional 'social
concern' novel. Jenkins' interest is not in expressing the characters'
responses to social dilemmas of a certain period or place: altnough he
presents tne social environment as one of the determinants of human
behaviour, it is a determination whose consequences he wishes to reject
or to see his characters cnallenge. He uses the limitations of the
environment to throw into a prominence events, judgements and moral
imperatives which refuse to be defined by their context, and which negate
any morality based on an acceptance of the conditioned and conditional
nature of human experience.
His moral vision is not the liberal humanism found in the realist novel of
the 1950's; above all he seems to abhor the spiritual lassitude that renders
people incapable of recognising or responding to pure good or evil. As
he is, however, an avowed aetheist, his apparent adoption of the realistic
frame emphasises the material limitations upon the sources or objectives
of such moral and spiritual imperatives. The aDsolutes by which his
characters are tormented - and which his plots force them to confront -
cannot be projected upon or derived from any religious source external to
the limits of a human world defined by given social conditions or outwith
the frame of the realist novel. Jenkins' aim, however, is not merely the
presentation of a flawed humanity; the conventions of realism have been
fully exploited by other novelists in achieving that end. For Jenkins,
the human condition is defined by a double awareness both of the limitations
of cur spiritual potentialities and of our desire to transcend these
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limitations. Aware of the destructive effects of the effort to live
according to those absolutist moral schemes towards which such spiritual
potentialities tempt us, he also detects a failure to fulfil our humanity
if we do not aspire to such absolutes. His characters are caugnt in a
tragic impasse, as their awareness that human values are socially
conditioned and contingent comes into conflict with their consciousness of
the possibility of ultimate values wnicn demand that they reject or
transcend the limitations imposed on them by their society's values. Those
moral imperatives which create this conflict, however, when shown from another
perspective, are revealed to be socially conditioned themselves, to have no
universal validity and therefore to be as contingent as the values which
they are meant to replace. Jenkins' characters, like his novels, are
haunted by the possibility that some set of values will be able to represent
a pure, unconditioned, and absolute good or evil. The novels point towards
extremes whicn, if actually realised in our experience, would tear the fabric
of its relativity, the relativity by which we have come to live, apart.
And this tearing apart of the relativity of our moral values would also
be the tearing apart of the realist frame of the novel. The paradox of
Jenkins' art has always been that it botn accepts that realist frame and
desires its overtnrow, seeking out characters who will represent absolute
values and then trapping them within a conditional and relative universe.
JenKins' long writing career reflects the changes and ambivalences wnich he
has experienced in trying to convey such a complex sensibility. At times
even subsequent novels appear to differ greatly in format; on closer
examination, however, the same character types, the same moral dilemmas, and
essentially similar philosophical concerns can be found in each. Above all
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an increasing confidence in his anility to test the conventions of
realism and the outlook that they represent, can be seen with each novel.
And although his novels may appear conventionally accessible and
thematically simple, a close reading of his works reveals their complexity.
In the following two chapters, therefore, I will concentrate in detail on
a selection of novels from the span of his writing career. In this first
chapter I begin by discussing the seeds of his later concerns to be found
in an early novel, Happy for the Child, prior to examining their
flourishing in The Cone-Gatherers and The Changeling - two novels which
represent salient but divergent strands of his work. The basic issue of
his confrontation with realism can then be assessed in relation to one of
his apparently more conventional novels, Guests of War. Moving to one of
his most ambitiously epic novels, Dust on the Paw, in the subsequent
chapter, I will examine similar manipulations of realism in a non-Scottish
context, then discuss the more radical experiments of A Very Scotch Affair
and A Would-be Saint, which lead to one of his finest but most ambiguous
novels, Fergus Lamont.
Happy for the Child
Happy for the Child, Robin Jenkins's second novel, published in 1953, points
4
towards the direction which future developments in his writing would take.
Initially it appears to adhere closely to realist techniques and, twenty
years later, was still being acclaimed as 'a small classic of realism in
5
Scottish fiction.' The work nevertheless mixes the conventions of realism
4. RoDin Jenkins, Happy for the Child (London", 1953). All page references
are to this edition.
5. Moira Burgess, 'Robin Jenkins: A Novelist of Scotland', The Horary
Review.22, no.6 (Winter, 1970), 409-412, p.409.
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with an element of fantasy, a combination which hints at Jenkins' early
interest in metaphysics and at his refusal to accede totally to the
demands of the realist novel.
Happy for the Child opens by focusing on a subject matter often to be
found in Scottish Kailyard fiction; in Jonn Stirling, the central character,
parallels can easily be found with the typical 'lad o pairts1, the local
boy who makes good. And certainly Stirling, despite his mother's poverty,
succeeds in going to the local Grammar School and surpassing all his wealthier
fellow-pupils with his brilliance. Of course, Jenkins, in true realist
style, goes further than the sentimentality of the Kailyard by investigating
the social implications of this elevation, its psychological effect on the
boy's family and friends, and the influence on the child of his own ambiguous
position. Yet two aspects of the novel would seem to indicate that all of
Jenkins' interests are not circumscribed by this fairly conventional subject.
Firstly, the novel contains so many references to Scottish fiction and its
traditions, that a degree of pastiche, or at least of ironic self-awareness,
is implied. Secondly, Jenkins places the Stirling plot in conjunction with
the story of 'Gourlay', a youthful counterpart of John Stirling's but
characterised by his extreme poverty, his sordid family background, and his
own cruelty. Although he is linked to the main plot through his
acquaintance with Stirling, and can be seen as representing the extremes of
urban poverty and lack of affection which Stirling fears, he develops in
the course of the novel into a larger than life figure, a fantastical
creation who, although demanding sympathy, also threatens to overwhelm the
relative and humanist interpretations of social reality which are expected
in the reader's response to the tale of John Stirling. And through these
two elements, worth examining in some detail, Jenkins' first implicit
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questioning of the realist novel can be seen.
Although the literary references in the novel to other Scottish fictions
and characters are not central to the novel, they nevertheless provide an
interesting echo of, and comment on,its main themes. The actual title
of the novel, used as an epigraph, is taken from a poem by Robert Louis
Stevenson, in which the second verse begins:
Home was home then, my dear, full of kindly faces,
Home was home then, my dear, happy for the child. 5
Although Jenkins is reluctant to acknowledge the direct influence of
Stevenson, he does seem to believe that he is one of Scotland's finest
writers - until recently, not a widely held opinion.^ The phrase,
along with the poem from which it is taken, appears both to indicate the
vision of an older, warmer Scotland and, in Jenkins1 use of it, to
acknowledge the nostalgia behind it. Indeed Stevenson becomes quite a
force within the novel. His adventure stories (along with Westward Ho!)
provide John Stirling with his main means of escape from his meagre
circumstances into another world. And Stevenson is seen Dy others as
a symbol both of Scottish potential for genius, and of the flight from
Scotland and its constraints. Hoping to see Stirling as a future writer,
a teacher on his first day at school thinks: 'Perhaps this small black-
haired boy, so shyly holding the cheap case, was to be another Da illy,
perhaps even a Robert Louis Stevenson or a Walter Scott.' (p.84) On
that first day, too, the pupils are welcomed in the name of Burns, of
Shakespeare and of Robert Louis Stevenson.(p.90) A moment later
6. Robert Louis Stevenson, 'Home no more home to me, whither must I
wander', Works XX, p.239.
7. See interview, Appendix p.436-437.
Stirling is questioned about Kidnapped by the English teacher who:
'thought Kidnapped the perfect novel: those who preferred Madame Bovary
C
were deluded.' (p.93) Once again, of course, in Kidnapped flight and
nostalgia are linked.
Another set of echoes, which point to quite a different strand of Scottish
fiction, are those referring to The House with the Green Shutters.
Although Jenkins denies basing his novel in any way upon that work the
similarities are difficult to ignore. The figure of the local bully in
both novels is called 'Gourlay', and Sam Gourlay's family, like that of
John Gourlay's in the earlier work, consists of a coarse, stupid character
and a 'dwaibly body', although the roles of husband and wife are reversed.
The parallel is even highlighted when the comment made on Sam Gourlay:
'You're rotten, ... you're rotten to the core!', (p.114) echoes the
condemnation of Deacon All&rdyce made by Tarn Wylie in The House with the
9
Green Shutters: 'Deacon Allardyce, your heart's black-rotten.' And
Douglas Brown's novel also features the plight of a sensitive boy,
with an overvivid imagination, in a world which overwhelms him. Without
placing too much emphasis on these literary echoes, they can be seen as
Jenkins' reminder to his readers both of their fictional heritage, and
of their participation in the fictional process. As such they operate
as a counterforce to the novel's apparent commitment to realism, although
Jenkins never again indulged in literary games to the same extent.
The other threat which Happy for the Child presents to realism, in the
character of Sam Gourlay himslef, is one which is more obviously
8. Sandy Stranger in Muriel Spark's The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie also
experiences a temporary obsession with Kidnapped, having imaginary
conversations with Alan Breck.
9. George Douglas Brown, The House with the Green Shutters (London, 1901),
p.306.
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related to Jenkins moral concerns. If John Stirling's situation
illustrates one of the cliches of Scottish writing, Sam Gourlay's would
at first appear to provide another stereotype. The boy who never
has a chance, who turns to violence through being the victim of poverty
and cruelty, who finds little support in his broken-down, philosophising
father, his overbearing and monstrous mother, and his sentimental sister,
Gourlay is the archetypal 'villain to be pitied'. Yet in spite of our
human sympathy for him, Gourlay assumes gigantic proportions within the
novel. On one level the tragic hero, a figure of wasted potential who
nevertheless retains his ability to enjoy life until even that is
forced out of him, he appears to deserve an understanding response. And
the baiting of him by his supposed friend Charlie Deans increases our
sympathy for him.10 At other times he evoxes a sense of disgust
and also of despair. His cruelty is so extreme, his enjoyment of it
so gleeful and defiant, that all his emotions assume fantastic dimensions.
So even at tnis early stage in his writing career Jenkins is creating
characters who deny the reader a consistent and easy response.
As the novel progresses the force of Jenxins' writing when he describes
this character soon begins to assume a power which trivialises the
treatment of John Stirling. Compare Stirling's response to the traumas
of scnool life:
The suspense, the constant defensiveness, and the
frequent isolations, of course, did him harm.
Often he had headaches; his heart would suddenly
race and become audible; he felt sick; but worst
of all, and most regularly, he suffered from
depressions. (p.151)
10. Charlie Deans could be seen as an echo of the Deans family in
The Heart of Midlothian.
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with Gourlay's real need for any money:
At last, in desperation, snarling like a dog
threatened with the loss of a bone, Gourlay took
the purse and, straining it across his chest,
ripped it apart so that for a moment he seemed to
be playing a concertina. Next moment he was delving
into its numerous empty compartments with demented
betrayed fingers ... Then finally he took it out and
held up, between finger and thumb, for the whole
treacherous world to see, the only coin in the purse,
a ha'penny with a hole in it ... Once he tried to
speak, to express his devastated hopes, but had to
stop, for it was evident he would have wept. ,
Both the language used and the experience described in the second passage
easily overshadow that of the former. And Gourlay himself overshadows
the petty spectrum of emotions which are experienced by the sensitive
Stirling, representing both a threat and a need, neither of which can
be accommodated by the relative reality established by the Stirling side
of the novel.
Gourlay, moreover, is shown as actually experiencing moments of
perception which seem to break down the boundaries of reality. After
killing a cat - one of his favourite misdemeanours - the world seems
to change: 'Because it lay black and sinisterly still among them
the green leaves and white flowers suddenly blazed and seemed tnemselves
to be alive. At any moment the whole bush might fly up and away.'
(p.36) Gourlay can experience such moments because he is so desperately
seeking some alternative dimension to the reality which constrains him,
is seeking any kind of significance, yet in himself he comes to represent
that alternative, a world of extremes, to the reader. Jenkins chooses
Gourlay as the character who sticks earwigs on pins, an action which
he sees as representing 'the evil of the world1,'''' and in so doing
11. See interview, Appendix p.443.
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indicates a kind of morality which cannot find a place within the
reality of an ethically relative society: it is too extreme. But Sam
Gourlay also senses a lack of all extremes in the world around him -
not only of evil. In Jenkins1 first novel, So Gaily Sings the Lark,
a roadmender comments to David, the central character: 'A man kens in
his heart that this is an unfinished sort of place, not perfect like
heaven; and when he sees something that he thinks is complete he looks
12
roond, without meaning to, for the disappointment.1 Gourlay, by the
end of the novel, epitomises this sense of something lacking in life:
He wept for a greater reason: again he felt, but
much more poignantly, that something important,
something indispensable, something without which
he must always fail as he had failed tonight, had
come close to him but had passed him by ... There
had been nothing in the purse; there had been nothing
tonight; there would be nothing always.^ 206-207)
Here Gourlay's sense of an indefinable absence can be seen as reflecting
that idea of the lack of absolutes within a conditional, eartnly reality,
which dominates Jenkins' moral concerns and shapes the form of his
fiction in future novels.
Meanwhile, although the text of Happy for the Child concludes with
Stirling, its real focus is made clear in the final mention of Gourlay,
as Stirling, departing for home having expiated his own feelings of
rebellion, views him cowed and ill: 'As he went into the house he was
laughing at this demonstration of the ultimate defeat of evil and the
victory of good. The likes of Gourlay were always crushed, whereas
boys like Stirling himself, clever and deserving, always succeeded in
the end: that was surely how the world went, that was how God had
12. Jenxins, So Gaily Sings the Lark, p.43.
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arranged it.' (p.230) The narrator's irony exploits the tension in tne
fact that Stirling's view is accurate to the experience of the two
characters within the development of the plot, in that Stirling has
been victorious and 'that was surely how the world went', while the
invocation of an absolute morality supporting that outcome is counter¬
manded by the reader's own necessary concern, not with the smugly self-
congratulatory Stirling but with Gourlay, sleeping/the coal cellar and
demanding an alternative to his existence:
Nor could he say where he wanted to go. Not home to
bed with curses and a drink of cold water; not to the
lighted street where cops would grab him and demand
why he was wandering aoout so late; not down to Charlie's
gate, where no one ever came; and not up the drain pipe
into the store, for in spite of his angry boasts to
Charlie he knew it would be agony to climb with his boils
so inflamed.
There seemed no place except back into the cellar,
and thither after two or three minutes he crept with a
baffled grin. It was a pity though the candle was done.
(P-249)
The alternative demanded by Gourlay is an alternative to the world of
social relativity and conditioning. While Stirling was threatened and
fearful he-like the reader - saw Gourlay as representing an absolutism
that challenged his own relative morality and mocked his own desire to
build a success on the weak and insecure foundations of social contin¬
gencies. Once successful, Stirling attributes that success to fundamental
and absolutist principles governing the universe; Gourlay, in whom he
had previously seen an evil absolutism, now becomes the victim of a
conditional and contingent set of circumstances for which there has been
no reprieve since no one has taken the conditionality of nis circumstances
sufficiently seriously. Here then can be seen, in an embryonic form,
the impasse that dominates all Jenkins' novels, between two different
dimensions of moral judgement and two different perspectives on the nature
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of human responsibility. In this case each perspective undermines
the positive power of the other. When the sense of absolute good
is weak, the sense of absolute evil is strong, and the threat it poses
makes all efforts at alleviating conditioning circumstances which create
evil impossible; when a sense of absolute good is strong, it is easier
to become careless of evil and all its circumstances, to see it simply
as a necessary part of a pre-ordained universe. In Happy for the Child
Stirling appears to triumph by this dichotomy: in later novels, however,
the 'Gourlay' element becomes the focus of Jenkins1 concerns.
The novel which followed Happy for the Child shows a similar concern
with the social conditions of urban life. Moreover, the fact that
13
The Thistle and The Grail, deals with football, one of Scotland's
national obsessions, in the context of a small community, gives it a
specific location and frame of reference - although even within this
framework Jenkins still introduces his moral concerns. It is in his
next novel, however, in The Cone-Gatherers, that this interest comes to
14
the fore. By concentrating on an isolated setting, an unusual
situation, and on characters who are not recognisable types, he creates
a world in which the social determinism ana the expectations of realism
cannot be so securely grounded. And by removing the comforting presence
of social norms he forces his readers into recognising the subjectivity
of their own perceptions and into becoming more open to the transform¬
ations of apparent reality described in the novel.
13. Robin Jenkins, The Thistle and the Grail (London, 1954).
14. Robin Jenkins, The Cone-Gatnerers (London, 1955). All page
references are to this edition.
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The Cone-Gatherers
The Cone-Gatherers focuses on two brothers, Neil and Calum, who have been
given the job of gatnering cones on tne estate of Lady Runcie-Campbel1,
located somewnere in Scotland. Their tasK is made necessary by the
stringencies of tne Second World War, which has caused tree seed imports
to cease. On the estate, carrying out their unusual and isolating job,
the brothers come into contact with the few other characters in tne novel,
who all seem to be defined by their attitude to the cone-gatherers. Their
main antagonist Duror, the embittered and malevolent keeper on the estate,
cannot come to terms with Calum, who is a hunchback and slow witted, a
figure of cnild-like innocence, totally dependent on Neil for care and
protection. Lady Runcie-Campbel1, administrating the estate in her
nusband's absence, is also made uneasy by the brothers, although her sen,
Roderick is fascinated by them. Mr Tulloch, the head forester wno employs
them, also remains kind and supportive towards them. The natural setting
of the estate thus provides the background and the characters for the
novel's events - an isolated environment whose seclusion is emphasised by
the war being enacted outwith this little world.
The paucity of character, the isolated setting, the apparent moral polaris¬
ations, and the deceptively simple plot structure, thus give the story
certain affinities with fable. The novel, nowever, also sets up a process
of revealing ambiguities in tne characters, setting, and in the apparent
i
moral centres it has established: a process best illustrated by an obvious
example for the novel's location. Since events mainly taxe place on the
estate, in a beautiful, natural environment, tne novel inevitably carries
Edenic overtones. And through the unfolding of the plot, througn tne
contradictions and ambiguities revealed by events within tne wood, the
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image of its 'untoucned innocence' is continually threatened. Even the
cone-gatherers, after all, are involved in a process which is against
nature in that they are organising the artificial pollination of trees.
The novel is thus based on an oscillating opposition between two different
realms of existence: on the one hand there is the territory belonging to
the war, against which the setting of tne novel in an Edenic and peaceful
natural world provides an image of innocence; on the other hand, within
the domain of this Eden, evil - mirroring the nature of tne war - is
already at work. The innocence is an illusion but an illusion which is,
nevertheless, compelling because the framing effect of the war is to turn
into symbols what might otherwise have been seen as conditional features of
the characters' existence; Calum's backwardness and love of nature, for
example, become symbolic of an enduring potentiality for tnat innocence
which the war negates but which would not have been realised even as that
potentiality except for the war. Eden has retained its power as an image
precisely because humanity has been expelled from it; in the novel it is
also a domain wnich has been recreated by, and lost again to,the forces of
evil wnicn that original expulsion set free into the world. Eden is not
in the past; rather it is a possibility which evil itself is always
regenerating as an image and destroying. This process of destruction
thus creates a sense of absent ideals which become a new source of potential
positives; and although those positives cannot survive tne actualities of
the world, their destruction only makes our sense of tneir aosence from
the delimited world in which we have to live more potent. The absolute
moralities which appear to live on in the Edenic frame of the woodlands
incapacitate the characters in their dealings with the 'real' world; and
yet their destruction comes not at the nands of the real world witn its
circumstantial-morality, but through the conflict of aDsolutes. JenKins'
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approach within the novel is thus one of considerable subtlety in whicn
we are led towards an awareness of our desire for absolutes and then
revealed the inadequacy of those absolutes in our actual lives. Yet
this destruction of aosolutes only makes our desire for them and tneir
potency all the more profound.
Jenkins can thus be seen as adopting an apparently realistic strategem,
and using an apparently consistent narrative tone, to give the impression
of unity within his work. Yet in reading this novel it soon becomes
clear that realism and fable, narrative omniscience and partial vision,
metaphysical proDlematics and petty moral dilemmas all rub shoulders within
it. And it is these contradictions which provide the dynamic of his
fiction. As all the elements within the work gradually undo the unity
that it initially appears to possess, the reader is drawn into the process
of maKing sense of contradictions, adjusting his or her own sense of
reality in order to decipher the novel's paradoxes. In The Cone-Gatherers
the central tension is created by the foregrounding of two opposing areas
around one central and contradictory concept. Estaolishing two very
different worlds, one being that of the wood, the isolated realm of fable,
and the other being the world of social reality, of relative morality,
Jenkins brings them into a confrontation centred around the problem
presented by the concept of innocence. These three central elements
dominating the novel, through the woodland setting, through the impositions
of a social hierarchy, and througn a pervasive vision of innocence, inter¬
act at different levels within the worn and illustrate the complexity of
Jenkins' aims.
The woodland setting, as stated, provides a closed world, a useful frame
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in wnich conflicts may be explored. Yet the concept of the wood as an
escape from reality, a world isolated from the evils and antagonism of
the war, is scon shown to be an illusion. In tne first paragraph of the
novel we are presented with the image of the two brotners high up in a
tree, gathering cones. Isolated even within the woods by their lofty
position, the Edenic overtones are very strong. However, as tne
description of surrounding nature continues in the second paragraph, a
more sinister note is introduced:
Seals that had been playing tag in and out of the
seaweed under the surface had disappeared round the
point, like children gone home for tea. A destroyer
had steamed seawards, with a sailor singing cheer¬
fully. More sudden and swifter than hawks, and roaring
louder than waterfalls, aeroplanes had shot down from
the sKy over the wood, whose autumnal colours they
seemed to have copied for camouflage. In the silence
that had followed gunshots had cracked far off in the
wood. (p.7)
The gradual alignment of natural and military, as one world takes on the
characteristics of the other, breaks down our expectations of the natural
environment, leaving us uncertain as to whether the guns mentioned are
sporting or warlike. Not only is the texture of the external military
world woven into the realms of nature, but it is done so in such a way
that the isolation of the ccne-gatherers is presented as the only point
from wnich this strange conjunction can be viewed. From tne very
beginning, therefore, their isolation is represented as the only position
in wnich such dangerous oppositions are accessiole. But, because of
that position, they can also be seen either as exposed or sheltered in the
highest trees, victims or survivors.
Apart from their symbolic ambivalence, however, the woods also serve a
more concrete function in tne novel; tne different values of the various
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cnaracters can be gauged according to their interaction witn the
woodland environment for it tends to reflect their attitudes to the
world in general. Neil, for example, dislixes tne woods, cannot
accept the stasis of tne environment and is continually watching for
some change in its nature:
Neil, the elder of the brothers, had often paused,
his hand stretched out from its ragged sleeve to
plucK the sweet resinous cones, and gazed at the
great house witn a calm yet bitter intentness and
anticipation, as if, having put a spell on it, he
was waiting for it to change. He never said what
he expected or why ne watched; nor did his brotner
ever asx. (pp.7-8)
Any change, even when it is only the approaching darkness of an imminent
storm, is welcomed by tne elder brother as a confirmation of the
suspicion witn wnich he treats the woods, an expression of the insecurity
he feels and of his disbelief in benevolent nature or natural justice:
Neil opened his eyes. It was now as dark as twilight.
The rain still plopped down in single large drops. As
yet tnere seemed no enmity or hatred in its falling, only
a kind of sadness and pity; but in five minutes, or less,
it would come roaring down mercilessly. He would De
soaked; his rheumatism would be so aggravated it might
cripple him for ever. If he was unable to walk, far
less climb, who would look after Calum with his derided
body and his mind as foolish as a child's? Wherever tnat
light had shone from, it had not been from Heaven, (p.153)
Nature thus confirms his belief in the world as potentially treacherous
and inimical, reinforcing . his expectations tnat he and Calum will be
overwhelmed, botn by the natural environment and by the man-made systems
operating'within it. Inevitably Neil resents the fact that Calum, with
his delight in the minutiae of the natural surroundings, can easily
accept the world in wnich he lives and is unaole to perceive external
impositions. Indeed, Calum's oblivion to such factors ensures tnat ne
suffers from them to a far lesser degree than his Droth-er. Calum, for
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example, has no sense of the social stigma attached to their task,
viewing the gathering of seeds as a means of bringing new life-
Conscious of tnose factors outside tne woodland world wnicn condition
their employment, nowever, Neil is forced to operate according to restrict¬
ions on his behaviour of which he is well aware but nevertheless deeply
resents.
In contrast, Calum operates according to an asocial, purely 'moral',
instinct. While presenting the world through Calum's eyes, therefore,
the narrator can point towards a vision of the universe free from social
pressures and from their categorisations of the individual. Within
Calum's world even physical restrictions can be broken down or transformed
simply through acts of imagination and empathy: 'Calum fancied he was
resting in tne heart of an enormous flower. As he breatned in tne
fragrance, ne stroked the branches, and to nis gentle hands they were
as soft as petals.' (p.9) Similarly, Calum can easily imagine himself
as an owl, suffering, 'in the ineluctable predicament of necessary pain
and death' (p.9), again becoming part of the natural world. His control
over such transformations, however, is minimal since they are effected
purely through his own subjectivity of perception; his role as victim
throughout the novel reveals tne precariousness of sucn a position.
Nevertheless, just as he can empathise with the woods, unaware of any
barriers between himself and nature, so he can ignore what Neil sees as
the insurmountable burden of circumstances which stand between numanity
and moral ideals. Calum accepts tnat the natural world operates
according to larger laws than he is aole to perceive. The fact that:
'Daylight announced it must go' (p.8), for example, causes him no fear.
Recognising his own role witnin this larger universe, his moral capacity,
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tne potential for good, is freed. But Calum is set apart from the
majority of people Doth by his physical deformity and by his innocence
of mind. Neil, in contrast, is, like most of humanity, aware of
constraints and restrictions which prevent us from acting according to
free moral choices but force us to comply with the pragmatics of reality.
Yet by knowing Calum and his perception on the world Neil is more aware
than the majority of people exactly how these social constraints trap
us. Denied the means of transcending the limitations of self-concern
and public facade most of us are forced to rely on a pragmatism which
frequently betrays us; Calum however, belongs to the world of idiots,
children and fanatics who can believe in an existence outwith humanity's
self-determined universe. And through this opposition between the
brothers Jenkins can be seen exploring a concept central to all his
works: the impossibility of coping with a fully idealistic, non-
pragmatic perception of moral polarities in a world dominated by
oppression, injustice and social constraints.
It may seem then, that Calum possesses the moral advantage in
conceptual oppositions within the novel; the novel's events, however,
reveal that the type of morality practised by Neil, one mitigated by
expediency, is the kind which will ultimately survive. Calum's
adherence to ideals, his potential for good, is shown through events
to be self-destructive. Indeed, an early incident in the novel, when
Calum is unable to Kill a trapped rabbit in order to put it out of
pain, illustrates the paralysing effect of his 'goodness'. Capable
only of doing good in a pure and absolute way, his morality is incapable
of coping with the actualities of a world that does not conform absolutely
to the terms of his own consciousness. The events of the novel therefore
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lead the reader into an awareness of moral relativism and compromise
as necessary for a functional existence witnin the limitations of
the human world, as Calum is forced to endure a deerhunt, is accused
of obscenity and corruption, and, finally, is murdered. Yet the moral
innocence which he represents emerges strongly througn tne novel's
images and succeeds in sustaining an ideal, indicating the possiDility
of transcending a relative morality which accepts the predominance of
social conditioning within our experience.
The ideal of innocence which Calum represents is emphasised even more
strongly by being placed in conjunction with another pole of morality -
the evil represented by the gamekeeper Ouror, an equally powerful but
self-destructive force. And Duror is also a character whose perceptions
are used to invest the woods with significance in a process of self-
revelation. Like Calum, Duror sees the woods as capable of magical
transformations, of liberation from the constraints of a fixed and static
reality. Believing that the autonomy of nature offers redemption and
an affirmation of his own form of moral extremism, Duror links tnem
with an all-encompassing sense of purpose that he recognises is lacking in
himself: 'This wood had always been his stronghold and sanctuary; there
were many places secret to him where he had been able to fortify his
sanity and hope.' (p.18) Here it is possible to see how Jenkins
uses tne characters' own desires for symDols and significance to amplify
the symbols estaDlished by tne pattern of the novel. Thus Duror's
resentment of Calum stems not only from the fact that the latter's
deformity makes the woods seem 'invaded and defiled', but also from
Calum's appropriation of the wood's apparent powers of transformation to
his own vision of innocence; Duror feels that, 'its cleansing and reviving
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virtues were gone.' (p.18) With his own wife physically distorted oy
illness, Duror had wished to see the woods as a reassurance that
perfection could still exist; Calum therefore Becomes another instance
of physical imperfection, a violation of the natural environment. Most
galling of all, however, to the gamekeeper, is Calum's apparently innate
good, for Duror has also used the woods as an environment in which he
can see only that side of nis self which he wishes to preserve, ignoring
tne perversions in his own moral character. But Calum: 'had made
acceptance no longer possible for Duror himself.' (p.18) By acting as
a physical reflection of those parts of his nature he had tried to
conceal, Calum makes Duror aware of his own spiritual deformity - a
recognition made all the more forceful for Duror because of the huncnback's
own moral purity. On realising that Calum, 'in some dreadful way nad
become associated with him, in fact had become necessary to him' (p.99),
Duror can no longer conceal his true moral nature; the only action left
to him is to destroy that antithetical image of himself by destroying
Calum, aware nevertheless that in so doing he is giving way to his own
capacity for evil, destroying himself in tne process. Although Calum
and Duror are thus shown as characters who can only achieve a fullness
of existence within the woods, being unable to make the compromises
necessary for survival outwith its boundaries, the enclosed environment
of the wood - by bringing them together - forces them into realisations
of self whicn they wished to avoid. Indeed, at one point Duror feels:
'It was almost as if there were not two brothers, but three; ne himself
was the third.' (p.222) The isolation which ensures their existence
and the expression of their full moral potential for aosolutes of good
or evil is therefore also responsible for creating their mutually
destructive symDiosis.
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Calum and Duror's relationsnip, however, is only brought to the point
of actual destruction, in Duror's murder of Calum and subsequent
suicide, by the intrusion of those social factors which operate as
constraints upon the other characters. LiKe Huck and Jim sailing down
the Mississippi on the raft, they are gradually invaded by restrictions
emanating from a world outwith their isolation which then precipitates
the climax of events. And here Jenkins balances the fabulistic
elements of his story with an awareness of social responsibilities and
human hierarchies more commonly to be found in the realist novel. Even
within the woodland environment characters such as Mr Tulloch and Lady
Runcie-Campbell find it difficult to function according to 'pure' moral
instinct alone. Lady Runcie-Campbell, for example, is continually torn
between her sense of moral justice and her desire to preserve the social
conventions. Unable to forget class barriers, she cannot recognise
'good' when it is manifested in those with whose behavioural patterns
she is not familiar; yet she also desperately wishes to achieve goodness
in her own life, as her son reminds her;
"You told me yourself," he muttered intensely, "never to
be quiet if I saw injustice being done."
She .started, and was painfully embarrassed by having
that grar|iloquent precept, that maternal counsel of
perfection, repeated to her there, by him, in the open, in
the presence of strangers, of inferiors. (pp.97-98)
Representing a conventional goodness, as mitigated by strong conditioning
and circumstantial reality, she is not condemned in terms of the
narrative sympathy, yet the novel nevertheless apportions her consider¬
able blame for the final sequence of events. By maintaining the pressure
of social restrictions on the cone-gatnerers and remaining uncertain of
how to deal with Duror, she forces the two polarities into an essentially
asocial conflict. Her failure to face up to the extremes of the
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situation is, however, explained away by Mr Tulloch - himself in
favour of moral relativism - who states: 'She seemed to him to be a
victim, rather than a persecutor1 (p.16b) And within the novel she
does function as a representative of the victimising processes of
historical and social conditioning which prevent her from takiny effective
action when faced with moral extremes and which deny her full under¬
standing when confronted by problematic moral concepts.
Ine most problematic concept with which she is faced in the novel, and
which also makes stringent demands upon the reader as well as the other
characters, is the idea of innocence. Once again Jenkins uses a
shifting focus, demanding a variety of approaches to the concept according
to the various levels operating within the novel. Obviously Calum acts
as a concrete manifestation of the possibility of innocence, being seen
by the. more enlightened characters as a representative of goodness, with
his retarded mental growth fixing him as the child who alone can enter
15
the gates of heaven. Of course, as is revealed to the reader,
much of Calum1 s goodness is due to his na'ivete and ignorance, but it
is for this very reason that characters within the novel endow him
15. Calvin held that children too are sinful, since they will inevitably
grow up and commit evil once they attain knowledge of the world:
And the apostle himself most eloquently testifies that
"deatn has spread to all because all have sinned" (Rom. 5:12).
That is, they have been enveloped in original sin and defiled
by its stains. For that reason, even infants themselves,
while they carry tneir condemnation along with them from
their mother's womb, are guilty not of another's fault but
of their own. For even though the fruits of their iniquity
have not yet come forth, they have the seed enclosed within
them. Indeed, their whole nature is a seed of sin: hence
it can only be hateful and abhorrent to God.
Calvin, Institutes, Book II,, i, 8, p.251.
Since Calum, however, is arrested in his mental growth, his progress
towards a state of sinning does not have the same inevitability.
232
with special qualities, making him acquire symbolic significance. In
him they see a refusal to accept that worldly knowledge which inevitably
restricts their own behaviour and makes compromise a means of survival.
Indeed, they wish to see Calum as making decisions in favour of good,
ignoring the fact that his behaviour stems as much from the inability
to perceive the complications of existence as it does upon innate good¬
ness. Roderick, the son of Lady Runcie-Campbel1, for example, taught
to be unafraid of moral absolutes by his 'Christian' grandfather,
perceives Calum as a point of definition, a symDol of goodness otherwise
lacking in the world around him. Moreover, he imagines that Calum is
actively demanding some kind of positive response from Roderick himself,
and it is this projection of conscious values upon the hunchback which
leads to Roderick becoming stuck up a tree as he tries to emulate Calum.
Inevitably his attempt to climb the tree fails; unlike Calum ne is only
too aware of the dangers inherent in the endeavour. On reaching the
tree's heights his trust in 'ignorance' fails, and his knowledge of the
reality of his position paralyses and traps him. Thus the principle
which he wishes to see as an ideal in Calum fails him in practical terms.
Calum, offering as he does a focus for the potentiality of pure good,
illustrates how Jenkins uses paradox to present his moral perspective.
On a symbolic level, aloft in his tree, high above tne word, witn an
empathy for his surroundings as shown in his ability to carve animals,
feeling at one with them and with nature, Calum represents an unresisting
acceptance of the universe around him, and an uncomplicated capacity for
good; he therefore functions as an ideal. And yet, on the level of
its realism, the novel highlights his inability to cope with the totality
of the world, his failure to achieve the relativity accepted by Neil,
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Mr Tulloch and Lady Runcie-Campbel1. The image of innocence is thus
attacked on both sides; if characters perceive pure goodness in him
they are victims of their own illusions, yet if his goodness is not
perceived all that remains is his incompetence. And in the novel two
alternatives only are offered to his innocence: on the symbolic level
it is opposed by the pure evil of Duror; on the realist level it is
faced with the compromises of the relative morality accepted by the
majority of the other characters. Both alternatives, however, are
brought together at the moment of Calum's death which presents the same
tension between destruction and reinforcement of ideals as did his life:
Though he smiled, he was dead. From his bag dropped
a cone, and then another. There might have been more,
but other drops, also singly, but faster and faster,
distracted her: these were of blood.
With moans and yelps of lamentation like an animal his
brother was struggling along that branch to try and reach
him.
As she watched, with Baird as horrified as sne, another
gunshot rang out. She glanced at him and saw that it had
not occurred to him so soon what it meant. She knew that
somewhere, on her beloved promontory, Duror, with his face
shattered and bloody, lay dead.
Then, while she stood there emptied by horror, she
heard far away a voice she loved screaming in excitement:
"Mother, he's down. It's all right. He's safe. Harry
got him down."
Baird thought she had not neard. Not looking at the
cone-gatherer still trying to reach his dead brother, and
not daring to approach too close to her, he took a step
forward and told her what Sheila was still screaming. What
she did then shocked him, even there amidst these shocking
sights.
First she said: "Help him, Baird." Then she went down
on her knees, near the blood and spilt cones. She could not
pray, but she could weep; and as she wept, pity, and purified
hope, and joy, welled up in her heart. ,
Although his deatn is presented with pathos, it also acquires positive
16
value in terms of symbolic significance. It offers Duror a chance to
realise his own potential for a destructive, yet absolute, act of evil.
Yet it also holds cut the possibility of a temporary redemption of sorts
16. Iain Crichton Smith comments: 'At the end when Calum is killed by
Duror, his body is seen as almost crucified, like Christ's, and the
lady of the estate is brougnt face to face with her own contradictions
in a conclusion of violence and hope.' Introduction to The Cone-
Gatherers (Edinburgh, 1980), p.3.
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for Lady Runcie-Campbel1. Although Calum illustrates the precept that
the innocent must suffer, and becomes almost sanctified by his death, his
real effect is to save the surviving characters from the continued
necessity of self-definition in the face of extremes. Lady Runcie-
Campbel 1 weeps, but will be able to return to a world in which such
absolutes as presented by Calum and Duror are no longer there. And yet,
for the novel, Calum's death offers a conclusion of climactic significance
and provides the dominant closing image - one which points beyond the
constraints of a relative reality, reinforcing the symbolic potential
of absolutes. By indicating the inoperabi1ity of ideals within human
reality it also registers a protest against the results of such relativism.
In assimilating these tensions within his novel, in bringing contradictory
levels of myth and story together, Jenkins obviously has to make some
adjustment to the conventions of realism. One of the main difficulties
in expressing the problematics of morality by bringing together
conflicting moral perspectives, is in deciding how to handle tne narrative
voice. Jenkins, in this novel as well as in most others, settles for a
third person narrative but remains aware of the tension created between
the narrator as a human persona - and therefore engaged in the struggle
with 'reality' - and the author behind the narrative, occupying a
position of control and power, able to escape from the constraints of
the real. Jenkins adopts a fairly conventional stance in The Cone-
Gatherers in that he appears to maintain a consistent narrative voice but
to leave the interpretation of events to the characters themselves. Yet
althougn he thus avoids imposing a dominant narrative perspective upon the
reader, he nevertheless finds means of allowing the narrator subtly to
guide the reader into certain, suitably metaphysical interpretations of
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events. This he acnieves Dy integrating authorial guidelines into the
apparent mimesis of characters' thoughts. Passages which may seem
mimetic of the characters' interpretations of events and of themselves
are, if examined in detail, revealed to be a form of diagesis, witn the
narrator translating and reinterpreting the cnaracters' mental processes
according to the wider themes of the novel.1''
This process is most obvious with those characters upon whom Jenkins
closely focuses. Lady Runcie-Campbel1, of course, often thinks in terms
of metaphysics but this seems appropriate to such a thinking, Christian,
woman. Duror, however, depicted as much less articulate and conscious
in his reasoning, is also shown to be 'thinking' in terms of metaphysics.
Arriving home after watching the cone-gatherers' hut, for example, we are
told: 'He allowed himself no such gestures as putting hand to brow or
closing his eyes. Why should he no longer simulate pleasure at being
home? What salvation was he seeking under tne cypress?' (p.29) Althougn
both questions in this passage are formulated in the same way, they relate
to very different levels of experience, with the former referring to
Duror's own reaction to his unhappy home life, but the latter introducing
a more metaphysical concept, that of salvation. But because we accept
the former as a valid reaction from Duror, we can also accept the question
about salvation as something that is in his mind. We cannot, however,
be certain of his actually thinking in such terms, since no indication is
given as to whether this is a conscious tnought being reflected by the
narrator's words, or whether the narrator is actually leading the reader
into seeing Duror's situation in terms of salvation. Likewise, when
17. The tneoretic implications of the mimesis/diagesis distinction are
discussed in more detail on pp.254-5 but for tne moment the terms can
be seen as relating to tne distinction Detween 'showing' and 'telling',
between 'scene' and 'summary'.
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Duror views the beauties of nature we are told: 'It was a morning that
seemed to beguile tne mind with recollections of a time of innocence
before evil and happiness were born.1 (p.41) Once again wider concepts -
here the opposition of good and evil and the context of a Golden Age - are
introduced into an apparently banal reflection on the morning and expand
the mimetic significance of the observation.
Duror, of course, is also depicted as a character existing a certain level
of intensity, but Jenkins applies his technique to other characters wno
have a less conscious response to extremes. Mr Tulloch, for example, is
described walking through the woods after the storm which brought the
cone-gatherers into confrontation with Lady Runcie-Campbel1: 'Before he
moved on, he plucked up a handful of old leaves still damp from yesterday's
deluge, and scattered them in the air. One or two fell upon him, but he
did not immediately brush them off. This was his gesture of grief.'
(p.164) Once again, tnat final sentence introduces a very different
dimension of experience from the purely descriptive details of action
previously given. And again we cannot be certain whether Mr Tulloch
himself is thinking of his action in such terms. Later in the same scene
we are told of his admiration for the cone-gatherers: 'Such fidelity to
so simple but indispensable a task was to the forester as noble and
beautiful a sight as was to be seen in that wood so rich in magnificent
trees.' (pp.165-166) No indication is given as to whether the forester
is conscious of his own reaction or whether this is a guideline for the
reader in interpreting his behaviour.
It is not uncommon for the'realist novel to- imply that a deeper
level of reaction may exist of which the characters are not fully aware;
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indeed, it is often seen as the tasx of the novelist to convey such
emotions. Yet where Jenkins differs from writers such as D.H. Lawrence,
who are interested in mining the sub-conscious realms of experience, is
that he gives us little indication as to whether we can actually trust
the narrator's interpretation as accurately reflecting the experience of
the characters, or whether tne narrator is all the time imposing a certain
kind of reading upon us. When the village men, for example, are described
18
as 'disciples in the religion of endurance' (p.132), we have little
evidence to judge for ourselves since we are only shown them drinking in
the village bar; the voice which has made the particular comment seems to
belong to a narrator determined to see existence in terms of metaphysics.
And are we really to believe that Calum, with his simple thought processes
is waiting, in conversation with Neil?'to have his vision accepted'?(p.153)
Again we are led into a metaphysical level of speculation about the
situation by a narrator who subtly guides our thoughts in that direction.
However, the same narrator, by the very consistency of tone wnich conveys
the details of both prosaic and metaphysical reaction, creates the
impression of a single ana unbroken level of interpretation both for
character and reader. For the duration of the novel, therefore, we
remain trapped within his particular vision.
Just as this apparent consistency of narrative tone can both conceal and
reveal contradictory levels of subject matter, so Jenkins' use of
symbolism allows for the existing of different levels of significance.
By moving away from conventional realism in allowing his characters
apparently to 'notice' symbols - helped here by the olurring of '
18. The name 'Duror' suggests too, that the stoic Duror is a leader
in this 'religion of endurance'.
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mimesis/diagesis distinctions - he reinforces tne readers' sense of
cnaracters moving in a spiritual dimension as well as in the descrioable
world of an apparently 'solid' reality. The symbols within tne text
thus become open to various levels of interpretation. The wooden doll
found by Calum is seen Dy the hunchback as a symbol of all wounded
existence to which he must extend his sympathy, yet Duror views it as a
symbol of Calum's obscenity; and once he points this out to Lady Runcie-
Campbell, she looks on it as a symbol of all the oDscenity contained in
the world. On another level yet, as readers, we can perceive tnat the
doll embodies botn Calum's innocence and Duror's ability to pervert reality
into an expression of his own evil. Jenkins fills the novels with such
images, open to a variety of interpretations: the cone-gatherers up a
tree in the storm; the rabbit in a trap; Roderick's cake rotting under a
tree; the mingled cones and blood dropping from Calum's poor body. Where
Jenkins' use of symbolism differs from that of say, D.H. Lawrence or
E.M. Forster, is that, although they allow botn character and reader to
appreciate symbolic significance, Jenkins then mocks the characters for so
19
seeking significance within the deceptive world of reality. This is
clearly illustrated by the way in which the characters themselves
frequently move into a symbolic mode - or at least, are presented as seeing
themselves so doing. Roderick for example, thinks of himself as a pilgrim
seeking the Holy Grail - in Calum. Yet because we are aware of the
inconsistencies of that Grail we can view Roderick as the deluded innocent
trying to effect a doomed escape from reality.
Of course, if cnaracters can be wrong about the myths in wnich tney see
themselves or which they desire, tnen the reader can be equally wrong in
19. For a more detailed discussion of Jenxins' use of symbolism, see
Chapter 5.
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interpreting the symbols presented by the novels. So while symools -
by being apparent absolutes - cnallenge the world of etnical relativity,
the relativity of symbols revealed by the shifting process of the novel
challenges the absolutes which the characters strive after. Aware,surely,
of this dichotomy Jenkins exploits it to the full by continually emphasising
the shifting nature of both real and symbolic perspectives on the world.
And here the technique developed in Happy for the Child - in which characters
lose confidence in the solidity of the world around them - is furtner
developed. Thus Duror experiences a moment of mutaDility within tne
woods:
While waiting, he had imagined them in the darkness
missing their footing in the tall tree and coming
crashing down through the sea of branches to lie dead
on the ground. So passionate had been his visualising
of that scene, he seemed himself to be standing on tne
floor of a fantastic sea, with an owl and a herd of roe-
deer flitting by quiet as fish, while the yellow ferns
and bronzen brackens at his feet gleamed like seaweed,
and the spruce trees swayed above him like submarine
monsters, (p.17)
The physical world thus seems to be altered for Duror by the deptns of his
emotion. Roderick experiences a quite different, although equally
distorted, vision of the woods when he is pretending to be Sir Galahad:
The wood was enchanted, full of terrifying presences. A
knot in a tree glowered like a green face. Low-hanging
branches were evil birds swooping with talons ready to rip
his face and pluck out his eyes. The sky was now a vast
kingfisher's wing, now myriad eyes, blue and watchful.
(pp.145-146)
Such perceptions are momentary but magical rearrangements of the world
wnicn point towards a breaking through the constraints of that limited
world which the characters have accepted as their 'reality'. By breaxing
througn the world of social reality the limits of moral relativity are
also breached, with relativity being revealed as no longer wholly applicable
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or able to encompass the dimensions of this new world. The potential
for extremes of good and evil is thus also revealed in the process. A
different vision of what constitutes the 'reality' of human experience,
then, is presented to the reader; a vision which co-exists with the more
limited, conventional and safe world which we normally accept as
constituting the boundaries of experience and of morality. Lady Runcie-
Campbell, for example, in just such a moment of heigntened, although
temporary, perception, glimpses a vision of another dimension in which
Duror exists as a personification of evil;
To Lady Runcie-Campbel 1 he had not come merely from ttie
rhododendron thickets behind the house, where every leaf,
and every insect on every leaf, had its ordained shape
and shadow. He was from some gruesome other world where
a child's toy became an obscene symbol and potatoes boiled
over as a housewife watched horrors rearing out of the dark
icy pools of her mind. ^
This world of extremes, although always potentially present behind our
secure acceptance of what we believe to be a solid 'reality' can thus
break through and destroy all our conventionally held perceptions, including
not only our necessary acceptance of a relative morality but also our
belief in the nature of 'reality' itself.
In The Cone-Gatherers sucn moments clearly occur within an environment
that has already been set apart from familiar reality. In addition to the
effect of the enclosed woodland setting, characters sucn as Calum and
Duror who belong to tne world of aosolutes and extremes dominate the
novel's images. Those characters who are shown struggling with their
own relative moralities, are represented as uneasy intruders into that
world, unaole to deal with the extremes confronting them. The novel,
therefore,is mere clearly located in the world of faole thati of a
recognisable and desirable social reality. And oecause of tne shifting
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nature of perception within the novel, the changing values of symbols which
initially appear fixed, the reader is also left to struggle with a
fabulistic world. In the process we too begin to share in the desire
for some point of fixity, for absolutes - although we are simultaneously
being made aware of our own inability to translate absolutes into the
relativity of our own 'reality1.
The Cone-Gatnerers, locating itself in the realms of fable, and in a world
of potential absolutes, represents the best of one strand of Jenkins'
work - a strand of fantasy which also manifests itself in novels such as
The Missionaries2§nd The Holy Tree.^ These novels are, however, relatively
unusual within his oeuvre in being so immersed - although always suspicious
of - the fabulistic. More frequently he adopts a consciously realistic
frame for his novels, exploring the intrusion of absolutes into that frame
of 'normality', rather than placing 'normal' characters in the struggle
with a world of absolutes. Nevertheless, The Cone-Gatherers maintains
the balance of worlds so subtly, and is so successful in evcxing a




In contrast to The Cone-Gatherers, The Changeling belongs to the group
of novels which consciously adopt the framework of social realism. It
is characteristic in many ways of his subsequent novels, including Some
20. Robin Jenkins, The Missionaries (London,- 1957).
21. Robin Jenkins, The Holy Tree (London, 1969).
22. Robin Jenkins, The Changeling - (London, 1958).
All page references are to this edition.
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Kind of Grace, A Love of Innocence, and A Toast to the Lord. Yet
in both plot and tecnnique it reveals the same concerns which dominated
The Cone-Gatherers: an exploration of morality and a confrontation with
fictional presentations of the real and the ideal.
In terms of its plot, The Changeling initially appears to express a
negative attitude towards moral issues. A boy is taken from the slums
of Glasgow by his idealistic yet egotistical teacher, Charlie Forbes,
and allowed to share the family holiday at an island resort on the west
coast of Scotland. At first this precocious yet alien child, Tom Curdie,
refuses to accept the friendship offered him, realising that not only is
he being presented with the opportunity of temporarily achieving a way of
life which will cause dissatisfaction with his normal mode of existence,
but also that this act of charity towards him may destroy his carefully
achieved cynical introspection, thus rendering him unfit for survival in
that moral jungle which is his usual environment. Using various devices
to block the kindness offered in an attempt to preserve his own moral
identity, such as stealing from Woolwortns and encouraging delinquent
friends from home to come and camp on the island, ne tries to maintain
nis isolation and reserve. Yet, as the charity of the Forbes family
begins to soften his soul, the altruism of his benefactors, which has from
tne first been slightly flawed, begins to wane as they find his acts of
defiance too much of a strain on their already fallible morality. They
are therefore unable to follow through their original good intentions.
Just as tnis realisation dawns on them, the boy's disreputable family
23. Robin Jenkins, Some Kind of Grace (London, 1960)
24. Robin Jenkins, A Love of Innocence (London, 1963).
25. Robin Jenkins, A Toast to the Lord (London, 1972).
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arrives on the island; the one event that could have encouraged him to
maintain his reserve happens too late. Tom is now over-sensitive and
vulnerable. The obvious moral disarray and squalor of the boy's family
poses no threat to the schoolteacher and his wife, but rather allows tnem
to display their moral superiority; the masks of 'good' and 'bad' can
now be confidently resumed without further consideration of the deeper and
more subtle moral complexities that Tom presented. As for the boy,
forced into a state of complete moral uncertainty, convinced only of his
own inability to function in any kind of society, he becomes as doomed as
Calum in The Cone-Gatherers, suffering an even more isolated fate. And
in one way his fate is more extreme than Calum1s because Tom has been led
to a recognition of his own alienation which leaver suicide as the only
solution. Yet, although his death indicates the failure of humanity to
achieve acts of pure-minded altruism and follow tnem through to their
conclusion, his own act also emerges as a moment of transcendence; outwith
the control of circumstances, unobserved, it is a positive action without
compromise.
As readers we can accept that moment as transcendent because by this stage
we have ourselves been led into a state of uncertainty about moral values
through that attempt to comprehend attitudes and decipher motives which
is necessary for a reading of the novel. We too, therefore, welcome any
clear and positive action, and can accept Tom's death as such. Nor does
nis fate prove to be too emotionally disturbing, for we can place it as
belonging to that other world of which we have had glimpses throughout.
This world, outwith the control of pragmatic moral compromises, cannot be
categorised in terms of conventional 'reality', but nevertheless serves to
throw some light upon that world which is perceived as 'real' by a majority
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of the novel's characters*. This new light shows up that 'reality' in
different and distorted proportions. Like The Cone-Gatherers this
alternative perspective in The Changeling is partly made possible by the
isolated setting - here that of a holiday on an island - which indicates
a removal from 'normality'. Charlie Forbes, however, soon begins to
realise tnat his island paradise is very much a construct of his own desires
for an ideal; as such it may contain greater depths of horror than
'normality' as well as offering greater possibilities for 'good1. Finally
Charlie rejects the possibility for either pure good or pure evil held out to
him; being human and fallible he is unable to face up to the challenges of
this new dimension.
Nevertheless the presence of this alternative perspective operates both
upon the so-called 'real' world of the novel and upon the conventions which
are used to create it. Literary realism, therefore, is threatened in three
main areas in the novel: in the making explicit the role of the reader as
observer and judge; in the breaking down of the solid idea of 'character'
into a series of shifting perceptions; and in the use of minor incidents
which have a power beyond their obvious and logical significance but which,
by remaining embedded within the main plot, may reflect upon it and alter
our responses to its terms.
The Changeling begins:
Though no-one would belittle the benevolence of the
Good Samaritan, in one respect he was lucky: he was
alone with his conscience and his neighbour in trouble.
There were, for instance, no business or profess¬
ional colleagues to warn against the folly of interference;
and no wife to cherish nim for his altruism but also
shrewdly to point out likely repercussions. ^ ^ ^
As an introduction this statement immediately establishes a theme common
to all Jenkins' novels: the difficulty of performing absolute moral acts
within a world flawed by circumstantial conditioning. However, the
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passage also contains a certain structural irony. Cnarlie Forbes, would
be do-gooder, envies the Good Samaritan the isolation of his act of charity,
emphasising the fact that he was alone and unobserved. Yet in so doing
he ignores the place of 'The Good Samaritan1 as one of the most popular
New Testament parables; its central character is, therefore, one of the
most 'observed' in Christendom. Since the tale is intended for an audience,
not only is the Samaritan 'observed' by the narrator but he is also intended
to be judged by all who read the fiction. The character is formed by this
narrator-reader relationship yet, because he is within a parable, we are
nevertheless meant to see him as presenting an ideal within a 'reality'.
In this paradox resides one of the contradictions of fiction that Jenkins
explicitly incorporates into his own novels. He apparently writes about
a recognisably real world yet frequently reduces this to a microcosm -
islands, foreign countries, small communities such as colonial exiles,
conscientious objectors, and so on. Within these small worlds ideals
often seem possible but are destroyed because the human beings within the
communities are still fallible and impcse their own relativism. Neverthe¬
less they are more aware of the potentiality of ideals, of moral absolutes,
than tney can perceive in the wider world. Similarly, Jenkins projects
through each fiction the recognition of ideals for the reader, through
symbols, through images, through an anti-realist sub-text, but does so
in the knowledge that this perception is only possible within the medium
and will disappear once the novel is closed and his readers return to the
constraints of their own perceived reality. Therefore, although we
function as observers and judges of the cnaracters and events within nis
novels, we too are part of the process of continual readjustments and
reassessments of the tension between the 'real' and the'ideal1. Nevertheless,
within the novel the reader still functions as an observer and a judge -
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even if our confidence in such roles may be somewhat shaken. In The
Changeling Tom and Charlie Forbes are presented through many of the
conventions of literary realism, encouraging identification and
participation on the part of the reader. However, the unfamiliar setting
to which they are removed from their normal environment and fixed social
roles demands that we interpret their actions according to more than the
criteria of social realism. We are therefore guided in this extended
interpretation - as in The Cone-Gatherers - by the narrative voice, which
ensures that we do not forget the wider moral dimensions of even the most
minor events by translating the reactions of the characters into the
language of metaphysics. Charlie is thus described as casting his qualms
about the success of the holiday venture aside with: 'But that black belief
could not possess his mind forever; out it had to go, or rather into some
deep dark hole in his suDconscious it had to plunge, when the steamer began
to leave Dunroth pier.' (p.63) The final detail aoout the steamer, of course,
returns us to a world of everyday reality, reminding us that this is simply
a local schoolteacher taking a wayward pupil on holiday; and through such
concrete details Jenkins covers over the tracks of narrative impositions,
claiming for his narrator an objective attention to a solid reality.
However, the language of metaphysics, describing deep dark holes in the
subconscious, has raised a quite different level of interpretation. And
throughout the novel Jenkins uses this language, demanding that we also
judge the characters in terms of the universals at which tne narrative voice
has hinted.
Again, as in The Cone-Gatherers, Jenkins uses apparent mimesis of characters'
tnoughts as a means of concealing narrative diagesis; yet in The Cnangeling
he uses it to a slightly different effect. Here too the thoughts of
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Charlie Forbes provide-the best example. At one point in the novel,
regretting bringing Tom to the island, he retreats into solitude to
consider his position: 'Then, as he listened, those noises of the sea
were no longer tranquil and neutral: they combined into a hostile
indictment of him: as a man, as a husband, as a father, as a teacher,
they roared, he had failed.' (p.109) Even if there is a certain element
of mockery of the teacher's dilemma in this statement, the power of tne
language, the support of the sea imagery, would seem to indicate that this
is a moment of significant moral recognition. And certainly Forbes is
shown treating it as such. Returning to his wife, to tell her of his
decision to send Tom home the next day, he thinks:
Silence and acquiescence must be his part now, until he
felt sure enough of his new self to begin to have trust
in it; in the meantime he would depend on Mary's advice
and judgement.
As a result he was appalled by the look she cast at
him as he slunk discreetly in; resentment and hatred were
surely in it,turning her.face almost unrecognisable...
"All right," she said. "You've won." ,
It is then revealed that Forbes' daughter Gillian has, in fact, taken
back the accusations of stealing which she had levelled at Tom Curdie and
which had led to her father's agonising. A moment that would appear to
be a major turning point, signalling a new awareness in Forbes' moral
consciousness, is quickly deflated before it can have any consequence in
the events following it. This pattern of apparent recognition, moral
decision, and then an absence of behaviour stemming from it, so that the
decision is lost, recurs throughout the novel; it maKes it extremely difficult,
therefore,for the reader to judge the novel according to the usual pattern
of cause and effect, motive and result, decision and action. Charlie
Forbes, for example, 'realises' half way through the novel that his motives
for adopting Tom are ambiguous - but we nave been given hints of this
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amoiguity from the start. LiKewise, it is never made quite clear at
wnich point Tom decides to respond favourably to the kindness shown to
nim. Frequently sucn decisions appear to have taken place wnile the
character is lest to the narrative perspective, is 'off stage1. And even
when moments of decision are revealed, as in the example given above, the
reader is given no indication as to whether this is a moment of
anagnosis following a reassessment of past actions and leading to a
significant change in behaviour, or whether it is a moment of introspective
self-indulgence on the part of tne character, witn no resultant action.
Any judgement which the reader might wish to make must be
suspended until an overview is established by the ending of the novel.
Through this technique, therefore, Jenkins can be seen avoiding the usual
notions of moral 'growth' to be found in conventional realist novels, and
also moving the reader's interest away from the characters, since we are
no longer able to accept them as capable of recognising or acting upon
moments of apparent moral insignt. Nor can we even trust in the existence
of such moments on this consciously spiritual level.
In spite of his language of reinterpretation, the narrator too refuses to
give total endorsement of a character's perceptions, be they moral or
to
emotional. It therefore becomes impossible securelyjlocate tne
characters on a scale of relative value. Jenkins thus develops his
exploration of tne mutability of perception, the examination of tne
uncertainty which lies behind an apparently solid moral and physical reality.
And, as in The Cone-Gatherers, he develops this theme by allowing moments of
insight to occur when reality itself seems distorted. One sucn incident
occurs when Forbes and his children come upon a raboit suffering from
myxomatosis: 'that head was so monstrous that even a St. Francis would have
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hesitated to stroke it in pity. It was a pinky-purple swollen mass, in
which the eyes, bulging hugely, were no longer organs of sight.1 (p.61)
The reference to St. Francis immediately links tne rabbit as a symbol
to one of the novel's central themes - the limits of human charity. Yet
the grotesque physical description also presents it as possessing tne
horrific impact of a creature from another dimension in which eartnly value
cannot apply. Ironically, of course, the rabDit is also a victim of
human expediency, and of a disease artificially spread. Existing now as
a projection of all that threatens human morality, it also represents tne
result of human pragmatism. The scene therefore implies not only that it
would require a saint to deal with this extreme from a world of horrors,
but also that such horrors can be created by us as our own 'reality1,
demanding similarly heroic acts of charity - a demand which the normal
human being, circumscribed by social reality, could never meet.
Throughout the novel similar images indicate a world of gigantic dimensions,
a world which calls upon a degree of moral heroism beyond that of human
capability. Yet the fact that such images are placed against a background
of apparently mundane normality would seem to imply that similar demands
may be made upon humanity within its own perceived reality, but which it
may choose to ignore, settling instead for a moral mediocrity. In the
novel we are therefore continually confronted with tne incipient threat
of transformation - transformation of a safely recognisable 'reality'
wnich will both alienate us from our own circumscribed conventions but
also make us aware of an alternative, extreme and absolute pattern of moral
values. In order to convey this threat Jenkins utilises small synodic
moments which then grow in significance. Already suffering from moral
disillusionment with the holiday expedition, Charlie Forbes decides to take
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his small group up Canada Hill, one of his favourite haunts of the past.
His idyllic conception of the scene, however, is soon threatened by a
'real' but grotesque, intrusion: 'Hanging to one bush, like an obscene
fruit, was an object, the most disenchanting on earth: a contraceptive.'(p.
167) This distortion of the Edenic fruit becomes for Forbes a symbol of
his own spiritual desolation: 'He felt lost in a wilderness of thorned
bushes to which clung contraceptives as numerous as Alastair's bubbles.' (p.
169) Reality has thus momentarily been extended, transformed into an
extreme dimension - a result of Forbes' search for some correlative of his
own despair. Unable to find a realisation for his feelings in the confines
of reality, a process of mutation is undergone. Already in the first few
pages of the novel we see how the pylon that the teacher views from his
schoolroom window becomes representative not only of slum conditions but
also of his own spiritual barrenness: 'A pylon rose like a gigantic spider
out of a garden of dandelions protected by barbed wire; and all round soared
other fantastic growths, tall factory stacks, branchless, leafless and
blossomless.1 (p.6) The 'fantastic' image meets the need of Forbes when he
makes a demand on the 'reality' of objects around him that it cannot possibly
fulfil. Seeking in the apparently solid world around him some expression
of extremity which would answer his own desire for absolutes, his perceptions
here too extend the dimensions of 'reality'. And in this moment of expanded
perception he can find an alternative both to his own fallible, relative^
morality, and to the limits of his usually circumscribed vision.
The problem, however, with such moments of 'recognition', as Jenkins indicates,
is that once his characters have glimpsed that world of absolutes and extremes,
they cannot return to a full acceptance of their previously limited conception
or reality and all its constraints. Obviously the tecnniques of literary
realism are also unable to accommodate the force of these new perceptions.
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In Jenkins1 novels, therefore, a common feature is the retreat of
cnaracters from narrative access, with the reader being denied
knowledge of their thoughts and responses to events. A later novel,
A Toast to the Lord, is perhaps the most extreme example of this. But
even in The Changeling Tom Curdie's decision in favour of suicide, once
the confrontation of the Forbes family and his own has overwhelmed his
newly developed moral awareness, is left unrecorded. Only with Gillian's
discovery of his almost dead body do we realise wnat he has been planning.
He therefore ends the novel as more of an enigmatic symbol than a
solidly realised, suffering, character. Tom, the changeling, is operating
in both worlds within the novel, is both a symbol and a victim of symbolism;
in him Jenkins bridges the gap between the world of expeditious morality
which operates within a social reality, and the world of absolutes
necessary for coping with the moral extremes that exist beneath the social
surface. As such he can neither be a complete symbol, nor a fully
realised character whose every action is explained in terms of motives
and causes. The 'changeling1, therefore, the alien being, not only
moves between the two societies shown in the novel, that of the urban
poor and that of the respectable 'altruistic', middle class, but he also
oecomes a focus,for those of heightened perception,of the uneasy
conjunction of two dimensions of existence, providing a perspective which
it is both easier and safer to ignore. And so Charlie Forbes, aDandoning
his attempts to do good, returns to a world of relative morality, while
Tom, abandoning his own morality of safety, moves into a dimension of
extreme and absolute acts. Neither course, however, is seen as offering
a complete solution to tne complexities of existence.
By thus bringing together two worlds in the novel, that of social reality
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which is the subject matter of realism, with the vision of absolutes in
a dimension outwith the confines of that reality, Jenkins keeps his
readers in a state of uncertainty both as to the type of moral behaviour
he is advocating and to the kind of fiction which he is writing. His
general perspective on morality itself, however, is made evident; through
the uncertainty he creates he leads the reader into sharing the desire
for moral absolutes yet simultaneously becoming aware of ttie impossibility
of realising such absolutes within the confines of a circumstantial
reality.
Jenkins1 manipulation of the conventions of realism, however, has caused
some confusion amongst critics and reviewers who, recognising his interest
in moral issues, try to relate his outlook to that of a relative and
humanist moral perspective; in the process they also tend to assume the
realism of his novels. Yet in trying to see him in this way certain
elements of his novels then begin to cause disquiet. Most critics
initially assume tnat the solidity of the world about which Jenkins writes
is indisputable. As early reviewers comment: 'How well Mr Jenkins
knows these people';25 'Mr Jenkins has performed the near-miracle of
making her credible';2'' and, 'One can rely on finding a vigour and fresh¬
ness of imagination that needs no tricks of angled or superficial
28
contrivance.' More recently, and perhaps even more surprisingly, his
work has been described as: 'characterised by a classically pure concen¬
tration on theme, on the development of a psychological and moral .
predicament in a specific milieu... Robin Jenkins' fiction thus has
25. 'Problems of Adaptation', Scotsman, 25 July 1555, p.11.
27. 'New Fiction', The Times, 25 July 1S55, p.11.
28. 'Limitations of Sympathy', Scotsman, 13 March 1958, p.8.
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much in common with the earlier Naturalists and Determinists, though
i29
without their frequent diffuseness. How tnen can these interpretations
of his work be reconciled witn tne subjectivity of perception, tne shifting
nature of character and the mutabilities of reality, which can also be
found in his fiction, and how does his work relate to the theories of
realist conventions? In order to answer both questions, I suggest that
it is useful first to examine one of his apparently most 'realist' novels,
and then to consider the theoretical implications of his techniques.
Guests of War
Of all Jenkins' novels Guests of War (1956)"^ appears closest to the
format of a traditional realist novel fashionable in the 1950's.
Expansive, discursive, it is based on a real incident - the evacuation
of eight hundred women and children from the slums of Gowburgh (Glasgow/
Edinburgh) to a small middle class town in the Scottish Borders. The
subject obviously offers plenty of scope for Jenkins' ironic humour, in
exposing pretension, revealing social friction, showing class ana
family divisions. Contemporary reviews praise the novel for its
evocation of time and place, nis 'solidly drawn Scottish characters' and
his 'memorable' central figure, Bell McShelvie, mother of a large family
from one of the poorer hemes who emerges as a source of strength for the
other woman while guiltily rejoicing in her escape to the country from
31
city slums. Yet one reviewer also expresses concern that the novel
remains 'obstinately incomplete1' asking: 'Is it enough merely to present,
O
however robustly, a slice of life, and leave it there?'-3 ; another complains
29. Paul Binding, 'Ambivalent Patriot', Mew Edinburgh Review, 53
(February, 19b1), 20-22, p.20.
30. Robin Jenkins, Guests of War (London, 1956). All page references
are to this edition.
31. 'Heme and Away', Glasgow Herald, 2 August 1956, p.3.
32. 'Problems of Adaptation', Scotsman, 26 July 1956, p.11.
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that Jenkins: 'misses the more oDvious and, it must oe confessed, more
entertaining opportunities his subject affords while a third
points out that: 'Perhaps Mrs McShelvie's powers of philosophical self-
34
analysis are occasionally expanded to a point that strains credulity.'
Critics tnerefore appear slightly uneasy about the novel's realism,
complaining of a lack of solidity in the characters and the absence of
any real conclusion in the 'message'.
Part of the reviewers' uncertainty stems from the fact that the novel's
main concerns lie in very diverse areas. Firstly it operates within
a social context, examining characters within the conditions of their
environment; and within this sphere a certain social determinism is
evident. Yet tne positioning of the characters is deceptive,for tne
large numDer of people involved prevents their individual personalities
being developed very far; Jenkins therefore uses them as part of a
pattern of shifting significances, with their various thematic functions
blending into the general moral implication. And altncugh it might be
expected that the war would play a fairly large part in a novel- about
evacuation, the war itself, as in The Cone-Gatherers, is kept very much
to one side; conditioning factors have only a limited role. Secondly,
Jenkins has once again cnosen a subject with obvious archetypal overtones.
The trip of the children and their mothers into tne country is seen as
a searcn for perfection and escape; even the headmaster leading the
expedition frequently compares himself to Moses or the Messiah. The
reader is thus forced into constantly testing this mythic ideal against
tne social reality. And thirdly, Jenkins creates two characters who
33. 'New Fiction', The Times, 2b July 1956, p.11.
34. 'Home and Away', Glasgow Herald, 2 August 1956, p.3.
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are shewn as capable of envisioning an alternative dimension to existence,
and whose successes and failures are often symptomatic of tne reader
struggling with the novel's morality. Bell McShelvie and one young
schoolteacher Mr Roy thus provide Jenkins witn identifiable, albeit
fallible, mouthpieces.
Within the social milieu of the novel Jenxins taxes certain characters
and reveals how they have been moulded to an extent by their environment;
he then removes them to another context in which such determinism can no
longer fully operate. Once conventional social mores are lost, morality
must find a different level on which to function. Meg Aitchison,
Bell McShelvie's friend, is a good example of this process. Liveliest
and most aggressive of the slum dwellers, described as naving 'accepted
her lot', and reached 'a faith in her own worth', (p.7) her departure
from GowDurgh reveals her oehaviour there to have been constructed as a
necessary means of survival. Once she is removed from tnis struggle
she can no longer face the threat of her husband's infidelity or her
own danger from cancer. More importantly, pernaps, she is unable to
cope with what she sees as the reality of ner own self. At the end of
the novel she realises that in the absence of conditioning factors her
'true self' is unknown; she can only be judged in terms of the facade she
had created for nerself. Thus the others believe that the tears shown
as real grief for Bell were surely: 'coming from the wild jocular side
of her nature.' (p.276)
Within the novel this process of 'defami1iarisation' holds good for most
of tne characters, although in varying degrees, as they are shown
gradually losing the social personae tney had so carefully established
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in GowDurgh. Langrigg, the Dcrder town, is not only presented as an
up-marKet alternative to their usual social environment - although
much of the novel's humour stems from its original depiction as such -
but also as a void; an alien, unfami1iar world in which estaolisned
rules can no longer function. Thus Archie Campbelton, the schoolteacher
who sees nimself as an elegant, sardonic cynic, cannot cope with the
real situational ironies with which ne is presented; his pose is gradually
revealed, not as detachment, but as a genuine inability to participate
in human activity, a result of his innate selfishness. The novel
continually sets up ideals in this way, then reveals them either to be
false or unattainable within reality. The reader is made aware of this
process both through the characters' consciousness of their own failures
to achieve perfectabi1ity, and through our access to the series of
shifting significations and revealing conjunctions in which the cnaracters
are placed.
Of all the characters in the novel, Sell McShelvie and Mr Roy are most
central to its themes; a consideration of the presentation of tneir
individual cnaracters is therefore necessary before assessing their
roles in the general scheme. Bell McShelvie, althougn an apparently
'ordinary' woman from Gowburgh, is shewn as responding most favourably
to tne escape into the country, achieving more than her counterparts,
in tnat she becomes a natural leader for the women, but also suffering
more than anyone when her favourite son, Sammy, is Killed in an accident.
Retaining a belief in aiming high, she is convinced that people can
'transcend the dreary ugliness' of their lives (p.8); yet she is also
conscious of tne constraints and banalities of everyday existence which
act as a barrier to such transcendence. Watcning a small mongrel in
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the city, for example, she views it as a victim of society: 'It
yelped and squirmed into tne wall of a high tenement when a lorry rattled
by; perhaps its lameness had been caused Dy one.' (p.7) Yet her
philosophy of social determinism dees not prevent her from demanding
that it make a stand against circumstances: 'Never, wee black dog,
whine for mercy.' Combining a stoical accepting of struggle, she can
also appreciate the value of ideals - although always recognising that
survival entails compromise and the forgetting of ideals. Ironically,
once she assumes a position of leadership, it is her capacity for endur¬
ance that makes her a heroine amongst the other women. Bell, however,
recognises at that point just how fall short she falls of her own, and
their, ideals. The climactic point of recognition for her comes wnen
she has failed to realise her ambition of climbing to the top of the
mountain outside the little town. Half-way up, she has to abandon her
attempt, and realises the extent of her own limitations: 'When in
dusk by the wobbling gate she turned and gazed up at the darkened hill
she no longer saw defeat or disappointment, but only a necessary
resolution.' (p.2b6) Bell has been compared, by Alastair Thompson and
35
Douglas Gifford^to Chris Guthrie and Jeanie Deans; certainly the
hillside scene has overtones of A Scots Quair, and thinking Scottish
heroines are few and far between. However, it is unlikely that
'necessary resolution' is an ideal that would appeal much to either of
the other two characters, who both aim for more specific goals.
Bell's ideals remain so vague that the struggle for and acknowledgement
of them remains in itself a point of definition and an achievement.
35. The comment made by Alastair R. Thompson in 'Faith and Love: An
examination of some themes in the novels of Robin ,Jenkins', New
Saltire, no.3 (Spring, 1962), 57-64., p.64, is reiterated by Douglas
Gifford in 'Scottish Fiction since 1945', Scottish Writers and
Writing, ed. Norman Wilson (Edinburgh, 1977), 1 1-2t>, p.19.
Mr Roy, the schoolteacher, is anotner character dissatisfied with tne
limitations cf existence who also ends up accepting a 'necessary
resolution1, confining his idealistic ambitions to the opportunities
provided by his finally joining the airforce, and acknowledging the
force of circumstances whicn prevented him from achieving his aims in
Gowburgh or Langrigg. Telling scruple to 'go to hell' (p.93), going
by instinct rather than principle, he nevertheless soon oecomes aware
that sucn neroics have little material effect upon the environment or
its innabitants. Bell and Mr Roy, although sharing an awareness of
tne novel's main themes of idealism and resolution, dislike and at times
resent each other; it is possible, in fact, to see them as representing
two different options presented Dy the author. Bell, in spite of her
aspirations, remains firmly rooted in the social reality around her and
returns to it, after her flight into a dream of country life. Struggling
through the vissicitudes of reality, she recognises thai many of her
ideals offered only the illusion of escape; by the novel's conclusion
she seems trapped in her hard-won philosophy of a 'necessary resolution.'
By contrast, Edgar Roy appears to be a figure from adventure fiction,
recklessly willing to push back the boundaries of reality inic an
anarchic world of fantasy. It is ne who champions the cause of the
Baxter brothers - the two pupils who seem closest to the 'Gourlay'
element of grotesque in the novel: 'If Sam McShelvie was one of the
elect, Willie Baxter was one of the damned.' (p.38) Flouting both the
school authorities ana the Gowburgn community, he decides that these two
should' be 'saved':
Roy had consulted nobody when making up nis mind that
this flitting to Langrigg might be a turning-point for
tne Baxters. In any case, GowDurgh itself under the
dark licensed conditions of war, would certainly mean
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final ruin for them. Soon they would be at the
difficult stage of turning from boys to men:
regeneration or lifelong depravity was ahead of them.
Perhaps it was sentimental to hope tnat the fields
and hills of Langrigg would purify what the streets
and backcourts of Gowburgn had helped to pollute; but
it was just as sentimental surely to oelieve that out
of the brutality and bloodshed of war would emerge
kindness and orothernood. , ~nx
Within such a romantic vision Roy can create for himself the identity of
a crusader. However, like Bell, he too ends up trapped in the identity
he has worked so hard to establish. Indeed, even the cynical Campbelton
warns him of this:
You are a. young man, Edgar: belief in the perfect-
ability of your species becomes you; it is the Red
Cross on your shield. Alas, swords plunged into the
blatant oeast of human nature break off in fragments
until only the hilts are left. If not thrown away
these turn into jewels, witn which the crusaders' souls
are bought. Throw away that hilt in time, Edgar: face
the world empty-handed; you still then may prevail^ ^
Roy transmits the image of himself as a crusading hero so successfully
that the people of Langrigg and Gcwburgh can soon see him in no other
light. Involved with the local 'young lady', Miss Cargill, he also
assumes the mantle of romantic hero; entering the airforce, his role
taKes over to such an extent that he need never think deeply about the
implications of the mask he has assumed. He too has become a more
distant character by the end of the novel.
Presented as victims of their self-images neither cnaracter offers a
resolution to the contradictions of the novel; for the novel itself is
centred around this notion of image, self-image ana symbolic significance.
Within the apparently fixed realism of the novel's world, the main
interest lies in the potential of ciiaracters to move within a series of
shifting significations, acquiring meaning for others and - occasionally -
for themselves. Thus Bell and Roy come to represent to the reader a
potential striving for ideals, while their inaccessabi1ity to the other
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characters makes them seen as representatives of actual ideals. Mr
Scoullar, for example, brooding on his colleague, recognises for a
moment the nature of his power: 'How in Christ's name, thought
Scoullar, could such a man be called upon to preserve Christianity and
civilisation from barbarism? ... Roy, he knew, might walk through the
mucks of depravity, but he would also soar into the clear sxy, in nis
silver aeroplane, and grapple with the dragons of the enemy.' (p.29)
Scoullar dislikes Roy, but the strength of his language, and of the
image, implies tnat a certain truth is being evoked. And Bell is pres¬
ented as a similar figure of speculation: 'Those few, who divined the
true source of Bell's revivification were more mystified than all the
rest whose guesses were more humdrum.' (p.238) Yet the language of
metaphysical searching for significance - used, of course, by the narrator
- can also be applied to Bell and Roy's visions of others, for these two
are also seen as being on moral quests. Mr Roy, for example, readies a
heightened moral sensibility through a view of Mrs Ross and her many
children:
Gazing after her, Roy had in his vision too the large
red-sandstone West Kirk, with its fine steeple; but it
was she and her children wno brought the awe into his
mind. Humanity, he had always known, was many-sided;
it was comic, sad, wise, foolish, chaste, lustful,generous,
greedy, sincere, hypocritical, and so on to the exhaustion
of his vocabulary; but there was another element, not so
easily named, there all the time possibly but seen only in
glimpses, and when seen, as now in Mrs Ross, making all
the vastness of churches intelligible. ^
Bell also experiences a moment of heightened moral perception, although
of tne opposite side to existence, when she looks at the boy Gordon
Aldersyde, wnom she believes may have oeen responsiDle for the death
of her son:
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She starec! at him, trying to see him as a child,
only montns older than Sammy, and nardly any brighter
at sums. She could not see him as such. Now he was
an agent of destiny or of God or Satan. Guilt of some
Kind attached to those chosen for such purpose: it
was inconceivable that they were altogetner olameless.
(p.259)
Here too the moral perspective of the character moves beyond tne surface
of a normally limited conception of 'reality' into a more extreme vision.
Roy and Bell, however, do not operate in isolation, but are part of a
revolving pattern of significations, with the interaction of the
different characters being used to point both to ideals, and to their
contradiction by reality. Thus tne Headmaster may see nimself as
Moses, leading his flock to the promised land, which is certainly one
of the novel's more ironic implications, but the same man is incapable
of leadership, terrified of 'the inccmpressabi1ity of human material.'
(p.33) Mrs Ross and Mrs Aldersyde likewise revolve in an ironic
examination of the ideal of motherhood. Despite her easy-go-lucky
lethargy, Mrs Ross is shown as possessing an innate goodness, partly
because - a favourite tneme of Jenkins - of her lack of comprehension
of tne subtleties of evil: 'Thus with absolute humility claiming her
present situation to have been the occasion of God's special foresight
and wisdom before the evolution of the stars, she set sail along the
main street, followed by her flotilla.' (p.104) Although we may pity
her homeless state, we can also see her as an ironic comment on the
theory of predestination when wholeheartedly and untninkingly applied.
Nevertheless, the image also operates as an affirmation of spiritual
dignity, even if her moral and spiritual superiority gains her little
recognition or respect witnin a relative, social reality. Mrs Aldersyde,
in contrast, determined to get the most out of the world of circumstantial
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reality through using a facade of morality, is shown to be trapped by
her belief in grace: 'It was as if she took God's bounty to be limited,
like a handful of sweets; and when so many had oeen given to her, how
could there be enough for anyone else?' (p.170) And yet, as events
within the novel combine to destroy Mrs Aldersyde's superiority, she
too is allowed to have a momentary glimpse of true grace, through the
kindness shown her by Bell McShelvie - although Bell herself is still
aware of inadequacies in her own spiritual attitude: 'As Mrs McSnelvie
listened, she laid her hand on her neighbour's head ana hushed her, as
one would an infant that did not yet know language, but knew already
fear and pain and an overwhelming need of love.' (p.220)
However, the lynchpin in this revolving pattern of shifting symbols is
provided by the figure of Sammy McShelvie, Bell's son and, according
to Roy, 'one of the elect', (p.38) Li<e Calum in The Ccne-Gatnerers
much of Sammy's 'goodness' is due to his naivete, yet to Roy, Sammy,
'seemed to him to live in some hallow oak in a perpetually sunlit wood
haunted by benevolent elves.' (p.3b) Becoming a focus of moral delignt
for the other characters, including the family with whom he is oilleted-
'they were completely captivated, by his immunity to ridicule of even the
friendliest sort, by his gratitude unadulterated with shyness or
calculation, and above all by his innocence' (p.112) - Sammy also provides
an ironic and tragic illustration of the precept that only the good die
young. Sammy's innocence,ncwever, depends very much on his total
acceptance of wnatever rules or modes of behaviour are imposed upon him.
(He remains, in fact, a perfect illustration of Piaget's tneory of the
'moral realism' stage of development.) By establishing Sammy as a
symbol of pure good, JenKins points towards the potential realisation of
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moral absolutes; his death, however, would seem to indicate that such
absolutism will not work as a modus vivendi within a relative world.
As a martyr Sammy provides a vision of goodness that has no place in
tnis reality, thus reinforcing the contradictions of idea and
reality present througnout the novel. The fact that other characters
appreciate him in much the way the reader does also allows Jenkins to
indicate the essential human desire - present in the reader as well -
to impose symbolic significance on objects end characters in an attempt
to bring some absolutes into our circumscribed and muddled world.
By moving significance from character to character, and treating each
with the same narrative tone, Jenkins avoids the authorial persona being
identified with any single point of view. He also prevents the reader
from developing too strong a sympathy with any one character, since a
rigid desire to adhere to a single fixed identity is seen as a form of
submission to the constraints of reality. However, altnougn his
approacn thus moves away from the conventions of realism, he cannot depart
totally from realist techniques since a central theme in the novel is the
effect a solid reality iias on human ideals; the gradual mitigation of
aims and ambitions according to*circumstances. Yet co-existing witn
this theme is Jenkins1 concern with tne human search and desire for
absolute symDcls and extreme ideals; this moral perspective inevitaoly
also denies him a total commitment to realism. He can therefore be seen
as maintaining a very delicate balance between two world views and two
forms - a balance, however, which seems the only possible means of
reflecting nis complex and contradictory view of human morality and of
conveying the essential and continuing confrontation between ideals and
reality wnich is the central theme of Guests of War.
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Altnough Jenkins1 deviations from tne realist novel may therefore appear
slight, it is worth examining their technical implications before
moving on to a further consideration of his thematic concerns in the
later novels. It is useful first of all to consider the aspects of his
techniques wnicn appear closest to the conventions of realism. One of
these would appear to be his use of detail in order to create the
impression of a solid and describable realixy, a world of things. Gerard
Genette, in Narrative Discourse, expands on Platonic precepts in describing
such a method, taking as his example, the descriptive detail of 'the long-
sounding shore':
The long-sounding shore serves no purpose other than
to let us understand that the narrative mentions it
only because it is there, and because the narrator,
abdicating his function of choosing and dictating the
narrative, allows himself to be governed by 'reality',
by the presence of what is there and what demands to be
'shown'. A useless and contingent detail, it is the
medium par excellence of tne referential illusion and
therefore of the mimetic effect: it is a connotator of
mimesis. 36
Apparently contingent information is very much a feature of Jenkins'
work, and adds to the impression of a describable and solid 'reality'
in which the majority of characters see themselves as operating.
Details appear to be incorporated because they are 'there', witiiout any
apparent principle of selection. However, as can be seen from The
Cone-Gatherers, The Changeling and - to a lesser extent - Guests of War,
such extraneous details are frequently used to carry a symDulic, although
4
temporary, significance. Trie image of the contraceptive in The Changeling
provides an ideal example: it achieves a symbolic status in the eyes of
Charlie Forbes and, although tne reader is allowed to mock nis spurious
search for significance in sucn apparently mundane circumstances, the
image remains impressed on our minds ana becomes a symbol to us of tne
36. G§rard Genette, Narrative Discourse, translation Jane E. Levin
.(Oxford, 1960), p. 165.
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novel's themes. The momentary significance of such details emphasise
the shifting nature of human interpretations of reality, mocking
the human search and desire for absolutes. Yet at the same time sucn
devices also succeed in pointing the reader in the direction of
potential absolutes. Jenkins can therefore be seen as creating two
domains within his novels - one is the world of social reality, limited,
solid and circumscribed, while the other is the dimension of absolutes,
of extremes which are unattainable for the majority of humankind.
Within the fiction the'only means of bridging the gap between the two
domains appears to be through symbols which have a function in both
realms. Yet the final irony of a Jenkins' novel is contained in the
fact that such symbols are also shewn to be temporary, to be shifting
and, ultimately, untrustworthy; they cannot, therefore, be successfully
used to bridge that unbridgeable distance between two worlds. The
novels' symbols too, like all the devices of conventional literary
realism used by Jenkins, are ultimately undermined.
In this complex deviation from the initial impression of a straight¬
forwardly realist technique, Jenkins offers a useful testing grcund for
recent literary theory which has been directed towards an understanding
of the mechanics of literary realism. In addition to his adaptation
of symbols, his general manipulations of the narrative function can be
illuminated by considering it in the light of recent critical debate.
Once again Genette's comments provide a useful starting point:
The strictly mimetic textual factors, it seems to me,
come down to those two data already implicit in Plato's
comments: the quantity of narrative information (a
more developed or more detailed narrative) and the
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absence (or minimal presence) of the informer - in
other words, of the narrator. 37
Genette refers here to the balance of mimesis and diacesis to be found
in different types of narrative; a conventional realist novel relies
fairly heavily on mimesis. And this could be said of Jenkins1 work.
There appear to be very few narratorial intrusions or comments upon
the action; the narrator is usually only present as an 'informer1, and
would, therefore, appear to be involved in a process of mimesis. Yet,
as we nave seen from looking at the individual novels, this mimetic
function is, at times, something of an illusion. However, in order
to consider fully Jenkins' use of the narrator, some examination.of the
so-called 'classic realist' text is required. In James Joyce and the
Revolution of the Word, Colin McCabe argues that in the classic realist
text inverted commas are used as a means of concealing the important
distinction between the 'saying' and the 'said', the enouncing and the
enounced, and as such falsely implies that the-area outwith the inverted
commas is the product of no articulation:
This unwritten text can then attempt to staunch the
haemorrhage of interpretations threatened by the
material of language. Whereas other disccurses within
the text are considered as materials which are open
to reintrepretation, the narrative discourse functions
simply as a window on reality. This relationship
between discourses can be taken as the defining feature
of the classic realist text. The normal criterion for
realism (whether a discourse is fully adequate to the
real) merely accepts the conception of the real which
the classic realist text proposed for its own project...
The classic realist text should not, however, be under¬
stood in terms of some homology to the order of things
but as a specific hierarchy of discourses which place
the reader in a position of dominance with regard to the
stories and characters. 38
37. Narrative Discourse, p.165.
38. Colin McCabe, James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word (London,
1578), pp.15-18:
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At first glance Jenkins would appear to adhere closely to McCabe's
description of the 'closed1, classic realist text. However, I
suggest that, in fact, Jenkins is subtly exploiting the 1 relationship
between discourses' in his novels. David Lodge, responding to McCabe's
analysis of Middlemarcn as tne 'classic realist text', has pointed out
that certain grey areas exist within the levels of discourse and that
39
interpretation is not so 'closed' as might appear. Discussing
passages of apparently diagetic narrative he points out that tne voice
of tne narrator may in fact give way at times to tne 'voice' of one of
the characters, thus moving into mimesis, although without any
punctuational indications to this effect. Building on Lodge's
perception of subtleties within McCabe's definition, it is also possible
to see Jenkins as operating within a grey area between the 'hierarchy'
of discourses. At first it would appear that Jenkins uses mimesis in
the dialogue of his novels, and in the depiction of characters' thought
processes. . But, as we have seen, these thought processes are
frequently translated into the language of the narrative voice, a
language dominated by the novel's moral concerns. Characters can thus
'think' in language and in terms that may not be 'natural' or 'real'
for them. It could be argued that this dominance of the narrative
voice would be a reinforcement of the 'closed' text but, because
Jenkins has concealed it behind a facade of mimesis, it actually has
the effect of unsettling the reader's confidence in the characters'
perceptions and in the apparent fixity of the 'realist' world of the
novel; it thus had the paradoxical effect of opening up the potential
for interpretation.
39. David Lodge, 'Middlemarcn and the Idea of tne Classic Realist Text',
The Nineteenth Century Hovel: Critical Essays and Documents, ed.
Arnold Kettle (London, 1961), 21b-23b.
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Jenkins therefore operates on the Dorderlines of realism, exploring
the boundaries between different dimensions of 'reality1, and locating
his moral concerns in the grey area between two moral philoscpnies.
'Realism' as a literary technique can be seen as 'fixing' the world
it evokes, with the very act of description tending by its nature
towards stasis- A movement away from realism opens up the potential
for change in the fictional world, creating fluidity and the
possibility of revolution. Jenkins, however, does not move too far
in this direction; his novels are concerned with examining the
potential for aosolutes and for ideals within the constraints of a
circumstantial reality, so the fixity of literary realism is as
necessary to him as are the attempts to break through the barriers it
imposes. It is in tne conjunction of the two territories that his
moral interests lie and his fictional techniques are formulated
accordingly.
CHAPTER FIVE
ROBIN JENKINS: THE MORAL QUEST
269
While the novels discussed in the previous chapter illustrate Jenkins'
own particular relationship with the conventions of literary realism,
they also indicate the way in which so many of his novels contain
almost obsessional reworkings of the same themes - explorations of the
nature of moral aosolutes and examinations of the role of ideals within
numan reality. In this chapter, therefore, I will examine these
thematic concerns in greater detail by looking at some of his later, and,
I believe, finest novels; these novels, Dust on the Paw, A Very Scotch
Affair, A Would-be Saint and Fergus Lament, continue and develop his
experiments with the limits of the realist novel.
Dust on the Paw
In the late fifties and early sixties Robin Jenkins spent two years
each teaching in Kabul, Afghanistan, Barcelona, Spain, and in Sabah,
Malaysia. His experiences abroad provided him with stimulating new
material for his fiction, and Some Kind of Grace, published in 1560,
was the first in a line of novels departing from his previous Scottish
settings and moving to more exotic locations. For the next ten years
the strange mixtures of colonial and native races in Malaysia and
Afgnanistan allowed him to develop further the themes of moral alien¬
ation and the limits of human understanding which were central to the
concerns of his Scottish works.
Dust on the Paw"*is by far his most ambitious work of this period. Like
Guests of War it nas epic overtones, using changing perspectives to
deal with a multiplicity of cnaracters. Integrating the more overtly
symbolic qualities of The Cone-Gatherers with the more consciously realist
1. Robin Jenkins, Dust on tne Paw (London, 1961). All page references
are to this edition.
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framework of Guests of War ana The Changeling, and exploiting to tne
full the unfami1iarity of the location, it also indicates an advance
in Jenkins' use of symbols. With its abundance of apparently
incidental details, it capitalises on minor events, imbuing them with
symDolic significance. Yet in spite of these symbolic overtones, and
the continually changing quantity and quality of information supplied
by the narrator, Jenkins also succeeds in maintaining tne impression of
a conventionally realist novel.
Set in Nurania - a country bearing obvious resemblance to Afghanistan -
the novel focuses on the ambitions and ideals of a Nuranian highschool
science teacher, Abdul Wahab. Once it becomes known that he is planning
to marry an Englishwoman, he is thrust into the conflicts and tensions
within the British expatriate community there. Having met Miss
Johnstone wnen studying in England, he has invited her out to Nurania,
to give her the opportunity to assess her new environment before deciding
whether or not to go ahead with the marriage. Her planned visit of
course, immediately calls for decisions on the part of tne expatriate
community as well; should they welcome her to the country or warn her
away from it? The situation presents ample opportunities for Jenkins
to examine the hypocrisy of moral and racial attitudes, as well as
cultural differences. The plot is made even more interesting by the
fact that Nurania is in the throes of a process of increasing national
liberation, cultural and political. The focus of this process is on
the rumours that tne snaddry - the al1-envelcping robes wcrn by Nuranian
women - will be abolished at the forthcoming religious festival or
Jeshan; and the climax of the novel comes with this symbolic derobing,
wnich signifies a major step into the twentieth century.
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Throughout the novel Jenkins emphasises the tensions in both the
characters and the situation by his striking use of symbols. Using
minor incidents, little moments, he points towards the wider dimensions
of a situation, indicating ideals and ambitions that have no place
within a world of pragmatic moral relativity. These symbolic pointers
to another dimension of existence which cannot be described but only
indicated, thus acquire a significance beyond their function in terms
of the general plot. And here elements of the sjuzhet can be seen to
conflict with the potentialities of the mythic structure to which such
moments gesture. An incident near the beginning of the novel
illustrates this technique. Bob Gillie, the Consul, is presented with
an American cigarette packet which the Ambassador had found on his front
lawn. Although obviously displeased by his finding, the Ambassador
offers no explanation of his reaction and the packet becomes an enigma
to the rest of his staff. Is it an anti-litter protest, is it seen as
a security threat, or is it perhaps simply a puzzle to test their own
intelligence? The apparently insignificant object thus assumes
gigantic proportions in their minds - proportions which are not wholly
diminished on discovering that to the Ambassador it is" both a
manifestation and a justification of his anti-American prejudices, a
symbol for him as well as for them. To the reader it stands for more
than any of these single explanations; the incident itself becomes
symbolic of the barriers which exist to human interpretations and
rationalisations, exposing the flaws of each character and indicating how
little each man knows or understands his fellows. And the incident also
mocks human attempts to seek a greater meaning for this mundane object,
which in themselves give rise to Jenkins1 usual mockery of the reader's
own search for moments of major significance within the text.
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3y snowing the reverberations of one minor event upon another in tnis
way Jenkins gradually draws in the complete cast of characters:
Winfield, the flippant and sarcastic administrator, Hint, deliberately
obtuse, Bob Gillie, with more insignt than is credited to his slow
exterior, Mrs "Mossaour, with her easily swayed ideas of the truth, anG
Harold Moffatt. Next to Wanab, Moffat is the novel's most disturbing
influence; a teacher at the local Nuranian University, married to a
Chinese wife and uncertain about having children with her, his principles
are tested more than any of the ether characters - mainly because he has
laid claim to more principles than them. Lan, his wife, despite being
possessed of genuine good intentions, also undergoes a process of testing
and is finally forced, like everyone else,into a compromise of her own
creation. Tunnelling into the novel through one character then another,
Jenkins finally introduces us to the central figure, Abdul Wahab.
Although we first see him through the suspicious eyes of the British
community, we are soon allowed to move fully into his perception of the
situation. In Wahab Jenkins creates one of his most fascinating
characters; a man who continually ponders the nature of truth itself as
well as the paradoxes of morality, he nevertheless maintains a keen
awareness of the necessity of deceit and of the propensity wnicn compels
him towards immorality.
The incident which gives the novel its title is, in fact, centred around
this question of 'truth' which causes so many problems for Wahab.
Having been shown different facets of each character, the contradictions
and compromises in their lifestyles brought to the fore by ihe presence
of Abdul and the advent ^f Miss Johnstone,the reader is revealed tiie
heart of tiie moral dilemma in a dialogue between Abdul Wahab and tiie
273
Principal of the school, whom he is aDout to supersede. Both men have
just been informed that the former is to take over the latter1s
position, a transition which encapsulates one of the novel's central
issues in its move from old to new, from age to youth, from the weak to
the suddenly powerful. This transition, ncwever, is neither easy nor
direct. Individual perspectives on the change alter quickly between
the individuals involved, as the dialogue between the two men illustrates.
At the time of the conversation both men are unhappily in exactly the same
position since, due to Nuranian administration, both have received their
letters of promotion and demotion at the same time. We are told that
Wahab 'took note several times of that efficient but nevertheless unwise
simultaneity1 (p.222), and his observation reveals a pattern within the
novel which indicates the divergence from conventional realism. JenKins
is not content to exploit coincidence wnile concealing its presence, in
the mere conventional realist manner, Dut actively draws attention to
the fact that Laura Jonnstone's arrival from England takes place shortly
after Mrs Monebzda, the only other English woman married to a Nuranian,
finally leaves her husband, while both events are shown to coincide with
tne unveiling of the snaddry. Attempts to establish relative assessments
of the situation are thus disrupted by this apparently arbitrary
patterning.
The conversation between Wahab and the Principal becomes a pattern for the
novel in other ways too, for" the roles of the participants in the dialogue
and tneir individual access to the truth is shown to change frequently -
a process which all the cnaracters experience at some point in the novel.
Wahab initially attempts to ignore his ex-superior1s whining protests,
remembering the Nuranian altitude that life should be seen in terms of
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one fly leaving a heap of camel dung while another immediately alights
saying: 'It's my turn now.' (p.223) Yet, as he listens to tne
complaints of Mussein, iie begins to envisage his promotion in political
terms: a continual entanglement in the processes of the powerful. As
he grows more anxious Mussein becomes more philosophical. Despite the
similarities of their situation - both fellow-countrymen, both exploited -
their minds fail to meet in any kind of 'truth' just as their words fail
to communicate. Wahab illustrates tne advantages of progress with
examples of 'Sputniks and hydrogen bombs and television1, but fails to make
his point:
Mussein opened his bloodshot eyes. "I know that
television is wonderful", he muttered.
"I have seen it, and it is not wonderful,"
said Wahab testily. "It is a toy. I used it as
a symbol. It represents the twentieth century;
far too much in Nurania still represents the first
century. (p>224)
A basic disparity in their views of the world is thus revealed. Mussein
is a student of Persian literature; he cannot see symbols in the terms
of Wanao, the scientist. Nevertheless, the lines whicn he quotes from
Furduzi to illustrate his situation are soon adopted by Wahab for
himself: 'I am dust on the paw of the lion,' he muses, (p.225) and
throughout the scene both men are affected at times by tne patnos and
heroism of that line. At one point the position of the dust holds
attraction, while at another the role of the lion has more appeal. Wahab
may rationalise: 'Be dust as you wish, Mussein; but do not protest when
others prefer to be the lion,' (p.225) and may mock: 'Wahab laughed: it
was amusing when the dust tried to impede the lion' (p.225) yet, as the
conflict continues, he becomes aware of incongruities in his own position;
the lion's tail: 'just wouldn't stay taut and proudly curled; no, it
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Kept wanting to droop and trail in the dust.1 (p.225) He even goes so
far as to gaze at the dust on his shoes: 'and for a foolish, passionate,
neart-sinking moment felt envious of it. To be tiie lion's paw meant
prowling and pouncing dangerously, and meeting in conflict otner liens,
older and fiercer.' (p.227) The symbol of dust on the lion's paw,
therefore, is not in itself fixed and may easily be translated or adapted
to suit different characters and situations.
In this example we can see how Jenkins adapts the use of symools to
convey his own moral perspective; the reader is asked to accept the image
of 'dust on the paw' as symDolic, but is also shown the deceptiveness of
such a symbol as Wanab and Mussein manipulate it to suit their own points
of view. The symbol-making process in which the novel is engaged is
therefore both valued and mocked. And Jenkins' idiosyncratic use of
symbols can be clarified if we compare it to a more conventional approach
in a novel which bears certain similarities to Dust on the Paw in its
exploration of conflict between native and colonial populations
surrounding a forthcoming marriage: E.M. Forster's A Passage to India.^
In A Passage to India certain symbolic moments and incidents - the
'gnost' which hits the Nawab Bahadur's car, the transformation through
chant of Mrs Moore into Esmiss Esmoor, and tne incidents in the MaraDar
caves themselves - all come to acquire a range of meanings for ootn
cnaracters and readers. Yet, although such symQcls are enigmatically
vague, the novel nevertheless assumes that a definite significance does
exist behind these moments, even if it is not fully comprehended; and this
significance nas a recognisable function in expanding perceptions of tne
2. E.M. Forster, A Passage to India, ed. Oliver Stallybrass, The Aoinger
Edition 5, (London, 1978). All page references are in this eGition.
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'real' world in which the characters exist. This solidity of the
symbols used is emphasised by a consistency evident in the images which
refer to them. 'When Mrs Moore emerges from the caves, overcome by the
echo which reduces everything to 'Bourn', we are told:
Even the striking of a match starts a little worm
coiling which is too small to complete a circle, but
is eternally watchful. And if several people talk
at once an overlapping howling noise begins, echoes
generate echoes, and the cave is stuffed with a snake
composed of small snakes, which writhe independently.
(p.139)
Later, as Mrs Moore reflects on the nature of the experience, the same
serpent image is used to describe her experience:
What had spoken to her in that scoured-out cavity of
the granite? What dwelt in the first of the caves?
Something very old and very small. Before time, it
was before space also. Something snub-nosed, incapable
of generosity - the undying worm itself ... Visions are
supposed to entail profundity, but wait till you get one,
dear reader! The abyss also may be petty, the serpent of
eternity made of maggots.
(p.198)
Through the reiterated images of worm and serpent Forster gives the
symbol a concrete identity, rarely found in any of Jenkins' symbols,
which tend to be contingent to the situation and the character within
it.
Two other main differences between the two writers may be discerned
from this example of the Marabar caves. Firstly, through his use of
the snake image, Forster relates the image very specifically to India -
and to an alien country with a mysterious past, stretching back 'before
time'. The European characters may therefore attribute the moments of
insight to their encounter with this strange culture, but can then return
with their new perspective into the recognisable moral context of
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English liberal humanism and a familiar society. In JenKins' novel
the symbolic elements cannot be so securely located within tiie realm
of the 'foreign1; what the characters in a Jenkins' novel find so alarming
about moments of symbolic insight is their new awareness of another
dimension which continues to co-exist with their previous conception
of a limited 'reality'. Moreover, with this expanded perception they
are left in a greater uncertainty as to ways of dealing with this ever
present threat to their everyday life. In Forster's novel, in contrast,
the effect of the moment of symbolic perception can be translated into
direct behavioural patterns in the characters' lives as they emerge out
of the incident; thus, after her encounter with the echo, Mrs Moore
becomes 'sunk in apathy and cynicism' (p.149) and is seen as emanating
'resentment', (p.190) Jenkins1 characters, however, are unable to
apply their moments of insight to any previous reality in this way,
since the effect of tnese insights has been to destroy all their confidence
in the boundaries of that 'real' world. And since the symbols in a
Jenkins' novel never do attain the status of a consistent image, and are
therefore much less reliable, it becomes impossible even for the reader
to gain any confidence in them. Rather they become part of the
characters' own desires and needs to seek significance witnout achieving
any independent solidity within the novel.
In Dust on the Paw, this tecnnique'of oblique and shifting
implication through symbols also reflects the novel's central tnemes:
not only does it support the attitude towards lying and the truth which
is seen as typically Nuranian, but it also reveals the extent to which
any apparent 'truth' is always, in some way or another, 'culture dependent'.
Moreover, Jenkins uses his symbolic images to subtly reinforce issues and
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attitudes explored by the novel's plot. The image of the fly on a
heap of camei dung, for example, illustrates the element of ciiange always
present in life but, because the image in itself is a fairly unpleasant
one, it also conveys a sense of disgust at the whole fickle business of
life itself. Similarly, wiien Paula Wint is described leaving Lan's
house in tne heat of the day, having felt both ill at ease and morally
under attack, we are told: 'Sweat poured down her face and body like
shame', (p.336) Here too the choice of phrase is not an innocent one;
considering the scene that has just taKen place, 'shame' presumably is
the sensation which Paula is trying to suppress.
This method serves Jenkins in a two-fold way. Firstly it reinforces his
reluctance to describe 'character' as if it were something fixed, which
could oe fully 'known'. By using oblique symbolic transference he
conveys a sense of character as something essentially mixed and contra¬
dictory. As Boo Gillie, himself often unaware of his own insignts,
remarxs: 'To be a lump of conceit, ambition and hypocrisy does not
disqualify from being a human being.' (p.374) Symbols which indicate
conflicting aspects of cnaracter, however, do not overtly threaten the
fabric of realism created by Jenkins; the impression of literary realism
as the dominant form remains. Symbolic details are also used by
Jenkins to build up this impression of realism in description; as Genette
suggests, minor and apparently incidental details reinforce the sense
of the narrator describing what is 'there'. Jenkins, however, as we
have seen in his earlier novels, also imbues such minor details with
symbolic significance. And in Dust on the Paw ne moves one step further,
by highlighting the way in which the characters themselves seeK
significance in tne minutiae of the world around them. Prince Nairn, for
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example, comes to see Laura as a symbol of Nurania's liberation; Gillie
is determined to elucidate the significance of the cigarette pacKet;
Mrs Mossaour resigns herself to seeing the rubbish dumps surrounding
her school as being of some educational value: 'They Kept the pampered
children of the West aware that here was no suourb of Washington or
London or Paris, but the unprivileged East.1 (p.3b) The characters also
attempt to interpret small actions in a similar way. Tnus when Abdul
Wahab picks Nairn's flowers, tne Prince has to interpret his behaviour:
'Could it be that the strange wanton pulling of the beautiful flowers by
Wahab was in some mysterious way symbolic and prophetic? Was Laura
coming, net as Wanab's inspiration and counsellor, but as his destroyer?1
(p.140) And by the end of the novel Wahab, perhaps the most trapped of
all the characters by his searches for significance, deliberately tries
to avoid seeing additional meanings in the scorpion wnich bars his path
to Laura: 'The dilemma was about to weave him into his customary web of
self-douDt when the insect scurried off into the grass of the ditch.
Grateful to it, he stepped forward and rang ttie bell.' (p.364) Apart
from adding to our view of the character and understanding of events, such
moments also teach us how to read the novel, encouraging us as readers to
seek significance in the details provided in the text.
Yet in the course of the novel we are also led to mock and distrust our
own search for synods that will apparently provide encapsulations of
the 'truth'. In spite of his use of symbolic images, Jenkins still
leaves the reader adrift in a sea of changing perspectives. Even the
images used often point only to 'significance' itself, to a world in
which an alternative dimension of meaning may be possiole; the nature of
this meaning is rarely elucidated. Indeed, tne reader is forced to fall
back on the consistency of tne narrative voice as the only 'trustwortny'
element within the text, holding togetner conversations in which no
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communication, no common idea of 'truth1 is shared by the participants,
and remaining constant in a world in which no final guarantee cf what is
'real' can pe given. A conversation between Moffatt and Lan illustrates
the amoiguity whicii can be created. Moffatt is the centre of the
narrative at tne beginning of the dialogue, we see through his eyes, yet
when he is described as looking at a photograph, he seems unable to
interpret his own thoughts: 'He looked at it for almost a minute. She
Knew more clearly than he did himself wnat his thoughts were.' (p.33)
In trie subsequent analysis of his thoughts, therefore, we cannot be
certain whether Lan or Moffatt himself is interpreting his responses.
This uncertainty is increased by the fact that the sentence aoove is
separated from the analysis wnicn follows - 'By gibing so bitterly against
racial prejudice, Moffatt more than helped to keep it in existence, he
also kept himself infected with it' (p.33) - by a purely descriptive
account cf the photograph in question. We are therefore unable to say
whether the analysis is Moffatt admitting his faults or Lan assessing his
character. Our only certainty must be the narrative voice through which
both possible interpretations would be filtered. The concrete detail
of the photograph is thus used in this exchange to confute the
certainties cf realism rather than to create any solid and interpretaDle
'reality'. Similarly, Jenkins frequently destroys our confidence in
the credibility of cne character after it has apparently oeen established,
by showing nim or her from another angle. We are led through the first
few scenes of the novel, for example, with the perspective of Alan Wint,
relying on nis observations. However, we are tnen told that another
character sees him as being possessed of a 'peculiar unawareness' (p.17),
which hardly ennances our trust in nis point of view. The general
effect of such devices therefore, is the creation of a lacunae within
the novel - within the boundaries of a fixed and recognisable 'reality'.
This sense of lacunae is reinforced by discussions between the characters
which point to inconsistencies and absences within their definitions of
'reality'. Wahab and Nairn, for example, have a conversation about
lying, which is governed by their contradictory thoughts on the nature of
truth: Nairn enquires about Laura:
"Has she been here before?"
"No, but I have described it to her."
"Truthfully?"
"As truthfully as I could. I admit I also spoke with
enthusiasm. Why should I not? I love my country, though
I am impatient with its faults. But do not for a moment
think, Your Highness, as Mr Moffatt evidently thinks, that
I deliberately deceived her with falsehoods." He spoke
with intense conviction, although he knew he was telling
lies. "As a scientist I must revere the truth. Is it
true that Mr Moffatt is a poet?"
"He writes poetry."
"I thought that poets also revered the truth."
"A different kind of truth perhaps."
"Sir, there is only one kind of truth."
"Do you think so?"
"I do." Thought really he didn't ...
Do you mind if I ask you some questions? No, don't give
me sanction until I have warned you that you may consider
them too personal and indeed too dangerous to answer."
"Sir, I have nothing to hide." Another lie. He had as much
as any man to nide. Did he not spend a good part of his
mental life in hiding from himself?
(p.126)
This exchange both postulates and denies that only one kind of truth
exists. It forces relativity and human indeterminacy to extreme lengths
until that which is absent - some kind of certainty, some absolute -
emerges as the only solution to the problematics of the situation.
However, although absolutes are desired they are also quite clearly
impossible within the framework of this limited view of reality, fraught
as it is with misunderstanding and ambiguity: the only kind of truth
available to flawed humanity is that based on compromise and
misconception, as is revealed in the conclusion of the exchange between
Wahab and Mussein, the Principal:
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They drew back a little so that they could stpre
into each other's eyes. Each saw that tne otner
had been, not lying, though what they had said was
not quite true, but bravely with their dreams defying
tiie poverty, not cnly of themselves out of their
whole country. ,(p.1b2)
As this moment illustrates, although trutn is culture-conditioned and
never purely expressed in reality, it can be postulated as an ideal,
which in itself calls on shared recognition. And it is this elusive
aspect of truth as an absolute which Jenkins focuses on in tne novel.
The shedding of the shaddry is therefore a fitting climax, overshadowing
the partial resolutions and compromises achieved by the individual
characters. Although the shaddry has operated as a symbol of darkness
throughout - Josh Bolton, armed with a gun and dressed in the long robes
is: 'in potentiality the most sinister figure since the history of the
world began,' (p.66) - and its shedding offers a moment of hope and
liberation, it also operates on a more general level in relation to the
novel's morality. Once the woman in the shaddry is revealed at Jesnan -
'She was an excitingly beautiful, exquisitely groomed, superbly dignified
woman.' (p.383) - the essential mystery of the image is lost, as it
becomes descrioable. By abandoning ambiguity it Deccmes part of a
'reality' composed of all that is definable, is concreiely known to
humankind; and after the moment of revelation, the aosolute power of the
image will be lost, as Nuranian women may now operate within the same
'reality' as their Western counterparts.
The characters, however; are shown as suffering from a lack of a security
in a fixed and describable reality around them, and needing absolute
moments which appear to offer a temporary resolution. Wanab, for example,
can only sum up his experiences in a stream of images:
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Into his mind there flashed memories; seme were
expected, but others touK him by surprise:
himself approaching with such careful modesty and
demeaning terrors the group of people waiting for
him on the International School verandah; his
father's bare feet; Laura's naKed bosom; Mussein
boasting about dancing in private witn his wife;
Moffatt's hand with the emptied wnisxy glass held
up as if some Kind of toast had just Deen drunK; the
flowers in tne taxi; Mrs Mossaour at the airport,
with her sex purposely displayed like a peacocK's
tail; and Rasouf leading the ooys in the silly act
of rubbing their nands in the sterile dust.
(p.35b)
So, if Dust on the Paw can oe summed up in a series of images similar to
Wahab's attempt at encapsulating his experiences, it is Decause such
images and symbols are the only resource at JenKins' disposal whicn can
help his attempt to name the unnamable or, at least, to point to the
existence of an unnamable dimension beyond tne boundaries of a
conventionally envisaged social reality. In this respect his technique
can be seen as an extension and intensification of the normal processes
of reading, as described by Gabriel Josipovici:
It is only so long as the boox is being read, so long,
that is, as the human imagination is travelling along
the arteries of the labyrinth, tnat we are aware of
ttie boundaries, and therefore of wnat lies beyond them.
When that activity ceases we fall back into our old
habits, and enter once more tnat real labyrinth, which
is so deadly just because we are unaware of it as such.
Closed, the dock becomes an object among many in the
room. Open and read, it draws tne reader into tracing
the confines of his own labyrinth and allows him to
experience himself not as an object in the world but as
the limits of his world. And, mysteriously, to recognise
this is to be freed of these limits ... 3
Through creating the illusion of a commitment to realism as a technique
but then avoiding the enclosed world which it creates, Jenxins' can draw
the reader's attention to the boundaries of realism and point beyond them,
just as his novels challenge the accepted liberal humanist notions of
wnat constitutes 'reality'.
3. Gabriel Josipovici, The World and the Book: A Study of Modern Fiction
(London, 1971), p.30"5^ "
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Dust un the Paw can tnerefore be seen as JenKins' most detailed
exploration of the literary device of the symbol; liKe Stevenson, he
seems to have found the exoticism of unfamiliar locations particularly
well suited to this endeavour. On returning to write fiction set in
Scotland he appears to have benefitted from the change of subject matter,
becoming more confident in the nature of tne boundaries established by
literary realism and therefore more adept at exploiting and cnallenying
them. Moreover, after the wider perspectives and more complex human
conflicts he found in ttiose alien environments, he seems to develop a more
cynical appreciation of the other boundaries involved in the concept of
'Scottishness1 and to be ready to extend nis challenge to more familiar
and accepted settings.
A Very Scotch Affair
Written in 1966, A Very Scotch Affair indicates tnerefore, not only a
return to a Scottish subject for Jenkins, but also an intensifying and
4
confident streamlining of his concerns. A difference is immediately
ncticable in the plot which centres very definitely around one character,
Mungo Niven, and focuses on one main action: his decision, in middle age,
to leave his wife, family and native Glasgow and to seek a better way of
life with a newly acquired, rich, mistress. Despite his wife's fatal
illness and continuous pleas for his attention, despite even her eventual
death and the breakdown of his affair, followed by the disintegration of
his family, Mungo maintains his resolve to escape from life in what he
calls 'tne ghetto'. The novel's canvas is therefore much smaller and
more localised that Dust on the Paw; and, as a result, there is a greater
concentration on the single character of Mungo, even if his wife, children
4. Robin JenKins, A Very Scotcn Affair (London, 196b). All page
references are to ttiis edition.
and neignbours are all given their share of the narrative perspective.
Although the novel is concerned with Mungo's search for an ideal the
narrative voice is not so noticable in translating his thoughts into the
language of religion or metaphysics. The overall tone is conveyed
through a fairly mundane vocabulary, leaving the more spiritual aspects
to be represented in the paradoxes of Mungo's character. The novel
therefore appears more realist in style, an impression reinforced by the
absence of any overt symbolism in its incidents and the lack of fantasy
in its location and subject. However, operating in direct contradiction
to this impression of conventional realism, we are, firstly, asked to
identify with a character wno is not only morally unpleasant, but is
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shown to be a fraud both in nis dealing with himself and with others.
Secondly, we are given only partial insights into most of the other
characters. Usually they are tantalisingly characterised and then with¬
drawn from narrative omniscience, with this withdrawal ta<ing place either
before or after a major decision, thus leaving us in a world without
cause or effect, only seemingly arbitrary decisions and judgements. This
device results in our being denied knowledge just at the moment when we
would most expect it. As in Dust on the Paw, the absences in the text
are, tiierefore, as important as what is present. Through these absences
Jenkins succeeds in- conveying the problems and paradoxes experienced by
Mungo in his struggle against his circumscribed experience. In
attempting to build up a picture of tne novel several factors which
5. Moira Burgess may be quite accurate therefore in her condemnation of
Mungo as someone: 'almost too bad to be true', although her judgement
would seem to be made according to realist criteria.
Moira Burgess, 'Rooin Jenkins: A Novelist of Scotland' , Library Review
22, no.8. (Winter, 1970), 409-412, p.411.
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contribute to its elusive quality tnerefore require examination; firstly,
Jenkins' return to a Scottish location; secondly, the effect of the
narratorial stances on the themes of irony and self-delusion; and
thirdly, the moral stance evinced oy the novel and tne ways in which this
affects its form.
Perhaps through having viewed other countries with the detachment of a
foreigner, Jenkins displays a more intensely analytical approach to
Scotland in A Very Scotch Affair than in any of his previous novels;
indeed it is second only to Fergus Lamont in revealing his attitudes to
the mind and morality of Scotland. His comment ttiat: 'Scotland is now
a small nation which is only too willing to recognise its smallness'0
indicates one of the functions wnicn Scotland has in A Very Scotch Affair:
it becomes both a real expression and a paradigm of all the restrictions
which encompass Mungo's spirit and which exist in his soul. Not only
is he confined by his allegiance to the Glasgow 'ghetto', to an easy
existence formed tnrough habit, but his 'Scottish' attitudes are also
shown to limit his chance of escape. At the beginning of the novel
Myra, his mistress and prospective Keeper, comments; 'The trouDle with
you, Mungo, is that you're too Scotch. You enjoy letting your conscience
torment you.' (p.7) Mungo's attitude - at the root of all his problems -
is not one that he consciously encourages; rather it is seen as a flaw
which he attempts to overcome. His 'conscience' is a sense of sin
instilled in him, not through any actual recognition of aosolutes of good
and evil, since tne only absolutes presented within the novel are
contained within his own ideals and aspirations, but by a communal guilt,
estaolished and held on to oy those around him as a response to the
6. See interview, Appendix p. 437.
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material circumstances of their society. Therefore, althougn the novel
may initially appear to attacK Calvinist philosophy - and it certainly
does condemn the remnants of Knoxian morality - if any philosophy is
truly attacked, it is that of the easy acceptance of determinism, of
adapting to circumstances, ana perceiving no alternatives. Mungo is
depicted as arousing the anger of those who have known him for a long
time, not because he has ideals - they seem to quite like his 'aaft'
ideas, as Nan Fraser shows: 'more than once he had amused her and Alec
by telling them how he would like to live in the country, with trees
round his house' (p.19) and may enjoy seeing him as trapped by circumstances,
by his fat and ugly wife - but what they do resent is the fact that he
manages to escape from their circumscribed world. In so doing lie proves
that determining circumstances are not all powerful and shows that they
themselves are representative of Scotland, cringing in submissiveness. ^
Of course, ironically, their diluted form of Calvinism still has Mungo
mentally in thrall: 'But tne unrelenting morality of his native Glasgow
could not be shaken off (p.14), altnough, at least in his actions, he
does appear to escape. Peggy, Mungo's daughter who succeeds in leaving
Scotland at the end of the novel, although disagreeing with her father's
behaviour,secretly shares his attitude: 'she knew that she too was a
traitor, ready to escape when the chance came.' (p.o5) On the level of
experience, therefore, Scotland represents the 'innumerable coils of sneer
commonplace habit' (p.24) that Mungo sees as holding him down.
Yet the concept of 'Sccttishness1 has another function in that it is used
to reflect Dack ironically upon the circumstantial morality of tne majority
7. See interview, Appendix p. 437.
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of characters. While the novel appears to be attacking the social effects
of a long assimilated Calvinist morality, it actually does so through
Calvinist precepts, showing how far from the ideal people have fallen.
An awareness of absolutes, although only applied ironically to the characters,
nevertheless impinges on the response of the reader. Therefore, when Part
Two begins with the lines, 'the ultimate disruption was waited for, as if
predestined. It was a very Scotch dissolution to a very Scotcn affair1
(p.137), the connotations of Disruption, and 'predestination' cannot pass
unnoticed, despite the triviality of the subject. And although they may
mock, they also, inevitably, create a further awareness of such issues to
be sustained and related to the central concerns of the novel.
Even in these brief examples we can see the importance of the novel's
ironic humour, operating both structurally and linguistically, either
through the characters or through the voice of the narrator. Irony, of
course, can be used to expose pretension and self-delusion, out Jenkins
also utilises it in the novel to manipulate the narrative in order that
the mockery reverberates upon our own expectations. On the most basic
level, however, the irony and humour is directed towards Mungo and the
seven week affair that leads him to renounce the relationships of a
lifetime. The bite of this irony is felt from the start of the novel
when Myra mocks Mungo and the narrator tells us that: 'He noticed no
irony' (p.8); this mockery becomes even more explicit when Mungo is shown
as admitting that he was always 'too honourable to cheat, bully, lie, and
deceive.' (p.9) Although we laugh at the discrepancy involved in this
assessment, the comment also raises important questions for the novel,
such as the nature of honourable action and the significance of honourable
intention. Is Mungo a coward, if judged by his intentions, or does his
behaviour indicate nobility? Similar questions may be raised
2bS
aDout his behaviour in later life. Despite the failure of his affair
and the sad state of his family, he has succeeded in breaking free;
is such freedom, achieved by adultery, less valuable than any other
Kind of freedom? Munyo debates with Myra at an early stage in their
relationship whether it is much worse to cheat at rounders or commit
adultery, (p.9) Both are seen as deviations from the code of nonour
but can only be compared through their effects rather tnan the intention
to be dishonourable. If this is the case, then the novel postulates
tnat some vindication can be made for Mungo's attempt to escape, since
he has discarded such relative determinism and is aiming purely for a
certain end. The novel thus turns conventional morality upside down,
advocating that the aim for absolutes is preferable to an adaptation to
circumstance. Even those who are shown as being in the right are con¬
demned. Mungo, for example, believes that Peggy is 'too just, too
neutral.' (p. 12b) And yet the novel still acknowledges that such absolutes
can only remain as ideals because humanity is unable to defeat that
circumstantial reality wnicn surrounds it. In this dichotomy is the
essence both of Mungo's dilemma and of the appeal and disquiet he creates
as a character.
The narrative's manipulations of our moral expectations is paralleled by
an undermining of our expectations of fiction. Part of the confusion is
created by wnat the narrator appears to withhold from us. Yet,as witn
his other techniques, Jenkins conceals his device as an external feature
of the fiction by making it also apply internally, within the world of
the fiction; in tnis particular case, the characters are also shown
feeling a sense of bewilderment at their inability to understand other
characters and events. Sometimes they fail even to understand their own
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actions. Thus Mungo returns to Glasgow and debates the possible lines
of action at his wife's funeral, is not aware of having settled on
one consciously, yet realises: 'So apparently he had decided.' (p. 157)
The decision therefore appears to have been taken without him having any
conscious access to his own mind. The narrative frequently denies
insight in this way, mocking not only the idea that one character may
'know', another and translating this concept into a mockery of fiction's
illusions, but showing that even as readers we may not 'know' everything
about a fictional character. The limitations of the medium, concealed
o
in a realist text, are thus revealed. Once again our own expectations
of fiction and of life are mocked, as we are shown how attempts to break
through their limitations nevertheless always come to rest within them.
The novel therefore makes full use of a shifting narrative perspective.
Jenkins himself admits: 'I don't like to write through the perceptions
9
of one character - it's too limiting.' Every character is viewed with
a certain degree of obliquity. Even Mungo, who dominates the first
few chapters with his own reactions and ideas, is formed in our minds
with help from the attitudes towards him shown by Nan Eraser his neighbour,
by comments made by others that she recalls, and by the reactions of his
own family. The novel then proceeds to give a series of different
perspectives on how the situation affects the various characters. Chapter
four moves to Andrew's life, chapter five to Peggy and in chapter six,
the whist scene that signals the beginning of Bess's illness is mainly
8. 'As to character, well, people are never going to know everything
about themselves or each other.'
Interview, Appendix p.441.
9. See interview, Appendix p. 443.
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viewed through the eyes of Flo MacTaggart. Curiously, Bess herself is
given little insight on the situation; even the nightmare journey back
to her house is described in the terms of the disinterested Mr Peffermill.
It would appear, tnerefore, that we are rarely given the perspective of
the main character in an incident, with tne exception of Mungo's appearance
at the funeral. By moving around in this way the narrator not only
denies us the opportunity to make judgements on the dominant character,
but also allows us to see the self-interested and more unpleasant
characteristics of the side-line spectators, tiius establishing the sense
of a commonly flawed humanity. Mungo is permitted to dominate to a
greater extent because he nas, by the later stages, acquired some insight
into (lis own failings and can face up to the unpleasant aspects of his
character. He can also recognise the limitations of that self-knowledge.
In this respect Mungo prefigures those characters who will appear later
in Jenkins1 ouevre, also unpleasant and ultimately indecipherable.
However, we have slightly more access to Mungo's self-doubt than to those
central characters in subsequent Jenkins' novels who finally elude our
full comprehension; we can therefore identify more easily with Mungo,
especially since he is so central a representative of the searcri fur
redemption which establishes the novel's most interesting thematic
contradictions.
While the novel implies tnat the only salvation for humanity is to search
for some escape from the restrictions of the circumscribed view it taxes
of 'reality' - an escape which is essentially unattainable - it also
implies a paradox in the vision of that restrictive society. 'Life,'
muses Mr Peffermill, 'was not a clean, tidy, well-run, well furnished
house. Society and civilised behaviour which prevented nim for instance
from raping her there and then, were founded on brute force.' (p. 114)
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If civilisation survives only on such a contradiction, by concealing
the forces which unberly it, Mungo's actions appear to raise the question
of whether similar paradoxes are not applicable to humankind. The local
minister, for example, attempts to excuse Mungo's benaviour by pointing
out that, 'A man can commit a great sin because there is greatness in his
soul.' (p.119) This idea would seem to indicate that,despite Mungo's
own equivocation, he achieves in some ways the moral extremism necessary
to break out of tne confines of mediocre circumstance. Moreover, Mungo
is shown as wishing to use tne extremity of his own actions to force
others, especially his children, into alternative, and perhaps more
worthwhile, forms of escape: 'That hardening of vision which sooner' or
later blinded most, would have been prevented or at any rate delayed in
tnem. They mignt suffer but it would redeem them.' (p.62) His
actions thus bring Mungo a greater understanding of the terrible effects
.of reduction to a relative morality and the victimisation of circumstance,
an understanding which eventually illuminates his perspective on those
around him. By the end of the novel he can view Bess's family and
neighoours at tne funeral with a sense of the momentary glory which they
achieve in their opposition to him:
These faces, familiar, commonplace, ana stupid, were
suddenly seen to be nevertheless of great value, in
a way he could never have explained; and any explan¬
ation would have been regarded by the minds behind
those faces with suspicion and distrust, for in that
vision of them he by no means bestowed on them qualities
they aid not nave. They were valuable as they were,
witn all their imperfections; and the most valuable, to
him, was now lost forever. ,(p.172)
This sense of tne hopelessness of any attempt at communication between
people 'as they are', perhaps best epitomises the novel. The alternative
which is presented is that of an extremism which can only
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arouse fear and condemnation and which in most cases is far less
preferaDle than the easy alternative of remaining with habit, with
compromise ana with an acceptance that surrounding circumstances
comprise all of 'reality' and tnerefore demand adaptation. Munyo is
shewn as someone who, in spite cf a series of self-doubts, rejects easy
acceptance and adopts extremes. Contemplating the possibility of a
return to the 'ghetto' he realises that: 'Here too self-contempt would
be encountered, but as a mangy uld cat to be kicked out of the way, not
as a huge devouring beast.' (p.160) Mungo, ncwever, settles for the
latter alternative, breaking away from the codes of those who are, as
Jenkins describes, 'mediocrely good together.'10
Throughout the novel, in spite of his unpleasantness, Mungo has been
allowed a far greater degree of identification from the reader than
Jenkins usually accords to any one character. We see his limitations
and failings but we are also led into sharing his rejection of the
constraints of a circumstantial morality. We are made to understand
both the attraction and the danger that he perceives in absolutes. And,
because the reader is permitted tnis identification, A Very Scotch Affair,
altnough presenting an unpleasant and disquieting situation, also allows
us a greater awareness of the compassion displayed by Jenkins in his
treatment of tne desire for impossible absolutes. The novel
as a result also displays a greater cynicism than is found in previous
works about the human capacity to live well and to oe 'good' within a
liberal humanist tradition dominated by a morally relative view cf
reality.
10. See interview, Appendix p.450.
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A Would-be Saint
Jenkins1 cynicism aoout tiie realisation of 'good1, as seen in A Very
11
Scotcn Affair,is taKen one step further in A Would-be Saint. His own
ironic comment on the central cnaracter of that novel gives some insight
into his aims in it: 'Gavin is suppused to be a good man. No novelist
ever depicted a good person successfully. Wicked persons are easy.
There's been no portrayal of a credible Heaven. Gavin Hamilton is an
attempt to pcrtray a good person, but tilings go wrong. The only solution
is an escape into silence but that in itself is a defeat1]^ A Would-be
Saint attempts to portray goodness in a credible form and, for the first
time, without using children, natives cr simpletons, but an adult as a
possesser of that quality. Jenkins would appear to have been working
on this development for some time, through novels sucn as A Very Scotch
Affair in which he concentrates on one main cnaracter, examining moral
imperatives in relation to his position. In A Toast to the Lord
Jenkins again focuses on an extremely unpleasant cnaracter, Agnes, a
pseudo-Christian wno, by the end of the novel, appears to have gained access
to a genuine source of transformation, becomes possessed by tne Lord and,
by virtue of her access to an aosolute, is lost Doth to tne narrative and
to the reader's comprehension. As his statement above indicates,
A Would-pe Saint, in developing this line of interest, presents a
challenge to the limitations of fictional realism, as well as philoso¬
phically acknowledging the reasons for failure and the limitations of
goodness in the flawed state of humanity.
As an examination of the life of Gavin Hamilton and his 'ruinous goodness',
11. Robin Jenkins, A Would-be Saint (London, 1976). All page references
are to this edition.
12. See interview, Appendix p.442.
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the novel Degins with Gavin's view of the world as a cniId- Altnough
still using third person narration, such an approach is unusual for
Jenkins who tends to show cnaracters tnrougn a variety of perspectives
and to avoid tracing the development of children into adults, preferring
to wor!< on a snorter time scale. However, as A Very Scotcn Affair would
seem to indicate, Jenkins has exploited to the full the effect of shifting
focus on a multiplicity of characters in ccmDating the fixity of realism;
he now appears more confident about adapting his techniques to dealing
witii a single character. In A Would-be Saint, moreover, it is essential
to nis purposes that we initially see Gavin in wholly realist terms. By
beginning the novel with a world which is governed by Gavin, wnich takes
nim, as a child, as its central subject, Jenkins encourages our
identification with him from the start. We are also led to view him as
an ordinary little boy. Indeed, Jenkins goes to some lengths to produce
tnis effect in a first cnapter wnich describes Gavin's explorations of
the environment around his home: 'One sunny afternoon, at the end of July
when tne wild roses were in bloom and in France tne Germans were being
bloodily defeated he set off alone with girr and cleek for a tour of his
world.' (p.b) Here the boy's perspective is enclosed by local descriptions
and by external social detail, adding solidity to tne scene. This
impression of a child's domain is continued: 'He had a right to go any¬
where in Auchengi1 Ian. It was his world.' (p.10) The concept of
'right', of being at one with tne surroundings, is an important feature
of this scene, because it establishes Gavin's 'normality' and indicates
his sense of confidence in nimself - two factors which, later in tne novel,
will radically diverge. Tne only slightly jarring element in this first
chapter in Gavin's assertion that fie likes everyone Decause ne believes
everyone likes nim; tnis perspective may be excusaole in terms of a
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child's point cf view, but it indicates tne demand for or, at least,
expectation uf justice on Gavin's part that will cause him so many
problems later in the novel.
The novel then proceeds to trace Gavin's childhood, tnrougn tne death of
nis father in tne war, his attendance at the local Academy by virtue of
his winning a bursary, his noted brilliance at both football and at
academic suojects, the death of his mother and the suosequent cruelty of
his grandparents who adopt him yet deny him the chance of further education.
Up to this point Gavin is presented very mucn as a victim, although a
self-contained and fairly passive one. Once his secure world has
disintegrated, nowever, this passivity is pushed to extremes. Rescuing
a 'fallen woman' who was a childhood friend, he loses tne love cf a
worldly fiancee. Abandoning football because it creates too much violence,
he also alienates friends and admirers. And when he decides to oecome a
conscientious objector in the Second World War, he comes near to losing
the friendship cf even those closest to him. From triis description of
the novel's events two structural perspectives can be seen to emerge:
we are allowed into the world cf Gavin and his 'good' intentions, Dut are
also presented with the view that Gavin is mad, a view gradually taken by
all who encounter him. Both perspectives are given a certain amount of
credibility out as readers we are never allowed to settle totally for
one or the other.
The novel thus gradually begins to reveal traits in Gavin which are
difficult to accommodate by the conventional 'lad o' pairts' image he
initially presented - acceptable in personality, academically bright and
with potential upward social mobility, and possibly important to Scotland
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because cf bis football skills. As his desire to do good becomes more
pronounced, as he undergoes suffering and alienation for his aims, with
even nis friends excluding him from their social activities - 'They
seemed to be under the misapprenensicn that the companionship would be
objectionable to him, as well as the whisky1 (p.67) - nis sense of self-
sufficiency increases. As a child he believes the best of people: 'He
did not think that if he failed anyone would laugh at him. He had a
higher opinion of people's goodwill than sne. It often had her shaking
her head at him, as if she foresaw disasters in store because of his
reckless trust.' (p.26) As he grows up, however, his attitudes begin to
cause difficulties. He believes, for example, that everyone has a
conscience: 'Surely, Gavin thought, everyone has a conscience Gavin
could think of no one who was net concerned to some extent about such
responsibilities.' (p.41) His belief is recognised as dangerous by
otners apart from his mother: 'Anybody's to be pitied,' remarks an old
lady, 'that nasn't learned to harden his heart by the time he's twelve.'
(p.43) The perceptions of others gradually does impinge upon Gavin's
consciousness, but does not lead him away from his idealism into a
worldly attitude for he is unable to accept any alternative to his beliefs;
it rather has the opposite effect, pushing him towards 'fanaticism'. Ana
this pattern of behaviour witnin the novel means that Gavin no longer fits
the conventional mould of the realist character, refusing to develop along
lines formed by his experience, and losing the identification of the
readers as nis unusual qualities begin to be perceived as dangerous.
The realisation towards wnicn Gavin moves in tne course of tne novel is
a much more complex one than simply a learning from experience. He
recognises that he cannot escape tne opinions of others, that he will
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always De watched. Although this theme bears certain similarities to
the Good Samaritan tale, and to the plignt of Charlie Forbes in The
Change 1 inc.Gavin emerges as a far more complex figure, for he is well
aware of the public dimension as the context in which he must operate,
recognising that in this area tiie real cnallenge lies. As a young boy,
when told of his mother's death, he feels very strongly the need to oe
alone:
As he locked at the face of each of them it was as if a
door slammed in his mind. If more people had been
present, more doors would nave slammed.
Alone, with no faces to see, the effect would surely
be tne opposite, doors would open and nis spirit would
be free.
This was wrong, he knew. It was going against every¬
thing he believed in. For all tne pain they caused, and
tne frustrations, tne company of people was as necessary
as food.
From tnis point on, tnen, until the novel's conclusion, Gavin can be seen
as trying to resist the desire to escape totally the company of others,
his reaction in tnis passage and his suDsequent struggle reveals one of
the novel's central dicnotcmies: should pure goodness try to prove
itself capable of operating within the confines of society and of other
human beings, or does it demand the ultimate isolation of tne hermit, of
a total withdrawal from the world?
The choice between these alternatives is not, however, expressed unly
through Gavin's responses. The reader is able to appreciate tne
dimensions of tne question through also seeing Gavin with the eyes of
tnose around him, and tnus experiencing his increasingly enigmatic features.
For example, Gavin is shown as arousing wonder in those who think tney
knew him. Julia, nis girlfriend, is, 'afraid that one day he would
commit some act of utterly irresponsible and ruinous goodness.1 (p.63)
2S9
Gradually, through their inability tc understand him, the community of
Auchengillan begins to feel the same way. Escaping from the norm,
from the restriction cf the stereotype, Gavin oecomes an unicncwn quantity
which mai<es them uneasy:
It was noticed how, though Gavin was very friendly, and
never failed to stop you in the street and asi< with
undeniaole sincerity how you and your family were, you
always felt awkward talking to him...
Some said it was because Gavin, without ever saying a
word that could be called preaching, made you feel that
there were lots of good deeds you should have done ana
lots of bad deeds you shouldn't. He was, alas, the
genuine article, He was the last person to talk to if
you wanted to feel satisfied with yourself. ,
This indictment is one of the last comments made on Gavin before he
actually ma.<es a move outwith that community in his role of conscientious
objector. 3y this stage the reader is also experiencing difficulties in
identifying closely with Gavin and in finding a fulfilment of expectations.
The fact that Gavin was, from the beginning, presented as the central
character, through detailed description of the number of events affecting
his life that are given, would lead us to expect to see in him, oy this
point, some kind of adaptation to circumstances, or at least a reaction
against them. Moving out from the child centered world of the novel's
first chapters, we would expect an increasing interaction on Gavin's part
with tnose around him: instead, the reverse seems to operate. Increasingly
we snare the view of otners, looking at Gavin externally and wondering at
his oehaviour, Decerning less capable of comprehending him. Yet, because
the novel began in an apparently conventional manner, in spite cf the
divergence of perspectives we still try to identify with Gavin, maKing
a conscious effort to understand his reasoning while it is still explained
tc us, prepared to participate in the spiritual search for the fulfilment
of nis aims and desires.- Only in the final stage of the novel, wnen ne
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moves to working in the forest as a conscientious objector are we finally
kept at a distance from him.
His move to the forest might be expected to signal that stage in the novel
at which the two worlds - that of Gavin's responses, ana that .of the
uncomprehending society which looks upon them - would be dissolved into one;
at least Gavin is supposedly meeting with others who share his moral stance
and are in a similarly isolated position. However, the men with whom
he works on the estate are depicted as likable if quarrelsome men, there
for a variety of reasons and with varying degrees of conviction. Above
all, they are presented as 'normal' examples of flawed humanity.
Inevitably the reader warms towards tnem, identifying with their doubts
and contradictions, while feeling increasingly distanced from, and unable
to identify with, Gavin. Disappointed that the men do not see themselves
as touched by 'any special grace' (p.154) Gavin slowly isolates himself.
The question of pride, wnich has been underlying all Gavin's action - it
is possible, for example, that lie is deliberately seeking some form of
13
revenge on his grandparents by showing them sucn kindness - fully emerges.
Gavin is determined to be 'beholden' to no-one who is involved in the war,
comLng to believe that isolation is the only way to acnieve that
impartiality, even purity, which will allow him to pity others and to see
what-is good. Only then can he extend his compassion to humankind;
13. His fiancee, in fact, ponders on this aspect of Gavin's character:
He did good deeds; but she sometimes wondered if he did
them out of pure compassion and not cut of a wish to show
up the selfishness of others, including herself. His
grandmother had done him tne greatest wrong, therefore
he shewed her the greatest forgiveness. As a way of getting
revenge it was very effective. What tne causes of the old
woman's mental agonies were was not easy to tell, but Julia
was sure beiny beholden to him was one of them. , ,-nv
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They were to be pitied. 8ut who had a right to pity
them? Not ministers or priests who told them that
Christ's commands to love their enemies did not apply.
Not politicians who promised them a guilt-free future
when the slaughter was over. Not airmen who thought
that the Killing or maiming of children was a risk that
could be honourably taken. Not soldiers who killed
other soldiers who were the fathers of children. Not
even their own parents who accepted as a legitimate
consequence of the war the deaths of other parents'
children.
And who had a right to pity those ministers,
politicians, airmen, soldiers, and parents?
Only someone completely uninvolved.
(P-177)
Donald MacMillan, one of Gavin's co-workers, believes that if such a
person existed, 'he would be a monster of spiritual arrogance whose contempt
would be preferable to his pity.' (p.177) But Gavin believes that this
view of arrogance and pity is an earthly one, judged in terms of circum¬
stantial and relative morality, whereas God would come to a quite different
interpretation. Gavin himself, therefore, posits the concept of an external
God who alone can perceive and happily accommodate moral absolutes.
To a certain extent the novel vindicates this point of view established by
Gavin. After the discussion described above, the novel moves into Part
Four, five years after Gavin's arrival in the forestry camp, and to the
end of the war. The most immediately striking feature about this section
is that Gavin appears to have moved out of the novel's central focus.
The narrator no longer appears to be tracing his development: the reader
is therefore denied access and it is with some relief that we turn to the
more easily comprehended characters. However, in so doing we may notice
that in a sense the two strands of the novel have come together, although
in an unexpected form, for Gavin has moved so far beyond the experiences
of the others, that he has become for them a symbol of all that they could
not achieve. As MacMillan realises, Gavin has become an ideal:
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Gavin was blossoms, sunshine and hope.
He was sure that his companions, so
contemptuous of religion, felt the same way.
ThinKiny about Gavin gave them faith. They
were prisoners, he was still free. Finding
the ourden too heavy or too snameful tney had
lung ago put down their idealistic protest
against the war. .Gavin still carried his.
Like me, thought MacMillan, they lie
awa«e at night despising themselves for adding
to the world's falseness and hypocrisy. Then
they remember Gavin and feel instantly absolved.
(p.192)
And it is almost inevitable that when we do encounter Gavin in this
section we see him in a similarily symbolic light, since we are told
so little about what has actually happened to him over tne past few years
or how changes in his personality have occurred. We see him finally in
tne role of prophet, with beard and home-made clothes, working in isolation
and having given away all his worldly goods. In terms of his represen¬
tative quality it would appear that he has achieved the status he sought."
For the reader this later view of Gavin creates a conflict between his
status as a symbol and the Gavin we had previously 'known1, at the centre
of the narrative and the focus of our identification and sympathy. Gavin,
the 'would-be saint',points towards a dimension of experience beyond our
own. The world of 'reality' and this alien spiritual dimension are
thus brought into an uneasy conjunction through the fiction, with tne
only links between the two worlds created by the hesitancies,•aoubts and
ambiguities within tne text which ensure our inability to be certain
aocut what is true or real. It remains unclear, for example, how much
Gavin's final stand is due to nis pride; we'cannot tell whether Gavin is
governed by his slightly ridiculour 'huff against humanity', (p.205), or
whether his own humorous self-mockery keeps this under control. Tne
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novel ends with MacMillan, Gavin's single remaining contact with
'realiiy', half-wishing, half-fearing tiiat tnis snowy night will be the
one in which Gavin will finally disappear into the hills and achieve
sainthood. His relief at finding that Gavin does not intend to disappear
that night is combined with a vague disappointment on realising that the
time for his retreat has net yet arrived. We are tnerefcre left in
ignorance as to whettier Gavin will ever become a 'saint' and martyr.
Our final glimpse has been of him earlier in the day, contemplating trie
ultimate action but coming to no decision: at the end of the novel,
therefore, he still eludes us. In Gavin, Jenkins has created a character
who is actually unable to inhaDit the world of reality, with all its
flaws and circumstantial constraints, and is thus a figure that will
always evade the descriptive limitations of literary realism. Gavin,
however, cannot be seen purely as an ideal either,- since we can never be
sure of tne motivation or quality of his actions, he cannot be totally
placed witnin a symbolic dimension or tne world of allegory. Remaining
a figure on the boundaries of realism and allegory, tie indicates tne
limitations of each as a complete expression of the moral dilemma faced
by humanKind. In A Would-be Saint, therefore, Jenxins not only illustrates
the problematics of his moral philosophy with considerable deptn, but
he also exposes the limitations of fiction in dealing with sucn material
and in so doing, again reaches beyong the boundaries of conventional
real ism.
A Would-oe Saint is in many ways a disquieting oook, but for me it remains
JenKins1 most serious examination of tne impossibility of achieving pure
good within a circumstantial reality; it also clearly indicates tne
limitations of fiction in conveying tne vision of an absolute morality.
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As a result it is a novel held together Dy tne tension between its
elements. In the novel which follows it, Fergus Lamont, Jenkins
appears to relax slightly, aware of tne paradoxes of the medium, and uf
nis subject matter: and even allows nimself an element of parody, lost
to his works since Happy for the Child.
Fergus Lamont
In Fergus Lamont we can see JenKins departing even further from the
conventions of realism, although as a novel it avoids the extreme tension
14
of A Would-be Saint. And although it continues the analysis of morality
found in that novel, it nas more obvious linKS with A Very Scotcn Affair,
both in its ironic consideration of the Scottish context, and in the
fact that its central character is so far from being a '-saint1. Fergus
Lamont could also be described as Jenkins1 most sopnisticated novel to
date, developing that refinement of focus on a single cnaracter begun in
previous novels to such an extent that a first person narrator - a device
15
which Jenkins had hitherto sought to avoid - replaces tne usual snifting
narrative perspective on a wide range of characters. That the voice of
the narrator is the voice of Fergus, tne voice of a poet, makes the
departure all the more striding.
Although the basic techniques of the novel are not extraordinarily
innovative in fictional terms they nevertheless represent a new direction
for Jenkins. Using a retrospective narrative which, with its interspersed
flash forwards into tne present, indicated by passages in italics, leads
up to the final hour of Fergus' writing, Jenkins leaves behind the
14. Robin Jenkins, Fergus Lamont (Edinburgh, 197S). All page references
are to tnis edition.
15. See interview, Appendix p. 443.
linearity of his previous novels and adopts a more spatial approacn.
In his previous novels any spatial quality has been gained only oy the
movement of tne narrative from the perspective of one character to
another, but in Fergus Lament it is achieved oy allowing the reaaer to
piece together information aoout the actual events in order to discover
the nature of both tne past and present. And trie character on which
Jenkins concentrates with such intensity is shown to be more eligible
pernaps than previous characters for sucn close attention; although Fergus
as narrator is only an old man living in relative poverty and obscurity,
he is shown to be someone who once possessed consideraole power and
social status. Moreover, his being a poet, looKing bac< on his life,
gives him a special licence not only in arranging his life experiences
in achronological juxtapositions, but also in supplying information about
his past that he could not have known at the time. The novel thus
develops two versions of Fergus; Gne the incipient hero, tne other the
old man sitting in squalor in a pUDlic library, writing his memoirs.
The two are brought together in tne narrative, however, in that the older
Fergus makes comments on his more youthful actions while he describes
them, as well as in the more obviously retrospective, italicised, passages.
The narrator, therefore, is always implicitly aware of tne act of
narrating and can address the implied readership on tne subject of iiis
own role:
I gaze at this old newspaper picture of a wartime wedding
outside St Giles Cathedral. Only the bride's arm can oe
seen: the rest of her has been cut cut. The groom wears
the full-dress uniform of a Highland officer, with medals
for valour on nis chest. Between him and the small anxious
boy who once pushed a barrowful of dung up the orae to nis
grandfather1s cottage, what is the connection? Ana what
nave I, an old man with shaky nands, to do with either of
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As in JenKins1 earlier, and more conventional novels, therefore, the
disparate characters, and even the many facets of the main character, are
held together Dy the consistency of the narrative voice - even when it
16
is commenting on its own actions. Yet ambiguity is maintained tnrougn
the movement in time between action and narrative; we are often unable
to ascertain whether Fergus is acting in one way and simultaneously thinking
in another, or whether he is looking back on, and reinterpreting past
behaviour. An incident when, staying as a guest in a stately home, he
encounters a poacher, offers an illustration of this ambiguity. Benaving
with extreme severity, even brutality, towards the 'criminal', he
nevertheless claims that he sympathized with him:
I felt sorry for him of course, and would nave liked to
send him away with a five pound note in his pocket, to
feed his family and buy medicines for his sick child;
but if I had done anything so self-indulgent I would have
let my side down, especially my little red-haired daugiiter,
Dorcas, whose good opinion was very important to me.
(p.135)
We cannot be certain here just how much of Fergus' analysis is a reflection
of his hard-headed realism at the time or a retrospective self-justification.
Such ambiguity is of course all to Jenkins' advantage in his portrayal of
uncertain moral territory; by the end of tiie novel tne narrator can look
bacK and discuss what he has written but we still cannot be sure of tne
'truth' of his comments. Yet the position of this first person narrator,
looking back on his life, philosophising on the nature of God and morality,
also means tnat Jenkins need no longer attribute metaphysical speculations
to apparently unlikely characters; narrator and discourse now seem at one.
Nevertheless, although critics have admired the quality of Jenkins' 'story-
16. Notice, for example: 'I am hurrying on too fast. Here is anotner
pnotograpn taken three years earlier' (p.61) and: 'Let me introduce
the others. They were all sons of landed gentry.' (p.62).
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telling', the novel has also oeen criticized for its plot.^ It has
been argued that the tale aoout a bey Drought up in the slums of Gantock,
going on to make nimself an officer and a gentleman, marrying an
author of sentimental novels who, in reality, is both callous and shrewd,
writing poetry and finally finding ten years of happiness in a Hebridean
idyll witn a pipe-smoking Celtic goddess called Kirstie, is both too
familiarly 'Scottish1, and not quite credible. ^ Yet it is these very
elements in the novel which offer some insight into Jenkins' aims; for
Fergus Lament can be read as a deeply ironic response to images of
Scotland, a development, through parody, of the examination which he
began in A Very Scotch Affair of the moral and intellectual bases of
Scottishness. And the fact that Jenkins has allowed the fairly dubious
and self-parodic character of Fergus to narrate can be seen as an
intentional escape clause for our credibility, should it be tested too
much.
Before moving on to a discussion of Scotland and morality as represented
in the novel, however, one more innovation of Jenkins requires consider¬
ation. His use of a poet, a writer, as his main character, indicates a
departure from his previous non-literary central character and, as in most
novels, implies that such a choice has been made for very definite reasons.
The kind of poetry, written Qy Fergus - he wants his first volume of poetry
17. Reviews praising the novel include:
Stephen Glover, 'Recent Fiction', Daily Telegrapn, 23 August 1979, p.11.
Allan Massie, 'A strange and wonderful romance', Weekend Scotsman,
25 August 1979, p.3.
Douglas Gifford, 'New Scottish Fiction', Books in Scotland, 5 „
(Autumn 1979), 14-16.
18. Such criticisms are made by David Craig, untitled review, Cencrastus,
2 (Spring 1980), 39-41.
to oe entitled Gathering Dung and it includes pcems such as 'The Stairneid
Lavatory', while his war poetry is described as dealing with some of the
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most degrading aspects of war - seems to reflect Jenkins1 own aim for
fiction of 'trying to creak through all the facades that people hide
behind'.*1 The role of poet, ncwever, is shown to have anotner significance
in the novel in tnat it represents a position of isolation from the community.
As poet, Fergus is set apart from his other roles of gentleman and social
climber. He first learns to make this distinction as a boy, when he is
sent before his headmaster for using the word 'fart' in an essay. The
rector finally excuses him for this, believing his language to be vigorous
and accurate, but reminds him: 'it is only poets who can afford to speak
the truth and defy convention. Are you a poet?' (p.59) The seeds of
the idea that a poet is not only someone alien to society and its values,
but also a person having greater access to the truth, is thus planted in
Fergus1 mind; and through portraying Fergus' growing confidence in tnis
duality, Jenkins can explore the nature of truth itself.
As he advances in his career, Fergus increasingly leads a double life,
developing the worst character traits possible in his officer persona, but
believing this to be excused by virtue of his being a poet underneath the
15. See, for example, his description of the poem entitled 'Trie Burning
of the Boots':
Tins poem, it may be remembered, tells how a night patrol
stumbles into a field littered with scraps of decomposed
bodies and dollops of numan excrement. Evidently a mass
grave and a huge latrine had been blown up together. Such
freaks happened. Afterwards they could not get the stench
of mortality off their boots, which had to be burnt. But,
to their horror their new ooots, no matter how frenziedly
dubbined, gave off the same sad stink. , 1fr,
20. See interview, Appendix p. 442.
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public facade. Indeed in his memoirs he often talks of 'the poet in me'
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as if of a separate person. Thus in tne poacher incident descrioed
above, iie retrospectively comments: 'Only arid perfectionists would nave
expected me to be as understanding of and as compassionate towards the
poor in my capacity as an ambitious social being, as I was in my capacity
as an inspired poet.1 (p.156) He then proceeds to excuse his lack of
such perfection: 'Poets nave a hard enough task showing mankind wnat
truth and love are, without their having to be truthful and loving themselves,
at any rate all the time.' (p.136) In Fergus Lamont, therefore, Jenkins
can be seen repeating, but encapsulating in one character, the central
conflict of A Would-be Saint. One part of Fergus can, like Gavin, with¬
draw from the world, recognising the truth by escaping constrictions.
The other lives in the world and must face its judgements. Arguably
Fergus is in an impossible position; his experiences as a social climber
obviously affects what he writes as a poet, even if his attitude differs.
Yet, although he can write poetry about life in Gantock, about tne War and
tne Hebrides, he must, for his own peace of mind, separate his moral stance
from his actual Dehaviour. Remaps only when he is in the Heorides do
the two worlds coalesce and for tiiat reason his time there is seen as the
spiritual climax of his life. At that point tne balance between fact and
fiction, between ideal and ttie real, seems finely poised. Yet after nis
return to the 'real world', when he devotes his time to being a writer, he
becomes a disaster socially, and the process thereafter is seen as one of
gradual decline.
It is perhaps surprising that Jenkins never used a poet or writer before
this novel, since it seems to be the ideal stance from which to engage in
21. Even at an early stage in the novel he comments: 'The poet in me,
tncugh suodued, nevertheless persisted.' (p.5o)
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metaphysical speculation and to represent his own moral outlook, through
the conflicts experienced. However, it would appear that in Fergus Lamont
Jenkins makes explicit certain anxieties about the nature of writing and
the role of the author. Does trie writer depict a truth which can be
referred to reality or an ideal which can only be contained witnin tne
fiction? And does the author have the power to set up as a God-like
figure with a key to the truth? These concerns have always oeen implicit
in Jenkins1 novels but nave never been so directly explored or with such
confidence. Although he may achieve some distance by the fact tnat Fergus
is a poet and not a novelist - and, indeed, stales that: 'I never had any
interest in novels' (p.131) - he nevertheless examines the position and
responsibility of the writer with considerable thoroughness. If Fergus
as a character may: not always be wholly credible he can nevertheless be
seen as reflecting an ironic disquiet with tne authorial role, rather than
indicating any artistic failure on Jenkins' part.
Certainly Fergus is both an example of the paradoxes of the writer, and
an explorer of their nature. Jenkins, as a Scottish writer, frequently
has Fergus as Scottish poet discussing other Sccttisn writers, their anom¬
alies and pretensions. And as the example closest to his own heart in
social and moral attitudes, Fergus often aisccurses on Sir Walter Scott:
'In his novels,' he states, 'Scott rejoices in madwomen and fisnwives,
but it was duchesses he entertained at Abbotsford.' (p.136) He also
describes his admiring reaction to a portrait of Scott: 'I studied this
for some time, for he was a Scotsman who had done with success what it was
my ambition to do; that was, write about common people and assort with
nobility.' (p.SO) Scott is thus used to demonstrate and justify the
aivergence between ideal and real, art and life, which Fergus sees as
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governing his own existence. Fergus, himself furthers the ironic
stereotype of the poet, as in his role in the Hebrides or standing as a
ghost at the War memorial in Gantock; even his wearing of the kilt seems
to be a poetic parody of his Scottisnness. Nevertheless, Fergus also
achieves a certain status by the end of the novel due to the fact that
Jenkins closes the book with a framing, concluding note by Fergus1 son,
denying Fergus the last word, taking away his control and making him into
an enigma of the fiction. Even Fergus1 value as a poet is left uncertain.
Calderwood offers him an explanation of his success: 'You could never have
written such good poetry if you had been able to think things out to their
nihilistic conclusion. Then you would have had to remain silent. Like
me 1 (p.290), but not only does this statement directly contradict Fergus'
vision of himself as the poet, the man who sees the truth where others
cannot, by implying that vision is successful only because it is limited,
but Calderwood's praise of Fergus' poetry which initially so flattered
him becomes a form of censure because of the malevolent, misanthropic
nature Calderwood has acquired. The conclusion, therefore, offers us no
final judgement on Fergus' worth as a poet, or of the validity of his
insights, but retains an essential ambiguity. Nevertheless, through
Fergus, Jenkins places his concerns within a tradition of Scottish writing,
staking a claim for his idiosyncratic point of view, making his place in
that tradition extend in reference beyond itself, and doing so with a far
greater confidence in his right to such literary cross-references than he
did in his early novel, Happy for the Chi Id.
The novel's ambiguity and irony therefore reveal an expansion of Jenkins'
moral concerns, a more open assessment of their wider philosopnical and
practical implications. Douglas Gifford offers an interesting explanation
of this new maturity wnen he writes:
All his previous novels spoke either of redeeming
grace cr bleak scepticism about humanity: and
Fergus Lament seems to pull them..all into one...
Fergus Lamont' has Fergus the quintessential Scottisii
snob, social climber, denying his background, and
Fergus the private saint and martyr; with a final
detachment from ootn which is most chastening. "
Tiiis quality of detachment seems worth emphasising, since it is achieved
tnrough the duality which permits us to identify with Fergus (out only to
a certain extent)and also allows Fergus to represent the indecision and
doubt as to moral standards that is so often the fate of the reader in a
Jenkins1 novel. As such, he becomes writer and reader of his own life, an
well as a character within its fiction. The reader is therefore drawn
more deeply into the dilemmas established oy the novel but also allowed to
view tnem with a mere humorous awareness of the inherent ironies tiian is
usual in a Jenkins1 novel.
The problems of a social morality are also dealt with mere explicitly than
in previous works. In the incident when he first discovers he is a poet,
Fergus realises that the teacher Jirkmyre, represents the 'Presbyterian
attitude1 to literature and begins to wonder: 'Was there a contradiction
between truth and gentiemanliness?" (p.57) He tnen proceeds to put this
concept into practice in his life, although he is net always sophisticated
in his awareness of its effects. Jetty, his wife, makes a similar point
with consideraDly more force when she indicates that the 'gentlemanly'
minister will, in fact, condone her adultery: 'In realistic theology,
Fergus, infidelities that save a marriage are not the same as infidelities
that wreck it.' (p.147) Indeed, the idea of a 'realistic theology' is
22. Gifford, 'New Scottish Fiction', Books in Scotland, 5 (Autumn
1S79), 14-15, p.14.
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seen as a basis of Scottish morality, at least by Fergus:
I still believed, cr rather felt as a poet, that
Kirkncpe, Cargill and Ettrick and their kind had
tnroughcut the centuries set up in Scotland a
morality that put the ability to pay far in front
of tiie necessity to forgive and love.
(p.77)
In his condemnation of grocers, lawyers and managing directors Fergus is
also presenting an argument against the social and economic faces of
Calvinist morality that is sustained throughout the novel, although a
distinction needs to be made nere between tne effects of a 'realistic
theology1 which can be applied to the practicalities of existence, and
the metaphysics of Calvinist philosophy which can be linked to tne idea of
a single, external truth that Fergus so desperately seeks. Fergus1
grandfather is seen as the prime exponent of the former,of a social Calvinism:
My grandfather did not allow my mother to be buried
in her own motner's grave; nor did he go to ner
funeral. He displayed atrocious callousness; yet, oy
tne sneer effontery of faith, he compelled most
people to think of him as a Christian of formidable
and maqnificent staunchness. , 0-,s(p-27)
It is this tyranny of the spirit - 'To the stern Calvinist no one was
innocent, not even a new-born baby' (p.235) - that Horrifies Fergus, and
tnat he finds so pervasive in Scotland. Even on East Gerinisn, the local
minister exemplifies such cruelty: 'He had cnce knocked off the head of a
cock with ins stick because he had caught it treading a hen on tne Sabbath.'
(p.22b) Yet Fergus can also trace the influence of Calvinist thinking
in its worst aspects within his own cnaracter, such as in tne moment when
he rejects his son. At that moment, he also reaches an awareness of
religion's essential contradictions: 'There must have been many moments,
with his face against a closed door, as mine was now, when my grandfather
naa seen himself, not as one of the elect, but as one cf those cast into
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o'uter darkness.1 (p.241) Yet, like his grandfather, Fergus can extenuate
himself by seeing his actions as necessary to save his scul. Moreover,
although a Calvinist sensibility is shewn to oe isolating when in an
extreme form, it can also have value in preserving a certain distance: in
battle, for example, Fergus sees himself as one of the Elect in order to
survive: 'The men in my company called me anointed. Tiiey intended
sarcasm and achieved truth.1 (p.96)
In contrast to its stern moral rigidity, the other aspect of Calvinism wnich
can set one apart is grace, a quality that Fergus also encounters, and
wnich JenKins treats with his usual amDiguous irony. Fergus1 ooyhcod
friend, Jock, offers him one of his first insights into its nature: 'Fie
nad done wnat among a graceless people always provo<es angry derision:
dressed in rags, he had dared to be chivalrous.1 (p. 10) Fergus thus
realises that, like the other aspects of a true Calvinist morality, sucn
qualities do not make for the easy operation of their possessor within
the human community, since they signal 'difference1. He comments:
'Every man excused himself with the plea that he would be honest ana
truthful always, if only he could depend on all other men to be honest
arid truthful too, otherwise he would be shamefully taxen advantage of.'
(p.190) Yet within this inescapable circle, tne form of behaviour
adupted, that of moral relativism, is seen as only a poor means of
preservation; no freedom of action is involved, since any choice is
governed by fear of tne unKncwn and unfamiliar. As a doctor in tne novel
remarks to Fergus: 'Most of us are prepared to tolerate only wnat we
understand and approve of.' (p.261) The relativity of a public morality
is thus revealed as a constraint, and the novel's highlighting of such
restrictions Decomes a cry for an alternative - a cry which is governed
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by the realisation of the impossibility of that ideal. In Fergus Lamont,
however, this acknowledgement of humanity's flawed and constricted state,
seems less despairing and possessing more understanding ,than some of
Jenkins1 previous novels, partly since it emerges through the personality
of the reprobate Fergus. As well as seeking for ideal states, he is all
too familiar with the dangers of idealism: 'My own mirror had made me
aware that the human face, if it tried too consciously to light up had
with idealistic zeal, succeeded only in looking demented.' (p. 155)
A certain balance is therefore achieved between conflicting forces, through
Jenkins' use of ironic humour.
Such humour is even applied to the important concept of good. Carrying
Kirstie's dead body on his back, Fergus thinks:
I remembered that there was a kind of star so
compressed that one thimbleful of it would
weigh a million tons. Surely it was a similar
compression, of unimaginable goodness, that
caused Kirstie to be so crushingly heavy?
(p.259)
The humour here shows both a new compassion for the situation, in Jenkins,
and a new awareness and even acceptance, in one of his characters, of the
ironies of morality in this life. Even when Fergus returns to
civilisation after ten years on East Gerinish and begins to put his new¬
found philosophies into practice, he is aware that the fallibility of
the human soul is still very much in evidence:
I quickly had it confirmed that to be calmly
tolerant of the nervous ill-temper of worldlings
not only, gave me satisfaction and confidence, it
even exhilarated me. In effect and taste it outdid
the finest whisky. Was it, in humbler degree, how
saints and martyrs felt?
(p.274)
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Moreover, he can discuss moral qualities as if they were in some way
set apart from consciousness, as if they occurred without any decision
being mace but were externally imposed: 'It could well be my experiences
in East Gerinish, taken all together, had made me, unknown to myself, a
good man.1 (p.275) This attitude is an apt expression of tne philosophy
tnat led Fergus to create moral tests for his grandfather while not
attempting to come up to any moral standard in his own behaviour. The
God that Fergus perceives is not one who will help him to achieve any
better moral attitude in life, or make (lis flaws seem more acceptaole,
as is the case with a more humanitarian view of God: rather, he states:
'I consider myself a wonderful and unique piece of creation, but believe
nevertheless that for the Creator to perpetuate me, even in an improved
form, for all eternity, would be an abuse of His powers. He has, I hope,
better things to do.1 (p.159)
oust as Fergus Lament is more explicit in its comments on morality than
Jenkins' other novels, so it more directly relates nis ideas on morality
to tne state of Scotland, using Fergus both to epitomise and to parody
experiences of 'Scottishness'. Aware of tne dichotomy between moral
aosolutes and a relative morality that is establisned in his work,
Jenkins then mocks the facile dichotomies tnat have been used in relation
to Scotland - especially that of the Caledonian antisyzygy - merely in
order to avoid more complex analyses. Seeing Scotland both as dominated
in aspirations by Calvinist ethics yet also as a breeding ground for tne
social restrictions and practical limitations which siem from tne attempt
to apply such ethics on a day to day basis, he both mocxs and sympathises
with this conflict through Fergus. Fergus - himself a parodic figure
<»
in nis kilt, and with nis experiences of a Hebridean idyll - is shown as
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attempting to divide the country and its culture into categories and
oppositions. He sees, for example, two worlds of inheritance for
Scotland's people; 'Theirs was by birtii the Scotland of tenements and
low-paid jobs. Mine was the Scotland of castles, famous families, and
heroic deeds.' (p.52) Such an opposition is, of course, snown as
spurious by the fact that Fergus himself mooes vn ooth worlds and thus
transgresses the boundaries described. Likewise, when a young boy, he
sees Scotland's intellectual life as being divided in two; watching an
encounter between his English teacher and the rector this strikes him
forcibly: 'I was watching, I realised vaguely, a clash between two
traditions in Scotland, that of love of learning and truth, and that of
Calvinist narrow-minded vindictiveness.' (p.58) Yet once again Fergus
exemplifies aspects of both traditions, and the novel reveals that tney
are not mutually exclusive; part of Calvinism's original basis is, anyway,
a love of truth. Fergus attempts even to see the two women who
feature in his life contrasted in sucn terms; 'Here was another similar
conflict oetween twc aspects of tne Scottish soul: in the one corner,
represented by Betty, mendacious sentimentality, and in the other,
represented by Mary, ironic truthfulness.' (p.120) Yet once again the
comparison cannot be sustained, since Betty displays a shrewdness near
to ironic truthfulness, and Mary betrays her political values during tne
war and joins with tne party in direct opposition to her own. Even the
simple distinction that the Scots, 'failed as artists and patriots, out
succeeded as engineers and theologians' (p.73) is contradicted by that
image of the arch-Scot and poet, Fergus. Tiie novel thus continues to
offer apparently simple explanations and categories of cultural phenomenon
and then disputes tnem, thus not only reinforcing the idea of a complex
reality Put also shewing human failure in attempting to impose their own
patterns on this reality in order to justify their own place within it.
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Fergus, is not unaware of contradictions in his own role. On tne
novel's first page he states: 'Puritanic and parochial Scots, you
murdered my young and beautiful mother. As one of you I must share the
blame1, and throughout the novel the myths and images of Scotland are
mocked, bankrupted, but emotionally reinvested. Fergus is told that he
looks like Harry Lauder (p.43); Kirstie is supposed to be a Celtic
Deirdre yet dresses like a man and smokes a pipe; Limpy Calderwood,
supposedly one of a tradition of great teachers who inspire the young,
teaches his own democratic brand of Scottish history by concentrating on
the lives of the ordinary people, yet is ultimately revealed as hating
those very people in the present because of their ordinariness. The novel
sets up, yet mocks, stereotyped images of Scottishness; and Fergus, always
struggling with his own sense of a Scottish identity is shown at the
centre of this conflict. We see him having to work at possessing the right
'Scottish' accent, acquiring first that which was necessary for his social
aspirations: 'From his [Lord BaidlandJ1ips I heard for the first time,
the authentic confident bray of the upper-class, and noted the instant
obsequious effect it had on those bourgeois Scots.'(pp.53-54) Later, on
returning from East Gerinish, he has to learn a middle-class, yet noticable,
'Scots' accent, very different from the language of his childhood:
I used the accent that I had evolved in East Gerinish:
not quite landed gentry, not quite officer-and-
gentleman, but not mere school-teacherishly superior
either; in short, it was an attempt to make an authentic
Scottish accent sound refined without at the same time
sounding artificial or effeminate.
(p.275)
A contrast emerges here between what is required to establish identity
in the eyes of the world and what is - or has been - a natural identity.
A similar insecurity can be seen in Fergus' sexuality: a parody of the
virile Scot in his kilt, he nevertheless blames his failure as a lover on
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his Scottishness: 'A natural earthiness of mind added to a Calvinist
conscience makes a combination prejudicial to any lover.1 (p.62) Never¬
theless, the most successful sexual relationship of his life is with
Kirstie, another parody of the 'spirit of Scotland1 figure. However,
that relationship takes place in a setting well apart from what is seen
as the everyday reality of Scotland; outwith the isolated context, it
would appear that all Fergus1 identity problems are caused by a conflict
of external and internal pressures, of the contrast once again between
an ideal and the real. This conflict is reinforced by the contradictions
between Scotland the nation governed by a particular morality, "and
Scotland as a symbol of the problems created by its ethics. Fergus
writes:
It seemed to me that since Scotland was small, proud,
poor, and intelligent, with a long history, she,
better tnan any country I could think of ... had an
opportunity to create a society in which poverty and
all its humiliations iiad been abolished without
refinement and spirituality being sacrificed. It
would be a help that the Scots had never regarded
themselves as particularly refined or spiritual.
(pp.246-247)
Once again disadvantage and advantage are placed in an interchangeable
relationship of paradox, still mocking both ideal and reality.
The paradoxes to which the novel points are not resolved in its conclusion.
Fergus' experience of an almost apocalyptic return to Gantock - standing
in Calderwocd's garden watching as ocmbs fall on the town - is not
permitted to stand as a moment of climax. If it nad been, we would have
been in danger of forgetting that old man writing his memoirs, wnc co¬
exists with and yet succeeds the 'fictional' Fergus. We would also oe
in danger of seeing the last response of that Fergus - 'I felt no hatred
of the young German airmen doing their loathsome duty, and for the people
of Gantock, at that moment suffering terror ana pain and death, I felt only
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pity and love.' (p.253) - as a moment of triumphant moral acceptance, a
glimpse of the truth and understanding he had sought for so long.
Instead, the concluding 'Footnote' reminds us of the strange 'author'
who has rejected all admirers, even his son, who refuses any charity, any
chance of 'salvation' from his fate, and who dies alone in poverty and
sickness. The brief factual note from his son returns us to an awareness
of the dual hero, and emphasises tiiat moments of transcendence are
inevitably followed by the continued need to survive with an implacable
and often sordid reality. Even the one ideal, the one aspiration put
forward by the aged Fergus - his desire for a full funeral on East Gerinisn -
is denied him, as the note informs us. And once again Jenkins has denied
us a full commitment to the world of his fiction, by easing us away from
any conclusive emotional response. hot only dees the footnote cast
some doubts on the 'truth' of what we have just read, by telling us that
the important clues of Fergus 'the many poems scattered throughout, some
in their entirety' (p.253) have been removed from the text, but it also
creates a paradox in itself since its author 'T.C. L.', Fergus' son, is
just as firmly rooted in the fiction as the 'character' of Fergus.
As in all Jenkins' novels, therefore, we are left in uncertainty as to how
the moral injunctions expressed by the novel could be applied to our own
existence, constrained as it is with the necessary relativity of circum¬
stance. And, as in all his novels, the conclusion offered provides no
resolution to the issues raised. The 'pity and love' felt by Fergus, like
the 'pity and purified hope and joy' ' experienced by Lady Runcie-
Campbell at the end of The Cone-Gatherers and the vision of Wahab taking
Miss Johnstone's hand at the end of Dust on the Paw: 'as if iie was about
tnere and then to go running with her along, yes, along one of those
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perilous sunlit roads' (p.364), is offered only as a temporary and
ironic response to the intransigence of a moral dichotomy which no
amount of compromise can resolve.
CHAPTER SIX
MURIEL SPARK: IMAGINATIVE EXTENSIONS OF THE TRUTH
'Fiction to me is a kind of parable. You have got to make up your mind
it's not true', wrote Muriel Spark four years after the publication of
her first novel in 1957J Discrepancies between the realm of fiction
and that world which is generally accepted as constituting our reality
never appear to have greatly worried Spark. Even in that first novel,
The Comforters, only a few, mocking, concessions are made to the conventions
of literary realism and throughout her long writing career she has avoided
any responsibility for the recreation of a recognisable reality. The
idea of 'truth', however, is something with which she is very much concerned.
Brought up in Scotland until she was seventeen, Muriel Spark, although
half-Jewish, was exposed through her education to a rigorously Calvinist
environment and, as The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie indicates, appears always
to have been both attracted and repelled by the absolutes offered within
the Calvinist philosophy of moral realism. Her conversion to Catholicism
in 1954, however, seems to have provided her with an acceptable context
for her own absolutist vision. Shortly after this she began to explore
her moral perspective in the writing of fiction.
Unlike Robin Jenkins, Spark does not place her interest in a non-realist
expression of moral absolutes against the humanist tradition of the
realist novel. Having never adhered to the conventions of literary
realism she has no need to confront them in her work. Indeed, in her
often disparaging comments on fiction she betrays more allegiance to
writers such as Hogg and Stevenson than to any of her more recent literary
1. Muriel Spark, 'My Conversion', Twentieth Century, 170, no. 1011
(Autumn, 1951), 56-63, p.53.
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2
predecessors or contemporaries with their commitment to social realism.
In her fiction Spark both assumes and implies in her readers an awareness
of all the paradoxes and inconsistencies which Jenkins tends to conceal
when creating his illusion of reality and only occasionally allows to
break through; and she highlights those contradictions in the form which
Stevenson exploits but never fully exposes. The control of the author,
the paradox of authorial foreknowledge when opposed to the manipulation of
suspense, the fixing, defining, yet limiting, qualities of language are
all explicitly recognised in her novels, becoming a characteristic of her
style.
Nevertheless, although she need never face up to and challenge realism, a
process of literary confrontation is enacted within all her novels. Freed
from the conventions of realism, the form of the novel which she adopts,
with its exposure of control and foreknowledge, is one which closely
resembles a Calvinist view of the universe, the view that all is known to
an omniscient God with absolute control of human lives through the frame¬
work of predestination. Having transcended the problem of the novel as.
a kind of 'lying' by avoiding realism, she still has to confront the fact
that the fictional form she has adopted displays the very characteristics
2. Her attitudes to fiction reveal parallels with Robert Louis Stevenson,
who wrote: 'There must be something wrong in me, or I would not be
popular.'
Letter to Edmund Gosse (2 January, 1886), Letters vol.2, 1880-1887,
Works XXVIII, p.311.
And in his behaviour James Hogg appears to have attempted a similar
undermining of the seriousness of his fiction: 'he himself frequently
set out to encourage the general interest in his character as a self-
educated man of letters. Thus, on his visit to London he courted
publicity by wearing a shepherd's plaid, and throughout his life he
frequently referred to himself as 'the Ettrick Shepherd'.
Douglas Mack, Introduction, James Hogg, Memoirs of the Author's Life
and Familiar Anecdotes of Sir Walter Scott (Edinburgh, 1972), p.ix.
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of that religion which, although it may have inculcated her with a desire
for moral absolutes, has also made her fear the tyranny of absolutes
which it imposes. In her own life Spark escaped from Calvinism to
Catholicism. In so doing she moved away from a moral vision which
imposes absolutes only through an external frame, thus rendering all
human aspiration within it futile, to a religion which emphasises absolutes
as a potential means of liberation from the constraints of an earthly
reality. In her fiction too she seeks transcendence, a means of convert¬
ing the imposition of limiting absolutes within the form to an appreciation
of the potential within absolutes for making humanity perceive a new
dimension to our apparently limited reality. Her own moral perspective,
her own desire for moral absolutes, makes it impossible for her to write
according to the conventions of the liberal humanist novel, as her comments
on the subject consistently indicate:
There is metaphorical truth and moral truth, and what they
call anagogical, you know, the different sorts of truth;
and there is absolute truth, in which I believe things which
are difficult to believe but I believe them because they are
absolute. And this is one aspect of truth, perhaps. But in
fact if we are going to live in the world as reasonable beings,
we must call it lies. But simply because one puts it out as
a work of fiction, then one is not a liar. 3
Spark must therefore - and in this she does resemble Jenkins - find a
means of disrupting the very form of fiction which she has chosen to write.
And only through this contradictory conjunction can she achieve the aim
she has stated for her fictions:
I don't claim that my novels are truth - I claim that they
are fiction, out of which a kind of truth emerges. And I
keep in my mind specifically that what I'm writing is
fiction because I am interested in truth - absolute truth
- and I don't pretend that what I'm writing is more than
3. Frank Kermode, 'The House of Fiction: Interviews with Seven English
Novelists', Partisan Review XXI, no.1 (Spring, 1963), 61-82, pp.80-81.
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an imaginative extension of the truth - something
inventive. 4
Fiction for Spark thus offers both a paradigm of her own inner tensions
about the function of moral absolutes, and a means of exploring and
reaching a temporary resolution of them.
Each novel examined in this chapter can be seen as a variation on this
central concern which is manifested in different attempts to disrupt the
form of her fictions. In The Comforters she examines similarities between
the novelist and God, assessing the responsibility of authorial fore¬
knowledge, while also making quite clear her departure from the realist
novel. Loitering with Intent, a novel written more than twenty years
later, proves her continued acceptance of her particular position as a
writer, but celebrates those contradictions implied in her first novel.
In assessing the ways in which she has moved from the justifications of
The Comforters to the rejoicing of Loitering with Intent, however, three
other novels, which examine the same problematic yet indicate the direction
her writing was taking, need to be considered. The Driver's Seat, Not to
Disturb and The Hothouse by the East River, published within three years
of each other, provide increasingly extreme expressions of the darker
implications of the fictional form but, as a result, lead to an increasingly
liberating disruption of that form, and provide a context for her enjoyment
of all fiction's paradoxes as expressed in Loitering with Intent.
The Comforters
5
As Spark herself acknowledges, The Comforters was both an innovation and
4. Kermode, 'The House of Fiction', p.80.
5. Muriel Spark, The Comforters (London, 1957). All page references
are to this edition.
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an experiment for herself: 'I had to write a novel about somebody
writing a novel, to see if it was aesthetically valid.'6 And as it is
an attempted validation of fiction, she makes little effort to conceal
her preoccupations. The novel's central character, Caroline Rose, is
herself a writer, currently working on a book entitled Form in the Modern
Novel - and is having trouble with the chapter on Realism. Spark, however,
making only a passing acknowledgement to the conventions of realism, appearing
largely untroubled by it. When Caroline becomes involved with her ex-
lover's attempts to discover the truth about his grandmother's connection-
to a smuggling ring, she seems to be in the situation of a typically
English, detective novel, 'plot'. To her alarm, however, she soon begins
to hear voices apparently writing her into scenarios within that novel, a
novel which, she discovers after her initial fear and bewilderment, she
will in fact write. As the cover blurb of the Penguin edition demands:
'Caroline Rose. Heroine or author of this novel?'' The novel, however,
sustains a more complex contradiction than this question seems to imply.
Initially Spark's own concept of a novel, with all the flaws and fissures
of fictional illusion exposed, is placed in opposition to the readers'
expectations of what a conventional novel should be and which we are led
to believe, from the first few opening pages, this novel will be. Yet
although the contradictions within her novel expose the illusion-creating
devices conventionally concealed within the fictional form, they simul¬
taneously make claims for the work as a 'truthful' revelation of the
novel writing business. Thus, while adumbrating a different kind of
6. Ian Gilham, 'Keeping it Short' (edited interview), Listener, 24
September, 1970, 411-413, p.412.
7. Muriel Spark, The Comforters, Penguin edition ('Harmondsworth, 1982).
'reality' by admitting the process of illusion, the novel also makes us
distrust any fictional claims of presenting reality. Our conventional
expectations of the form are also denied through the narrator. Firstly
the figure of Caroline Rose blurs the distinction between the narrator,
as someone relating all that has happened, and the character, who does
not know what will happen next. Secondly we also have to contend with
an authorial voice which apparently remains separate from Caroline's
'voices' until one becomes the other or both are subsumed into a single
and unusually omniscient narrator at the end of the novel. Full
identification with an authorial stance, a narrative voice, or even an
'innocent' central character, is thus denied the reader.
Once all illusions that this could be a 'realist' novel are destroyed
Spark begins a more complex exploration of the deeper contradictions and
moral implications of the form she has evolved. Indicating what will
become a central problematic in all her novels, the focus of disruption
in The Comforters is the novelist's power of control and foreknowledge.
The novel opens by concentrating on Laurence Manders, but his limited
position within the conventional novel 'plot' is soon made clear when he
is described as being 'now in the present tense.' (p.4) Laurence,
therefore, is trapped within the novel world. Caroline's 'voices', in
contrast, are able to discuss even the future in the past tense. And,
as Caroline begins to hear voices, and we become aware of a controlling
presence behind the narrative, intruding into it, the conventional
implications of a pattern of sequential events becomes distorted. This
process begins simply enough when Caroline and Laurence send each other
almost identical messages simultaneously: 'It was horrifying. Like
predestination', Caroline remarks, (p.66) And soon all Caroline's most
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instant thoughts are echoed by the sound of a typewriter and by her
'voices':
Meantime, she was trembling, frightened out of her
wits, although her fear was not altogether blind.
Tap-click-tap. The voices again: Meantime,
she was trembling, frightened out of her wits,
although her fear was not altogether bliricE
(p.44)
The real force of this predestination becomes apparent, however, when the
voices begin to anticipate Caroline's actions:
"I've just jerked up to the fact," she said, "that
our day is doing what the voices said it would. Now,
we chatted about Eleanor. Then about ourselves. All
right. We've frittered the day. The narrative says we
went by car; all right, we must go by train. You do see
that, don't you, Laurence? It's a matter of asserting
free will."
(p.108)
Despite all Caroline's attempts at resistance the car journey does take
place and, due to her initial delaying tactics, the couple are involved
in a car crash which later emerges as a necessary part of the novel's
plot. In trying to assert free will she ends by complying with her
destiny. The usual novelistic process, whereby all that happens next
explains all that has happened before, is thus distorted in its emphasis
throughout the novel as the external 'voices' and the voice of the
narrator combine to precede the sequence of events leading up to a happening
with an account of the event itself. And the most paradoxical expression
of this distortion is reserved for the novel's conclusion, in which
Laurence is shown puzzling over the way in which a letter he wrote to
Caroline, destroyed and never posted, could appear in Caroline's finished
novel, with a deeper irony implicit in the fact that we are reading an
account of the incident from a source which is external to both Laurence
and Caroline but is still part of the novel.
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Spark's technique here is not merely one of playing games with chronology,
a reordering of the fiction's events, but represents an attempt both to
make the readers aware of fiction as paradigmatic of a moral universe,
and to lead us into questioning this patterning. In all her novels
Spark highlights the framework of absolute control implicit in her fiction,
thus indicating that the events of her novels take place in a world in
which absolutes may freely operate. Her exposure of this element of
absolute control disrupts the usual patterning of events in fiction
whereby suspense and the desire for denouement are created. Through her
technique therefore the readers' attention is not focused on the outcome
of temporal sequences but is turned towards the presence of an authority
which, through its control and foreknowledge transcends time. Yet
although the authorial power of control, which establishes absolutes
within the fictional form, may be seen as a form of imposition, limiting,
defining, and fixing each part of the fiction in its place, the same
power of control frees it from the necessity of 'realistic' logic,
necessary causality, or confinement to the realities of temporal sequence.
Within the absolute framework erf the fiction, therefore, a potential
liberation from the constraints of 'reality' can be presented. What is
said in the fiction may limit and define but anything may be said.
And in this apparent paradox the central contradiction of Spark's meta¬
physical position emerges, for, if an absolute framework in the Calvinist
sense may appear a form of imposition, a tyrannical control, the Catholic
outlook recognises that this same absolute framework may represent a
potential liberation from human constraints. Within the fictional process,
too, the same awareness of limitation and sense of potential is presented
in combination, with both being created by the authorial presence.
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The potential of fiction is indicated within the novel by ironic manipul¬
ations of the narrative position. At one point, for example, the
reader is presented with the character of Eleanor, looking slightly worn,
looking in fact 'like a framed portrait, indistinct, in need of some
touching-up.1 (p.92) If the pun on the physical and artistic implications
of the phrase 'touching-up' is accepted the following chapter can be seen
as supplying exactly what is required as in it we are given further
information about Eleanor as she was in her youthful past. Her physical
appearance is thus rejuvenated at the same time as her fictional character
is given a greater depth. A similar instance of the controlling presence
supplying the reader with whatever may be required or desired occurs when
Caroline is lying in her hospital bed. We are told that the narrator
does not know enough about hospitals to describe a ward in full detail,
yet a few pages on we are given precisely that description, with the
implication that Caroline has, by then, acquired the requisite experience
to make such a description credible. And when Edwin Manders advises
Caroline on her novel: 'Make it a straight old-fashioned story, no
modern mystifications. End with the death of the villain and the
marriage of the heroine' (p.231), the novel can ostensibly meet all his
demands, with Georgina Hogg drowning and Louisa Jepp marrying Mr Webster.
The authorial authority may thus meet all the apparently arbitrary demands
made upon it.
Another example of the deeply ironic approach to the potential of fiction
in The Comforters can be seen in the creation of Mrs Hogg, the novel's
villain, and a character who simply disappears when no-one is looking at
her. She is described as having'no private life whatsoever' (p.177) -
which explains her ability to become invisible when on her own, although
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by the end of the novel she is disappearing even when only asleep - and
Spark uses her in two very different ways. On one level Mrs Hogg
performs the fairly conventional function of being a testing point for
the other characters who react to her in a variety of ways. To Helena,
who cannot see the world in terms of a deeper moral dimension but judges
only by appearances, Georgina Hogg is simply 'not all there1 (p.208)
whereas to Mervyn Hogarth, whom Mrs Hogg threatens with exposure throughout
the plot, she is a creature of 'turbulent mythical dimensions' (p.159),
and to Caroline, as novelist, she is 'not a real-life character ... only
a gargoyle.' (p.157) Yet, since Georgina is also presented as a
manifestation of evil - although convinced, nevertheless, of her own
righteousness - she can be seen as operating within a world of absolutes
and thus exposing the hollowness of the fictional process which tries to
place her within a limited and relative reality. In her disappearances
she mocks the fictional illusion that any character can be known and
described. Her location within this other dimension of the novel is
emphasised by the narrator's own ironic comment on her disappearance of
'God knows where she went in her privacy' (p.177), which, in addition to
colloquial usage, could be given a literal interpretation. Spark's
own comments on the nature of fictional 'characters' reinforce her
reasoning behind the manipulations of Mrs Hogg:
I don't understand about writers who tell you that
the characters take over, develop a will of their
own. I know the whole time that I'm making them up
and I have to go on making up what they do, and this
is very hard work. They must be real and behave
logically and in character. I never believe in them
myself but just have to hope the reader does. 8
In Mrs Hogg's more conventional role as a moral testing point Spark
fulfils' the readers' expectations of a solid character but, by allowing
8. Mary Holland, 'The Prime of Muriel Spark' (interview), Observer
Colour Supplement, 17 October, 1965, 8-10, p.10.
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her to disappear and then reappear, Spark completely disrupts our con¬
fidence in such conventions and makes us aware of the absolute power of
the fiction's controller to create or destroy anything s/he chooses
within the fictional world.
The limiting effect of absolutes (and of fiction as a form of absolute
imposition) is also indicated throughout the novel however; and here
Caroline Rose plays an important part. While she enacts the role of
novelist by the end of the novel, her responses as she listens to the
voices telling 'her' story can also be seen as reflecting those of the
novel reader, resistant to narrative impositions. Moreover, through
Caroline, Spark can convey her own resistance to the absolutism of her
position within the fiction. As the car crash incident shows, Caroline
resists the impositions of a foreknowing narrative presence in control of
her. She also condemns Laurence for becoming involved in that very
'novel plot' which she is trying to resist: 'I can see clearly that
your mind is working under the pressure of someone else's necessity, and
under the suggestive power of some irresponsible writer you are allowing
yourself to become an amateur sleuth in a cheap mystery piece.' (p.115)
But, since in Caroline herself the distinctions between author, narrator
and reader become blurred, her own resistance to 'someone else's necessity'
is highly ironical. If she is 'the authorial presence' in the novel she
can only achieve this status retrospectively, responding in some future
time to her own past; any 'foreknowledge' in her case can only be gained
by the end of the novel's events but before the writing of the same novel.
As we are told at one point: 'Her sense of being written into the novel
was painful. Of her constant influence on its course she remained
unaware and now she was impatient for the story to come to an end, knowing
that the narrative could never become coherent to her until she was at
last outside it, and at the same time consummately inside it.' (p.206)
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The image used here, of enclosing, overlapping boundaries which
simultaneously define and yet undermine, is a frequent one in Spark's
novels and it is an image which conveys the full paradox of fiction's
absolutism. Yet in Caroline Rose Spark has also found a means of
questioning and undermining that absolute control of the fictional narrator,
as the control which Caroline later appears to possess is mocked throughout
the novel.
At one point, Caroline condemns her 'voices' for showing 'Bad taste ...
Revolting taste', but a few sentences later the narrative contains the
comment: "'Bad taste0 - typical comment of Caroline Rose.' (p.157)
Apparently external comments are also made about the role which Caroline
is intended to fulfil in the novel. In hospital, for example, she is
supposed to be safely out of the way so that the plot can proceed without
hindrance: 'Caroline among the sleepers turned her mind to the art of
the novel, wondering and cogitating, those long hours, and exerting an
undue, unreckoned, influence on the narrative from which she is supposed
to be absent for a time.' (p.155) The statement thus creates a certain
ambiguity as to whether we are being given a comment on the 'authorial
presence' from an even more external 'author' or whether we are hearing
Caroline herself analysing her own involvement. Indicating the
problematic role of free will within an external determining framework -
such as fiction - or within a divinely governed universe, framed by a
system of absolutes, Spark juxtaposes the choice of either suffering
under the impositions of absolutes or of becoming an absolute in oneself.
But by bringing these alternatives together in the different aspects of
Caroline Rose's position - the choice of either being within the fiction
as a character suffering under authorial control, or the novelist outwith
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the fiction determining and controlling events and characters - and by
having Caroline simultaneously enact both roles, Spark herself transcends
the necessity of making such a choice; she also offers her readers the
recognition of another possible position. By separating out the roles
of narrator, novelist, character, reader, through her exposure of the
form's contradictions, while at the same time bringing them all together
in Caroline, she diverts responsibility for that final element of control
from herself. Avoiding any restrictive claims that could be made for
her own position as author, she places herself in a less rigidly defined
relationship to both characters, readers, and 'narrator'.
Yet even the transcendence to which Spark points only retains its potential
«
within the fictional form; the enigmatic contradictions of the novel serve
to remind the reader that no 'ideal' solution to the paradoxes which
Spark explores can be extrapolated from the novel and applied to reality.
As Mervyn Hogarth, one of the novel's more cynical characters, comments:
'Reality, however, refuses to accommodate the idealist.' (p.18) Therefore,
although The Comforters does succeed as Spark's 'justification' of her
fiction-making, it also shows that from her very first novel she was
aware of, and acknowledged, a central problematic in her own fiction.
In presenting a view of the potential of absolutes to free the reader from
the constraints of limited and relative conceptions of 'reality', she is
also externally imposing a view which cannot be expressed validly within
that same limited world which conventionally accords with the reader's
experience. Only by reading her fiction can the reader perceive any
expansion of the boundaries of this 'reality', but this expanded
perception will always be limited because it must be contained within and
dependent upon the world of fiction. However, having made this
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acknowledgement of a central paradox within her own aims for fiction,
Spark is then free to explore the contradictions of her position and to
find more extreme ways of disrupting her fiction, defying the absolutist
limitations of the form, and making its contradictions a source of
1iberation.
In the novels which followed The Comforters Spark continued to examine,
through a variety of approaches, the issues of control, foreknowledge, and
predestined endings which she raises in that first novel. And as she
faced up to the darker implications of her own fictional form, she became
increasingly adventurous in testing the boundaries of the fictional world,
disrupting it by emphasising its own inherent contradictions and, at the
same time, using the fictional paradigm to explore her own moral
perspective. In particular, The Driver's Seat, Not to Disturb and
The Hothouse by the East River, all novels from the middle of her career,
c
show her pushing further the paradoxal position, set out by Caroline Rose,
of both accepting and transcending the power of fiction, of being both
'outside' the narrative and 'at the same time consummately inside it1.
The Driver's Seat
9
The central paradox examined in The Driver's Seat is that of control, both
divine and fictional, although the novel also focuses on the question of
endings, fictional and personal. Lise, the novel's heroine, deliberately
sets herself up as a murder victim, planning a holiday in a 'Southern
town' in order to achieve the desired end. The novel details the day of
her preparation - buying suitably loud clothes so that she will be
9. Muriel Spark, The Driver's Seat (London, 1970). All page references
are to this edition.
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noticed, talking in a variety of strange accents, and generally behaving
in such a way that she will be fixed in the minds of all who see her on
her journey - and then describes her ultimately successful search for
the man who will kill her. In her behaviour Lise is seen as abandoning
all the constraints of her previously repressed character, a character
which Spark describes succinctly while also implying an imminent change
of personality to take place in the 'future':
Her lips are slightly parted; she, whose lips are
usually pressed together with the daily disapprovals
of the accountants' office where she has worked
continually, except for the months of illness, since
she was eighteen, that is to say, for sixteen years
and some months. Her lips, when she does not speak or
eat, are normally pressed together like the ruled line
of a balance sheet, marked straight with her old-
fashioned lipstick, a final and a judging mouth, a
precision instrument, a detail-warden of a mouth;
she has five girls under her and two men.
(p.12)
With similar objectivity and detachment we are told of Use's efforts
once abroad, as she single-mindedly devotes her attentions to finding
the 'right type' who will kill her. After various false alarms, which
reduce her to an anxious fear of failure, she eventually meets the
'right' man and literally leads him away to kill her. 'Lise touches
him on the arm. "You're coming with me," she says.' (p.150) In so
doing Lise takes control of the plot of the novel in which she is a
character, and makes events comply with her own intentions. As Ruth
Whittaker points out: 'Lise is reduced to making drama out of the most
elemental plot of all, the knowledge that her life will end.'10
Lise's actions, however, have significance on a more important level than
10. Ruth Whittaker, The Faith and Fiction of Muriel Spark (London, 1982),
p.118.
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merely providing a psychological insight to her character; by her death
she gives the rest of her life a meaning outwith her own personality.
As Frank Kermode argues in The Sense of an Ending: 'Men in the middest
make considerable imaginative investments in coherent patterns which, by
the provision of an end, make possible a satisfying consonance with the
origins and with the middle.'11 The novel, although written in the
present tense, uses our awareness as readers of her end as part of our
knowledge of Lise as a character. Her identity is created at a very
early stage by the manner of her forthcoming death. Soon after the
novel begins, we are told: 'Her nose is short and wider than it will look
in the likeness constructed partly by the method of identikit, partly by
actual photography, soon to be published in the newspapers of four languages.'
(p.26) Our understanding of Lise is therefore always partly constituted
by the fact that we know she will be a murder victim, a foreknowledge
which we not only share with the author, but also with the character.
Spark's technique thus moves one stage further than a conventional
novelistic exposure of a work's devices. It is not uncommon for the
reader to be given some indication from the novelist as to what a work's
conclusion will be; most novelists are, after all, well aware of their
12
characters' fates. It is unusual, however, to have a character actually
complicit in that conclusion's inevitability, and threatening to usurp
the control of the novelist. Yet by such a device Spark shifts
responsibility for establishing absolute control of the fictional world
from the author outwith that world to someone from within it. Unlike
Caroline Rose, Lise will not attempt to evade her destiny as novelist of
11. Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of
Fiction (New York, 1967), p.17.
12. Dickens in Great Expectations, Emily Bronte in Wuthering Heights,
and Thackeray in Vanity Faircan all be seen as exploiting this
characteristic of their fictions.
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her own fate but will actively determine it for herself.
The pattern which the novel establishes, however, is a more subtle one
than a simple evasion of authorial responsibility on the part of Spark
for, while she allows the reader to perceive Lise as governing events,
she also makes quite evident the degree of foreknowledge and control which
belongs to the narrator of the novel. This she achieves by using a
third person narration which continually provides comments on the future,
inserted into descriptions of the past. And she emphasises the strange¬
ness of this prefigurative capacity by her consistent use of the present
13
tense. Nevertheless, she also succeeds in maintaining the reader's
awareness of the distinction between the narrator as story-teller and the
novelist as external controller. The narrator, for example, appears so
detached from events as to be frequently ignorant of Use's state of mind.
At one stage this narrator even comments: 'Who knows her thoughts? Who
can tell?' (p.74) The narrator then, it seems, does not have complete
control over, or insight into the character's every thought, whereas the
novelist has control of events, even foreknowledge of them, but not control
over Lise's 'necessary' part in them.
Yet Lise herself is not in complete control either, although she may
aspire to that position. Despite having her 'end' in sight, she still
worries that she may not achieve it. At one stage, in a taxi-cab, she
almost breaks down at this thought:
"Anything the matter, lady?" says the driver.
"It's getting late," she says, weeping. "It's getting
terribly late."
13. 'I'm so interested in the present tense that I've redone a book I've
been working on for three years, The Hothouse by the East River, and
put it all in the present tense.'
George Armstrong, Interview, Guardian. 30 September 1970, p.8.
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"Lady, I can't go faster. See the traffic."
"I can't find my boy-friend. I don't know where he's gone."
"You think you'll find him at the Metropole?"
"There's always a chance," she says. "I make a lot of mistakes."
(p.134)
Significantly Lise is, at this point, being driven as a passenger in a
hired car; she is not in the 'driver's seat' which she will occupy, in
every sense, when she takes her murderer to commit his crime. For the
moment she has not only lost her 'boy-friend' but has also lost control.
And Lise is dependent upon contingency in this way throughout the novel.
Her victim is the very man whom she has sat next to on the plane. The
old lady whom she befriends, Mrs Fiedke, unconsciously returns Lise to
the very type for which she has been looking: the man on the plane,
seeking to escape Lise, turns out to be the old lady's nephew. And
Mrs Fiedke even provides Lise with the murder weapon, a knife bought as
a present for that nephew, by asking Lise to keep it safe until she can
give it to him. Irony is thus created out of events by the novelist at
the expense of the characters. And because the characters, including
Lise, do not have full responsibility for the situations in which they
find themselves, and for the way in which apparent chance aids them, it
becomes impossible - and irrelevant - to attribute blame for the act of
murder to any one individual. We cannot tell, for example, whether
Lise is ultimately and totally in control or whether she is merely
complying with a destiny that has been externally decided for her and for
her victim and murderer. Even the killer only makes feeble protestations
at her demands because his inclinations tend towards murder anyway;
fate appears to have provided him with a victim. Yet the reader can
• also recognise a certain truth in his excuses to the police that he had
nothing to do with the organisation of the crime, that he was not even
responsible for the location of the site, marked on the map; 'She must
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have made it herself. She knew the way. She took me straight there.'
(p.156) With his past history of mental problems and sexual violence,
he has no means of resisting the opportunity to kill when it is presented
to him; the choice of doing good or evil is no longer open to him.
The reader, however, also shares the murderer's predicament; we too have
followed Lise to her death and have been left no alternative but to
witness it; we are therefore, like the murderer, guilty of a certain degree
of complicity. But in our compulsive pursuit of a conclusion to the
novel, a conclusion of which we have been forewarned but nevertheless
insist on pursuing, we adopt another role which demands an even greater
degree of complicity. In our avid desire for an ending we too come to
occupy the 'driver's seat', forcing the novel onwards to a conclusion that
will satisfy us by ratifying all the hints about Lise's demise which we
have previously been given. And by forcing us into this role Spark
indicates exactly how the reader, by setting in motion the act of reading
itself, by desiring an ideal solution - whether it could be applicable to
our experience of reality or not - is as much part of the fictional process
as the novelist, who is normally seen as being in the 'driver's seat'.
Spark herself is aware of the impetus which drives the events in the novel
towards their inevitable conclusion; describing it as a 'study in self-
destruction', she admits that this was a frightening book tOvwrite. Once
the writer creates the original situation, it seems, she becomes
responsible for forcing events through to their conclusion: 'I frightened
14
myself by writing it, but I just had to go on.' In order to avoid this
14. Gilham, 'Keeping it Short', p.413.
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fear and to bring the novel to its end, she keeps the novel on a certain
level of detachment, eschewing the emotional involvement which she so
15
much dislikes. She also keeps the dialogue to a minimum, permitting
very few conversations which are inessential to Use's purpose, and she
provides very few details about the lives of any of the characters except,
again, those which are necessary to the bare plot. As a result the
novel not only lacks the usual requisite background solidity of the
realist novel but its barrenness becomes part of the novel's mythology,
a reinforcement of the sterility of individual life which it portrays.
Lise leads a barren existence in a bare room, discarding all but the
essentials. Likewise, when faced with the absoluteness of the end, of
death, humanity is reduced to an essential and bare relationship within
an external context. It is only in such an absence of the circumstances
and superfluous details of everyday reality that absolutes can be
recognised. The novel itself makes this point when Lise, asked how she
will recognise the 'right type' when she meets him, if she will feel a
'presence', replies: 'The lack of an absence, that's what it is. I
know I'll find it.' (p.105) And Lise's room, as described at the
beginning of the novel, indicates her earlier and less successful attempts
to achieve such a recognition: 'The lines of the room are pure; space is
used as a pattern in itself.' (pp.18-19) The style of the novel itself,
moreover, operates according to a similar pattern. With its prose
refined down to essentials, fiction is presented as a stark defence
against nothingness, an attempt to define absolutes by placing them within
a context of absences; but the process also becomes a form of definition,
15. 'I think it's bad manners to inflict a lot of emotional involvement
on the reader - much nicer to make them laugh and to keep it short.'
Gilham, 'Keeping it Short', p.412.
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as the barest of details provided delineates the boundaries of a vacuum.
In Catholic terms, the vacuum in which Lise operates is that of free
will in the context of God's foreknowledge. However, Lise is also
guilty of using that notion of free will to evade the blame for her own
suicide. And, as Malcolm Bradbury points out, Lise's approach can be
applied to the novel itself: 'The novelist's victory, happily derived
at lesser cost ... is also casuistical, a kind of outwitting of the
nouveau roman by showing that if the world is all present and disconnected
there is always the claim of a future;plot can be won from a plotless
world.Yet, although Lise perversely exercises free will, the novel
still contains a sense of her being in thrall to some form of predestin¬
ation. She must, for example, find exactly the 'right type' destined
for her and this necessity leads to a totally functionary approach to her
present existence. Bill, of the microbiotics, is discarded because he
is almost too kind to her, wishing to establish some form of relationship,
whereas all she seeks is the deliverer of her death. She dislikes it
when characters attempt to become intimate, to reveal their personalities
to her. And, her response to the proximity of death would seem to
indicate that she is not fully master of her own destiny but is yielding
to an external force: 'As the knife descends to her throat she screams,
evidently perceiving how final is finality.' (p.159)
Maintaining the ambivalence about who is in control even in the conclusion,
the image of the 'driver's seat' not only blurs distinctions between
novelist, narrator, character and reader, attributing to each a degree
16. Malcolm Bradbury, 'Muriel Spark's Fingernails', Possibilities:
Essays on the State of the Novel (London, 1973), 247-255, pp.253-254.
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of responsibility: the image also provides a sharp focus for Caroline
Rose's contradictory wish of being both outwith and inside the narrative.
Whoever is in the driver's seat has the freedom to 'drive' anywhere, to
make anything happen. Yet this same liberation calls for choices on
the part of the 'driver', the controlling force, as to what should be
done, what direction to take. Fiction offers a parallel conflict of
apparent arbitrariness and necessity. Although Lise attempts to control
the fiction from inside, to achieve absolute control from within, she too
becomes a 'victim of necessity', and suffers through her own absolutism,
unable to defy the inevitability of the narrative she has set in motion.
Yet through sacrificing Lise the novel itself becomes a means of
revealing the danger of such absolutism, and in this condemnation
temporarily escapes from the very boundaries which it criticises.
Not to Disturb
Despite the fact that The Driver's Seat and Not to Disturb1Ire only a year
apart in publication, the latter shows a distinct advancement in the
sophistication of its approach, as well as conveying a sense of greater
relaxation in the writer as she moves from the intensity of the thriller
format to a parody of the Gothic novel.
Having taken the concept of absolute control to one of its limits, Spark
now concentrates on pushing the implications of predestination in fiction"
to another extreme. Although both novels favour Spark's manipulations
of the present tense, Not to Disturb is even more radical in its disruptions
of conventional literary chronology and sequential patterning. If The
17. Muriel Spark, Not to Disturb (London, 1971). All page references are
to this edition.
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Driver's Seat exploits narrator, character, and reader's expectations of
a future ending, Not to Disturb follows the logical trajectory of this
position until it becomes a novel which discards even the plot of the
'future' as already being a part of the 'past'. It also moves away
from attributing any activity to the central characters governing events
in order to ensure that the 'future' will take place as planned. Although
Lise has an end in mind, she also has an active role to perform in order
to ensure its completion, as can be seen in her anxious search for Mr
Right and her careful planning of details, even down to all the effort and
emotion expended in trying to find a dress that wi11 stain. Lister, the
main manipulator of Not to Disturb, in contrast, has the plot of the future
(and the end of the novel) so firmly fixed in his mind that he need do
nothing to make it happen, only ensure that events are not too disrupted
by external contingencies. Any plans that he does make are for a time
when all the novel's event - and the novel - are over. The sequence of
events within the novel, therefore, is, in a sense, irrelevant to the
patterning of the work. The pattern, determined before the novel begins,
becomes an absolute, and we can only await its inevitable fulfilment.
The situation which makes this pattern possible is the supervision of a
group of servants over the murders and suicide of their two aristocratic
employers and the secretary-lover of both in a locked room within their
mansion. Even before events take place the servants have decided what
will happen, make plans accordingly and, when their employers retire to
that room, with orders 'not to be disturbed', simply wait for the
conclusion of the inevitable. The servants, led and inspired by Lister,
have foreseen all that will happen; they even know what will be the murder
weapon, and have made preparations to exploit their own positions of
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involvement to the utmost advantage. Ready to tell their stories to
specially selected reporters through prepared interviews, they have also
worked out all the financial arrangements for the eventual film rights.
Since we are told of all this at the beginning of the novel, there is
very little room left for suspense. The novel therefore is virtually
deprived of any peripeteia, a literary device which Frank Kermode describes
as depending 'on our confidence of the end; it is a disconfirmation
followed by a consonance; the interest of having our expectations falsified
is obviously related to our wish to reach the discovery or recognition by
an unexpected and instructive route.' He goes on to point out: 'The
more daring the peripeteia, the more we feel that the work respects our
18
sense of reality.' In Not to Disturb, however, nothing disturbs; there
is no sense of disconfirmation. Indeed, it would be impossible for one
to exist since any events in the 'middle' are already subsumed into those
of the end. Eleanor, perhaps the one character who is less than completely
certain in her assumptions of the future, is even reprimanded by Lister
when she questions his use of the past tense:
"The whole of Geneva got a great surprise."
"Will get a surprise," Eleanor says.
"Let us not split hairs," says Lister, "between the
past, present and future tenses." ^ ^
By assuming a position of God-like omniscience in which past, present
and future all become part of a continuum, Lister transcends all temporal
distinctions. And. ironically the readers, with the end placed before
them at the beginning, are put into a similar position.
Having, througn this extreme situation, establisned an exposure of that
18. Kermode, The Sense of an Ending, p.18.
predestination always implicit, but more usually concealed, within
fiction, Spark proceeds to illustrate the power of this absolute
determination of the future over events, as even contingencies are
subsumed into the overall plan. She achieves this by showing the 'fate'
of events which initially appear to be 'unexpected'. One such event
takes place when the servants discover that the lunatic youth upstairs
is actually the direct heir of the property, but he is immediately married
off to the very pregnant maid, Heloise. The extreme fortuitousness of
this discovery is aided by the arrival - again 'unexpected' - of the
'Reverend', who is just in time to marry the couple. Although such events
may not have been foreseen, it is still implied that the characters
involved have very little choice in their participation and that all
unexpected happening will nevertheless culminate in the 'expected' ending.
As Lister points out: 'one foresees the unforjseen.' (p. 109) Informing
the clergyman that he must perform the marriage ceremony, he adds: 'You
can't refuse. In fact, you may not refusej (p.112) As soon as anyone
becomes part of this train of events all choice of action is denied them;
they are incorporated in a sequence with its own internal logic, becoming
victims of a predestined 'necessity'. As Lister states: 'There is a
vast difference between events that arise from and those that merely
follow after each other. Those that arise are preferable.' (p. 111)
Lister's parody of the aesthetically fulfilling processes of causality in
fiction reveals the extent to which the 'real' world and the world of
fiction have been merged.
The other interruption in the course of the novel is the arrival of two
friends of the (about to be murdered) secretary, who are refused entry to
the house since they 'don't come into the story' (p.51), and are later
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referred to as 'only extras', (p.142) Since Spark herself admits that
her aim in writing the novel was, 'to pare everything away which I feel
19
to be superfluous', it is not surprising that the same rigour is applied
to the two unwelcome guests by the narrator of the novel. They are
killed immediately, without sympathy, and only in a subordinate clause:
'Meanwhile the lightning, which strikes the clump of elms so that the two
friends huddled there are killed instantly without pain, zig-zags across
the lawns, illuminating the lily-pond ....' (p.143) They depart unnoticed,
in the almost religious fervor with which the inhabitants of the mansion
view the progress of events: 'What is done is about to be done and the
future has come to pass', marvels Lister, (p.12) Appreciation of this
future is therefore seen to transcend the death of two individuals, to be
on a higher level, even, than time itself. Or such, at least, is the
point of view of Lister, who asks that we do not 'strain after vulgar
chronology.' (p.66)
It is Lister who, tnroughout the novel, indicates to the servants the more
philosophical implications of their roles outwith that of purely monetary
gain. When counting a small part of his future income, he remarks,
'Small change, ... compared with what is to come, or has already come,
according as one's philosophy is temporal or eternal' (p.17) This
distinction in chronology is an important one for the novel, and plays an
important part in Spark's work in general. Writing at an early stage
in her career on the particular qualities of Proust, she states:
Proust in many ways anticipated a revised notion of Time
which is still in process of formulation. He regarded
Time subjectively, and realised that the whole of eternity
19. Philip Toynbee, Interview, Observer Colour Supplement, 7 November
1971, 73-74, p.74.
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is present 'now'. Of the span of his life recollected
in its eternal aspect, Proust writes "I had at every
moment to keep it attached to myself ... I could not
move without taking it with me." Proust fixes in our
mind that when we use words like 'forever', 'eternal1,
phrases like 'everlasting life', 'world without end',
we refer to an existence here and now, to which we
cannot normally approximate. He reminds us that there
is a method of apprehending eternity through our senses,
anal|jous to our sacramental understanding of eternity
by faith. 20
Spark has always acknowledged Proust as an influence on her work, and in
this passage we can sense her admiration for his description of the
conjunction between temporal and eternal. Capable herself of using her
fiction to achieve the 'apprehension of eternity' which Proust describes,
she obviously appreciates the theological implications of his use of time,
especially when seen in relation to the Catholic concept of transcendence.
As Henri de Lubac points out when discussing Catholic doctrine on the
relationship of humanity to the eternal:
Man is only himself, he only exists for himself here and
now if he can discover within himself, in silence, some
untouched region, some mysterious background which ... is
not encroached upon by the cares of the present....
There is in man an eternal element, a 'germ of eternity',
which already 'breathes the upper air', which always hie et
nunc evades the temporal society. The truth of his being
evades his being itself. 21
One one level, therefore, Not to Disturb can be seen as offering an image
of eternal atemporality, a transcendence of earthly chronology, a new
perspective on the 'truth of being1. But the novel also exemplifies
the horror which this tyrannical control, this absolute, eternal frame¬
work can impose upon the values inherent in a relative conception of
earthly existence.
20. Muriel Spark, 'The Religion of an Agnostic: A Sacramental view of
the World in the Writings of Marcel Proust', Church of England Newspaper,
27 November 1953, p.1.
21. Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: A Study of Dogma in Relation to the
Corporate Destiny of Mankind, translation Lancelot C. Sheppard (London,
1950), pp.198-199.
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The most obvious criticism of predestinal forces is made through the
portrayal of the servants. If the novel does offer transcendence of
time, they would appear most likely to have access to this eternal realm.
In the main, however, they are depicted as callous, grasping and unpleasant.
Ruth Whittaker, seeking to provide a Catholic interpretation of the novel,
is clearly disturbed both by the power of the servants and by the force
of authorial authority. Commenting on the death of the two intruders, she
states: 'Inevitably all authors make such a selection, but it is the
gratuitous display of power, the revelling in it, which makes this incident
22
so peculiarly disagreeable.' Such callousness, also exemplified in the
denial of a profitable marriage to Sister Breton, the idiot's nurse, can,
however, be viewed as an extreme parody of the predestinal implications
of authorial control, and a mockery of the bleak philosophy of predestin¬
ation itself. If the future, past and present are all one in the eyes
of an external presence - be it God or a novelist - there then seems little
point in distinguishing between them. In the light of some future world,
or the end of this world, they will blend together and can be defined only
by their not being at the point of ending. Teleological extremes
thus provide an illustration of what happens when a universe - fictional
or moral - becomes totally orientated towards its own end, an end which
alone can offer full understanding of that universe.
Through exaggeration of this teleological approach Spark can present an
extreme mockery and implicit criticism of predestination but in so doing
must also mock her own use of a fictional and predestined form to make
that criticism. In Not to Disturb this ultimate mockery of fiction (and
22. Whittaker, p.120.
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condemnation of predestination) is achieved by dooming those callous
servants to a life trapped within the fictional dimension.
As Ruth Whittaker points out: 'The novel is filled with jargon relating
to the manufacture of fictions, the welding together of events; it sounds,
collectively, like an extract from a thesaurus: 'coalesce', 'coincidence',
23
'connect', 'construe', 'co-ordinate', 'correspond'.' Such examples,
however; are only the tip of the iceberg; not only is the use of certain
jargon a noticable feature in the novel, but the role of such words in
the construction of sentences is of equal importance as the following
exchanges indicate: "'I wouldn't have married him for choice," says
Heloise. "He doesn't cognate'" (p.111); '"He had a kind of something,"
Pablo says. "I know," says Hadrian. "But it didn't correspond.1"
(p.90);1"Heloise, relate." "What do you mean, I don't relate?" she says.
When you relate you don't ask what you mean. There's such a thing as a
trend.'" (p.89); "'Lister can adjust whatever it is. Lister never
disparates, he symmetrizes," Heloise says and lights a cigarette.' (p.95);
'"Lister's got equibalance," he says, "and what's more, he pertains.'" (p.
95); "'You have to me be frank with those types," Heloise says. "They
don't connect," says Pablo.'" (p.108) In each of the examples verbs
which are usually transitive are used intransitively; as a result no
'connection' is made by them, and little sense is gained from them. The
objects of the statements never appear; like the novel they await com¬
pletion but, again like the novel, are nevertheless complete and must be
taken as they stand.
In tnese extremes the novel does not, however, represent a rebellion
23. Whittaker, p.119.
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against, or movement away from the fictional form; rather it shows what
can happen if the conventions of the form are themselves pushed to extremes.
If connections are made too completely by the patterns of fiction, by the
neatness of a plot, if all can be anticipated, then the value of
connectiveness itself as a means of conveying significance is lost. And
yet this is what fiction usually does - although it attempts to provide
an illusion of incompleteness in the process. It is therefore unsurprising
that the fate of all the characters in Not to Disturb, who have so cleverly
plotted and accepted the ending of their own story, is to be assimilated
into their own fictions. Even before the novel ends we can hear their
voices reciting 'life-stories' to various prepaid journalists. The
triumph of Lister and his colleagues therefore only has any meaning within
the fiction they themselves have created. As Lister himself proves,
they are lost in a tangle of novelistic cliches, denying all reality -
even that of geometry - through the power of words; 'To put it squarely,
as I say in my memoir, the eternal triangle has come full circle.' (p.39)
Likewise, by holding an ending in mind - although concealing it
conventionally by suspense and delay - fiction destroys any connection it
may have with a 'real' world in which endings cannot be foreseen. The
characters who attempt to achieve their triumph over time are thus
implicitly condemned and, rather than transcending their existence by
moving into an eternal dimension, they become trapped forever within the
realm of fiction; in trying to move outwith the narrative they become
'consummately' trapped within it - and thus also trapped within the
temporality they have sought to transcend.
The Hothouse by the East River
The third in this group of novels written in the early 1970s, The Hothouse
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by the East River, is the most complex of the three novels in its theme
and construction. If Lise fails either to be totally outwith the
narrative or to control it completely from within, and if Lister, by moving
outwith events becomes trapped within the fiction, the two central characters
in The Hothouse by the East River can be seen as trapped within different
dimensions of the fictional process, one trapped by his attempts to impose
absolutes, the other apparently liberated by her acceptance of them. And,
although the novel again examines foreknowledge and authorial control in
relation to 'endings', the greater complexity of the approach is indicated
in the first line of the novel: 'If it were only true that all's well
that ends well, if only it were true.' Indeed, the whole question of
endings takes on a more metaphysical implication in the novel for, as we
eventually discover, the novel's main characters, Elsa and Paul, although
appearing to lead lives of frenetic luxury in New York, are in fact already
dead. Focusing on their haunted and haunting deceptions of themselves
and each other, the novel also examines the confrontations with imaginary
friends and family which take place in their apartment on the East River,
an apartment where the faulty central heating system means that the
inhabitants are permanently suffering from excesses of heat or cold. But
the novel also looks back into the past of Elsa and Paul, to a more
peaceful existence in England - paradoxically during the war - when both
Paul and Elsa worked with an intelligence unit and where they were both
killed in a bombing attack.
It is New York, however, which operates in the novel as an important
indication of the work's metaphysical dimensions as well as providing a
24. Muriel Spark, The Hothouse by the East River (London, 1973). All
page references are to this edition.
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social milieu. The world of the wealthy in New York may exemplify a
particularly extreme aspect of modern life, but it is the attitudes
governing this lifestyle, revealed in the behaviour of Paul and Elsa but
also of their family, Pierre and Katerina, their friend Princess Xavier
and the psychoanalyst Garven, which are of primary interest to SparK.
She describes the city as:
borne of the vivisectors of the mind, and of the mentally
vivisected still to be reassembled, of those who live
intact, habitually wondering about their states of sanity,
and home of those whose minds have been dead, bearing the
scars of resurrection. ,
(p.12)
For Paul and Elsa this is a suitable setting; not only are they ghosts,
haunting New York as it haunts them, but they too wear the scars of mental
and spiritual resurrection. The nebulous world of New York gives them
full scope for their self-deceptions and mutual game-playing. It also
provides Spark with a means of conveying to the reader just how far the
boundaries of reality that we can accept in a fiction may be tested for,
although we are given frequent clues to the 'unreality' of the situation
with such paradoxical remarks as Paul's cry of 'How long ... will these
people, this city, haunt me?' (p.104), while he is, in fact, haunting
the city, and Katerina's enquiry to her mother: 'Am I on a trip or is
she real?', to which Elsa replies 'Both' (p.106), we, the readers, like
Paul, try to ignore the implications of such comments and to resist the
world of apparent 'unreality' imposed by the fiction. To accept the
situation which the character's remarks imply would be to accept the
fact of Paul and Elsa's death and would destroy any recognisable solidity
within the novel's world. Like Paul we wish to remain in a state of
ignorance about the true dimensions of this strange world which, the novel
implies, is nevertheless a dimension of reality although one ignored in a
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liberal humanist perspective. To accept the dimensions of this world
would reveal the limits which are conventionally ascribed to existence in
order to confine it to a relative and comprehendable definition of
'reality'. Paul therefore reflects our own reactions to what seems an
alien and absolutist vision.
The most obvious dimension of his and his wife's existence which Paul
wishes to ignore is the very fact of their deaths; for the reader, however,
the focus of the novel is not their deaths, but their existence within a
modern vision of Purgatory. Modern New York, 'Manhattan the mental
clinic ... New York the sedative chamber where you don't think at all
and you can act as crazily as you like and talk your head off all day,
all night' (pp.89-90), provides an ideal image of Purgatory, the dimension
between Heaven and Hell in which sinners suffers temporarily but in a
timeless, atemporal world. Like New York, Purgatory is not only a
place, it is a state, a condition. And Paul, trapped within this dimension,
unable to face the implications of his position,needs this world where 'we
analyse and dope the savageries of existence.' (p.89) Elsa, in contrast,
is much more liberated from the demands of New York, - she even leaves it
to go abroad at one point - and can accept both her death and the necessity
of a period in Purgatory, while recognising too the absolute dimensions
of Heaven and Hell which define its boundaries.
Examining the analogies between New York and Purgatory, Ruth Whittaker
complains that the allegory is not sustained: 'it is impossible to
25
interpret the internal symbolism'. Spark, however, can be seen as
25. Whittaker, p.129.
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encapsulating a condition and the feelings created by it rather than
attempting any direct allegorical representation. Moreover, I would
argue that she is using the idea of Purgatory itself in a symbolic way,
as representing similar problems and paradoxes within metaphysics and
within the nature of fiction. It is therefore worth considering more
closely the definition of Purgatory itself. According to the New Catholic
Encyclopaedia it is:
the state, place or condition in the next world, which
will continue until the last judgement, where the souls
of those who die in the state of grace, but not yet free
from all imperfection, make expiation for unforgiven
venial sins or for the temporal punishment due to venial
and mortal sins that have already been forgiven and, by
so doing, are purified before they enter heaven. 25
As Paul and Elsa were killed unexpectedly, while enjoying a temporary
reconciliation but still suspecting each other of sexual deceptions,
Purgatory is their just destination for an undefined period of suffering.
Although it is neither Heaven nor Hell, it is removed from the world of
earthly reality and provides a dimension in which the sinner is aware
of the ideal state but is also conscious of failure, for the pain suffered
in Purgatory is not necessarily that of conventional hellfire but,
according to Catholic doctrine, is the punishment of being deprived from
27
the beatific vision of God. Spark therefore places her subjects in a
vacuum, in a world defined by the absolutes of Heaven and Hell but in
itself operating as a definition of both these states by virtue of being
neither of them. Within the vacuum, there exists a world
26. New Catholic Encyclopaedia (Washington, 1967), XI, p.1034.
27. 'The temporary deprivation of the beatific vision, for which the
soul would otherwise be prepared, is surely one of the keenest
punishments of purgatory.'
New Catholic Encyclopaedia, XI, p.1036.
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without any of the relative definitions of an earthly existence. And
yet it is implied that this is, in fact, the reality of an earthly existence
which the realist novel cannot convey.
The two characters within this world respond very differently to it. To
Paul the most frightening aspect of his existence is exactly its lack of
definition; throughout the novel ne attempts to ignore the world into
which he is thrown and to impose upon it his own regulations and control.
Within the dimension of Purgatory the boundaries to it provide the only
true definitions, are the only certainties, and within these boundaries
all attempts to establish relative meaning becomes futile. Paul,
attempting to avoid this realisation by attributing all distortions of his
desired reality to tlsa's imagination, is nevertheless faced with state¬
ments and ideas which break down all his accepted notions of time and
space logic. Elsa confidently states: 'I never do today the same as I
did yesterday' (p.86), and she tells Paul': 'You think of everything my
dear, when you don't think of something else' (p.42); even when Paul asks
his daughter, 'Did you really date him, Katerina'? she replies 'Oh, I
don't know, Pa. If it wasn't him it was someone else.' (p.85) He is
thus confronted with a world in which any rearrangement of time is possible,
and betrays his own subconscious participation in it by such comments as:
'Today she began a new course in analysis, or perhaps she began last week'
(p.17); he even begins to doubt his own control over the present:
'"Are you ready?" he says. Or perhaps he says, "Now, pull yourself
together"' (p.19); and his sense of the past:
He cannot remember exactly what day it was that on
returning to the flat at seven in the evening - or six ...
if he could remember the season of the year ...
In the evening - he cannot exactly rememoer the day,
the time of day, perhaps it was spring, or winter, perhaps
it was five, six o'clock... , 1K\
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It thus becomes extremely difficult for him to ignore the fact that in
Purgatory, 'the separated soul no longer lives in the time of this world,
28
but in aevum, where duration is not measured in days and years.1
He is faced with what he sees as a dangerous continuum, a force of
predestination which transcends time and, like Lister's view of events in
Not to Disturb, renders each individual incident within that continuum
meaningless.
In this world of uncertainty Paul's attempt to define the nature of
reality and unreality become focused on his efforts to establish the
whereabouts and identity of Helmut Kiel, a man to whom both Paul and Elsa
were attracted while in England during the war, and whom Elsa claims she
has met working in a shoe shop in New York. All Paul's suspicions of
Elsa, all his recriminations about the past, focus on Kiel but his
obsessive search for him eventually leads not only to a reconciliation
between Paul and Elsa but also to Paul's acceptance of his own death.
Well aware of the nature of Paul's desperate search, Elsa comments: 'If
Paul could be induced to believe this man's somebody else, then he becomes
somebody else.' (p.44) Yet although Paul does eventually accept this
potentiality inherent in Purgatory, brought about by the very lack of
those relative meanings and definitions which he seeks, he never achieves
the total liberation of Elsa. Elsa, trailing her 'faithful and lithe
29
cloud of unknowing across the pavement' (p.168), accepts that if nothing
28. New Catholic Encyclopaedia, XI, p.1036.
29. The Cloud of Unknowing is a religious treatise written by an anonymous
English mystic in the fourteenth century. As Phyllis Hodgson describes
it, quoting from the original treatise, the aim of the contemplative is:
'To eliminate all distractions that play upon the mind in order to
concentrate solely on the goal, this is to enter the cloud, or the
darkness, of unknowing:
When I sey darknes, I mene a lackyng of knowying; as
alle that thing that thou knowest not, or elles thou
hast forteyn, it is derk to thee, for thou seest it
not with thi goostly ighe.
Phyllis Hodgson, Three Hth-Century English Mystics (London, 1967),p.23.
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is real then one can become or can know anything. Her name clearly
linked with the repeated motif of 'someone else', 'something else', she
understands the potential for becoming anything within the limits of
Purgatory, unlike Paul and Garven, the psychoanalyst, who both wish to
establish some kind of normality that they can explain in the terms of a
relative, earthly existence. Elsa, however, represents the extreme of
acceptance of the unknown within an absolute framework, and in her final
reconciliation offers some solution to the darker implications of the
novel's vision. As Peter Kemp points out:
The self, it demonstrates, can never hope to find
security through complete and final understanding
of another person. There will always be the dark
shadow - the unascertained and the ambiguous. The
only way to achieve peace of mind, therefore, is to
become resigned to this and unselfishly make a leap
of faith. 30
The 'cloud of unknowing' which Elsa carries around with her allows for
this leap, indeed demands it for, as Phyllis Hodgson points out in her
book on English mysticism:
The aim of The Cloud ... was essentially psychological:
to destroy the bonds which chain the individual to the
world of his senses and discursive reason, thereby hold¬
ing him from his eternal nature. The exercise taught
must be begun in faith, and only in response to a special
and unmistakeable prompting of grace. 31
By her acceptance of this cloud of unknowing- Elsa can both accept the
absolute dimensions to her existence and enjoy the absence of definitions
within it. And her acceptance of an achronological, providential order
provides an alternative to the darker side of predestination as presented
in Not to Disturb.
30. Peter Kemp, Muriel Spark (London, 1974), p.155.
3-1. Hodgson, p.23.
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Rather than simply presenting New York as a symbol of Purgatory, the novel
can therefore be seen using Purgatory itself as offering symbolic insight
on several levels. Firstly it is used as a means of exploring the
reading/writing process with all its advantages and disadvantages. Paul,
in his attempts to impose a relative interpretation onto the world of the
novel, reflects the struggles experienced by the reader accustomed to the
liberal humanist conventions of the novel in attempting to relate the
patterning of an unreal, fictional world, into a paradigm of significance
for their own existence. Elsa, in contrast, could be described as Muriel
Spark's ideal, if not actually 'implied' reader, liberated from the
constraints of a rigid and secular conception of reality. As such, however,
she has no place within a circumscribed 'reality' and must remain inscribed
into the dimension described as 'unreal' and 'fantastic'.
In addition to reflecting the reading process, the characters and their
32
dilemmas also offer analogies with the making of fiction itself. Paul
is terrified by the potential arbitrariness of his world and tortured
throughout the novel by the jargon of fiction. He is told, for example,
that Katerina 'is a vagary of your mind, that's all' (p.152), and events
in which he believed are described as 'That was your imagination running
away with itself.' (p. 151) And it is this dangerous freedom of creation,
in which any kind of 'reality' can be contemplated, which he attempts to
evade for most of the novel while trying to impose his own rigid 'authorial'
control over events to such an extent that he even protests about the
'real' existence of Elsa: 'She's a development of an idea, that's all.
She's not my original conception any more. She took a life of her own.'
(p.149) Elsa herself is most terrifying of all to him, in fact, because
she has accepted and moves within this expanded 'reality', revelling in
32. Auberon Waugh describes the version of New York presented in the
novel as a 'literary hell'. 'Spark Plug', Spectator, 17 March 1S73,
331-332, p.332.
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its potential for liberation. As well as the 'ideal reader1 therefore
s"he also offers a contrast to Paul in being representative of an 'ideal
author', freed from all the constraints of necessary representation and
thus of fixing or settling for any single vision of reality. Yet Elsa
is also a dangerous force to introduce into everyday conceptions of a
relative existence, since the 'something else' which she represents
renders all the conventional terms and definitions useless,aestroying
the moral imperatives necessary for a conventional functioning within that
relative existence. In the dichotomy between the two characters, there¬
fore, Spark explores further the implications of the pressures and the
potentialities of the fiction-making process, the conflict between the
necessity of controlling and defining and the desire to establish a
potential for escaping from definitions and control.
Even this fictional analogy is not, however, of paramount importance in
the novel. As in the other works discussed in this chapter, Spark uses
the processes of fiction as a means not only of examining her own moral
disquiet with the novel as a form but also of assessing the novel as a
paradigm in itself of the moral and ontological paradoxes which she faces.
Trapped in their hothouse Paul and Elsa are brought together as representing
conflicting and essentially unreconcilable attitudes to the relationship
between absolute ideals and the relative morality necessary for operating
within an experiential and circumscribed reality. The central irony of
the novel is that Spark brings these two together in a moment of
reconciliation, a reconciliation achieved by both through acceptance of
the leap of faith; this leap of faith however is in itself only made
possible within a 'circumscribed reality' by the existence of the fiction,
the very medium that helps create the dichotomy in the first place. And
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in this apparent paradox the most central conflicts of Spark's attitude
to morality and to fiction are expressed. In attempting to maintain a
relative moral outlook and to interpret reality within certain human
boundaries which have no room for absolutes, Paul represents a logical
extension of Spark's own fear of acceeding to the acceptance of Calvinist-
like moral absolutes which define, but in a very negative way, everyday
existence. In Elsa and her 'cloud of unknowing', however, a Catholic
answer to Spark's desire for moral absolutes - which, paradoxically,
derives from the same Calvinist inheritance- is presented, in which absolutes
expand the dimensions of everyday existence. And yet, because such a
perspective threatens conventional limitations on 'reality', and cannot
be assimilated into a relative outlook, Elsa remains in her 'hothouse'
and the reader must accept that it is only through the fictional process
that Spark can achieve a satisfactory expression of that 'leap of faith'
necessary for reconciling the ambivalences of a philosophy of moral
absolutism.
In The Hothouse by the East River Spark succeeds in bringing together,
through the reconciliation of Paul and Elsa, two dimensions of absolute
control, with the apparently crazy world of the narrative only becoming
coherent when both characters accept its boundaries from within and can
thus move outwith it. As the tensions of the novel show, however, such
a reconciliation can only be achieved after considerable struggle, and
the resolution gained is only temporary, kept in that moment of the
fiction.
Loitering with Intent
The tensions evident in The Hothouse by the East River reassert themselves
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33
in Spark's later, and bleaker novels, The Takeover and Territorial
34
Rights. However, the joy in her portrayal of Elsa also indicates
her capacity for celebrating the disruptions of her fiction, for
enjoying the sense of potential achieved by the recognition of absolutes.
35
Nowhere is this made more evident than in Loitering with Intent.
In many ways this novel indicates a return to the basic principles
examined in The Comforters but, if that early novel is an attempt to
examine and justify the implications of the kind of fiction which she
writes, Loitering with Intent represents an affirmation of her continued
belief in the validity of her endeavours combined with a recognition that
her basic suspicions of the form have never been satisfactorally
alleviated.
Spark's ouevre is characterised by her experiments with fictional genres
and Loitering with Intent, ostensibly falling into the category of
autobiography, is no exception. Whether the novel is read as an oblique
autobiography of Spark herself, or as the autobiographical memoirs of
Fleur Talbot, the central character, first person narrator, and herself a
writer, it gives Spark the chance to explore further the relationship
between author, narrator, novelist, character and reader, in a tightly-
knit context. Earlier Spark novels have dealt with various types of
image-makers, but a 'writer' has not been the focus of her attention since
The Comforters. In Loitering with Intent she again confronts, with increased
sophistication and enjoyment, the nature of the writer's art. Many of
33. Muriel Spark, The Takeover (London, 1976).
34. Muriel Spark, Territorial Rights (London, 1979).
35. Muriel Spark, Loitering with Intent (London, 1981). All page
references are to this edition.
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Fleur's remarks echo comments made by Spark herself in her infrequent
interviews and, like Spark, Fleur embarks on a literary career in
London during the late 1940s. The novel itself is a retrospective
assessment of the events surrounding the publication of Fleur's first
novel, Warrender Chase, and Fleur's awareness of her role as a writer
obviously gives Spark full scope for assessing her own position.
Moreover, it would seem that an increasing self-confidence allows Spark
to explore in even greater depth the dichotomy between the novelist as
an actual manipulator of events and experience, a source of control and
foreknowledge, a force of definition and limitation, and the novelist
as a potential liberator from the constraints of everyday 'reality',
possessing the power to establish expanded perceptions of the moral
dimension. And in its tone Loitering with Intent establishes from the
start a sense of self-justification in the novelist's pursuit, expressed
quite openly by Fleur herself:
The thought came to me in a most articulate way: 'How
wonderful it feels to be an artist and a woman in the
twentieth century.' That I was a woman and living in
the twentieth century were plain facts. That I was an
artist was a conviction so strong that I never thought
of doubting it then or since ... , 25)
In spite of a greater element of personal involvement than usual, there¬
fore, Spark can achieve detachment through a light-hearted tone yet
can also examine in greater depth than in any previous novels, the function
of fiction in representing unattainable absolutes in opposition to a
limited view of reality while still indicating her awareness of the
problematics of the form which in itself creates defining and limiting
absolutes.
Awaiting the publication of her first novel Fleur Talbot finds employment
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with a Sir Quentin Oliver; as secretary to his Autobiographical
Association she is delighted by his description of it;
"We have all started to write our memoirs, the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth. And we
are lodging them for seventy years in a safe place
until all the living people mentioned therein shall
be living no longer ..."
The Association, as he called it, then comprised
ten people. He gave me a bulky list of the members'
names with supporting biographical information so
selective as to tell me, in fact, more about Sir Quentin
than the people he described. I remember quite clearly
my wonder and my joy ...
(PP.19-20)
And Fleur is soon playing an important part in the Association, being
given instructions which, by their liberality, further encourage her
participation:
By the end of the first week I had been let into
the secrets of the locked cabinet in Sir Quentin's study.
It held ten unfinished manuscripts, the products of the
members of the Autobiographical Association.
"These works when completed," said Sir Quentin, "will
be both valuable to the historian of the future and will
set the Thames on fire. You should easily be able to
rectify any lack or lapse in form, syntax, style, character¬
ization, invention, local colour, description, dialogue,
construction and other trivialities. You are to typewrite
these documents under conditions of extreme secrecy, and
if you succeed in giving satisfaction you may later sit in
at some of our sessions and take notes.
(p.23)
While working for the Association however, Fleur soon notices that Sir
Quentin is beginning to resemble the central character of her own
novel, the evil Warrender Chase, and shortly afterwards he begins to
suspect Fleur of incorporating the memoirs of the Association into her
novel. As his suspicions deepen he behaves increasingly like Warrender
Chase, exerting a control, through moral blackmail, over the members of
the Association. Soon he has Fleur's novel stolen and proceeds to
insert passages from it into the memoirs entrusted to him. Yet his
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action is only an extension of Fleur's own embellishments of the
manuscripts. The boundaries between the reality of fiction in
relation to the external world, and the reality within the fictional
world, are thus blurred, with the only enlightenment on the process
coming from remarks Fleur herself makes about her situation and her own
attitude to fiction.
Indeed, most of the remarks made by Fleur and the situations in which
she finds herself reflect issues raised in The Comforters; but in
Loitering with Intent there is an even greater blurring of distinctions
between authorial control over the world of fiction and absolute control
as operating within the world of the novel. Material researched by
the 'author', Fleur, directly shapes the form of the novel while the
fiction begins to shape her own experiences. The novelist, for example,
may note characteristics of several individuals which, once pieced
together, become prophetic in their resemblance to other characters she
is yet to meet. Such a prefiguration of 'reality' has its most extreme
example in the figure of Sir Quentin. On being asked how well she
knows him, Fleur comments: 'I almost feel I invented him.' (p.113)
And she states: 'Sometimes I don't actually meet a character I have
created in a novel until some time after the novel has been written and
published.' (p.25) More generally, she remarks: 'I was finding it
extraordinary how, throughout all the period I had been working on the
novel ... characters and situations, images and phrases that I absolutely
needed for the book simply appeared from nowhere into my range of
perception. I was a magnet for experiences that I needed.' (p. 15)
As her comments show, Fleur is allowed to share Spark's own awareness of
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fiction's contradictions and throughout the novel she tunnels deeper
into the paradoxes of the fictional process. The main areas in which
these paradoxes are exposed are those first examined in The Comforters
but discussed in greater detail in The Driver's Seat, Not to Disturb
and The Hothouse by the East River. In particular Spark uses the novel
to reexamine the author's power to create character, the effect of
fictional and providential order, and, ultimately, the similarities
between the novelist and the absolute figure of God.
Amongst her reflections on the novelist's art, Fleur comments:
'Contradictions in human character are one of its most consistent notes ...
Since the story of my life is just as much constituted of the secrets of
my craft as it is of other events, I might as well remark here that to
make a character ring true it needs must be in some way contradictory,
somewhere a paradox.' (p.41) And her observation again implies an
opposition between the complete control which the author has over a
character, defining and limiting it, and the same authorial freedom to
be both inconsistent yet 'realistically' contradictory. The authorial
power to define, to limit, is at the same time the power to create, to
add potential to an apparently limited 'reality'; as Fleur admits: 'I
was aware of a daemon inside me that rejoiced in seeing people as they
were, and not only that, but more than ever as they were, and more, and
more.' (pp.8-9) In the novel's emphasis on character in the writing
both of fiction and autobiography, Spark again creates a conflict between
the advantages and dangers of the novelist's position and power, with
autobiography itself shown to be another fictional process whereby the
author can exert control, can create absolutes, although in this case
through his or her own life.
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The irony of Fleur's own autobiographical position thus becomes a
structural feature of the novel as Spark examines, in a more reflexive
way than in previous works, the imposition of fictional absolutes.
And if the concept of 'character' highlights paradoxical absolutes,
an even deeper irony is revealed in the imposition of order, both
chronological and providential. At one point in the novel Fleur
complains:
While I recount what happened to me and what I did
in 1949, it strikes me how much easier it is with
characters in a novel than in real life. In a novel
the author invents characters and arranges them in
convenient order. Now that I come to write biograph¬
ical ly I have to tell of whatever actually happened
and whoever naturally turns up. The story of a life is
a very informal party; there are no rules of precedence
and hospitality, no invitations.
(p.59)
Yet in the novel all the events, both autobiographical and historical,
in Fleur's experience are placed within the pattern of the work in an
obviously formalised and achronological manner. And this stylisation
of the novel makes quite clear the presence of a controlling force.
It would therefore appear that there is no way in which fiction can
actually avoid the process of establishing its own order. The
'necessity' which forces Fleur to 'tell of what actually happened'
is only another variation of absolute authorial control, although in
this instance it is imposed upon the 'novelist' by the nature of her
experiences as both 'character' and 'narrator1.
Throughout Loitering with Intent, therefore, Spark not only disrupts
the form of her fiction, but also mocks her own 'necessity' for writing
it. Her most mocking condemnation, however, is reserved for those
who consciously manipulate others, attempting to transform themselves
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into sources of absolute power. Both Sir Quentin and the fictional
character, Warrender Chase, are seen as evil because of their manipul¬
ations of a small, enclosed group of people. In their machinations
however both men clearly resemble FLeur.in the-role of novelist and -
by implication - Spark herself. The two men can do anything with the
people in their power but whatever they choose to do becomes an absolute
for those individuals, defining and limiting them. Each 'authorial'
persona can thus be viewed as a false god, attempting to establish their
own absolute control but again becoming the victim of 'someone else's
necessity', a process which can only end with God. And as each
manipulator is drawn into 'someone else's' fiction they lose their own
power. Even Fleur momentarily experiences this: 'For a moment I felt
like a grey figment, the 'I' of a novel whose physical description the
author had decided not to set forth.' (p.95) And she also has a strong
sense of losing control of those events which she had thought, through
her creation of Warrender Chase, were her preserve. Foreseeing the
consequences of Sir Quentin's emulation of her own character creation,
she worries: 'It was a frightening thought but at the same time
external to me, as if I were watching a play I had no power to stop.'
(p.182)
Loitering with Intent thus destroys even the notion that the controlling
force of the fiction can present a single 'reality' or can achieve the
absolute nature - although imitating the authority - of God. The
various 'fictions' within the novel are each attempting to present a
single vision, but continually come into conflict and merge with each
other: incidents in memoirs of the Autobiographical Association are
supplemented by passages from Warrender Chase at the same time as Fleur
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is drawing material for subsequent novels from the characters within the
Association; the reader learns only of Sir Quentin's death through the
analogies with the fate of Warrender Chase; characters such as Beryl Tims
are transplanted in personality from one novel to the other. Even Fleur
begins to show concern about the interpenetrations of fictions;
Anyone who has read Warrender Chase will know what happened
to these autobiographies during my absence, in fact, the
possibility was already half in my mind that I was falling
into the same trap as Marjorie in my novel... But the very
fact that it was half in my mind almost, to the other half
of my mind, precluded the possibility that my suspicions
could be valid. It seemed quite unlikely that my own novel
could be entering into to my life to such an extent.
(pp.179-180)
And even the reader, who appears to be in control of all the fictions,
simply by reading the finished novel Loitering with Intent, is denied full
knowledge of the relationship between the different fictional worlds -
for we have not 'read Warrender Chase1 or any other of the novels which
Fleur claims she has written. We too therefore are unable to transcend
the fiction or move outwith it.
Such disruptions within the novel may appear to preclude the novel being
a valid celebration of the potential of fiction; Fleur's own awaremess of
the contradictions of fiction, however, allows her to comment freely on
the process as she refuses to conceal any of the paradoxes it conveys.
Taking her friend Solly's advice of 'Fuck the general reader' (p.77),
she admits: 'I knew I wasn't helping the readers to know whose side they
were supposed to be on. I simply felt compelled to go on with my story
without indicating what the reader should think.' (p.74). Her approach
in itself seems to liberate Spark for,through the position which Fleur
has gained, she can speculate freely on the nature of fiction in relation
to life; more importantly she can also examine the moral implications of
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the novelist's art.
In this respect Loitering with Intent goes further than the other novels
discussed in this chapter, displaying affinities with those novels - to
be discussed in the subsequent chapter - which more explicitly focus on
the moral implications of absolutes, on the polarities of good and evil.
Sir Quentin reminds Fleur that 'Truth is stranger than Fiction' (p.17),
and Fleur echoes Spark's own comments in claiming that her fictions are
directed towards exploring the sense of 'absolute truth': 'I wqsn't
writing poetry and prose so that the reader would think me a nice person,
but in order that my sets of words should convey ideas of truth and
wonder, as indeed they did to myself as I was composing them.' (p.82)
Loitering with Intent therefore contains several claims about the nature
of good and evil. Fleur states: 'I have never known an artist who at
some time in his life has not come into conflict with pure evil ... I
think it true that no artist has lived who has not experienced and then
recognised something, at first too incredibly evil to seem real, then so
undoubtedly real as to be undoubtedly true.' (p.169) Fleur not only
claims that her position as an artist helps her to recognise the true
nature of good and evil but also that such sharp moral dichotomies can
only be conveyed through fiction. Once again the process has both
advantages and disadvantages: fiction's strength is that it can convey
more extreme polarities of morality than are found in relative perceptions
of reality, and as such can also help the reader to recognise moral
absolutes; the absolutes which are recognised,however,must remain within
the fictional form and thus lose their independent validity. Georgina
Hogg hints at the nature of this dilemma in The Comforters, but the
question is examined more clearly in Loitering with Intent, in a discussion
371
between Fleur and her friend Dottie about the character of Marjorie in
Warrender Chase:
It was at this point Dottie said, "I don't know what
you're getting at. Is Warrender Chase a hero or is
he not?"
"He is," I said.
"Then Marjorie is evil."
"How can you say that? Marjorie is fiction, she doesn't
exist."
"Marjorie is a personification of evil."
"What is a personification?" I said. "Marjorie is only words."
(PP.73-74)
Yet although Fleur, expressing Spark's own reluctance to claim any fixed
'truth' for her fiction, resists Dottie's accusations she also sees them
as indicating the means of pointing towards that sense of 'truth and
wonder'. When Dottie tells Fleur that Sir Quentin has been killed in
exactly the manner of Warrender Chase and adds: 'So that it proves your
Warrender Chase to be valid', Fleur denies it with 'Nothing to do with
my Warrender Chase. Quite a different situation. The man was pure
evil.' (p.208) After speaking to Dottie however, she concedes: 'The
theme of Warrender Chase was indeed valid. Such events as I'd portrayed,
even in a different way from the reality, could happen. My Warrender
Chase was valid ...' (p.208) And it is this liberation of moral 'truth'
in an absolute sense rather than truths directly applicable to reality,
that Spark shows to be fiction's greatest potential achievement in
Loitering with Intent.
Fiction's capacity for representing a non-realistic absolute dimension
is at once both its strength and its danger. Nevertheless, although
Loitering with Intent reveals, through Fleur's exploration of fiction's
contradictions, an awareness of the dangers of the fiction-making process,
it is the advantages gained by both the process and the awareness of it
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that are celebrated. Fleur, for example, remarks: 'Although in
reality I wasn't yet rid of Sir Quentin and his little sect, they were
morally outside of myself, they were objectified. I would write about
them one day' (p.199). And it is fiction's capacity for achieving a
detached moral perspective that is celebrated (as well as feared) by
both Fleur and Spark. Fiction is not seen as offering any fixed
solution; on the contrary it is shown to be dangerous to manipulate life
as fiction or fiction as life and to accept fictional impositions as
absolute. Nevertheless, it can offer a temporary moral recognition which
transcends our usual limited perceptions of the moral dimension.
In this transcendence it not only achieves 'an imaginative extension of
the truth' but also conveys to the reader that sense of wonder which
transforms the fiction into mythology, an achievement which is again
celebrated by Fleur: 'Without a mythology, a novel is nothing. The
true novelist, one who understands the work as a continuous poem, is a
myth-maker... and the methods are mythological by nature' (p.141). And
by the end of the novel Fleur, through a moment of epiphany, moves into
that realm of mythology:
Some small boys were playing football, and the ball came
flying straight towards me. I kicked it with a chance
grace, which, if I had studied the affair and tried hard,
I never could have done. Away into the air it went, and
landed in the small boy's waiting hands. The boy grinned.
And so, having entered the fullness of my years, from there
by the grace of God I go on my way rejoicing.
(P.222)
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(While giving a punning acknowledgement to another great modern myth-maker)
36. Rejoicipn-
'The evening air was pale and chilly and after every charge and thud
of the foot-ballers the greasy leather orb flew like a heavy bird
through the grey light.' (p.3)
'And from here and from there came the sound of the cricket bats
through the soft grey air. They said: pick, pack, pock, puck:
little drops of water in a fountain slowly falling in the brimming bowl.'
(P-43)
James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (New York, 1916).
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Fleur is, for that brief moment, both within and outside the fiction
as she sends it gracefully through the air into the waiting hands of
the reader; and although the myth-maker and a part of the myth, she
achieves freedom from any false sense of control through her recognition
of that 'chance grace' which makes it possible.
CHAPTER SEVEN
MURIEL SPARK: A PARADOX YOU LIVE WITH
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Never having followed the conventions of realism, or the humanist view
of existence which it implies, Muriel Spark's fiction is liberated from
the constraints of logic, temporality and causality and can thus be used
to present an expanded vision of reality which transcends the limitations
humanity places upon itself. And in this ability - as she herself
recognises - both the strengths and weaknesses of her novels lie. Yet,
just as she is always aware of, and testing, the potentialities and
limitations of the fictional form she has chosen, so, too, her fictions
are employed to assess the validity of the 'truth' and 'wonder' which she
aims to present through them. The ease with which she can represent
extreme polarities of good and evil, the 'transfiguration of the common¬
place'1 which her fictions appear to offer, is never taken for granted.
Her novels therefore, in addition to re-examining their own fictional
parameters, sustain a continual testing of the moral vision they express.
In the novels discussed in the previous chapter the emphasis on fiction
itself as an expression of the author's metaphysics was the salient
feature; the novels to be considered in this chapter, however, focus more
explicitly on the moral issue.
The majority of critical considerations of Spark's work take her Catholicism
as the basis of her moral outlook; very few even acknowledge her upbringing
2
in the strongly Calvinist environment of Edinburgh. Those early years
1. 'The Transfiguration of the Commonplace' is the title given by Sandy
Stranger to the psychological treatise which makes her famous in
The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie. It is also an apt description of the
sense of 'truth and wonder' which Fleur in Loitering with Intent -
and, presumaDly, Spark herself - wishes her fiction to evoke.
2. Only Allan Massie in Muriel Spark (Edinburgh, 1979) and in 'Calvinism
and Catholicism in Muriel Spark1, Muriel Spark: An Odd Capacity for
Vision, ed. Alan Bold (London, 1984), 94-107, maxes any real attempt
to take Calvinism into account.
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would nevertheless appear to have had a powerful effect on the way in
which she sees the world and views her art; her ambivalent attitudes to
absolutes of morality, as well as the absolutes of her fictional form,
can be seen as deriving from the conjunction of this early awareness of
the Calvinist consciousness with her subsequent conversion to Catholicism.
To argue for this conflict of influence is not, however, to minimise her
involvement with the Catholic church; a deep, although critical,
involvement with that religion is apparent in all her recorded interviews
and articles. It is possible, nevertheless, to view her Catholicism as
partly a result of, and partly a resolution to, her own ambivalent
attitude to the absolutism of the Cal.vinist vision. And in her novels the
ambivalences of this moral outlook are expressed in a variety of ways.
In some novels, of which The Ballad of Peckham Rye is an early example,
she uses humour, light fantasy and metaphysical wit to consider the function
of absolutes within the human consciousness. In The Prime of Miss Jean
Brodie, however, although elements of humour and wit remain, Spark considers
more seriously the implications of moral absolutes for humanity within a
personally familiar and more 'realistic' context. Moreover, because, of
all her works, this is the most obviously Scottish, clearly facing up to
the effects of Calvinism itself, it is an important novel for the issues
considered in this thesis. Equally vital, although less characteristic
of Spark's work, is The Mandelbaum Gate. Moving closer to the conventions
of realism than any of Spark's novels, this novel represents another facet
of her explorations of her own moral vision. Although Spark herself sees
it as an ambitious failure, its juxtaposition of the direct representation
of a human reality with a metaphysical awareness of the dimension in which
absolutes may operate, makes it a full, if problematic, representation of
the tensions and contradictions in Spark's outlook. Spark, however, is
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equally capable of mocking the contradictions which obsess her and in
The Abbess of Crewe, with characteristic wit and lightness of touch, she
both parodies her own fiction and mocks the moral absolutism which prevails
in her novels. In examining these four novels it is therefore possible
to see the flexibility of her approach to both the advantages and the dangers
of a consciousness of moral absolutes. Revealing Spark's awareness of the
contradictions in her philosophical development, they explore the tension
between the Catholic and Calvinist response to the human need and fear of
moral absolutes in a variety of ways, yet still maintain the characteristic
irony with which Spark views both her medium and her metaphysics.
The Ballad of Peckham Rye
3
The Ballad of Peckham Rye ends with the hope that 'there was another
world than this', indicating a potential 'transfiguration of the commonplace',
but the world of the novel itself offers a fantastic environment in which
moral absolutes, the extreme polarities of good and evil, are brought into
conjunction with a reality so banal as to seem 'unreal'. At the same time
as it creates an alternative to the conventional, circumscribed view of
'reality', therefore, the novel also functions as a witty assessment of the
dangers and advantages of this alternative. By introducing a force of
extremes -the novel's central character Dougal Douglas - into an exaggerated
and deliberately stereotyped world of everyday existence, Spark can not
only caricature humanity's adherance to such stereotypes, mocking our fear
- of extremes, our own minor attempts to recreate absolute determinants in
order to give significance to existence, and revealing the human response
when faced with absolutes over which we have no control, but she can do so
3. Muriel Spark, The Ballad of Peckham Rye (London, 1960). All page
references are to this edition.
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in a form which itself evades any of the constraints of such a reality.
The form of the novel thus operates as an ironic reflection of the
issues it examines, while also allowing Spark the freedom of fantasy in
considering its deeper moral implications.
Dougal Douglas - the angel-devil, with bumps on his head where he claims
his horns have been shorn - is an Arts graduate from Edinburgn who comes
to Peckham as an employee of the firm of Meadows, Meade and Grindlay, an
assistant and researcher for their Personnel Manager. Into the set,
patterned world of banalities and stereotypes which constitutes Peckham,
he brings a volatile personality, a chameleon nature, a new perspective
on right and wrong, and a fascination with fictions of all kind. His
external perspective on that small world highlights the absences within the
'reality' of Peckham and makes its inhabitants dissatisfied with their
circumscribed existences; through his presence there he leads a young man
into jilting his girlfriend, a personnel manager into a nervous breakdown,
a director into murdering his mistress, and he brings about a large increase
in the very absenteeism which he was employed to stop. His more positive
function, however, is to encourage the same characters - and others - to
reassess the nature of their existence and examine the 'truth' of their
own beings.
Although the actions which Dougal precipitates may not be positive in the
conventional sense, therefore, they are at least 'significant'; any sense
of meaning or importance to existence previously appears to have been
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absent in Peckham. In spite of paltry attempts to achieve meaning and
identity through their narrow-minded attitudes and their cliched language,
none of the inhabitants of Peckham have previously dared to act in
contravention of the stereotypic norms; Dougal, whose motto is 'Actions
more effective than words' (p.128), spurs the people of Peckham into
acting out their desires for extreme definitions. And he does so, not by
imposing an external influence but by entering into the 'fictions' of
Peckham, into their world of jargon, cliche and double standards, and by
adding to their illusions his own expanded fictions - fictions so extreme
that the characters can only realise them in action, thus making their
deeds into absolute statements rather than self-deceptions. For, above
all, Dougal is a fiction-maker, an exploiter of language, story and myth.
The 'ballad' of the title suggests not only the stylised and patterned
format of the novel, but also the transformation of stereotypic fictions
into mythologies through the introduction of absolutes. Rather than
evaluating the moral significance of apparently empty lives within a banal
'reality' herself, Spark introduces Dougal as a novelistic force of
evaluation, confronting spurious with genuine fictions, and assessing the
result.
The language and 'fictions' of the inhabitants of Peckham are used to
define, limit and constrict; Dougal uses his both to puzzle and to
liberate. That the former can only detract from 'meaning' and significance
4. Like Nicholas Farringdon in The Girls of Slender Means (London, 1963),
Dougal may introduce the concept of 'evil' but in so doing also implies
the existence of 'good'. Spark here would seem to parallel Baudelaire's
belief, as described by T.S. Eliot, that: 'the sense of Evil implies
the sense of good.' As Eliot points out: 'So far as we are human, what
we do must be either evil or good; so far as we do evil or good, we are
human; and it is better, in a paradoxical way, to do evil than to do
nothing: at least, we exist.'
T.S. Eliot, 'Baudelaire' (1930), Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, ed.
Frank Kermode (London, 1975), 231-236, pp.235-236.
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is made clear by the mimicry of jargon which is such a predominant
feature of the novel.^ Filled as they are with a litany of empty phrases,
the most recurring feature of Peckham conversations is the attempted
creation of definition through dogmatic comments which have no connection
with any reality outwith their linguistic context. At Dougal's first
interview with Mr Druce, the director of Meadow, Meade and Grindlay, for
example, the language of big business is used to establish identity within
a certain social milieu, but always with a contradiction in meaning.
Dougal is told that 'Industry and the Arts must walk hand in hand' (p.13),
the firm is described as 'a small but growing concern' (p.13), and Dougal
learns that he will work on his 'own level' but 'Of course you will be
under Mr Weedin.' (p. 14) And Humphrey Place attempts to educate Dougal
into another social world by teaching him the difference between 'issues
and disputes': 'Sometimes they take it to law to decide whether an issue
or a dispute has arisen.' (p.30) Always quick to pick up jargon which
offers an opportunity for parody, Dougal's talent for mimicry reveals just
how meaningless such language is, as illustrated by his torment of the
local Lothario, Trevor Lomas. Extending Trevor's initial comment to his
girlfriend of 'Come and wriggle, snake' (p.76), Dougal invites her to
'Come and leap, leopard' (p.81) or 'Come and frolic, lamb' (p.82), and
enquires of Trevor 'Got a pain, panda?' (p.81), and 'Feeling frail,
nightingale?' (p.83), until Trevor cannot bear to hear the inflations of
his own rhetoric.
This parody of language, however amusing, does not only reveal the banality
of c1icrfe; it also indicates that attempts to define through language, to
give some form of limitation to existence, can be dangerous, especially
when applied (as they frequently are in Peckham) to moral issues. On a
5. The text is, for example, heavily laden with the conventions of dialogue,
with 'he saids' and 'she saids', which report statements made by other
characters but give no proof of any actions behind such reports.
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simple level the inadequacy of such linguistic definitions as a form
of moral judgement is illustrated by the opinions on Dougal expressed
throughout the novel, most notably those of the Crewe family, as summed up by
their daughter Dixie:
My young brother doesn't like him. My mum likes him.
My dad likes him so-so. Humphrey likes him. I don't
agree to that. The factory girls like him - what can
you expect? I don't like him, he's got funny ideas."..."
My dad doesn't mind him, but Leslie can't stand him. I
tell you who else doesn't like him."
"Who?"
"Trevor Lomas. Trevor doesn't like him."
"I don't like Trevor, never did," Connie said.
(P.96)
The absurdity of this monologue is further revealed by the fact that their
liking or disliking of Dougal is never explained by any motive or reason,
but is simply stated as irrefutable fact. The danger for the inhabitants
of Peckham lies in their inability to recognise the falsity of such
attempts at imposing self-made definitions; although the jargon is devoid
of any meaning its use has extended into their lives so far that they have
come to believe it capable of conveying the deepest significance and
sincerity. Their glib use of words like 'frankly' and 'honestly' indicates
their need to see their opinions and feelings, however shallow, as being
'true'. Yet, as is indicated by a conversation between Dougal and Mrs
Joyce Willis, in which her 'honest' protestations are interspersed with
descriptions of her trivial actions, their 'sincerity' has little meaning:
Joyce Willis said, "Quite frankly, the first time Richard
invited you to dinner I knew we'd found the answer.
Richard didn't see it at first, quite frankly, but I think
he's beginning to see it now."
She crossed the room, moving her long hips, and looked
out of the bow window into the August evening. "Richard
should be in at any moment," she said. She touched her throat
with her fine fingers. She put to rights a cushion in the
window-seat.
Still standing, she lifted her glass, and sipped, and
put it down on a low table. She crossed the room and sat
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on a chair upholstered in deep pink brocade.
"I feel I can really talk to you now," she said.
"I feel we've known each other for years."
(p.165)
A similar protestation that a personal observation exists as irrefutable
fact can be seen in the facile use of 'It's psychological', a catch-all
phrase implying scientific validation, which Dougal also parodies. The
meaninglessness of this language, which creates the illusion of depths
of feeling but relies upon trivialities, is made quite clear, and the
sphere to which it properly belongs is revealed, when we discover that
Dougal is, in fact collecting such clich§s and jargon for his task of
ghost writing the autobiography of an actress friend Maria Cheeseman.
And we are given an example of the resemblances between the language of
Peckham and that of cheap, sentimental fiction as Dougal dictates a
passage from that 'autobiography':
"Peckham was fun exclamation mark but the day inevitably
dawned when I realised that I and my beloved pals at
the factory were poles apart full stop The great throbbing
heart of London across the river spelt fame comma success
comma glamour to me full stop I was always an incurable
romantic exclamation mark New para The poignant moment
arrived when I bade farewell to my first love full stop
Up till now I had had eyes for no others but fate - capital
F - had intervened full stop We kissed dot dot dot a shudder
went through my frame dot dot dot every fibre of my being
spoke of gratitude and grief but the budding genius within
me cried out for expression full stop Ana so we parted for
ever full stop New para I felt a grim satisfaction as the
cab which bore me and my few poor belongings bowled across
Vauxhall Bridge and into the great world - capital G capital
W - ahead full stop Yes comma Peckham had been fun exclam¬
ation mark"
(pp.180-181)
Again the language of deep feeling and complete 'honesty' is used to
exploit sentiment and to imbue a moment with a false sense of significance;
statement and description becomes a substitute for thought and action.
Facile expressions of sentiment in the novel are accompanied by equally
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shallow moral judgements, although the inhabitants of Peckham frequently
comment on the rights or wrongs of actions and individuals. Talking of
absenteeism Humphrey states: 'Well, frankly and personally ... I think
it's an immoral thing to do' (p.73), although he sees no immorality in
jilting Dixie. Dixie herself complains that Dougal is 'immoral' yet is
quite willing to have sex with her fiance, never questioning the morality
of the act and, since it has no effect on her finances, failing to find
any significance or pleasure in it. Elaine decides that Trevor's
girlfriend Beauty, 'got no morals' (p.83), but Beauty's behaviour differs
very little from Elaine's own. The slickness with which they make such
moral condemnations is again parodied by Dougal who emphasises that he is
a 'solid steady Edinburgh boy' to his employer, assuring him that he will
take a 'moral stance' and pointing out:
"Have you observed, Mr Willis, the frequency with
which your employees use the word immoral'? Have you
noticed how equally often they use the word 'ignorant'?
These words are significant," Dougal said, "both
psychologically and sociologically."
(p.116)
And the words are indeed significant since Dougal, perceiving the lack of
any real meaning in them, does his best to make them become relevant
terms, shattering the cosiness of Peckham, and bringing about the recog¬
nition of true moral polarities.
On Dougal's arrival in Peckham the language of its inhabitants and their •
morality are both equally ineffectual, with linguistic cliches simply
used as a means of creating the illusion of a moral code which could define
the individual self. Dougal not only reveals the ludicrous, and essentially
false, nature of such attempts to create a morally absolute language for
oneself without any external correlative in either action or faith, but
also encourages the characters to transform their cliches into 'reality',
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thus escaping the purely fictional quality of their own self-imposed
constraints. He achieves this liberation in two ways, and with striking
results. On the one hand he teaches the inhabitants of Peckham to recog¬
nise and utilise fictions in a variety of ways, from pointing out to Merle
Coverdale a hidden advertising symbol, of a baby's pram sitting on a window
ledge, to reading snippets from old newspapers about Peckham in the past,
including one about a mermaid to be seen at a fair in the district, to
reminding inhabitants of Peckham's ancient history by himself acting out
the part of Boadicea. In so doing he helps Peckham itself to move outwith
its constrained sense of its own 'reality' and into the realm of mythology.
And the characters whom he educates in this way become dissatisfied with
their previous 'fictions' which were simply a way of limiting their reality,
perceiving how 'fictions' can equally well expand reality, imbuing it with
the potential for transfiguration. On the other hand Dougal himself
reinforces the potential for transfiguration, for expanding the limits of
so-called 'reality', by defying them in his own person through his eccentric
behaviour. Mocking stereotypes, Dougal appears capable of changing
appearance and identity at will: 'Dougal sat like a monkey-puzzle tree'
(p.14); 'Dougal changed his shape and became a professor' (p.14); 'Dougal
leaned forward and became a television interviewer' (p.15); 'he was now a
man of vision with a deformed shoulder' (p.16); 'he was a confessor in
his box, leaning forward with his insidious advice through the grille'
(p.86); 'he was a divorce judge suspending judgement till the whole story
was heard out' (p.87); and 'He sat back like an exhausted medium of the
spiritualist persuasion.' (p.91) Able to behave in any way he chooses,
Dougal can thus abandon all conventional patterns of character and
behaviour, liberating those around him by the sheer unexpectedness of his
actions and again indicating that they are more powerful than words. He
384
can even change names and become Douglas Dougal to those who do not
know him as Dougal Douglas. And his most extreme moment of exultant
liberation from any 'fixed' identity or reality occurs at a dance when,
with the aid of a dustbin lid, he again transforms the 'commonplace':
Next, Dougal sat on his haunches and banged a message
out on a tom-tom. He sprang up and with the lid on
his head was a Chinese coolie eating melancholy rice.
He was an ardent cyclist, crouched over handlebars and
pedalling uphill with the lid between his knees. He
was an old woman with an umbrella; he stood on the
upturned edges of the lid and speared fish from his
rocking canoe; he was the man at the wheel of a racing
car; he did many things with the lid before he finally
propped the dust-bin lid up on his high shoulder,
beating this cymbal rhythmically with his hand while with
the other hand he limply conducted an invisible band,
being, with long blank face, the band-leader.
(pp.79-80)
In this exuberant display Dougal shows how escape from the constraints of
conventional 'reality' can lead to a joyous sense of freedom and to
'transfiguration' in the most literal sense.
Although such a moment of wild joy is a form of extremity, however, it
is never made clear in the novel whether the laughter it evokes is that
of angels or devils, and Dougal's own position in this respect is
ambivalent.^ While always drawing attention to his shorn horns, and
admitting that he is a devil, Dougal appears equally capable of imitating
an angel: 'Dougal posed like an angel on a grave which had only an
insignificant headstone. He posed like an angel-devil, with his hump
shoulder and gleaming smile, and his fingers of each hand widespread
against the sky.' (p.36) And even the actions he precipitates give little
6. He is thus part of a Scottish tradition of angel/devil figures, with
Hogg's 'Gilmartin' in The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a
Justified Sinner (see Chapter One, pp.51-b3j and Stevenson's mysterious
figure in 'Markheim', (see Chapter Three, pp.156-161) being the most
notable examples.
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indication as to the right or wrong of his encouragement, although the
effect of his influence is unmistakeable. In the two areas where his
influence is most noticable - the jilting of Dixie by Humphrey, and the
murder of Merle by Mr Druce - he does achieve a complete transformation
of relationships and lives, although whether to the good or not is debat¬
able. Both couples are shown to be caught in sterile, unsatisfying
relationships, with the depiction of each couple's lovemaking on
Midsummer Night operating as an ironic comment on their supposed pleasure.
Dixie and Humphrey, in spite of the romantic setting, are trapped in the
discussion of mundane concerns:
Humphrey pulled her towards him, and started to
unbutton her coat. She buttoned it up again.
"I'm cold," she said.
"Oh, come on Dixie," he said.
"Connie Weedin's got an increment," sne said.
"I've got to wait for my increment till August...
It's only because her father's Personnel. I'm
going to take it up with Miss Coverdale."
Humphrey pulled her down towards him again
and kissed her face.
"What's the matter?" he said. "There's something
the matter with you."
"I'm going to take Monday off," she said. "They
appreciate you more if you stop away now and again."
(PP.72-73)
And although Mr Druce and Merle Coverdale are having a secret affair,
their liason is governed by rigid patterns of behaviour:
Merle switched on the television and found a play far
advanced. They watched the fragments of the play as
they drank their coffee. Then they went into the
bedroom and took off their clothes in a steady rhythm.
Merle took off her cardigan and Mr Druce took off his
coat. Merle went to the wardrobe and brought out a
green quilted silk dressing-gown. Mr Druce went to the
wardrobe and found his blue dressing-gown with white
spots. (p.70)
Any action which could provide an alternative to either couples' situation
would appear welcome but, in each case, the action which Dougal subtly
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instigates is of an extreme kind. Encouraged by Dougal, Humphrey
finally puts into practice the glib language of 'frankly' and 'honestly',
replying 'No ... to be quite frank, I won't', when asked if he will take
Dixie to be his bride..(p.3). In so doing he is responding to a
prefiguration of this scene 'created' by Dougal when the two men discuss
Humphrey's forthcoming marriage: 'Dougal read from the book: "Wilt thou
take this woman," he said with a deep ecclesiastical throb, "to be thai
wedded waif?" Then he put the plate aside and knelt; he was a sinister
goggling bridegroom. "No," he declared to the ceiling, "I won't, quite
frankly '(pp. 157-158) By imitating Dougal, Humphrey gives 'frankness'
a genuine meaning outwith its phatic function, realising the words by
his action - yet in so doing he moves outwith the conventions of everyday
codes of communication and morality. Likewise, when Mr Druce murders
Merle with a breadknife, an action brought about both symbolically, by
Dougal's admiration and stroking of Merle's long neck, and, in actuality,
through his rejection of Mr Druce's homosexual advances, he is realising
Merle's wish for a glass of red wine because 'I feel I need something
red, to buck me up.1(p.190) Again the action is an extreme one but it
does imbue their relationship with a significance which it never
previously attained. Rather than seeing Dougal as eitner angel or devil,
therefore, his own description of himself as a choreographer appears
most apt: 'I see the Devil in the guise of a chap from Cambridge who
does motion study, and he's the choreographer ... And ... of course
this choreographer is a projection of me. I was at the University of
Edinburgh myself, but in the dream I'm the Devil and Cambridge.'(p.65)
As angel-devil and as fiction-maker, Dougal orchestrates the movements
within the novel.7
7. Significantly, the one companion Dougal has in the novel who escapes
his machinations is Elaine - a 'process-controller'.
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The moral absolutes which are indicated by the processes of fiction are
not, however, allowed to pass untested within the novel, nor is the
fiction itself allowed to stand as an absolute. Dougal's fictions are
an important means of expanding the perceptions of reality and as such,
liberate the characters from restricting definitions, but the novel
itself mocks fiction's manipulations of 'reality1. Douglas complains
to the actress for whom he is ghost-writing: 'I thought it was a work
of art you wanted to write ... If you only want to write a straight
autobiography you should have got a straight ghost. I'm crooked.' (p.104)
And in the novel's own patterning the reliability of fiction as a
O
representation of reality is soon disputed. The novel begins with
Dixie's mother having 'words' with Humphrey but a few pages later we read
of another version of the incident which describes it quite differently,
as the mother herself recounts her actions. Similarly, . at the beginning
and end of the novel, people recall Humphrey's jilting of Dixie and,
again, each version is different. Moreover, Spark's usual manipulations
of chronological sequence throughout the novel again cast doubts on the
'reality' of events described, blurring the distinction between what is
'true' and what are only 'remembered' fictions. Just as the original
fictions of the characters in Peckham were undermined by Dougal's
revelation of their inadequacy, so the fiction itself is undermined by
Spark's techniques ; nowhere is this made more pointed than in the
account of Dougal's eventual fate:
He was away off to Africa with the intention of selling
tape-recorders to all the witch-doctors ... 9
Much could be said of Dougal's subsequent life. He
returned from Africa and became a novice in a Franciscan
8. Peter Kemp argues, in fact, that when Nelly, the religious street-
crier, refers to the six things which the 'Lord most hateth' she is
describing the attributes of the novelist.
Peter Kemp, Muriel Spark (London, 1974), p.54.
9. For a brief discussion of Spark's obsession with tape-recorders, see
p.421.
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monastery. Before he was asked to leave, the Prior
had endured a nervous breakdown and several of the
monks had broken their vows of obedience in actuality,
and their other vows by desire; Dcugal pleaded his
powers as an exorcist in vain. Thereafter, for
economy's sake, he gathered together the scrap ends of
his profligate experience - for he was a frugal man at
heart - and turned them into a lot of cock-eyed books,
and went far in the world.
(pp.200-201)
Ironically relegated to the role of novelist, Dougal's own position within
the novel is thus undermined.
It is fitting, therefore, that Dougal's last object of interest in the
10
novel should be the discovery of a tunnel dug underneath Peckham, for
not only has Dougal undermined the surface reality of Peckham, indicating
a potential void, which emerges as the boundaries of that safe but
limited view of reality are destroyed by the recognition of absolutes, but
he has also indicated the dangers in such an expanded perception of
existence if the absolutes it implies are realised within the circumscribed
world of our everyday 'reality'. The novelist also undermines what has
been achieved by her fiction's presentation of moral absolutes, reminding
her readers that the potential for transfiguration which can be expressed
through the fictional form may be insufficient to sustain or to accommodate
an absolutist vision within a non-fictional existence. The novel does
end with a moment of transfiguration for Peckham and for Humphrey:
But it was a sunny day for November, and, as he drove
swiftly past the Rye, he saw the children playing there
and the women coming home from work with their shopping-
bags, the Rye for an instant looking like a cloud of
green and gold, the people seeming to ride upon it, as
you might say there was another world than this.
(p.202)
10. It also seems appropriate that in the struggle with Trevor Lomas
which takes place in the tunnel, it is Dougal's eye which is wounded.
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The moment remains, however, one of hope, of potential rather than
realisation. And while indicating the potential sources of a
transformation of humanity's limited world views, the novel serves as an
acknowledgement of the difficulties and dangers present in human attempts
to accommodate an absolutist vision within the conventional boundaries
of our reality.
The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie
The conflict between a secular and limited view of existence and the
force of an absolutist vision which The Ballad of Peckham Rye examines,
is firmly contained within the context of its 'fantasy' world; neither
the banal stereotypes of the Peckhamites, nor the devilry of Dougal
Douglas seriously threaten the reader's own sense of 'reality' ; the
moral dichotomy remains within an obviously fictional dimension. In
The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie,^ published a year later, Spark engages
with the same metaphysical issues but in a context which demands a closer
confrontation with the problematics of 'reality' itself. Not only does
the novel reveal an element of Spark's own background but it also directly
confronts the introduction of a force of absolutes into a recognisable
and detailed reality. Facing up to the Calvinism which, I suggest, has
not only inculcated in her a desire for moral absolutes but has also made
her fear the realisation and imposition of such absolutes in the rigid
and limiting manner practiced by that religion, Spark appears unable
to distance herself from her own experience through her usual process of
parodic fictionalisation. The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie is therefore a
crucial novel for the consideration of Spark's work within the context of
11. Muriel Spark, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (London, 1961). All
page references are to tnis edition.
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my argument. Like The Mandelbaum Gate, another Spark novel dealing very
closely with her own experience and moral conflicts, The Prime of Miss
Jean Brodie shows her moving beyond her adept manipulations of fiction
as a means of containing yet reflecting her moral dichotomies. In
contemplating the force of absolutes when introduced into a more
recognisably personal context, the problematics of a morally absolute
vision appear to break through the boundaries of her own authorial control
and remain as unresolved and - to a greater extent, unschematized -
paradoxes. Therefore, although like Stevenson's 'Jekyll and Hyde' the
novel has been popularised and simplified through film and television
adaptations, the story of the Edinburgh schoolmistress and her influence
on the small group of girls whom she plans to transform into the'creme de
la crkme', represents a serious consideration of the complex question of
moral polarities and an investigation of the effect such absolutes can
have when imposed upon more relative conceptions of 'reality1.
Because the novel deals with a more recognisable dimension of reality
than either The Comforters, for example, or The Ballad of Peckham Rye,
and thus loses some of the element of fantasy found in these novels, the
author must find alternative means both of conveying her moral ideology
and of creating an identity for her fictional world. In The Prime of
Miss Jean Brodie Spark achieves this not only by her familiar manipulations
of chronology but also by a sharpness of language which is used to reflect
the novel's moral issues. Moving between the factual and the impression¬
istic, the specific and the abstract, the text not only tests the defining
and limiting force of words and phrases, but also utilises language in
destroying or re-establishing parameters of reality. Negatives are
frequently used to give positive definitions through implication, comments
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defy our expectations of a conventional linguistic sequence, and the
repetition and rewriting of significant words and phrase alternatively
creates the impression of unity or diversity. Reading the novel
becomes a process of delimiting, redefining or expanding boundaries.
And the linguistic manipulations of the text produce an effect very
similar to that created by the novel's central character, Jean Brodie
herself, who both liberates and defines her pupils.
One of the most striking features of Spark's style in the novel is the
conflation of fact and impression, the bringing together of objective
and subjective observations so that the distinction between them becomes
blurred. The very first sentence in the novel provides an example of
this approach: 'The boys, as they talked to the girls from Marcia Blaine,
stood on the far side of their bicycles, holding the handlebars, which
established a protective fence of bicycle between the sexes, and the
impression that at any moment the boys were likely to be away,' (p.1)
'Establish' is used as a verb in connection with two very different
objects, on the one hand to form something solid, a fence of bicycles,
and on the other to create an impression of imminent departure. Similar,
and more significant, conjunctions of the tangible and the impressionistic
occur throughout the novel, generally with the effect of relating a
specific present to a more nebulous and apparently uncertain future; thus
'The days passed and the wind blew from the Forth' (p.52)invokes a sense
of imminent change through the image of the weather. A more unusual
instance of this linking between different levels of perception can be
seen in the confusion of 'nesty', a visual metapnor, with 'nasty', as
used by the policewoman eliciting a description of a man who exposed
himself to one of the girls during a solitary walk,(p.88) The confusion
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of terms in each example indicates a blurring of the different categories
of time, of appearance, and of the different levels of existence,
revealing a departure from the apparent conventionality of the 'reality'
described.
In similar fashion Miss Brodie serves to undermine the normative values
of her girls and to question the conventions of their own 'reality'.
And in her own personality she provides them with examples of contradictions
which defy both convention and logic. Sandy, the most perceptive of
the girls, for example, comments: 'She's not supposed to give us freedom,
she's supposed to give us lessons.' (p.29) Her use of abstract and
specific terms in surprising contiguity is, however, a trick of speech
that she has learned from Miss Brodie herself who states categorically,
while denying all that the girls have previously been taught: 'Safety
does not come first. Goodness, Truth and Beauty come first.' (p.9)
Miss Brodie can also state with equal dogmatism that Giotto, not Leonardo,
is the greatest painter because: 'he is my favourite.'(p.10) In her
language, therefore, she imposes absolutes which appear illogical in the
context of mundane and accepted conventions of 'reality', but in so doing
expands her girls' perceptions of the world. The Headmistress of the
school, recognising the power of Miss Brodie's linguistic propaganda,
attempts to combat it with some of her own but, since her terms are so
obviously contradictory, they fail to establish the surprising but
stimulating conjunctions of thought achieved by Miss Brodie:
'You are very fortunate in Miss Brodie. I could
wish your arithmetic papers had been better. I am
always impressed by Miss Brodie's girls in one way or
another. You will have to work hard at ordinary
humble subjects for the qualifying examinations.
Miss Brodie is giving you an excellent preparation for
the Senior School. Culture cannot compensate for lacx
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of hard knowledge. I am happy to see you are
devoted to Miss Brodie. Your loyalty is due to
the school rather than to any one individual."
(pp.35-86)
Miss Mackay's iinguistic tyranny is far less successful than Miss
Brodie's subtle rearrangements of an apparently intractable reality
because the headmistress's conjunctions confuse rather than bring
enlightenment. Jean Brodie, although a tyrant, also brings, through
her linguistic manipulations, insights which can have a meaning within
reality. Within the mundane reality of Miss Mackay's world such
absolutes cannot operate.
In Miss Brodie herself, therefore, we are presented with both an expansion
and a contraction of the conventional teaching role; and through her
bringing together of facts and fictions, impressions and observations,
the nature of a fixed and definable reality to which the girls are
accustomed is called into question. Yet, ironically, this very liberation
is achieved through her apparent dogmatism and imposition of absolutes.
Nowhere is this made more clear in the novel than in the question of
'identity'. Above all things Miss Brodie abhors the 'team spirit'
mentality, believing that: 'Phrases like 'the team spirit' are always
employed to cut across individualism, love and personal loyalties.1(p.103)
She encourages the girls to be individuals, characterising them as such
with labels for their own peculiar qualities, with which she endows
them: Eunice is famous for gymnastics, Jenny is pretty, Mary is stupid -
the group scapegoat - Sandy is initially notorious for her beautiful
voice, her small piggy eyes, and, later, for her insight, which is placed
in opposition to the instinct of Rose Stanley, also famous for her 'sex'.
Of course, as the events of the novel prove, such tags cannot fit
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consistently with the individuals concerned: Miss Brodie is shown to
be, not 'wrong', but certainly limited in her categorisation. The
greatest example of her fallibility, and perhaps the most significant
blow to her judgement, is the fact that it is Sandy, not Rose, who
becomes the surrogate lover of Teddy Lloyd, the art teacher whom Miss
Brodie loves but with whom she will not permit herself a relationship
because he is married. The sense of individuality which she encourages
is therefore shown to be false in terms of the fixed definitions which
she attempts to impose upon the girls; like the absolutes of Calvinism,
by which Sandy is obsessed, their rigidity and delimiting qualities make
them both destructive and dangerous to those who have to function within
an everyday reality.
The dangers of Miss Brodie's attempts at imposing absolute identities
upon the girls are revealed even more clearly when she tries to impose
a group identity upon them. Not only does she bring together a Brodie
'set' but, inspired by her admiration for fascism in general, and
Mussolini in particular, she tries to mould the group into her own private
army. Sandy only appreciates the full dangers of Miss Brodie's endeavour
when the teacher expresses her disapproval of the Girl Guides:
It occurred to Sandy, tbevc at the end of the Middle
Meadow Walk, that the Brodie set was Miss Brodie's
fascisti, not to the naked eye, marching along, but
all knit together for her need and in another way,
marching along. That was all right, but it seemed,
too, that Miss Brodie's disapproval of the Girl Guides
had jealousy in it, there was an inconsistency, a
fault. Perhaps the Guides were too much a rival
fascisti, and Miss Brodi-e could not bear it. Sandy
thought she might see about joining the Brownies.
Then the group-fright seized her again, and it was




The 'group-fright' which Sandy frequently experiences, and which has
been instilled in her by Jean Brodie, prevents the girls from achieving
any liberation through their supposed individuality, and ultimately
leads Sandy into the need to betray her mentor.
An equally dangerous but more complex aspect of Miss Brodie's absolutism
is revealed in her transformations of facts into fictions and fiction
into fact. Telling the girls about her fiance'' Hugh, killed in the war,
she embellishes his personality with the characteristics of Teddy Lloyd
and Mr Lowther, the two men currently in her life:
This was the first time the girls had heard of Hugh's
artistic leanings. Sandy puzzled over this and took counsel
with Jenny, and it came to them both that Miss Brodie was
making her new love story fit the old....
Sandy was fascinated by this method of making patterns
with facts, and was divided between her admiration for the




Miss Brodie thus exercises the 'economy' which is seen to be necessary
for the successful creation of fictions, and her ability to extract
elements of reality in order to create a fantasy world not only appeals
to the girls but also influences their own attitudes to an apparently
solid reality. In the Senior School, for example, they soon learn to
use concrete facts to create fantasies about their teacher:
By the summer term ... Sandy and Jenny had begun to
apply their new-found knowledge to Miss Brodie in a merry
fashion. "If Miss Brodie was weighed in air and then in
water ..." And, when Mr Lowther seemed not quite nimself
at the singing lesson, they would remind each other that
an immersed Jean Brodie displaces its own weight of Gordon
Lowther.
(p.111)
12. Spark herself states: 'I have an economical mind. The theme has to
be simple and the field of choice is limited - I like that, in
everything.' Joyce Emerson, 'The Mental Squint of Muriel Spark',
The Sunday Times Colour Section, 30 September 1962, p.14.
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And Teddy Lloyd, who also comes under the Influence of Jean Brodie in
her prime, soon begins to exercise a similar 'economy' in the portraits
he paints of the Brodie set; each picture emerges bearing a striking
resemblance to Miss Brodie, a phenomenon with which she herself is
delighted: 'It is because you are mine ... I mean of my stamp and cut.'
(p.129) In her fiction-making Jean Brodie not only draws the girls
into her fantasy, forming them as an author forms her characters, but
also ensures that she becomes the dominant figure in all their fictions
and fantasies, thus becoming both the creator and the God-like centre of
their universe.
It is in this novelistic power, however, that Miss Brodie's most dangerous
influence - and her eventual downfall - lies. Displaying all the aspects
of an author which Spark herself most fears, she refuses to acknowledge
that her fictions can only function on the level of spiritual enlighten¬
ment. Instead she tries to transform her fictions into fact, to realise
them within the conventional boundaries of reality, thus emulating all
the worst aspects of Calvinism as an imposed religious practice rather
than a source of spiritual understanding. Again it is Sandy, the
character closest to, yet most critical of, Miss Brcdie, who first
perceives the danger. Initially quite taken with the artistry of Miss
Brodie's plans for her girls, reassuring herself with 'After all, it was
only an idea' (p.146), Sandy suddenly perceives the extent of Miss Brodie's
ambitions:
All at once Sandy realised that this was not all theory
and a kind of Brodie game, in the way that so much of
life was unreal talk and game-playing ... But this was
not theory, Miss Brodie meant it Sandy looked at her
and perceived that the woman was obsessed Dy the need for
Rose to sleep with the man she herself was in love with;
there was .nothing new in the idea, it was the reality
that was new. ^ ^g^
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When Miss Brodie attempts to rearrange reality, to impose her own
politics like a providential force of predestination upon the girls,
Sandy feels obliged to stop her. Rather than pointing to the potential
value of a recognition of absolutes, which could stimulate alternative
perceptions of reality, Miss Brodie tries to impose a different reality
upon the girls but one which is even more rigid and limiting than that
to which they have been accustomed.
Sandy's attitude to 'fictionalising' is very different. Indulging in
her own private fantasies, seeing herself as a companion of Alan Breck,
as Jane Eyre, as a helpmate to her favourite policewoman, she nevertheless
does not allow these fictions to intrude into her world. We are
frequently shown Sandy daydreaming, but we also always see her coming
out of these daydreams, facing up to what is going on in the 'reality'
around her. And although Sandy and Jenny create their own fiction, a
'novel' about Jean Brodie, they finally bury it in the sand and leave
it behind them as they grow up.(p.17) Sandy's increasing attempts to
distance herself from the world of Miss Brodie's fiction thus enacts
the adage, 'Truth is stranger than fiction', and provides a context for
Miss Brodie, a perspective from which the reader can view her increasing
absolutism with a growing disquiet. When Miss. Brodie states:.'Wei 1,
as I say, that is the whole story', we are more inclined to take an
alternative point of view: 'Sandy was thinking of something else. She
was thinking that it was not the whole story.' (p.77) Through Sandy,
therefore, a framework is provided in which Miss Brodie's fictions are
revealed to be false, and in which the dangerous implications of the author
as God may be exposed.
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The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie, however, does not only mock the author
as an ordering and all-seeing force and criticise human attempts to
transform themselves into figures of absolute authority as do other
Spark novels - but also directly condemns the effect and practices of
Calvinism. By attempting to impose absolute rules upon humanity, within
the context of their muddled and imperfect existence, Calvinism imposes
impossible limitations, forcing the individual into rigid, and essentially
false definitions of being dammned or elect. Jean Brodie ultimately
becomes a similarly restrictive and destructive force. As Sandy
recognises: 'She thinks she is Providence ... she thinks she is the God
of Calvin, she sees the beginning and the end.'(p.161) Paradoxically,
it is Miss Brodie's sense of herself as a force of predestination which is tne
beginning of her ultimate betrayal and downfall for, although she may
map out the future for her pupils, she is not in control of her own
destiny: 'the principles governing the end of her prime would have
astonished herself at the beginning of it.'(p.55) Ironically, therefore,
Miss Brodie becomes a victim of a wider context than the self-centred
one which she has tried to impose on those around her. While she remains
sure of herself as an absolute she is convinced that she is outwith moral
condemnation or approval; and so, temporarily, do her girls: 'All the
time they were under her influence she and her actions were outside the
context of right and wrong.1(p.113) Such a belief, however, imposes on
the Brodie set a necessary adherence to their teacher for, as Sandy
realises, if they were to step outwith the context which she has created
for them, they would have to face up to the consequences of their own
actions and confront themselves. As the girls march along, Sandy
perceives them as 'all in a frightening little moment, in unified compliance
to the destiny of Miss Brodie, as if God had willed them to birth for
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that purpose.'(p.36) Again, as in Calvinism as a social practice, it
is fear which holds the followers to the precepts of the religion, while
those same religious precepts establish that fear.
Nevertheless, Spark does not settle for a simple condemnation of either
Miss Brodie or the absolutes of Calvinism which she represents. Sandy
betrays Miss Brodie but only when she recognises that no loyalty is due
her, a recognition which Sandy can only reach when a true context for
loyalty is found. J Departing from the system of absolutes imposed
upon her mind and her existence by Miss Brodie, Sandy flees to another
set of absolutes and provides herself with a framework in which Miss
Brodie's power is diminished. Like Spark herself, Sandy turns to
Catholicism as a world view which provides the absolutes she desires but
which does so in a context where everyday human reality may be
'transfigured1, expanded by spiritual insights, but is not contracted by
human impositions and imitations of divine absolutes. As Sister Helena,
clutching the bars of her cell when she talks to visitors, we can see
Sandy as being within a rigidly defined world of absolutes, but it is
one in which her absolutism need never be applied to or confronted with
an external reality. And since Sandy, of all the girls, has a deeper
sympathy with, while also having greater doubts about Miss Brodie's moral
vision, her solution is, ironically shown to be one which might have
benefited her teacher: 'she was by temperament suited only to the Roman
Catholic Church; possibly it could have embraced, even while it disciplined
her soaring and diving spirit, it might even have normalised her.'(p.113)
13. 'Sandy replied like an enigmatic Pope: "If you did not betray us it
is impossible that you could have been betrayed by us. The word
betrayed does not apply...'" (p.169)
"'It's only possible to betray where loyalty is due," said Sandy.
"Well, wasn't it due Miss Brodie?"
"Only up to a point," said Sandy.1 (p.170)
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In her self-imposed confinement Sandy has found a means both of
fulfilling and of containing the desire for absolutes inspired in her
by Jean Brodie, which her mentor ignores.
Jean Brodie, not obtaining this solution, is betrayed and condemned by
events within the novel; in spite of this, however, the image of her
absolutist vision remains triumphant. Although her attempts to persuade
the girls into realising her absolutes in actuality result in disaster
- Joyce Emily Hammond, for example, is killed while on her way to fight
for fascisim at Miss Brodie's subtle instigation - the vision of
absolutes expressed through her fictions and though her ideas becomes in
itself a source of liberation for the girls. All of them remember her
in their later lives: Jenny recognises the influence of Miss Brodie when
she is for a moment filled with a 'sense of the hidden possibilities in
all things .'(p.106) It is through this sense of potential that Jean
Brodie achieves her 'transfiguration of the commonplace' rather than
through any practical enacting of absolutes. By setting them on a
quest for absolutes, she inculcates in them an awareness of the contra¬
dictions, paradoxes and ambivalsnces. within the boundaries of
conventional concepts of 'reality', thus undermining its apparent solidity
and filling them with a sense of its potential transformation. As
Sandy, entitling the psychological treatise which makes her famous 'The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace', and continually acknowledging the
influence of 'a Miss Jean Brodie in her Prime', comes to recognise, Jean
Brodie has been a force of absolutes capable of transforming reality
almost in spite of herself: 'It was twenty-five years before Sandy had
so far recovered from a creeping vision of disorder that she could look
back and recognise that Miss Brodie's defective sense of self-criticism
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had not been without its beneficient and enlarging effects.1 (pp.113-114)
It is only when the girls have moved outwith Jean Brodie's attempts to
realise her absolute vision within actuality through them, that they can
actually appreciate that vision itself without having to resist its
impositions. They can then apply it to their own view of existence
without being confined by it. And it is only from a certain distance
that Sandy sees Miss Brodie herself in the light of transfiguration:
Sandy felt warmly towards Miss Brodie at those
times when she saw how she was misled in her idea of
Rose. It was then that Miss Brodie looked beautiful
and fragile, just as dark heavy Edinburgh itself could
suddenly be changed into a floating city when the light
was a special pearly white and fell upon one of the
gracefully fashioned streets. In the same way Miss
Brodie's masterful features became clear and sweet to
Sandy when viewed in the curious light of the woman's
folly, and she never felt more affection for her in
later years than when she-thought upon Miss Brodie as
silly.
(p.148)
Just as the dark city of Jchn Knox can become transformed through its own
light, so Miss Brodie too is transformed, in spite of herself, through
her own 'folly'. And Spark would likewise appear to acknowledge through
this image that in spite of, yet paradoxically because of, its dark and
rigid absolutes, Calvinism contains in its moral absolutism the seeds
of a vision which, although in practice confining and limiting, can, as
a spiritual insight lead to a recognition of the enlarging potential of
such absolutism, expanding and enlightening the human concept of 'reality'.
In the novel which followed The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie Spark continued
her exploration of the positive and negative effects of moral absolutes
within a relatively defined reality. And The Girls of Slender Means
reinforces the point made in both The Ballad of Peckham Rye and The Prime
of Miss Jean Brodie that, 'a vision of evil may be as effective to
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conversion as a vision of good'. In its style, however, it is much
closer to the earlier novel, remaining securely located in an obviously
fantastic and explicitly fictional world, and confining its witty
examination of the polarities of good and evil to that context. It
therefore lacks that sense of a personal interest in the confrontation
between an absolutist vision and a limited and humanist concept of reality
to be found in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie. In her subsequent novel,
however, Spark returns to a more direct consideration of the effect of
moral absolutes within a circumscribed existence by explicitly focussing
on that material reality itself.
The Mandelbaum Gate
In examining the effect which moral dichotomies created by an absolutist
vision have on the functioning of humanity within the limits of our
existence, Spark must necessarily move closer to the conventional view of
15
'reality'. The Mandelbaum Gate is therefore not only on a larger
scale than her other works, but also appears to bear a greater resemblance
to the conventions of the realist novel than any of her other fictions.
Although one of her most ambitious novels however, it cannot be
described as her most successful; she herself said of it: 'I didn't like
1 fi
that book awfully much ... It's out of proportion.' In confronting
the more conventionally humanist view of 'reality', and in having to
represent it with some credibility in her fiction, the problematic tension
created by absolutes within that circumscribed world appears to become
14. The Girls of Slender Means, p.180.
15. Muriel Spark, The Mandelbaym Gate (London, 1955). All page
references are to this edition.
16. Ian Gilham, 'Keeping it Short', Listener, 24 September 1970, 411-413,
p.412.
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too great, refusing to be contained within her usually neat and spare
form. While contemplating the 'hopeless complexity of motive' (p.169)
which is seen as all important within that humanist view of the world,
Spark herself appears at times to become a victim of that complexity.
Nevertheless, although not her most artistically satisfying novel, the
complex considerations of The Mandelbaum Gate makes it play a significant
part in any assessment of Spark's own moral vision.
The Mandelbaum Gate gives the impression of having a greater personal
relevance to Spark's moral concerns partly because, rather than examining
the potentialities and limitations of moral absolutes through the
patternings of fiction, it concentrates on assessing them in relation to
the individual. In Barbara Vaughan and Freddy Hamilton, the characters
who share in the novel's central adventure plot, two different attitudes
to morality are represented: both characters, nevertheless, are seen
responding to a confrontation with moral absolutes which alters their view
of reality. Barbara, the child of an Anglican-Jewish marriage, and
herself a convert to Catholicism, had previously been viewed by friends
and family as a stereotypic spinster schoolteacher. She has, however,
fallen in love with a divorced archeologist, despite the fact that,
because of her Catholicism she must wait for his previous marriage to be
annulled by Rome before she can marry him. Her pilgrimage to Israel,
will not only both satisfy her Catholicism and perhaps help her to come
to terms with her mixed origins, but will also ensure that she is near
him while he is working in Jordan, as they wait for the decree to
come through from Rome. Meeting Freddy Hamilton, a minor diplomat, in
Jerusalem, she confides in him her desire to visit Jordan in spite of the
warnings that her Jewish origins may make such a visit dangerous. Through
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a series of circumstances Freddy becomes involved in an attempt to allow
the visit to go forward; together they encounter adventures in which
both characters, discovering new facets of their personality, find their
sense of identity altered. And the setting of their adventure, the
fragmented dislocated atmosphere in the Middle East 1961, with Israel and
Jordan divided politically, religiously, and nationally, provides an
appropriate background of confusion and contradiction for their individual
search for significance within themselves.
As this description of the novel indicates, not only does The Mandelbaum
Gate have a more complex plot, with a greater emphasis on the materiality
of circumstance than other Spark novels, but its characters are also
given fuller realisation than is generally found in her work. Barbara
and Freddy are presented as credibly complex characters, caught in
extreme situations which both frighten and excite them. Faced with the
absolute extremes of such situations their carefully preserved senses of
identity vanish and in this dislocation, with its resulting fragmentation
of personality, they are led to seek - and indeed discover - new
definitions of themselves which can accommodate the awareness of absolutes
and which liberate them from the previously 'fixed' identities to which
they had clung. In order to examine the confrontation of absolutes with
a limited conception of reality, Spark has had to create characters who
initially appear to conform to the conventions of the realist novel, who
appear 'rounded' and securely identifiable; but, having created such
characters, she can then use them not only to reflect the response of
humanity when faced with absolutes, but also to reveal the effect such a
confrontation may have on the concept of 'character' itself. In Freddy
and Barbara, therefore, she creates two characters who appear sure of
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themselves but who, even at the beginning of the novel, are shown to
use their self-confidence as a means of concealing basic uncertainties.
By following them through a series of improbable adventures she can
trace their changing self-definitions, their developing responses to
absolutes, and, because they are shown to be very different kinds of
people, can offer a more complex assessment of the effect an awareness of
absolutes has on human reality than is possible in her other novels where
all the characters appear content to be part of the fiction's fantasy.
Freddy Hamilton is initially shown as a man intent on maintaining his own
national and cultural identity. When we first see him he is desparately
repeating a little English rhyme in an attempt to shut out the chants of
Hebrew schoolchildren, 'pitting culture against culture.1(p.10) Needing
to see himself as the 'norm', he labels everything alien to him as 'aosurd':
'outside of the Embassy, and even inside it, he never really felt at ease
with chaps until sooner or later they remarked that the place was quite
absurd.1(p.5) He thus avoids the threat which anything strange or foreign
may pose to him although, as he later realises, the 'absurd' may also
provide escape from the norm as well as a threat to it. Above all, Freddy
wishes to steer a middle course, to avoid any extremes which could
threaten his carefully established personality. Although not religious,
'he disapproved of letting young chaps into the Foreign Service who
openly professed to have no religion at all' (p.215), and he believes
that strong feelings can lead to 'revulsion, heart-quickenings, murderous
attachments, the sort of emotions that had always led to trouble at school
and university, and they led to international incidents as well.1 (p.3)
It is therefore appropriate that soon after meeting Barbara, she accusingly
quotes Scripture at him: 'I know of thy doings, and find thee neither
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cold nor hot; cold or hot, I would thou wert one or the other. Being
what thou art, lukewarm, neither cold nor hot, thou wilt make me vomit
thee out of my mouth.' (p.16)
Barbara, when the novel begins, presents an antithesis of Freddy; all
through her life she has been faced with extremes and imposed definitions.
By both her Gentile and Jewish relations she has been categorised according
to what she is not, as well as what she is. And in her relationship
with the archeologist Harry Clegg she has fled from the definition of
spinsterhood imposed upon her by her colleague and employer, Miss Rickward,
making love with him in a site hut, as if to prove her capacity for extreme
passion. On arrival in Israel she is faced with yet more imposed
definitions, as the Israelis demand that she oe wholly Jewish, and her
Catholic pilgrimage to Jordan is forbidden because she is not wholly
Gentile. The imposition of such contradictory definitions only leads
ner into a greater uncertainty about herself, until a Jewish taxi-driver
forces her into complete confusion by demanding from her some kind of
self-definition:
Barbara thougnt, 'Who am I?' She felt she had
known who she was till this moment Barbara knew
then that the essential thing about herself remained
unspoken, uncategorized, and unlocated. She was
agitated, and felt a compelling need to find some
definition that would accurately explain herself to
thlS man*
(pp.23-24)
At this moment she realises that all her previous attempts to assert a
sense of self have been unsatisfactory. In Israel she is faced with
extremes of definition which seem just as powerful as the Catholicism
she has previously seen as all-accommodating. While Freddy's adventures
lead him to face extremes for the first time, Barbara is led to encounter
a multiplicity of extremes which threaten the definitions she thought
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she had established for herself.
Through the events of the novel - the journey into Jordan, the disguising
of Barbara in order that she might complete her religious pilgrimage,
the discovery of a spy in the British Foreign Service, and his own affair
with Suzi Ramdez - Freddy appears to become liberated from the boundaries
of caution he had previously imposed upon himself. Experiencing depths
of emotion for the first time he enoounters extremes of both joy and
sadness. Such is the extent of this extremity, however, that when he
returns to Israel and his 'normal' life he suffers from amnesia and is
unable to remember any of his experiences for the past few days. Blotting
out all memories of these extremes he thus avoids any contemplation of
alternatives to the conventional and fixed sense of self he had
previously established, although in his adventures he has discovered an
unexpected potential for extremes of action within himself. Yet this
sense of 'otherness' which he encountered cannot be assimilated into
his carefully limited 'reality'; the memories of it remain vaguely in
his mind, often creating a feeling of regret and astonishment;
the events were to come back to Freddy in the course of
time; first, like an electric shock of fatal voltage,
, but not fatal, and so, after that, like a cloud of
unknowing,17 heavy with the molecules of accumulated
impressions and finally when he had come to consider
the whole mosaic of evidence, when he had gathered the
many-coloured fragments of what actually happened, and
had put the missing parts in place, then he came to
discern, too late for action but more and more clearly as
the years sifted past, that he had been neither a monster
nor a fool, but had behaved rather well, and at least
with style and courage.
(pp.147-146)
17. 'The Cloud of Unknowing'; see Chapter Six, page 357, footnote 29.
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Although he is never fully able to ascertain the validity or even
respectability of his experiences, they come to acquire a significance
of their own in his life:
So it was to be throughout the years; it was always
unexpectedly, like a thief in the night, that the
sweetest experiences of his madness returned; he was
amazed at his irresponsibility for a space, then he
marvelled that he could have been so light-hearted,
and sooner or later he was overwhelmed with an image,
here and there, of beauty and delight, as in occas¬
ional memories of childhood.
(p.272)
That his confrontation with extremes does have a value is indicated in
the way in which his own 'reality' can at times become expanded in
remembering his past; here too a transfiguration of the commonplace is
achieved.
There is, however, a correlative in Freddy's own experience to the
absolutes which he encountered in his adventures and which, like a leap
of faith, enhance his appreciation of the dimensions of existence.
While he is suffering from amnesia and enjoying his dramatic experiences
in Jordan, he forgets to write his usual letters to his mother and old
nurse, who are living together in England but are constantly warring with
each other. And it is in this distant scenario - never described in
the novel except through letters - that absolute extremes are brought into
reality, that polarities of morality are applied in practice with
disasterous results: 'the news from Harrogate was brought to the
Cartwright's house that Freddy's mother had been stabbed to death by a mad
old servant, Miss Bennett.' (p.314) In this off-stage event a warning is
carried about the effects of moral absolutes if realised in actuality
within the limits of human existence: once again their dangerously
destructive qualities are revealed. In the improbable and, in Freddy's
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case, only half-remembered events of the novel's plot, however, the
positive aspects of his encounter with absolutes are also revealed;
it is the insight they provide which remain with Freddy in later years-
Barbara Vaughan's response to her adventures is both more complex and
more fully articulated than Freddy's, partly because she is of a more
academic frame of mind but also because of her conversion to Catholicism
and mixed upbringing - a personal background which appears to reflect
Spark's own. Yet there are structural parallels between Baroara and
Freddy's experiences; not only are both characters caught up in the same
adventure, both experiencing a sense of liberation from their former
selves in the course of it, but Barbara, while searching for her own kind
of absolute definition is, like Freddy, presented with a warning example
of the realisation of absolutes in practice. This awareness comes to her
when she goes to watch the trial of Eichmann. Implying that he has only
responded to external laws, the man on trial evades all responsibility
for his own actions. As Barbara realises: 'The man was plainly not
testifying for himself, but for his pre-written destiny. He was not
answering for himself or his own life at all, but for an imperative deity
named Bureau IV-B-4, of whom he was the High Priest.1(p.189) Eichmann's
actions, his attempts to carry out a course of absolutes action
unmitigated by any consideration of its consequences, can be seen as an
indictment of 'moral realism', a morality of absolutes, if imposed on
humanity as practice rather than theory. His example reinforces that
condemnation of Calvinism's imposition of a religious idea into humanity
found in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie. And to Barbara, Eichmann
represents the dar<er side of the absolute definitions for which sne aims.
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The trial however, does perform a positive role as well, not only in the
novel but for Barbara's own development, as one passage in particular
indicates:
"Well, either religious faith penetrates everything in
life or it doesn't. There are some experiences that
seem to make nonsense of all separations of sacred and
profane - they seem childish. Either the whole of life
is unified under God or everything falls apart. Sex is
child's play in the argument." She was thinking of the
Eichmann trial, and was aware that there were other events
too, which had rolled away the stone that revealed an
empty hole in the earth, that led to a bottomless pit.
So that people drew back quickly and looked elsewhere for
reality, and found it and made decisions in the way that
she had decided to get married, anyway.
(pp.307-308)
The adherence to absolutism seen in Eichmann does 'roll away the stone',
and calls for a recognition of absolute dimensions to existence which
render humanity's role within it meaningless. In a universe whose
boundaries are established and controlled by a divine external presence,
in which only moral polarities have any true significance, and only
actions count, the position of humanity, as it attempts to evolve moral
laws and make decisions which can accommodate all the relative consider¬
ations of everyday existence, becomes meaningless. If this 'black hole'
is recognised than all the relative norms of a humanist outlook are lost;
even the concept of 'reality' itself is threatened. Like the tunnel
running under Peckham, the bomb in the grounds of the May of Teck club in
The Girls of Slender Means, the introduction of absolutes into the confines
of a conventional view of existence undermine the established concept of
'reality'. And at this moment Barbara realises that all the devices,
conventions and norms of everyday existence to which she clings-, are used
as a means of avoiding this recognition.
Although this moment of perception terrifies 3arpara, it also serves to
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bring her own concern about self-definitions, by which she can operate in
her own reality, into perspective. Throughout the novel's events sne
has been faced by contrasts which define; she sees similarities between
Saul Ephraim and her own cousin Michael, she looks for resemblances between
Michael and her lover, Harry Clegg, and even sees a likeness between Miss
Rickward and Harry. All her attempts to make sense out of these
conjunctions reflects her desire to establish a consistent identity for
herself: 'Barbara understood then, that her self-image was at variance
with the image she presented to the world .'(p.36) When she arrives in
Israel she sees no way of resolving this problem; she feels that '.her
habits of mind were inadequate to cope with the whole of her experience,
and thus Barbara Vaughan was in a state of conflict, like practically
everyone else, is some mode or another' (p.18), and she is described as
'displaced': 'she felt her personal identity beginning to escape, like
smoke from among her bones.1 (p.23) Yet on her visit to the Eichmann
trial she is presented with an extreme form of adherence to absolutes
which makes her fear their application within reality but also allows her
to appreciate the form of absolutism to be found within her own religion.
And, by the end of her adventures, she recognises that a context does exist
in which apparently contradictory definitions of personality, and her
own fragmented sense of self, can be securely located. As Barbara
appreciates,Catholicism recognises the muddled morality by which humanity
functions on an everyday basis but, while encouraging the recognition of
an absolute and divine framework, does not make impossible demands upon a
fallible humanity for these divine rules to be realised within the
constraints of an everyjreality:
To Barbara, one of the first attractions of her
religion's moral philosophy had been its recognition
of the hopeless complexity of motives that prompted
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an action, and its consequent emphasis on actual words,
thoughts and deeds; there was seldom one motive only in
the grown person; the main thing was that the motives
should harmonize.
(p.169)
Unlike Calvinism, unlike the blind obedience of Eichmann, Catholicism
offers a recognition of moral absolutes as a means of expanding the human
response to the reality in which it operates but does not enforce an
alteration of that reality.When Barbara hears a priest also on pilgrimage
preaching from Hebrew 13, v.14 - 'we have an everlasting city, but not
here; our goal is the city that is one day to be1 - the necessary discrepancy
- between the 'reality' of everyday existence and the world in which divine
absolutes can be realised is reemphasised. And when the priest recalls
Paul's answer to the question, 'What is faith?': 'It is that which gives
substance to our hope, which convinces us of things we cannot see' (p.214),
the way in which earthly reality can be transfigured - that is, through
faith - is indicated.
'I've got a lot of faith. It's all I've got. I don't do good very much',
admits Barbara.'(p.314) However, through the novel's events she comes to
realise the value of this faith and its function in achieving a temporary
transcendence. Indeed she is described as being gifted 'with the beautiful
and dangerous gift of faith which, by definition of the Scriptures, is the
sum of all things hoped for and the evidence of things unseen.' (p.18) By
using her faith she can contemplate a reality in which a variety of human
definitions are possible, yet not feel anxious about the fallibility of
such definitions, assured of a wider context in which her existence has
significance. And in this wider context she can find liberation from
self-imposed and earthly definitions of sex, religion, nationality or
politics. When Freddy hustles her away from the convent at which she is
413
staying, in the middle of the night she sees her escape as a liberation
from1an unidentified confinement of the soul1 (p.174), and through this
liberation can accept contradictions within an earthly reality. This is
in marked contrast to her thoughts at the beginning of the novel: 'Barbara
... reflected wearily upon her reflections. She thought, my mind is
impatient to escape from its constitution and reach its point somewhere
else. But that is in eternity at the point of transfiguration.1(p.27)
By the end of her adventures, however, she has learned to perceive a
potential transfiguration of'her 'reality' but has also been warned against
imposing this vision of absolutes upon her day to day living. In so doing,
she accepts the paradox.that humanity cannot carry out in practice the
idealism of absolutes which it nevertheless must perceive if existence is
to be given any moral meaning. In this paradox lies both the positive
values of moral absolutes and the terrifying aspect of them revealed in
the Eichmann trial. When the stone rolls away an abyss is revealed, Dut
a potential transcendence over earthly reality is also offered. Flying
along the dusty roads of Jordan, disguised as an Arab woman, this
realisation of transcendence comes to Barbara:
She did not think, now, of unpicking knots, for there
was some definite purpose in the air about her,
liberated as she was under the black clothes with the
landscape flying past the car. Knots were not necess¬
arily created to be untied. Questions were things that
sufficed in their still beauty, answering themselves.
(pp.301-302)
Her perception, while providing a statement of philosophical acceptance
which appears close to Spark's own, also aptly describes the author's
approach to fiction - in all novels, that is, except The Mandelbaum Gate.
It is ironic that in the novel which offers the clearest expression of
her own moral philosophy, which advocates the strategy of not 'unpicking
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knots' followed in the majority of Spark's fictions, the author is
unable to leave her questions as sufficient 'in their still beauty', but
does become entangled in the hopeless complexity of human existence.
The novel can however be seen as a necessary failure, a deliberate
entanglement with the paradox that besets her. Rather than offering the
fiction itself as a moment of transfigurative insight as she usually does,
in The Mandelbaum Gate Spark considers the difficulties of living with and
without such insights; she both mocks and sympathises with the situation
of humanity. At the end of a novel which has continually focused in the
division between Israel and Jordan which are marked by the boundary of the
'Mandelbaum Gate4 between the two parts of Jerusalem, we are told that the
gate itself has no inherent significance but is, 'hardly a gate at all,
but a piece of street between Jerusalem and Jerusalem, flanked by two huts,
and called by that name because a house at the other end once belonged
to a Mr Mandelbaum.'(p.330) Like the boundaries between the vision of
an absolute framework for humankind and the earthly reality in which
humankind's muddled morality operates, the division has been created by
humanity itself; nevertheless, this self-imposed definition has acquired
a significance which can only be transcended if both the absurdity and the
reality of its existence is recognised. Similarly Spark presents a
paradox which appears unresolvable, but also indicates that an awareness
of the existence of such a paradox in itself offers the potential for
transcendence.
Although The Mandelbaum Gate may seem - to an even greater extent than
The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie - uncharacteristic of Spark's work in its
realism and in the complexity of its moral problematic, both novels
nevertheless indicate the heart of her attempts to come to terms with the
paradoxical function of moral absolutes within a human reality, which can
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be traced in all her novels. And, as if these two novels, in deepening
her awareness of the moral dichotomy of absolutism, also confirmed the
validity of her approach to fiction, her subsequent work shows a return
to the fantastical lightness of technique found in the earlier novels, even
if her outlook itself appears to bleaken. In concluding, therefore, it
would seem appropriate to consider one of those later novels which
provides both a mocking celebration of her own desire for yet distrust of
absolutes and an ironic comment on the uses to which she has put her own
fiction-making.
The Abbess of Crewe
18
Originally inspired by the Watergate scandal, The Abbess of Crewe tells
the tale of a wealthy, secluded convent in which the impressive Alexandra,
running for election as Abbess, isolates her nuns in archaic rituals yet
teaches them electronics and supervises the convent through an elaborate
bugging system in order to ensure that her rival Felicity - 'the common
little thing' (p.87)-will be unable to prevent Alexandra's accession to
the position of Abbess. With an obvious appreciation of the mechanics
of plotting, Spark relates with relish the ways in which Alexandra
attempts to impose a fiction of her own ideals upon the enclosed world of
the convent. And, because the convent is so far removed from everyday
19
reality, Alexandra's Machiavellian plans can succeed. This is in sharp
contrast to Watergate itself for, as the Abbess ironically comments:
'Such a scandal could never arise in the United States. They have a
sense of proportion and they understand Human Nature over there.'(p.23)
18. Muriel Spark, The Abbess of Crewe (London, 1974). All page refer¬
ences are to this edition.
19. Machiavel1i's Discourses and The Art of War become necessary reading
for Alexandra in the course of the novel.
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Undeterred by any such considerations of a relative morality as a 'sense
of proportion1, and operating in a context where 'human' nature is not
the primary concern, Alexandra believes that she can control the world
which she governs and attain within it that fulfilment of absolutes
which is denied to humanity in the 'real world'.
She is aided in her endeavours by the enclosed setting of the convent, by
its apparent lack of contact with the outside world. And in this little
universe, Spark has ample scope for an exploration of the total imposition
of absolutes upon a small community untainted by considerations of
'reality' or 'normality1. Both Alexandra and her predecessor Hildegarde^
who groomed her for succession, apparently worshipping, but actually
playing at being God, have enforced their own archaic form of religion on
the novel's inmates: 'What a piece of work is her convent, how distant
in its newness from all the orthodoxies of the past, how far removed in
its antiquities from those of the present!' (p.12) Alexandra is shown as
aiming, therefore, for an ideal state within the convent in which the
everyday constraints of reality need not apply.
There is, however, one barrier to her achieving this aim, in the person
of Felicity who is not only her rival but the antithesis of all that
Alexandra represents. Not only is her behaviour 'common', whereas
Alexandra possesses 'an aristocratic soul' (p.97) but her approach to
religion is to bring it directly into contact with all the exigencies of
reality. Representing the new social orientation of the Catholic church,
Felicity believes that every action must have some validity within an
earthly reality, whereas Alexandra refuses to be constrained in this way;
as she complains:
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Felicity wants everyone to be liberated by her
vision and to acknowledge it. She wants a
stamped receipt from Almighty God for every word
she spends, every action, as if she can later
deduct it from her income-tax returns. Felicity
will never see the point of faith unless it visibly
benefits mankind.
(p.43)
By limiting her faith in this way Felicity is shown to be denying several
of the valuable dimensions of her belief; she is unaole to perceive a
universal metaphysical significance which is greater than temporal
usefulness. She thus remains grounded in reality herself wnereas
Alexandra has moved beyond that and into mythological status.
'Here, in the Abbey of Crewe, we have discarded history. We have
entered the sphere, dear Sisters, of mythology. My nuns love it.
Who doesn't yearn to oe part of a myth at whatever the price in comfort?
Here, within the ambience of mythology, we have consummate satisfaction,
we have peace.'(p.20) An important concept in all her novels, in
20
The Abbess of Crewe Spark foregrounds 'mythology'. It is presented
firstly as the one means by which Alexandra can transcend reality, can
move beyond its contradictions and realise her own absolutes. Within
the fictional world which she has created in the convent such contradictions
can both be resolved and are acknowledged as the force which necessitates
the fiction in the first place. When asking advice from Sister Gertrude,
a parody of Kissinger, travelling from pole to pole, Alexandra is told;
'A problem you solve ... A paradox you live with.'(p.31) In establishing
a world in which absolutes may be fulfilled but which in itself can never
be part of an external reality, Alexandra lives within a paradox; that
20. Her interest in the realm of the mythological again reveals similar¬
ities between Spark and Stevenson. (See Chapter Three, p.161,
Footnote 27.)
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God has instilled in humanity a desire for absolutes which they cannot
fulfil is itself a paradox. Alexandra can therefore excuse her
behaviour by seeing it as a reflection of her own religion: 'That Religion
is to be founded on principles of Paradox. That Paradox is to be
accepted and presents no Problem1 is how she introduces her justification
to the Congregation of Religion.(p.32) And her stance is supported by
citation of the Church's own evidence of paradox:
That electronic surveillance (even if a convent
were one day to practice it) does not differ from any
other type of watchfulness, that which is a necessity
of a Religious Community; we are told in the Scriptures
'to watch and pray', which is itself a paradox since the
two activities cannot be effectively practiced together
except in the paradoxical sense.
(pp.32-33)
Her perspective, inimical to humanist terms, to relative morality, and
to logic, nevertheless offers a religious justification of her actions.
Such a justification can, however, only be accepted within the realms of
mythology because only on that level can paradox flourish and be accepted.
The realm of mythology in which the paradoxes of moral absolutes can be
accepted is therefore an important element in the novel, offering both
an insight and an ironic reflection of the status of Sparx's own work.
Writing on the difference between fiction and myth, Frank Kermode points
out:
Myth operates within the diagrams of ritual, which
presupposes total and adequate explanations of things
as they are and were; it is a sequence of radically
unchangeable gestures. Fictions are for finding things
out, and they change as the needs of sense-making change.
Myths are the agents of stability, fictions the agents
of change. Myths call for absolute, fictions for
conditional assent. 21
21. Kermode, The Sense of an Ending, p.3S.
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Within the apparently muddled morality and exigent reality of the
contemporary world it would appear that there is little space for agents
of stability and for absolute assent except as ideals or within those
fictions which can become myths, leaving the constraints of reality
behind. It is this plane to which Alexandra aspires, and in her
ambitions Spark can mock the aims and functions of her own fiction-making.
Alexandra states:
Garble is what we need now, Sisters. We are leaving the
sphere of history and are about to enter that of mythology.
Mythology is nothing more than history garbled; likewise,
history is mythology garbled and it is nothing more in all
the history of man.
(pp.103-104)
•
In abandoning the world of actual events for the world of garble,
Alexandra reflects Spark's own techniques in her novels; this point
is emphasised throughout the novel as Alexandra - ironically
contextualised by the readers' own awareness of the work's fictionality -
uses a variety of fiction and fiction-making techniques in order to
maintain her ascendancy over the nuns, to sustain the absolute dimension
she has imposed, and to contain herself within the world of mythology,
far removed from the reality outwith the convent.
'Garble' therefore permeates the novel. The most obvious example of it
is to be found in the explanations of the bugging which Alexandra offers,
guaranteed to confuse those to whom they are addressed. When reporters
discover what is happening at the convent she fobs them off by quoting
Milton to them, and she confuses the bishops worried about the convent
by reciting Marvel 1 (a favourite poet, presumably, because of his
metaphysical wit.) Instead of her daily religious chants she recites her
beloved English poetry during daily worship, using it to soothe and
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reassure herself. And her love of fictions, of artistry in language,
is also imposed upon the nuns, as the Scripture readings during
mealtimes oecome a strange mixture of the Bible and lectures on electron¬
ics. She embroils the community even further into her fictional creations
by persuading them that the choice of Abbess is dependent upon their own
good-breeding, thus exploiting their innate snobbery by a fantastic guide
to etiquette which leaves them no option but to reject Felicity as a
potential Abbess:
In this Abbey a Lady places her love-letters in
the casket provided for them in the main hall, to
provide light entertainment for the community during
the hour of recreation; but a Bourgeoise keeps her
love-letters in a sewing-box.
A Lady has style; but a Bourgeoise does things
under the poplars and in the orchard.
A Lady is cheerful and accommodating when dealing
with the perpetrators of a third-rate burglary; but a
Bourgeoise calls the police.
A Lady recognises in the scientific methods of
surveillance, such as electronics, a valuable and
discreet auxiliary to her natural capacity for inquisit-
iveness; but a Bourgeoise regards such innovations in
the light of demonology and considers it more refined
to sit and sew.
(P-69)
Felicity, her victim in this speech, is less literate; when writing a
letter of complaint about the happenings at the convent she is reduced
to recourse to a Thesaurus, a fact which Alexandra, with consummate
linguistic skill parodies for her own satisfaction and amusement:
High and low come the canticles and the Abbess rises
from her tall chair to join the responses. How lyrically
moves her lips in the tidal sway of the music! ...
Taking, obtaining, benefitmq , procuring, deriving,
securing, collecting, reaping, coming in for, stepping into
inheriting, coming by, scraping' together, getting hold of,
bringing grist to the mill, feathering one's nest ...
Sisters, be sober, be vigilant, for the devil goeth
about as a raging lion seeKing whom ne may devour!
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Gloating, being pleased, deriving pleasure,
etcetera, taking"delight in, rejoicing in, relTshing ...
(p.115)
And so she continues, mistress of the medium. The bugging of the
convent itself becomes part of her fictionalising, thus developing the
fascination with tape-recordings which Spark reveals in other novels.
A recording can give the illusion of truth but, as Watergate shows, can
be altered, edited, misinterpreted and manipulated; thus Gertrude advises
Alexandra to 'Delete the English poetry from those tapes ... It will
look bad for you at Rome.' (p.125) In this respect therefore it
provides a parallel with the illusions yet distortions of reality to be
found in the novel form. Like the novelist herself, the justification
which Alexandra offers for her fiction-making devices is aesthetic
credibility - 'truth and wonder'. Asked the meaning of 'scenario' she
replies: 'They are an art-form ... based on facts. A good scenario is
a garble. A bad one is a bungle. They need not be plausible, only
hypnotic, like all good art.' (p.106) And in her statement we can see
Spark's own ironic validation of her art, emphasised by the lightness
of tone in the novel, a sense of enjoyment close to that found in
Loitering with Intent.
Alexandra, however, is not allowed to triumph totally in her imposition
of absolutes and her fiction-making, like that of Spark's, is never
completely vindicated. Although she does succeed in elevating both
herself and the convent into the realms of mythology, she also becomes
trapped in the image she has imposed upon herself, a victim of her own
absolute control. Liberated from earthly constraints, she is unable to
function within reality and must remain within the fictions she has
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created. Happy to translate her own experiences into fiction, she must
remain within the parameters she has established. Thus, when she
contemplates her journey to Rome by sea, she thinks in explicitly literary
terms: 'Yes, the fleecy drift of the sky across the Channel will become
me .1 (p.127) And this image is fulfilled at the end of the novel:
She sails indeed on the fine day of her desire into
waters exceptionally smooth, and stands on the upper
deck, straight as a white ship's funnel,
marvelling how the wide sea billows from shore to shore
like that cornfield of sublimity which never should be
reaped nor was ever sown, orient and immortal wheat.
(p.128)
Contained within that lyric intensity Alexandra does achieve transfiguration
but appears to have lost all contact with the commonplace, becoming a
creature purely of mythology, as she herself recognises: 'I am become
an object of art, the end of which is to give pleasure.'(p.125)
In spite of Alexandra's mythological significance, therefore, she may
never be seen as a symbol which could be translated into terms of earthly
reality. As for the reader, we realise that in the novel itself, we have
been left with the very contents of the tapes edited by Alexandra and
entitled by her, 'The Abbess of Crewe'. Even the scene which begins the
novel is revealed to be a 'scenario' carefully selected for inclusion by
the watchful Abbess. Thus the novel traps itself within the paradox
of the fiction-making process, unable to extrapolate its own meaning and
apply it to a reality outwith its parameters. The novel glories in
'garble', celebrates fiction as a means of presenting and containing the
paradox of moral absolutes. Yet it also mocks its own pretensions
through 'unrealistic' mediums such as fiction and theology. By -the end
of the novel the applicability of its epigraph, two stanzas from Yeat's
'Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen', becomes clear. The first verse
encourages us to: 'mock at the great/That had such burdens on the mind/
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And toiled so hard and late/To leave some monument behind', but the
second verse adds: 'Mock mockers after that/That would not lift a
hand maybe ...' If we are to mock at absolutes and their imposition
it would seem that we also have to recognise their validity. The
Yeats' quotation, however, ends with Spark's usual sharp reminder of
both the limitations and the value of her fiction: 'for we/Traffic in
mockery'. To represent the function of moral absolutes within a human
reality is in itself a mockery; yet, for Muriel Spark, it is only





... - Truth is not crushed;
It crushes, gorgonises all else into itself.
The trouDle is to know it when you see it?
You will have no trouble with it when you do.
Do not argue with me. Argue with these stones.
Truth has no trouble in knowing itself.
This is it. The hard fact. The inoppugnable reality.
Here is something for you to digest.
Eat this and we'll see what appetite you have left
For a world hereafter.
From Hugh MacDiarmid's
'On a Raised Beach'.
MacDiarmid's vision of humanity, alone in a universe of stones, dwarfed
by the external, intransigent frameworx to existence, parallels the
absolutist vision of extremes to be found in the work of Stevenson,
Jenkins and Spark. They too have a vision of the 'hard fact', the
'inoppugnable reality', and face up to the implications of this perspective
in their art. MacDiarmid, however, presents his view of 'indigestable'
absolutes through the complexity of language and the imagery of 'On a
Raised Beach'; the form of the long poem does not demand that his vision
be reconciled with details of everyday experience but permits it simply
to be expressed in a moment of condensed insight. In contrast, the form
of the novel creates a different set of expectations in the reader; some
relevance to everyday experience, some connection with the apparent
constituents of our material reality, is anticipated. Nevertheless, in
exploring the metaphysical implications of their moral outlook, Stevenson,
JenKins and Spark seek ways of confronting a potential expansion of those
conventional constituents of human experience, and of transcending every¬
day materiality. In thus relocating moral significance to the theoretic
rather than the social sphere, they come into direct conflict witn the
representation of 'reality' generally found in the liberal humanist
1. Hugh MacDiarmid, 'On a Raised Beach', Complete Poems 1920-1976, ed.
Michael Grieve and W.R. Aitken, 2 vols (London, 1978;, 422-433, 11.
266-2S5, p.430.
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tradition of the novel. As their moral vision demands that they
establish new fictional parameters within which they can accommodate
their perception of absolutes and by which they may challenge accepted
boundaries of human reality, they are led necessarily into defying the
conventions of the realist novel.
In moving away from the expression of a relative morality, that 'morality
of reciprocity' which has characterised the novel form - in the English
tradition, at least - Stevenson, Jenkins and Spark express a philosophy
of 'moral realism', one which has tended to be seen as less sophisticated,
less mature than that of liberal humanism. The moral concern which they
express has, nevertheless, an obvious correlative within their cultural
context - in the ideas of Calvinism. Although all three writers may
reject the social practices of that religion as expressed in Scottish life,
their moral absolutism can be viewed as both a result of their exposure
to the theological tenets of Calvinism and a response to its attitudes
towards human existence. As such, therefore, their philosophical
outlook., as well as their manipulations of fiction,may 'be identified as character¬
istic of certain national and religious configurations. And, although
they are amongst its most skilled exponents, they are not alone in
Scottish literature in holding this world view.
A Drief glance at other major figures in Scottish writing reveals their
work as reflecting similar concerns and indicates their awareness of
humankind operating within an earthly reality which is framed by, yet
separate from, an external dimension in which human actions and reasoning
appear insignificant. T.S. Eliot, for example, asserting Byron's
Scottish heritage, claims that he projects an essentially Calvinist
consciousness:
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But there is a very important part of the Byronic
make-up which may appropriately be mentioned before
considering his poetry, for which I thinK his Scottish
antecedence provided the material. That is his
peculiar diabolism, his delight in posing as a damned
creature - and in proving evidence for his damnation
in a rather horrifying way. Now, the diabolism of
Byron is very different from anything that the Romantic
Agony ... produced in Catholic countries. And I do not
think it is easily derived from the comfortable comprom¬
ise between Christianity and paganism arrived at in
England and characteristically English. It could only
come from the religious background of a people steeped
in Calvinist theology. 2
In a recent article on Byron and Scotland, Angus Calder develops this
point of view, arguing that 'underlying Byron's persistent and at times
tiresome sniping at Wordsworth lay a Calvinist hunch that the world is
not suffused with love and delight and pure morality - it is either a
fallen world of carnal snares and delusions or, God not existing, it is
3
mere stone and dust.' Again a Calvinist outlook on existence is not
necessarily precluded by a lack of specific religious faith. Thomas
Carlyle, who more obviously suffered from the rigours of a Calvinist
upbringing, also appears to have had his philosophy shaped by an early
religious consciousness. He has been described as fascinated with the
opposition between secular authority and spiritual power, experiencing a
life-long conflict about the providential pattern of existence.4 And,
as discussed in Chapter One, a similar fascination with the theological
implications of Calvinism has given rise to two of Scottish literatures'
most vigorous works - Burns' 'Holy Willie's Prayer' and James Hogg's
Confessions of a Justified Sinner.
2. T.S. Eliot, 'Byron' (1937), On Poetry and Poets (London, 1957),
193-206, pp.194-195.
3. Angus Calder, 'Byron and Scotland', Cencrastus, 15 (New Year, 1984),
21-24, p.23.
4. Fred Kaplan provided some interesting observations on this point at a
lecture given to the Carlyle Society, University of Edinburgh, 20
January, 1984, on 'Carlyle: Power and Authority'.
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Nor is the Scottish fascination with a Calvinist outlook confined to
those ages in which it had its most obvious social manifestations.
Even today, Scottish novels frequently focus on the position of a fallible
humanity within essentially deceptive boundaries of existence, seeking
some form of definition which will give an absolute significance to their
being. Both Neil Munro and John Buchan continue Stevenson's search for
significance through the potential purity of action, emulating Stevenson's
5
adaptations of the adventure form, while John Buchan's Witch Wood focuses
explicitly on the religious issue in a historical setting.b Willa Muir,
although not advocating an absolutist perspective, nevertheless examines
its implication in Imagined Corners by considering the plight of a
minister torn between his own desire for a liberal theology and his
recognition of a sterner face of religion. Preaching a sermon advocating
the latter point of view, he is described as:
proving to them that the existence of good connoted the
existence of evil; this world was a world of both good
and evil, unlike the Kingdom of God, which, when it came,
would be neither good nor evil, but equally beyond both,
transcending both. Meanwhile, because on earth we had -j
intuitions of good, we must admit also intuitions of evil.
He comes to realise, when balancing the two viewpoints, that the choice
for him lies between accepting, 'Neither heaven nor hell. Or both
8 -
heaven and hell?' More recently, in A Green Tree in Geade Alan Sharp
5. See, for example, Neil Munro, The New Road (Edinburgh and London,
1914) and John Buchan, The Thirty-Nine Steps (Edinburgh, 1915);
Greenmantle (London, 191b).
6. John Buchan, Witch Wood, (London, 1927).
7. Willa Muir, Imagined Corners (London, 1927).
8. Imagined Corners, p.185.
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depicts a group of characters each seeking escape from the constraints
of their everyday world, searching for some means of transcendence,
and attempting to realise the Edenic vision expressed by an itinerant
g
preacher, the great-uncle of one of the characters, Harry Gibbon. It
is this vision of another kind of existence which is set out in the novel's
epigraph:
A green tree there is in Gedde growing, and in the
branches the hawk it perches with the dove; fruit
there is for all to eat, golden and silver globes
and purple plums, and all abloss with bloom is brondes.
No perdifol is there nor foliomort, and hallards none,
but green leaf everlasting.
Know ye not this hallidrome, this greenheart axle-
tree; know ye not Gedde7. Its seed lies within us each.
John Moseby, the character most tied by the apparent security of his
everyday existence, and the only character who remains in Greenock for
the duration of the novel, is ultimately shown as also seeking his
freedom, reflecting to himself: 'Had not this town urged this on him
without respite, like some great metaphor of the mind, the world beyond
the province of self, the true idea of transcendence.'1^1 The only
vision, however, with which the novel ends, is Moseby's bleak perception
of his town and beyond as part of a universe of infinite and unyielding
absolutes:
He shivered, afraid, emptily afraid as night covered
the land from end to end in pure dark, faintly stained
by towns and cities but rising always above their
yellow scars into the regions of silence and still, the
high hang, the vast vault of other than earthly space,
where the moon does not shine to light nor guide but in
purposeless perpetuance exists, where stars no longer
twinkle their blinter to yearning watchers but burn aeon-
9. Alan Sharp, A Green Tree in Gedde (London, 1965).
10. A Green Tree in Gedde, p.378.
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old holes In time. Where no birds fly and prayers do
not reach and the dawn flood rising foams against no
sight but sweeps its sweep across the deserts of the
endless air. 11
And his tutor at university suggests to him that such a perspective is
endemic to the Scottish character, arguing that we are a race of
'Existential mystics. Passionately concerned with the world as our
12
domain yet obsessed with the dream of transcendence.' George Friel
presents an equally comfortless vision in Mr Alfred M.A., a novel which
traces a schoolteacher's increasing disillusionment with the banalities
13
of his work and his life. Seeking some meaning to his existence in
the graffiti scrawled over the walls of Glasgow, attempting to read into
it some pattern of significance, he eventually comes face to face with
the perpetrator of all the slogans, a demonaic figure called Tod, who
14
claims to be a former pupil of Mr Alfred's. 'Tod' - the Scots for a
man alone - represents anarchic disorder, stating: 'I believe in the
dialectic. The unity of opposites. Law is anarchy. That's what
15
I'm after ... Badness is all.' Explaining to the schoolteacher that
1 ft
'All I've did is to reduce human conflicts to its simplest terms', he
reveals his aim of reducing the printed word to meaninglessness. Thus
denied all the significance he had sought in the world around him, Mr
Alfred turns to graffiti writing himself, soon sinking into senility.
11. A Green Tree in Gedde, p.378.
12. A Green Tree in Gedde, p.378.
13. George Friel, Mr Alfred M.A. (London, 1972).
14. The encounter with Tod, in fact, shows certain similarities, once
again, with the meeting described by Stevenson in 'Markheim'.
15. Mr Alfred M.A., p. 196.
16. Mr Alfred M.A., p.193.
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And by introducing an element of fantasy into his novel through the
figure of Tod, George Friel succeeds both in presenting the essential
fallibility of the apparently meaningful codes and conventions of the
world in which we live, yet also in warning against the search for
insights which may be dangerously destructive to that reality. An even
more determined effort to move away from the conventions of the realist
novel and the view of reality which it implies, is made by Alasdair Gray,
in Lanark.^ In that ambitious work he places two different dimensions
of existence in conjunction; one, a recognisably Scottish reality, is
in •
presented through the apparently conventional form of the oildunqsroman
yet the two books dealing with the hero's youth in Glasgow are context¬
ual ised by two books providing an account of events in the terrifying
world of Unthank. Within this latter dimension an austere, and at times
horrific, alternative to Glasgow is offered; nevertheless, within that world,
because of the extreme mixture of demands made upon the central character,
moral significance may be more easily discovered. A similar attempt to
escape from the muddles of everyday reality in the search for an absolute
vision, however terrifying its implications, is expressed in MacDiarmid's
'On a Raised Beach'. Contemplating the universal meaning of stones on
a beach, he states: 'It is reality that is at stake/Being and non-being
18
with equal weapons here/Confront each other for it'; and he continues:
We must reconcile ourselves to the stones,
Not the stones to us,
Here a man must shed the encumbrances that muffle
Contact with elemental things, the subtleties
That seem inseparable from a humane life, and go apart
Into a simpler and sterner, more beautiful and more oppressive world,
Austerely intoxicating; the first draught is over-powering,
Few survive it. 19
17. Alasdair Gray, Lanark (Edinburgh, 1981).
18. Hugh MacDiarmid, 'On a Raised Beach', 11.204-206, p.428.
19. 'On a Raised Beach1, 11.219-226, p.428.
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MacDiarmid's desire for contact with 'elemental things' reflects the
force which drives Stevenson, Jenkins, Spark and other Scottish writers
into manipulations of the fictional mode which will allow them to express
and consider a philosophy of absolutes. A similar sentiment is expressed
in a recent novel which initially appears wholly concerned with the mundane
trivialities of daily existence. In The busconductor Hines by James
Kelman, Hines is shown for most of the novel as suffering under the
constraints of everyday life. By the end of the novel, however, he has
declared his desire to escape from that version of reality using all the
resources at his disposal: 'He doesn't regret having falsified the tale.
Why should he? Lying is no concern of his. Truth is. He seeks the
true. Fling the telly out the fucking window and be done with it. Not
for him the lush pastures. He is in favour of the bottomless depths,
20
however, which are good when clear.' And in his statement the
combination of an awareness that fiction itself is a duplicitous form,
with the paradoxical recognition that lying might be a means to the truth,
which characterises the work of the writers under discussion, finds
further reflection.
In abandoning the 'lush pastures' for the 'bottomless depths', Stevenson,
Jenkins, Spark, and other Scottish writers who share their interest in
absolutes and experiment accordingly with the fictional form, do not
discard all that is 'real' in human existence. Instead, they relocate
the emphasis on what holds significance and meaning for human attempts to
comprehend the nature and morality of their own 'reality'. In What is
Literature?, Sartre states: 'The error of realism has been to believe
20. James Kelman, The busconductor Hines (Edinburgh, 1964), p.213.
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that the real reveals itself to contemplation and that consequently one
could draw an impartial picture of it. How could that be, since the
very perception is partial, since by itself the naming is already a
21
modification of the object?' As if sharing this recognition, although
through the influence of their Calvinist heritage rather than by the
workings of existentialist philosophy, Scottish writers have avoided the
drawing of 'impartial pictures', unable to believe that such a
representation could be achieved and reluctant to accept the constraints
on existence which such a representation would imply. Yet aware also
that fiction - by virtue of its being a 'modification of the object' -
can create an alternative world, removed from the boundaries of a
recognisable human reality, they have used it to provide temporary
contemplations - momentary insights into an expanded context for human
existence. In fiction which challenges the conventions of realism they
have therefore found an artistic form ideal for the expression of their
philosophy of moral absolutes and entirely appropriate to the presentation
of a dimension outwitn the conventionally accepted boundaries or 'reality'.
Given that the expression of this absolutist philosophy features in the
work of a variety of Scottish writers, a reconsideration of both the role
of Calvinism and the function of the novel in the reflection of Scottish
consciousness would appear necessary. To see Calvinism and its ideology
as the source of Scottish writers' struggles with a certain set of
metaphysical assumptions, and as the inspiration for their manipulations
of the realist form, is to contradict the widely held view of Calvinism
as an art-denying force. John Broom expresses the conventional notion
of Calvinism's role in the cultural life of Scotland when he states: 'I
21. Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature?, translation Bernard
Frechtman (London, 1950), p.44.
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think every fair-minded person must agree with MacColla that as a direct
consequence of the triumph of Calvinism with its hatred of the arts,
22
Scotland has become a cultural desert.' I suggest, however, that
Calvinism, and the moral philosophy of which it is an expression, may be
perceived as a focus of stimulation for Scottish writers. Rather than
depriving Scottish culture of richness, it has provided a fruitful tension
which has encouraged writers to confront complex ontological issues. By
offering a clear manifestation of both the advantages and dangers of a
morally absolute perspective, by reflecting the most basic human desires
and fears in the morality of self, it establishes a creative focus for
contemplation of the paradoxes of existence.
In order to accept Calvinist ideology as possessing a positive function
in the cultural life of Scotland, however, it is also necessary to
reassess the nature of Scottish writing in general. In the fullest
consideration of the Scottish novel currently available, F.R. Hart sums
up his ooservations by discussing the tensions and problems inherent in
the diversity of the novel in Scotland:
Moreover, the novelists' intentions may reflect
conflicting assumptions. The aim of local realism
assumes a historian's loyalty to the transient, tne
passing facts and customs of a particular milieu;
the generic analyst assumes a social typology, a
Scottish consciousness that endures; the archetypal
fabulist assumes a reality of nature and motive
that transcends local and cultural configurations.
There is no theoretic reason why a fiction cannot
have meaning of multiple levels, so long as these
levels do not contradict each other in terms of their
assumptions about what is real. They sometimes do
in Scottish fiction, perhaps reflecting ontological
conflicts in Scottish consciousness: the nominalist
historian, the social theorist, and the absolutist
theologian coexist uneasily. The local antiquarian
22. John L. Broom, 'Fionn MacColla, Albannach M<5r', tssays on Fionn
MacColla, ed. David Morrison (Thurso, 1973), p.5o-ob, p.oj.
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can be compromised by the nationalist historian and
both may be overwhelmed by the theological moralist,
for whom history is a war of psychic polarities. 23
Because of this 'uneasy' coexistence he perceives, Hart divides the
pattern of Scottish novel writing into an opposition of romance and
realism, placing Gothic fantasy against social relevance. In the writers
discussed, however, it is possible to describe this very opposition of
fantasy and reality as in itself a creative tension, and to present its
juxtaposition as an accurate representation of their moral outlook as well
as the only viable fictional reflection of their perspectives. Aware of
the practical advantages of existing within a limited conception of what
constitutes 'reality', and recognising the necessity of a relative morality
for operating within the constraints of such a definition, they neverthe¬
less also feel the need to project a dimension of significance (whether
feared or desired) which transcends the boundaries and muddled morality
of everyday existence and is only defined by absolutes. Yet they
paradoxically realise that to live in practice on the terms of such
absolutes would destroy all the codes and assumptions necessary for
functioning within human 'reality'. Only in fiction, therefore, by an
opposition of the boundaries of the supposedly 'real' and 'fantastic',
by a mutual testing of parameters, can they represent and explore the
dichotomies of their moral vision.
Within the patterning of fiction offered by the works of Stevenson,
Jenkins and Spark, amongst others, an alternative perspective on the novel's
form and function to that presented by the humanism of the tradition of
the English realist novel may be discerned. Their fascination with
23.. Hart, The Scottish Novel, p.406.
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moral absolutes calls for a necessary manipulation of the conventions
of realism and creates a challenge to its premises. If the pattern
which they, and other Scottish writers, represent can be accepted as a
valid alternative to the English tradition of realism, then the Scottish
novel itself need no longer be viewed only as a history of failed attempts
to utilise codes and conventions inappropriate to its subject matter.
Instead it may be perceived as a configuration of literature in its own
right: an identifiable and successful response to a particular cultural
and religious context.
APPENDIX 1
INTERVIEW WITH ROBIN JENKINS
In November 1981 I went to Dunoon to interview Robin Jenkins;
the following conversation took place.
G.N. Do you see yourself as writing within a Scottish tradition, an
English tradition, or just a more general tradition of the novel?
R.J. I don't think you can see writers as being within particular
traditions. That's imposed by the academics and literary critics. I'm
never conscious of writing within a tradition. I don't think any writer
is.
G.N. In that case, who would you say were the writers who influenced
you most?
R.J. I couldn't name one writer who has influenced me in the sense that
I think about him or her when writing. People have said that Happy for
the Child was influenced by The House with the Green Shutters, just
because there is a character in it called Gourlay.
G.N. But there is a line in that book in which he is called 'black-
rotten', which seems a definite echo.
R.J. Nevertheless, I couldn't portray a character like Gourlay. The
House with the Green Shutters couldn't have influenced me in that way.
I see life as comic and myself as essentially a comic writer. The
pretensions of human beings are endlessly comic.
G.N. What about Stevenson?
R.J. Yes, I was influenced by him at the beginning of my writing career.
I looked to him as someone who had worked hard to create a style, but had
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sometimes put style in front of content. I have a great respect for
Evelyn Waugh too, in his use of language.
G.N. What effect, if any, did the Scottish Renaissance have on you?
R.J. I think it's rubbish to call it the Scottish Renaissance, and it
certainly had no influence on me. It's a pompous title and if I had
ever been involved in writing then, such a name would have been an
embarrassment to me.
G.N. MacDiarmid is supposed to have admired your work?
R.J. He said that he did, to my face, but I doubt if he had ever read
any of my novels right through. He didn't like novels, and only extolled
those of his friends with typical extravagance.
G.N. In 1958 you wrote in the Saltire Review that Scotland was a small
nation which refused to recognise its smallness. Do you still see it
that way?
R.J. No, I think Scotland is now a small nation which is only too
willing to recognise its smallness and cringes submissively under that
recognition. Scotland is unique among nations in that it rejected a
small measure of Home Rule.
G.N. Do you think that there may be some cultural expansion as a
reaction against that vote, as there was in Ireland, say, after the fall
of Parnell?
R.J. No, the Irish had burning feelings, they had Yeats and Joyce and
Synge. No one in Scotland has that kind of intensity. The Referendum
set me back, it was a great shock that the Scots had so evidently lost
faith in themselves, and I seriously thought of leaving Scotland for good.
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G.N. Would It be fair to say that you have felt caught in the kind of
trap described by Archie Hind in The Dear Green Place - because of the
difficulty of writing about 'the canny Scot with his deathly stultifying
safety,' there is a conflict between the desire to write about Scotland
and a dissatisfaction with it as subject matter?
R.J. Novelists depend on people and today the Scots don't think themselves
they are worth writing about. That's partly why I set books abroad.
Important themes would just vanish in a Scottish context. When I was in
Spain I saw some links between the Scots and the Catalans, but they were
much more fervent. The Scots and the English have an unusual relationship,
perhaps the only similar is that of Canada and America. I would be much
happier with Independence. Returning to Archie Hind, yes, the Scot has
no faith in himself, has lost all belief, doesn't know where he is. In
California, visiting my daughter, I was considering the American Indian
question, and thought the only solution for them would be to become
ordinary Americans - which is what they could never do. And I thought
this might be the only solution for the average Scot - to become an
ordinary Englishman.
G.N. Would ^ou be happy with that?
R.J. Of course not, but that's what most Scots secretly seem to want.
Except of course, when it comes to football, when phoney patriotic fervour
takes over.
G.N. And yet you wrote a football novel, The Thistle and the Grail?
R.J. Yes, but I deliberately chose a junior team so that support would
be patriotic. It was a very ironic novel, contrasting the devotion given
to football with the lack of devotion given to religion....
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G.N. To return briefly to influences, do you see any links in your work
with Stevenson and the adventure tradition?
R.J. I have written one adventure story, Some Kind of Grace, but it
wasn't perceived as such - too many undercurrents. I couldn't write an
adventure story like Alastair MacLean. I wouldn't be able to take it
seriously. Going back to Stevenson, I think he had far more talent than
he showed. His best work to my mind is 'The Beach of Falesa', an adult
story. I think Weir of Hermiston is overrated.
G.N. How important then do you think the actual events of your novels are?
R.J. I'm actually more interested in character than event. For example,
in Sabah, I had to watch students teaching classes and there was one little
girl of mixed blood who became the centre of The Expatriates.
G.N. And do you ever see any of your novels as approaching allegory or
fable?
R.J. The Missionaries was a deliberate attempt to create an allegory -
a mixture of fantasy and realism. I'm a mixture of dour Presbyterian
realism and another part of me which says to hell with all that. In
The Missionaries I tried to create a situation in which miracles could
happen - and I very nearly succeeded, despite being an atheist. Of all
my novels I think The Cone-Gatherers is my favourite. It accepts its own
1imits.
G.N. Some of your earlier novels, those set in the west of Scotland, are
more realistic in manner. Was there a greater concern with specific
social conditions then?
R.J. My political views have a moral basis. If I were in the Labour
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Party just now I would be a Bennite because as a voter I would want to
know what my M.P. is thinking - from a moral point of view there is a
need for an explanation. Maybe I'm too much of a moralist, too
consciously so, in a Scots tradition.
G.N. Have you experienced the difficulty often found in writers dealing
with the working class - that in writing about them they inevitably place
themselves outwith the world they describe?
R.J. Look down on it, as it were?
G.N. Yes, or at least see it from a distance.
R.J. No, it hasn't been a problem, although I like to be able to move
outwith the working class. A picture of the working class alone would
be limited.
G.N. Is working class life unable to sustain drama then? Or unable to
articulate experience?
R.J. The conditions of life are such that they make drama unlikely.
Eight to five work is exhausting. Your characters could only be active
at the weekends. Analysing the novel from the point of view of
occupation, most characters have jobs which don't interfere too much with
their leisure. Fiction falsifies in this way. Scenes in a ceramics
factory, for example, might be interesting for a scene or two but not day
after day. Maybe I would have been able to write a novel about the urban
working classes if I'd been born in Glasgow, say, but I was born in a
small Lanarkshire village.
G.N. And that's where all your earlier novels are set?
441
R. J. Yes.
G.N. In those earlier novels it seems much easier to point to an ethical
or political stance in your work than your later novels. Are you
deliberately aiming for narrative impartiality?
R.J. Ethical rather than political stances I would think. I'm surprised
there hasn't been a stronger political impulse in my work, because I'm
interested in politics and enjoy discussing them. Narrative impartiality
arises naturally; one is not going to be didactic, but neither do I try
to conceal my ideas.
G.N. There also seems to be an increasing ambivalence in your attitude
to goodness and innocence.
R.J. Just wait till I tell you what I'm writing at the moment.
G.N. Is there any link then between the idea of 'good' characters and
the way in which central characters seem to slip out of the endings of
7
your novels. I'm thinking of Agnes in A Toast to the Lord and Gavin
Hamilton in A Would-be Saint.
R.J. Agnes? She isn't forgotten, but by the end of the novel she is
possessed by the Lord. That book was a gauntlet to Christianity. But
it was misunderstood. The only reviewer who thoroughly understood what
I was trying to do was Jack House - and he's not a literary critic. As
to characters, well, people are never going to know everything about
themselves or others, I'm impatient with that phrase, plaintively uttered,
'Who am I?', and by the American obsession with searching for identity.
G.N. In connection with these two novels in particular, however - why do
you make your characters so unpleasant? Is it a general reflection on
humanity?
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R.J. I don't agree my characters are unpleasant. People are a mixture.
You go about daily life meeting apparently nice people who wouldn't hurt
a fly, and then world wars occur with the full approval of all those nice
people. Yes, it's a reflection on humanity. Humanity is morally as
well as spiritually lazy. Nobody wants to face the truth about them¬
selves - we go on telling half truths about ourselves; although we are
aware of a level of attainable goodness, we don't try to attain it because
we come up against the barrier of human selfishness. Fiction is a
method of trying to break through all the facades that people hide behind.
Novelists try to reveal people as they are, and this may be why my
characters emerge as unpleasant. Every Agnes you meet - you like little
bits of her and dislike others. That's how people are.
G.N. What about Gavin Hamilton?
R.J. Gavin is supposed to be a good man. No novelist ever depicted a
good person successfully. Wicked persons are easy. There's been no
portrayal of a credible heaven. Gavin Hamilton is an attempt to portray
a good person but things go wrong. The only solution is an escape into
silence but that in itself is a defeat. Take even a superficial look at
society. People have far more than they need, others have far less.
Yet this is accepted by everybody. Goodness is impossible in such a
situation.
G.N. Have you ever been particularly interested in symbolism in your
work?
R.J. Once writing you don't stick in symbols. Writers often aren't
aware of them until people point them out. They just arise.
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G.N. It's just that you seem fascinated by certain images, such as the
little boys 'crucifying' earwigs.
R.J. I saw that done when I was a small boy. It still represents for
me the evil of the world.
G.N. Your constant change of narrative voice and lack of strong
identification with any one character would seem to indicate that you do
not believe in a single absolute truth?
R.J. I don't like to write through the perceptions of one character -
it's too limiting.
G.N. Novelists often do.
R.J. But you might as well write in the first person, and that has great
disadvantages. I've only used it once, in Fergus Lamont. One man's
mind all the time - it's a waste of opportunity. Why not sample different
points of view? A writer doesn't need to guess other people's feelings -
he knows, or at least he can say he knows.
G.N. But in your novels this does seem to create a degree of shifting
which can be disconcerting.
R.J. There is no absolute truth; things do keep shifting. I think there
is nothing wrong with writers making the whole foundation seem unsure.
In my own life foundations seem very unsure.
G.N. Fergus Lamont is, I suppose, your most radical novel yet in terms
both of technique and theme?
R.J. Yes, I thought the italics was a good idea. Canongate wanted it
out but I refused. Fergus is an old man writing about events forty to
fifty years ago; it's sensible to show him as he was when he was writing.
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G.N. Fergus isn't allowed to retain his writing as his central concern -
is this symptomatic of the role of the writer in Scotland?
R.J. I think I have a prejudice against writers as characters in my
books. Also I've wondered why none of my characters have been to
University. Perhaps this is because my own university life was an
enormous discouragement to me as a writer. I had no respect for the
lecturers or professors, or the attitude to literature. I remember
writing a critical essay on Charles Lamb for Professor Alexander who was
a great Lamb enthusiast, and he got very angry and asked me if I knew the_
meaning of self-opinionated. I was supposed to agree with the
conventional academic estimate of Lamb. It left me with a vast lack of
respect for academic opinion.
G.N. Why then did you become a teacher?
R.J. I wanted to write and I wanted to live, so it was either teaching
or journalism.
G.N. You have obviously used your own life as experience for your novels
and yet you remain fairly reticent about this. It would be interesting
to find out how your teaching, especially in Kabul, and other places
abroad, and your role as headmaster, have affected your writings.
R.J. I don't put myself in my novels, except as a diffused personality,
although I do use my experiences and my knowledge of locale. As a
teacher I perhaps gained a sound understanding of children.
G.N. And use them as a symbol of innocence?
R.J. Aldous Huxley once said that no one learns anything about humanity
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after the age of twelve. I agree. Only in children can you find
innocence, though you also find wickedness. In Kabul I found that ideas
of teaching in Scotland wouldn't work there. I had a class of forty
strange faces, of all nationalities. Few people seem to understand
what's happening in Afghanistan now. It isn't simply a case of Russians
oppressing the poor Afghans. Any country that uses military force on
another is no friend of mine but the Russians by their invasion have
given the Afghans a chance for the activity they live for - fighting.
Men in Kabul twenty years ago used to walk about the streets with rifles
slung over their shoulders the way businessmen here carry umbrellas.
Thirty miles outside of the King's palace his jurisdiction ended. The
mountain tribes were a law unto themselves. My students used to announce
to me in ringing tones - of shame - 'Sir, our country is the second most
backward in the world.' In Dust on the Paw I write about the abolition
of the shaddry. I was there when it happened. And now on the
television I see the women are wearing shaddries again.
G.N. What novel is to be published next, and what are you working on now?
R.J. I've finished a novel about the Great Disruption of 1843. It's
something that ought to be written about - a dramatic episode in Scotland's
history. Perhaps there is no more dramatic in any church history.
Dr Welsh gets up and instead of conducting business, reads out the protest,
puts it down, and walks out of the church. I make a lot of that exciting
moment but I also have to examine the characters of all the ministers
involved, examine the basic morality of the Christianity of the Church of
Scotland. The Scottish church was not represented at the Nuclear
Disarmament conference in Amsterdam. It seems to me ridiculous for a
church to be in favour of nuclear arms. At the moment I'm writing a
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novel in which all my ideas about humanity and innocence are concentrated
in a boy of sixteen, called Duffy. Very na'ive, intellectually regarded
as being not very bright, he thinks up ways of attacking humanity, or
rather its faults. At an early age he becomes aware of the lies that
are told, the deceit, the selfishness. Aware of the irony of 'love'.
A mother loving her own child being cruel to other children, dog-owners
throwing stones at other dogs. He buys a Woolworth's jotter and in it
writes down acts of human atrocity; it was quite easy enough for me to
find them. A teacher at his school tells the class that it is legal for
a declaration of war to give a licence to kill. Asking who made it
legal, Duffy is told by a confused teacher that it was God. Duffy sees
this as imposing legality at every level, and paints a declaration of war
on a wall in the town. He sees books as the enemies of truth, there
not to portray life as it is, but as a means of avoiding truth. Eventually
pressure of events pushed him into the horror of killing someone; he
becomes evil himself. The idea's fascinating, though it wouldn't be if
I used a grown man. This boy of sixteen sees the truth dimly but cannot
hold on to it. Things close round him, and he is destroyed. But in
the end he can retreat into silence. Allegory, yes.
G.N. How do you imagine it will be received?
R.J. It can't be popular. Duffy shows a prodigious disgust of humanity.
At times he is almost paralysed with this terrible disgust. It's a
feeling most of us have at one time though in a lesser degree, unless we
want to take things easy from a moral point of view. A lot of us have
thrown in the towel too early. We can think of good actions and of ways
of living unselfish lives but prefer to stay in our safe little ruts.
There are good people in the book, and I do try to bring Duffy to a
realisation that he's asking too much in expecting people to act unselfishly.
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G.N. Do you think he's asking too much?
R.J. No, I don't. It's not too much to ask America and Russia to scrap
the nuclear bomb. But it certainly won't be done. The boy discovers
Swift, Gulliver's Travelstand finds that many of the ideas in it are his
own ideas - but not on an intellectual plane. Duffy sees it on an
emotional plane. That's why, in the end, he loses his head.
G.N. How do you view the attitudes of the reading public, then?
R.J. Too many are content to think 'serious books' are above them and
won't make the effort. In the past this didn't harm serious books too
much but it's different today. A serious young writer is going to have
great difficulty in finding a publisher. It's especially difficult to
get long novels published. The London publishing scene is one of great
depression at the moment.
G.N. What then are your reasons for writing?
R.J. Because I enjoy it. It's a hobby, in the same way that I enjoy
mending the road outside my house. You can feel oblivious in creating
your characters and their situations. It's a superior form of ludo.
G.N. Surely if that's all it were, then you wouldn't publish,?
R.J. Well, I'm not so keen to get things published now. I've written
a novel about the teaching profession called Charlatans but my agent thinks
it's too long. It won't break my heart if it doesn't get published while
I'm alive. As for reviews, I think if I have one review that shows
someone else appreciates what I was trying to do in a book that's all that
matters. I don't go out of my way to read reviews of my novels.
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I see that Gunn has had a lot of his novels reprinted. He's very good,
a very sensitive writer; my favourite's Morning Tide. But his
mysticism puts me off. I can't take it unless it's managed through
the characters and the action; otherwise it makes for heaviness. There's
a heaviness about a lot of writers - the bread hasn't risen as it should
have done. In Evelyn Waugh and Anthony Burgess the bread has risen, in
Margaret Drabble it hasn't. I thought in my mellow old age I would write
novels to reconcile myself to humanity; the sun shining, everyone laughing
merrily, the gates of heaven opening, but, alas, no.
G.N. Have you then become more bitter?
R.J. Bitter? I'm not bitter except when the golf course is floodedl
I'm severe on my characters and I'm severe on myself. Nobody could
be more severe than Shakespeare. He portrays his characters with
savageness.
G.N. But also with some grandeur, and often at a distance, whereas you
come discomfitingly near at times?
R.J. Well, Duffy's anthology makes interesting reading. You wouldn't
believe human beings could be so wicked. I don't like it when they
condemn people by saying 'they're like animals'. No animal could be
half so wicked or savage as a human being. Harvey, our white cat, is
the most dignified creature under the sun, harms nothing except the odd
fieldmouse. The novel may, I think, be received with some horror.
G.N. More so than A Toast to the Lord?
R.J. I was good-humoured and reasonable in A Toast to the Lord. I
constructed a set of circumstances in which to watch Agnes, beloved of
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the Lord, bob up undefeated because the Lord stood by her. People believe
that, so do nations - we will come through because the Lord is with us.
In Agnes I was doing the same thing on a personal level. Edwin Morgan
wrote that the book was without a trace of irony. I was amazed. I'd
been embarrassed by having so much irony in it. I'm not making the
same mistake with Duffy. Edwin Morgan also complained recently that a
book of Scottish short stories was lacking in contemporaneity - I think
he meant topicality. A writer has to be distanced from his material. I
was going to bring the Referendum into the Duffy book but I thought it
would complicate matters.
G.N. Do you work on more than one novel at the same time?
R.J. Always when I've nearly finished one novel I start the first three
or four chapters of the next. It avoids leaving a gulf.
G.N. You carry the idea around for a long time before writing?
R.J. Duffy in particular has been asking to be written for years. I
would like to write something about Islay next, an island I'm very fond
of. A comedy in which the leading character is a womanising artist who
retreats to Islay from the Far East, and then has his haven invaded by
three women from his past. Seeing my work in print doesn't interest
me now. I recently realised that you write a novel in bits and pieces,
never reading it as a whole. So now I put my novel in a drawer for
six months and then read it through, as a reader not an author.
G.N. Novelists such as Gunn and Gibbon have portrayed their women
characters as sources of strength. Do you share this view?
R.J. Yes, Guests of War is, I hope, one of my funniest novels and based
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on real events, but it also shows my respect for women. I believe I
have more respect for women than for men.
G.N. Quite often your male characters are rendered inactive by the
nature of their moral dilemmas.
R.J. We all have moral dilemmas. I don't think there's such a thing
as self-deception. We all know when we are doing wrong, unless we're mad.
G.N. But goodness, as you show it, can also be destructive. Gavin
Hamilton, for instance, hurts many people.
R.J. Gavin tried to live a life of sheer goodness, so those people who
didn't were hurt and annoyed. It's not playing the game to show up our
moral laziness and deficiencies. We ought all to be mediocrely good
together. Morality hasn't advanced a bit in the last two thousand years.
The space shuttle, for example, isn't the kind of adventure I would want
for humanity. Goodness sets people apart. Christ is the best example.
My characters won't follow the herd. Duffy is the most serious novel
I've written in this respect. I used to like writing fine phrases, but
now I've erased them. In order to get some vision of reality you have
to use all kinds of dodges. Fergus, for example, is not always telling
the truth. Writing that novel I was often thinking about Boswell, who
tries to tell the truth about himself and frequently shows himself as a
booby. There are times when the writer is never sure where the character
is going or whether he's lying or half-lying.
G.N. Will 'Duffy' be its title?
R.J. Yes, or maybe 'Just Duffy'.
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